Thomas Fingar, who has observed developments in U.S.-China relations since "ping-pong diplomacy" in the early 1970s, spoke with China-based Leaders Magazine about the significance of—and hype surrounding—the Obama administration's "Asia pivot." The following is an edited version of the interview transcript.

President Obama recently announced a new military strategy, in which he stated that budget cuts will not weaken the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific. How do you interpret this?

The Asia-Pacific is the most economically dynamic region in the world, and it has the largest military forces and the most nuclear powers. U.S. interest has always been there. Our interest, our stake, and our involvement as a Pacific power is very great.

President Obama has been talking about our overall budget deficit and the need to reduce spending, including on defense. Some savings have already come from ending the war in Iraq and winding down the war in Afghanistan, which then increases the relative percentage of the military budget for East Asia. In the process of balancing its budget, the United States is not going to do anything to destabilize the region.

Is this just the policy of the Obama administration, or is it a longer-term strategic shift that could lead to a cold war?

I would distinguish between the rhetoric of "pivoting" toward Asia and the fact that the United States never left Asia. The George W. Bush administration did not send representatives to a number of ASEAN meetings and that troubled people in the region. But U.S. economic and political involvement and military deployments in the region, as well as the alliance structure, have not changed for decades.

American engagement has been important to the threat of nuclear weapons and to the freedom of the seas in the Asia-Pacific. Our allies and China can be confident that this policy is not aimed against anybody—it is not a cold war.

Some experts say that relations between Washington and Beijing are actually doing much better than the media portrays. Do you agree with this perspective?

I do agree with it. I have been involved in U.S.-China relations since "ping-pong diplomacy" in 1972, and we still have ups and downs and swings in our relationship, but the pattern is clear and the magnitude of the swing is much smaller than it used to be. In recent years, we have bumped up against one another in more places around the world, on more issues, because we are both global players. Most issues are handled pretty smoothly, however, and in a pretty routine fashion. The strength of the bilateral relationship—the depth of the interdependence—keeps growing.

From your experience, will there be a big impact on bilateral relations when the new Chinese leadership takes office later this year?

I think it used to be the case that personalities mattered a great deal, but it does not make so much of a difference now in both countries. I do not expect China’s policies and objectives to change, or its perceptions of the United States. In addition, if we elect a new presidential administration, I also do not expect a change in American perceptions of the opportunities and challenges China poses.

Which issue in U.S.-China relations most concerns you?

Mutual suspicion concerns me the most. Some people in China believe the United States will attempt to stop China’s rise or to contain it at some point. In the United States, the things we do not understand about China's intentions and aspirations lead to a similar kind of “worst case” thinking. I think the two countries need to do more to talk directly to one another about their concerns, and to find new approaches. For example, China does not like the bilateral alliance structure the United States has in Northeast Asia. The United States is quite prepared to acknowledge it is an arrangement that was developed for a different time and conditions. What kind of a new collective security arrangement can we have in the region that then? We are a long way from figuring it out, but we need to start talking about it together. 

Original article

"American experts discuss the significance and outcomes of the 'Asia pivot'"
(in Chinese)

Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping recently visited the United States to meet with top officials and tour various cities. China experts followed the trip closely because Xi is anticipated to become China’s next president. Thomas Fingar spoke with the Shanghai Oriental Morning Post about the visit, and about the Obama administration’s Asia policy.

How will the Obama administration’s strategic adjustments towards the Asia-Pacific shape or influence Xi’s visit? Given the fast-changing environment and shift of power towards Asia, will there be any changes or differences in the United States’s treatment of China’s anticipated future leader?

The primary impact is likely to be on the discussions between Xi and his American interlocutors. I assume that U.S. officials will want to explain the announced strategic adjustments and that Xi will seek authoritative answers to questions that he and other Chinese leaders have about the objectives and implications of the adjustments.

Contrary to your question, I do not believe the environment is changing rapidly—shifts in the global system and the shift in dynamism and wealth toward Asia have been under way for decades. The United States has been and will remain a part of that transition. The U.S. goal is to ensure that the changes result in increased security and prosperity for all—a win-win situation not unlike what happened when first Japan and then the other “Asian tigers” preceded China on the path toward greater wealth and power. 

