The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the pleasure of hosting Ryan Hass, Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution for the program "Partner, Competitor, and Challenger: Thoughts on the Future of America’s China Strategy." Hass explored cooperation and competition between the United States and China before engaging in a lively Q&A session with the audience. Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

Presently, China is at once a major and increasingly hostile competitor to the U.S., a formidable challenger to U.S. regional and global leadership, and an important partner on a range of transnational challenges. An important and pressing question for many is whether or not it will be possible for both sides to coexist amidst intensifying competition. In his talk, Ryan Hass explored this question by delving into the present and future of US-China relations, as well as the discourse that shapes and is shaped by that relationship. He also discussed the likelihood of conflict between the two countries, particularly surrounding Taiwan, suggesting that it might not be as likely as many of us fear. Listen at this link. 

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Exploring Means of Enforcing Accountability

Speaking as an independently acting investigator, Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana echoed the findings of his predecessors in warning that the activity within North Korea has escalated from human rights violations to international crimes against humanity, including extermination, enslavement, torture, sexual violence, and knowingly inflicting prolonged starvation.

What governing body has the ability to hold national leadership at the highest level accountable for such crimes? Quintana outlines several options. One is the International Criminal Court, the international tribunal seated in The Hauge. However, superpower nations such as the United States, China, and Russia are historically recalcitrant to the jurisdiction of this legal body and could feasibly veto a case against the DPRK sent to the ICC.

Another option is for the UN Security Council to create a hybrid tribunal through which international prosecution could litigate. This option is more ad hoc, but would circumvent some of the potential veto pitfalls to using the ICC.

The Secretary General of the United Nations could also use the pejoratives given under Article 99 of the United Nations Charter to force action and accountability forward. This would be a difficult and even unprecedented means of jurisdiction, but it is supported by an already existing, if rarely enacted, legal framework.

Moving Forward

Each of the avenues proposed by Special Rapporteur Quintana has varying levels of efficacy and shortcomings, particularly in the immediate context of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the further hindrance it has created to gathering evidence and intelligence directly from North Korea. As Roberta Cohen notes,

“No possibility exists right now for International Criminal Court referral, or establishing an ad hoc tribunal, but progress is nonetheless being made in laying the groundwork for eventual criminal prosecution and other aspects of transitional justice.”

Former Ambassador Joon Oh echoes the importance of keeping the issue of human rights and international crimes in North Korea in the spotlight even if immediate legal options stall.

“The issue of accountability is extremely important. These alternative ways [of creating accountability] should be explored. Exploring these avenues adds pressure on North Korea. Even remote possibilities add pressure, which might help change their behavior.”

On April 26, 2021, Ambassador Robert King, former U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean human rights issues will continue the dialogue on accountability in North Korea with a discussion of his forthcoming book, Patterns of Impunity: Human Rights in North Korea and the Role of the U.S. Special Envoy, and the role the South Korean and U.S. governments play in promoting human rights in North Korea. Registration for the book launch is open through the day of the event.  

As the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis from 2005 through 2008, Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar had to implement legislation intended to enact sweeping reforms of intelligence procedure, establish a new federal agency, and integrate and improve the performance of 16 intelligence agencies. Synthesizing this experience, Fingar’s new book, From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform, explains how he carried out that tremendous charge. Identifying and codifying the commonalities that shape and constrain prospects for success, the book provides a practical guide that every new government appointee could use.

In a conversation with FSI Director Michael McFaul, Fingar discussed some of the themes and lessons he shares in the book, from prioritizing and sequencing interconnected objectives through determining organizational structures and staff arrangements, to building support and managing opposition.

“One of the first jobs of any new appointee is to determine which prescribed and suggested tasks are necessary and which ones are possible,” said Fingar. “The flip side of that is making judgments about what isn’t immediately necessary, or maybe necessary but not urgent, and what really isn’t possible under the circumstances.”

All government appointments come with a mix of tasks, responsibilities, and opportunities, and oftentimes carry with them a mandate subsuming requirements and authorities, but virtually never do they come with a blueprint detailing the steps to achieve the required and desirable changes over a four-year time horizon.

When Fingar accepted the position of deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, he knew he had to implement the legislative and presidential mandate he was going to be judged by — namely, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President George W. Bush signed into law in December 2004 — and to meet the ongoing intelligence responsibilities amid reforming and reorienting the organization. But he also prioritized another necessary task, that of restoring confidence in the intelligence community.

After the events of September 11, 2001 and the failure to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the intelligence community faced severe criticism and harsh scrutiny. “The loss of confidence began at the top, with President Bush,” said Fingar, “and went down through Congress and senior officials, influencing the morale of the workforce.” He knew that it was impossible to meet the requirements of the mission if the people supported by it did not have confidence.