What interests Washington most about Vice President Xi? What expectations does the United States have for his visit?

Washington expects Xi to succeed Hu Jintao and understands that he will be first among equals in a collective leadership that constrains Xi’s ability to act independently. But U.S. officials also understand that Xi, like all leaders, brings personal preferences and agendas to the job and that dealing with him will be influenced by his personality, understanding of American culture, and goals for the relationship. Simply stated, the Americans Xi meets will want to get to know him and what he is like.

U.S. officials understand that he is here as China’s vice president and therefore is unlikely to be bringing new initiatives. They do expect him to have questions about U.S. and Obama administration positions on a wide range of global issues and to have questions about U.S. intentions in Asia.

Is the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy aimed at containing or encircling China? Almost all U.S. official statements try to clarify that the United States is not trying to contain China, but its policy focus and military deployments in the Asia-Pacific have made many Chinese scholars doubtful of U.S. intentions. What are your observations? Is U.S. rhetoric consistent with its actions?

I do not like the term “pivot to Asia” and am pleased that U.S. officials seem to have stopped using that term. The United States is not returning to Asia; we never left. I think the basic point of recent statements is that with the end of the U.S. role in the conflict in Iraq and plans to draw down in Afghanistan, the United States will be able to focus more attention on other parts of the world. Asia is, and has been, the most dynamic, fastest changing, and in many ways most-challenging region of the world for many years. The region is also very important to the United States and deserves more attention than it has received. The Asia-Pacific is a region of superlatives—biggest economies, largest militaries, most nuclear powers, largest military budgets, largest foreign exchange reserves, etc. It would be unwise and impossible not to pay attention to developments in and affecting the region and its relations with other parts of the global system.

I have been working on China for more than 45 years and working with Chinese counterparts for 40 years. I must say that I have just about abandoned efforts to persuade important groups in China that the United States is not attempting to surround, contain, or thwart China’s rise. They seem determined to believe that it is the case no matter what we say or do. It is impossible for me to look at the policies and actions of the last eight administrations and come to any conclusion except that the United States means what its leaders have said: that it is in the interest of the United States for China to be strong, secure, and prosperous. The record shows quite clearly that the United States has assisted China’s rise. It also shows that China’s rise has been beneficial to the United States. We are not poorer or weaker or more insecure because China’s people live better and China plays an increasingly important role on the world stage. 

Do you think the Obama administration has changed the direction of U.S. strategy toward China or Asia compared with the Bush administration?

The short answer is, “no. ” The Bush administration was preoccupied by terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan and devoted less time and attention to Asia. Obama is redressing the balance and better aligning attention with current interests. Arguably what has changed is the perception of China held by others in the region. A series of foreign policy blunders in 2010 undercut the success of China’s diplomacy and increased regional concern about China’s intentions. That prompted requests for reassurance that the United States would remain engaged in the region and that the Bush administration’s “neglect” of certain regional meetings was not a harbinger of a retreat from Asia. The Obama administration seeks to provide that assurance and to make clear that we are engaged in Asia because we are a Pacific power with great interests in the region. We are not there to contain or block anybody.

The United States is struggling with its economy and also cutting its defense budget. Do you think this strategy comes at the right time?

Downturns in the economy never come at a good time. The great recession has taken a heavy toll but we are recovering and will recover. We have been spending too much for too long and need to cut back. In my opinion, we also need to tax ourselves more to pay for modernization of infrastructure, better schools, and other requisites of continued prosperity. We are winding down two long and expensive wars and should reduce our defense budget. It will take time to replace worn out equipment and to reduce the large role that defense expenditures played in the U.S. economy during the Cold War, but we will get there eventually. More importantly, now is a good time to reduce defense expenditures and reorganize our military because we do not have any enemies and are not bent on conquering other nations.

Is the “pivot to Asia” strategy concrete or more of a “paper tiger” given the fact that other challenges, including Iran, are still occupying the United States?