Next-step considerations must address whether the requisite conditions to achieve the prioritized objectives — including staff, information, authorities, and funding — exist or must be obtained. For example, if some tasks require skills that are not currently available, then it is essential to identify and recruit people with the necessary skills and experience. Or if building the capacity to achieve priority goals requires organization restructuring and personnel reassigning, then these tasks require steps to protect or deemphasize legacy activities.

To succeed in their roles, government appointees must also win cooperation and stave off criticism both from opponents and those who believe they could do better. That, in turn, requires one to strike a balance between transparency and flexibility. Knowing what to report and when to report it, having a vision that is clear and easy to explain, and responding to feedback while still conveying an image of resolution and handle on strategy are all invaluable for judgments about what steps to continue, modify, or jettison right away, Fingar writes in his book.

“We captured this with a motto that was also our modus operandi,” he said. "Think Big. Start Small. Fail Cheap. Fix Fast. Listen to feedback. Involve people in the decision-making process.”

This op-ed by Oriana Skylar Mastro was originally published in Foreign Affairs.

A new administration in Washington faces a familiar problem: North Korea is once again testing missiles, including ballistic missiles, in contravention of a UN Security Council resolution. Rather than retread dead-end paths, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has pledged to think anew on North Korea, and it has already distinguished itself from its predecessor by signaling that it will consult with U.S. allies and partners to formulate a strong response to Pyongyang that does not rule out diplomacy.

Such a reorientation is welcome. But if the new administration really wants to move the needle on North Korea, it will need to rethink the assumptions it has inherited about China’s role there. So far, the Biden team has cleaved to the long-held view that the United States and China share a common interest in the nuclear disarmament of North Korea and that U.S. policy there must make use of Beijing’s tremendous influence over the government in Pyongyang. During his visit to Seoul last week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken asserted that “Beijing has an interest, a clear self-interest, in helping to pursue the denuclearization of [North Korea] because it is a source of instability.” Blinken further paid tribute to China’s “critical role" and “unique relationship" with North Korea.

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But Beijing has demonstrated for almost three decades where its self-interest really lies, and that is in maintaining the status quo. China certainly doesn’t want to see North Korea weakened and the United States strengthened on the Korean Peninsula. But neither does it want the balance to tip so strongly toward North Korea that the United States feels compelled to bulk up its military posture. China is toeing a careful line to keep the prospect of peaceful denuclearization alive without provoking Pyongyang or aggravating tensions with the United States.

If Beijing were to do nothing to assist in denuclearization, the United States could lose confidence in diplomacy and decide instead to increase its military presence on the peninsula or even to take military action. But if Beijing does too much to help the United States, North Korea could collapse, and the whole peninsula could fall within the U.S. orbit. China’s North Korea policy is therefore an elaborate balancing act. Through it, Beijing seeks to maintain influence over the regime of Kim Jong Un without emboldening it; participate in multilateral efforts to pressure North Korea, such as the UN sanctions program, without exposing Pyongyang to pressure that could precipitate regime collapse; and offer the United States just enough hope for a diplomatic solution to forestall military intervention while simultaneously ensuring that any resolution contributes to China’s relative power, not that of the United States.

China’s Balance

For better or worse, the past year has been one of great change in Chinese strategy and policy, especially toward its neighbors. China flew an unprecedented number of sorties into Taiwanese airspace, placed trade sanctions on Australia after the latter supported inquiries into the origins of COVID-19, and came to blows with India over a border dispute that had not seen armed conflict in decades. But in the case of North Korea, China has stuck to its balancing act.

Beijing and Pyongyang have been on tepid terms the past few years. On paper, the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty makes the two countries allies. But in practice, the Chinese government has distanced itself from the alliance, stating that if North Korea provoked a conflict, Beijing had no obligation to defend it. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson remarked in 2006 that China was not an ally of North Korea, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has characterized the relationship as “normal state-to-state relations.”

A flurry of diplomatic activity in 2018 and 2019 gave many the impression that the two countries meant to repair and normalize their relationship. Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un met for the first time in March 2018, marking Kim’s first meeting with any world leader. Four more meetings between the two followed, in May and June 2018 and January and June 2019, and Chinese official media noted that the relationship “radiated a new vitality.” But despite numerous exchanges of platitudes since—just last week, Xi sent a message to Kim affirming that the countries’ traditional friendship is a “valuable asset” and seeming to suggest an intention to strengthen relations—Xi has maintained his distance from Kim and his regime.

The 70th anniversary of China’s entrance in the Korean War passed without a summit or fanfare about the nations’ closeness. Social-distancing requirements undoubtedly had something to do with the lack of a high-level meeting but could not explain the absence of the customary propaganda about how the two countries are like “teeth to lips.” Moreover, Xi continues to avoid referring to North Korea as an ally. After his state visit to Pyongyang in June 2019, Xi described the relationship as one of  “friendly cooperative relations,” and on a January 2021 phone call with Kim, he characterized the bilateral relationship as one of “friendly socialist neighbors linked by mountains and rivers”—in the language of the Chinese government, hardly an expression of closeness and solidarity.

Then there is China’s approach to managing international efforts aimed at reining in North Korea. Here too, China has continued the same dance, trying to come off as a team player while restraining the international community from acting too harshly against the Kim regime. China voted in favor of all three of the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea in 2017. In 2019, Beijing even garnered praise from then-President Donald Trump, who said that China was “a big help” in dealing with North Korea. On March 25, 2021, Pyongyang conducted two ballistic missile tests in violation of the UN Security Council resolutions, and Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not condemn them but predictably “call[ed] on all parties concerned to work together to maintain the situation of detente, and promote political settlement of the Peninsular issue through dialogue and consultation.”

Beijing has always been skeptical of using sanctions to coerce North Korean compliance on the nuclear issue, expressing concern that too much pressure could push Kim to lash out and undermine international efforts. When the United Nations imposed sanctions in 2017, China at first appeared poised to strictly enforce them. But then Beijing quickly reverted to business as usual, teaming up with Moscow to try to ease sanctions. China also allegedly violated the regulations by supplying North Korea with 22,730 tons of refined oil and helping Pyongyang export about $370 million worth of coal. Three months ago, the United States publicly accused China of circumventing the sanctions to aid North Korea, and China denied having done so.

Beijing’s North Korea policy is primarily motivated by a desire to counter U.S. power in the Asia-Pacific region and increase Chinese influence on the Korean Peninsula. The nuclear issue gives Beijing a pretext to call for the United States to reduce its military presence and activity on the peninsula on the grounds that North Korea would halt weapons development if it felt less threatened.

Beijing decidedly does not want a war on the peninsula. Such a conflict could destabilize the region and end with a unified Korea under U.S. influence. Trump’s “fire and fury” approach and his willingness to meet directly with Kim threatened China’s ability to triangulate between Washington and Pyongyang in order to ensure its own maneuverability. The real possibility that the United States would forcibly displace the North Korean regime convinced Beijing to both strengthen its ties with Kim and put real pressure on his government. But the last Trump-Xi summit, in February 2019, was a failure; the Trump administration seemingly abandoned its focus on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and Beijing returned to business as usual.

Biden’s Choice

To set a new course on North Korea, the Biden administration needs to throw Beijing off balance once more. The status quo—in which Beijing enhances its influence over the future of the peninsula and wins international image points while simultaneously undercutting the United States’ North Korea policy—is no longer acceptable. The United States needs to strike its own balance: one in which Washington makes progress on reducing the threat from North Korea while also gaining ground in its competition with Beijing.

Multilateral diplomacy that takes a more incremental approach to denuclearization, such as a freeze on North Korea’s current program, will not accomplish this end. Beijing would welcome such a move, as many in China thought that Trump’s demand for complete denuclearization was counterproductive and that Washington’s alienation of its allies risked spurring South Korea or Japan to develop nuclear capabilities. China sees a multilateral approach as one that affords it more influence on the relevant players and can help ensure a positive outcome for Beijing.

The White House should instead consider pursuing multilateral diplomacy that excludes Beijing or that at the very least does not give China pride of place. Such an approach would be consistent with the predilections of many of Biden’s advisers, who seek a pragmatic tack that does not rely on Beijing’s goodwill. China would likely react by scrambling to redefine its role in managing peninsular affairs in order to make sure that it is not cut out of any deal. China might tighten its relations with North Korea and Russia in order to influence policy through them as proxies. The United States could then join forces with European allies in response, whether to counter Beijing’s overreaching claims in the South China Sea or to buttress democracies against Chinese political interference.

Greater closeness between China and North Korea could prove useful to the United States. North Korea has in effect placed the harshest imaginable sanctions on itself, shutting its borders completely in January 2020 to prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus. The country’s trade with China is down 81 percent as a result. China’s economic leverage over North Korea has thus dissipated—and with it, the effectiveness of sanctions as a coercive tool. China may now work to create new leverage against North Korea, perhaps through positive inducements, which could supply another tool for the Biden administration to use later on. And if Beijing cannot forge closer ties with Pyongyang, it might even seek to ingratiate itself with Seoul—also a favorable development for Washington, as such relations may allow the United States to pursue deeper military cooperation with South Korea’s regional allies without fear of provoking a strong Chinese response.