As previously noted, the term “pivot to Asia” exaggerates the amount of change. The United States never left or lost interest in Asia, but is now able to devote more attention to the most dynamic, and in some respects most dangerous place in the world. Building a new security architecture that is inclusive—including China—and addresses concerns in and about North Korea is and should be a priority. Forging institutions to ensure continued stability and prosperity in the region despite paralysis at the global level and adjusting to changes in production and supply chains are among the long list of specific issues that need attention. The United States has a stake in the way these issues are addressed and must be engaged in the search for solutions.

While it is known as a leading center for the study of contemporary Northeast Asia, the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) has also conducted significant research and publishing activities about South Asia for more than a decade. Rafiq Dossani, a senior research scholar at Shorenstein APARC and a former director of Stanford's Center for South Asia (CSA), serves as the executive director of the Center's South Asia Initiative. Addressing key South Asia issues, his diverse research interests range from entrepreneurship and technology to economics and security.

"In a liberal democracy with a functioning rule of law, the socioeconomic condition of Muslims [in India] has, relative to the population, steadily declined.

-Rafiq Dossani

Most recently, Dossani launched a research project with Shorenstein APARC's Henry S. Rowen and CSA's Thomas Blom Hansen to study the socioeconomic conditions faced by Muslims in India. He is currently working on an article on the subject for the March 2011 inaugural edition of Avicenna, Stanford's new journal on Muslim affairs. "In a liberal democracy with a functioning rule of law," says Dossani, "the socioeconomic condition of Muslims [in India] has, relative to the population, steadily declined." He emphasizes that since Independence in 1947, Muslims, who make up 13 percent of India's population, have had equal access to power in the Congress Party-led national government. One difference, however, is that special provisions have been made to provide jobs and education for members of lower-caste Hindu and tribal groups. "Generally speaking, Muslims have lost out," states Dossani. India's government demonstrated its concern about this growing issue by publishing a 2005 report acknowledging clear cases of discrimination against Muslims, even at the government level. Discrimination, says Dossani, has led to a ghettoization of Muslims and a movement towards a religion-based identity, which he suggests will not only work against Muslims but also has security implications for the country. "It is understood at the top level by policymakers, and yet the situation persists," he cautions.

In addition to South Asia-specific research, Dossani has participated in several interdisciplinary, multi-country studies, including a project examining higher education in the "BRIC" countries of Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, and China. Led by Martin Carnoy, the Vida Jacks Professor of Education at Stanford's School of Education, members of the research team interviewed approximately seven thousand students and studied one hundred colleges and universities in India, focusing on engineering education. "It is one of the most globally comparable [disciplines]," says Dossani. For India, the findings indicate that the cost of education, which is approximately twelve hundred dollars per year for tuition, is affordable for many families and it has a high rate of return in terms of how quickly students find employment and recoup tuition costs. On a global level, however, the quality of education does not measure up to many other countries, such as the United States. Dossani cites the highly politicized nature of India's university system as a major reason for this. While 95 percent of India's colleges are now private, government-run universities confer degrees, set the curriculum, and direct appointments to high-level positions. There is a certain degree of corruption, and teacher and student unions are tied to political parties. According to Dossani, states tend to emphasize the quantity of campuses—particularly in poor, rural areas—over the quality of curriculum and instruction, in order to garner votes. "[The university system] is in a state of stasis," he says, "so the quality does not improve."

Dossani is actively engaged in numerous other research projects, including studies of telecommunications in India, and outsourcing, private equity, security, and regional integration in relation to South Asia. He is also currently serving as the co-chair of the 2011 conference held by the Industry Studies Association, which annually convenes a large interdisciplinary academic conference. Scholars participating in the 2011 conference will discuss findings in their areas of specialization within the broader themes of general industry studies; energy, power, and sustainability; globalization; innovation and entrepreneurship; labor markets, organizations, and employment relations; and transportation and logistics.

In addition to his research, Dossani is an avid volunteer. A recipient of the 2011 Asian American Heroes Award for Santa Clara County, he has volunteered for many years with Hidden Villa, a San Francisco Bay Area-based nonprofit organization dedicated to teaching about the environment and social justice. He also chairs the United States branch of Focus Humanitarian Assistance (FOCUS USA), an international non-profit group that conducts disaster preparedness and response activities in developing countries. Dossani traveled last summer to Taijikistan to visit villages where FOCUS USA is supporting the training of emergency-response volunteers, the earthquake retrofitting of schools, the installation of early-warning systems, the stockpiling of supplies, and the building of shelters. The area is close to the border of Afghanistan and surrounds Lake Sarez, which at over ten thousand feet is one of the world's highest glacial lakes. In addition to earthquakes caused by frequent seismic activity in the area, flooding of Lake Sarez and its adjoining rivers due to heavy glacial melt is an issue of major concern. 

Through his work with FOCUS USA, Dossani has learned about techniques that work to successfully address nontraditional security issues, such as the economic hardship and the displacement of people due to natural disasters. Non-governmental organizations and governments can successfully collaborate, he maintains, and nothing, in fact, can be done in a country without the support of its government. Effective results are less about policy than about focusing on establishing trust over a period of time, especially at a local level, states Dossani. "Being effective requires partnerships and trust," he says. He points to the United Nations, a globally respected entity, as a successful organization for smaller or new non-profit groups to partner with. Dossani's group has also found that disaster-preparedness measures, such as paying emergency-response volunteers, can actually offer significant economic benefits. For example, in the area where they operate, where the per capita income is two hundred and thirty dollars, the additional six dollars per day that volunteers receive is a major boost to a family's income. The work of such groups could potentially serve as a model for governments looking for more effective ways to address nontraditional security issues. 

In conjunction with his Shorenstein APARC work to address key South Asia issues, Dossani frequently speaks at events in the San Francisco Bay Area and worldwide. More information about his research and publishing activities and about Shorenstein APARC's vibrant South Asia Initiative, including publications such as Does South Asia Exist? Prospects for Regional Integration (Shorenstein APARC, 2010) and Prospects for Peace in South Asia (Stanford University Press, 2005), can be found on the Shorenstein APARC website.

". . . History, values, memory, and identity are significant elements that can influence the 'soft power' of an alliance built on 'hard power,' and policy makers of both nations should not overlook their importance," says Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Stanford Korean Studies Program, in the chapter that he contributed to the recently published book U.S. Leadership, History, and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia.

In his chapter "Values and History in U.S.-South Korean Relations," Shin discusses developments in the types of issues that the United States and South Korea have collaborated on in recent years--including free trade agreements, Iraq and Afghanistan military operations, and policy coordination toward North Korea--and the significance of issues of history, values, memory, and identity--such as inter-Korean reconciliation and memories of U.S. military maneuvers in Korea--that have given the U.S.-South Korea relationship a "more complex and multidimensional" nature.

Published by Cambridge University Press in October 2010, the book was edited by Gilbert Rozman of Princeton University's Department of Sociology.

Global health disparities were the topic of a special event November 11th co-sponsored by the Asia Health Policy Program of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Center for Health Policy / Primary Care and Outcomes Research.

Sir Michael Marmot, internationally renowned Principal Investigator of the Whitehall Studies of British civil servants (investigating explanations for the striking inverse social gradient in morbidity and mortality), spoke about research on the social determinants of health and taking action to promote policy change. Pointing out the extreme disparities in life expectancy for peoples in different parts of the world – including the “haves” and “have-nots” within the high-income world – he presented an overview of “Closing the gap in a generation: Health equity through action on the social determinants of health” (http://www.who.int/social_determinants/en/). That report was commissioned by the World Health Organization (WHO) and released last year; Sir Marmot served as the Chair of the Commission on Social Determinants of Health.

Criticizing those who justify initiatives in global health solely on economic grounds, Sir Marmot argued that addressing the social determinants of health is a matter of social justice.

He presented data and discussed the report’s three primary recommendations: 1. Improve daily living conditions; 2. Tackle the inequitable distribution of power, money, and resources; and 3. Measure and understand the problem and assess the impact of action.
Stating that the World Health Assembly resolution on the social determinants of health was only meaningful as a first “baby step,” Marmot urged the audience to consider how research and policy advocacy can address the social determinants of health so that all individuals can lead flourishing lives.

Examples from Asia include

• the high risk of maternal mortality (1 in 8) in Afghanistan;
• the steep gradient in under-5 mortality in India (with the rate almost three times higher for the poorest quintile than for the wealthiest quintile);
• less than half of women in Bangladesh have a say in decision-making about their own health care;
• a large share of the world’s population living on less than US$2 a day reside in Asia;
• social protection systems like pensions are possible in lower and middle-income countries, with Thailand as an example;
• more can be done to address the millions impoverished by catastrophic health expenditures, such as in southeast Asia; and
• conflict-ridden areas and internally displaced people, such as in Pakistan and Myanmar, are among the most vulnerable.

He also responded to questions about the role of freedom and liberty in social development – contrasting India and China – and commented on the peculiar contours of the US health reform debate.

Professor Marmot closed by noting that, in exhorting everyone to strive for social justice and close the gaps in health inequalities all too apparent in our 21st century world, he hoped he was not too much like Don Quixote, going around “doing good deeds but with people all laughing at him.” 
Professor Sir Michael Marmot MBBS, MPH, PhD, FRCP, FFPHM, FMedSci, is Director of the International Institute for Society and Health and MRC Research Professor of Epidemiology and Public Health at University College, London. In 2000 he was knighted by Her Majesty The Queen for services to Epidemiology and understanding health inequalities.

The coming to power of a new party in Japan, with a strong mandate to rule, is unprecedented in the postwar era. In the aftermath of the Japanese elections in August of this year, there has been much discussion, particularly in the Japanese media, about the foreign policy orientation of the new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led administration. Some commentators see an “anti-American” tilt—evidenced by differing views on the relocation of U.S. bases in Okinawa and the renewal of Japanese naval refueling operations in the Indian Ocean.

This viewpoint misses the foreign policy forest for its trees. The paradigm-shifting potential of this change lies much more in the DPJ’s desire to re-center Japan’s foreign policy on Asia. Across the spectrum of the DPJ, from former socialists on the left to those who came out of the conservative Liberal Democratio Party (LDP), there is broad agreement on the need to put much greater emphasis on Japan’s ties to the rest of Asia, particularly to China and South Korea.

The new Asianism in Japanese foreign policy was on display at the October 10 triangular summit of the Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese leaders, held in Beijing. It was only the second time these three have met on their own and the meeting was substantive, covering everything from coordinating on North Korea and economic stimulus policy to taking initial steps toward formation of a new East Asian Community. “Until now, we have tended to be too reliant on the United States,” Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama told reporters after the meeting, adding that “The Japan-U.S. alliance remains important, but as a member of Asia, I would like to develop policies that focus more on Asia.”

The dominant foreign policy camp in Japan has been what Hitoshi Tanaka, a former senior foreign ministry official and close advisor to the DPJ, calls “alliance traditionalists,” whom he defines as those who “place the maintenance of a robust alliance with the United States above all other foreign policy priorities.” In the view of some DPJ policy advisors, the previous conservative governments mistakenly tried to cope with the challenge of a rising China by getting as close to the United States as possible. The decision to send troops to Iraq and the Indian Ocean was prompted not by any deep support for those causes but rather by the belief that this would ensure U.S. support in any tensions with China, and with North Korea.

All this took place as Sino-Japanese relations descended into their most troubled phase in the postwar period, prompted by former Prime Minister Koizumi’s provocative visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead. High-level contacts with China were frozen, tensions rose over territorial issues in the East China Sea, and rising nationalism on both sides culminated in the outbreak of government-sanctioned anti-Japanese riots in 2005 and a Chinese campaign to block Japan’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council.

There was an attempt by Koizumi’s conservative successors to roll back some of these tensions. But those signals were always mixed with the persistence of anti-Chinese views and the powerful camp of rightwing nationalists in and around the LDP who cling to a revisionist view of Japan’s wartime role, some even indulging in a vigorous defense of Japanese imperialism.

In the view of DPJ policy advisers, this pseudo-containment strategy is doomed to failure. Given the increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China, and their overlapping strategic interests, the United States will never form an anti-China front. Japan cannot rely solely, these advisers argue, on the U.S.-Japan security alliance to deal with China’s bid for regional hegemony.

Nor can Japan afford to indulge fantasies of confrontation with China, given its own extensive ties to its economy and society. Rather, the greater threat, in the view of many Japanese analysts, is being abandoned by the United States through the formation of a U.S.-China “Group of Two” that effectively excludes Japan, or relegates it to second-level status in the region.

Japan, those policymakers argue, needs to preempt that threat by engaging Asia on its own—not only China, but the entire region, from India back to Korea. The DPJ’s own policy vision, articulated by Prime Minister Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, and party strongman Ichiro Ozawa, remains vaguely defined but has three clear elements:

• The U.S.-Japan security alliance remains the cornerstone, but with limits.
• Japan plays a leadership role in East Asian regionalism.
• The “history” question must be resolved.

What does this mean? There should be little question, particularly after the initial meetings between the new government and the Obama administration, that the DPJ seeks to back away from the security alliance. Over the past fifteen years, the DPJ leadership has not only supported, but even led, the expansion of Japan’s security role, beginning with the passage of the 1992 law permitting Japanese participation
in peacekeeping operations and including the initial dispatch of naval forces to the Indian Ocean in response to 9/11. Though the DPJ has made commitments to reduce the U.S. presence in Okinawa, it is already realizing how difficult that is to accomplish; some kind of compromise on this issue is imminent. Similarly, Foreign Minister Okada’s visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan demonstrated a willingness to contribute, mostly through economic aid, to the security effort in both countries.

Prime Minister Hatoyama presented his somewhat romantic desire to reproduce the European experience to create an East Asian Community in September before the United Nations General Assembly. Hatoyama has indicated that he understands this is a long process, and has been careful to make clear that Japan has no intention of excluding the United States’ role in the region, nor the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. As Hatoyama put in his UN address:

Today, there is no way that Japan can develop without deeply involving itself in Asia and the Pacific region. Reducing the region’s security risks and sharing each other’s economic dynamism based on the principle of “open regionalism” will result in tremendous benefits not only for Japan but also for the region and the international community.

Given the historical circumstances arising from its mistaken actions in the past, Japan has hesitated to play a proactive role in this region. It is my hope that the new Japan can overcome this history and become a “bridge” among the countries of Asia.

I look forward to an East Asian community taking shape as an extension of the accumulated cooperation built up step by step among partners who have the capacity to work together, starting with fields in which we can cooperate—free frade agreements, finance, currency, energy, environment, disaster relief and more. Of course, Rome was not built in a day, so let us seek to move forward steadily on this, even if at a moderate pace.

DPJ policymakers advocate pursuit of an East Asian community as only one of a nest of regional structures, including a regional security system that might grow out of the Six Party talks on North Korea. They also embrace the idea of a Japan-U.S.-China strategic dialogue, based on their own perception that without the combined muscle of the United States and Japan, they cannot bring China to the table on a range of issues from energy to intellectual property.

The last element of the DPJ’s policy vision is to take another major step in clearing away the legacy of the wartime past. Hatoyama personally reaffirmed his government’s adherence to the statement on war responsibility issued by then Prime Minister Murayama in 1995, at the time of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war.

Hatoyama, Ozawa and others in the DPJ leadership are determined to confront the history issue in a way that eases tensions with China and South Korea and also closes doors backward. They will not only refuse to go to the Yasukuni Shrine but also want to remove the Class A war criminals whose “souls” are enshrined there by decision of the shrine authorities, to the consternation of the Emperor, among others. The DPJ led the hue and cry over the unapologetic revisionism of former Japanese air force chief of staff, General Toshio Tamogami, who wrote an essay justifying Japan’s colonialism and wartime aggression, including the attack on Pearl Harbor. Foreign Minister Okada has backed the creation of a joint history textbook by China, Japan and South Korea, based on the model followed by France and Germany. These are stances the LDP has been historically incapable of taking.

The DPJ draws some inspiration from the anti-imperial form of Asianism—“Small Nipponism”—championed by the late Tanzan Ishibashi, who served briefly as premier in the mid-1950s and who was allied to Hatoyama’s beloved grandfather, and former premier, Ichiro Hatoyama.

In the coming months, the Hatoyama government will have numerous opportunities to develop its new policies, particularly in the run-up to Japan’s hosting of the APEC summit next year. Undoubtedly, it will be difficult to implement in practice, but this new Asianism marks a clear turning point in Japan’s postwar foreign policy.