Some Biden advisers, including Kurt Campbell, have called for a bolder approach. One possibility is for Washington to shift its focus from denuclearization to arms control. Under this scenario, the United States would accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear state and take measures to enhance deterrence against it, such as stepping up the U.S. military presence and tightening military cooperation with allies in the region. China would have a harder time than before delegitimizing the U.S. military presence in the region and just might be compelled to do what is necessary to induce North Korea’s denuclearization, even at the cost of destabilizing the regime.

Biden’s new approach to North Korea must force China to tip its carefully constructed balance toward either complete cooperation or obvious obstruction. Depending on which way China goes, the United States can then decide whether to include Beijing or cut it out of its North Korea policy efforts. But one thing is clear: conducting business as usual with Beijing hurts U.S. objectives in both denuclearization and competition with China.

Can China’s aggression towards Taiwan be stopped? Oriana Skylar Mastro joins the Munk Debate podcast to argue affirmatively that Chinese military capability has advanced too far for the United States to credibly deter the PRC through military means alone. Michael Beckley, an associate professor of political science at Tufts University and visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, offers the rebuttal. The full debate is available below.

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Many of China’s military development goals were set with a target date of 2020, which means the PRC is currently in a strong place with its offensive and defensive capabilities. By Mastro’s measure, China now has the most advanced ballistic missile program in the world, including the United States. For Taiwan, this means the reality of an aggressive neighbor who possesses offensive weapons that are very difficult to defend against.

China also has geographic benefits when it comes to offensive maneuvering. If a hot conflict began, neither Taiwan nor the United States has a comparable network of sole-sovereign military bases in the area such as China’s. Not only does this mean China can utilize its air defense capabilities — again, now one of the strongest in the world, by Mastro’s account — but it can also support a robust blockade against Taiwan across the strait and devastate the island both militarily and economically.

As Mastro points out, “Taiwan’s economy completely depends on China, so if China decided to use economic coercion, which is defined as a type of aggression, the United States has absolutely no way of protecting Taiwan from any economic harm coming from the PRC.”

Because of this potential for combined military and economic aggression, Mastro pushed for urgency on deterrence in Taiwan. “The United States and international community do not have forever. The Chinese are not happy with maintaining the status quo, and they will soon believe they have the military capability to [take Taiwan].”

Rather than continuing to act alone, Mastro hopes the United States will lead out in organizing an international coalition that includes other regional partners such as Australia, Japan, and India as actively contributing participants. With the United States no longer seen as a monolith in Beijing, only broad, coordinated cooperation will provide effective deterrence and security for Taiwan.

On another podcast, Conversation Six, Mastro joins Abraham Denmark to discuss China's Taiwan strategy and what the United States can do to deter China from invading Taiwan. The threat of non-military intervention by the United States and its allies is the way forward, she says. "The US needs to do more in non-military realms," she argues.

This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui originally appeared in Nikkei Asia.

As the summer of racial unrest forced America to confront its racist past and present yet again, a book by Heather McGhee, The Sum of Us: What Racism Costs Everyone and How We Can Prosper Together, which documents how racial division prevents Americans from uniting to lift everyone's lot, has attracted a good deal of attention.

From welfare to education to policing, Americans have generally supported policies that lifted the white middle class. But as the middle class has become more racially diverse, politics has become a divisive zero-sum game, with many whites seeing government spending as shifting money away from them toward minorities, even if whites also benefit.

This politics of racial division forecloses a social consensus that could boost the U.S. as a whole, leading to flagging social infrastructure, sputtering criminal justice system reform and challenges in offering broad economic support even to counter the pandemic.

This is not a problem unique to the United States. Social scientists have studied the relationship between racial division and low levels of public goods provision in multiple countries and established that ethno-racially heterogeneous societies tend to provide less in the way of public services.

Plagued by suspicions that some groups might benefit more than others, diverse societies tend to have greater difficulty in reaching consensus and working together on a strategy for economic and social development that would improve everyone's lives.

On this count, Japan is at the other end of the spectrum. More ethno-racially homogenous than most other advanced democracies, Japan has fared well when it comes to providing public goods such as efficient public transportation systems, low crime rates and universal health care.

Japan is often quick to reach a broad consensus about government spending on public services, since people generally feel that everyone benefits if they all support each other. Strong social cohesion, facilitated by the relative homogeneity of the population, enables this social consensus that supports spending on public goods.

The flip side of this coin is Japanese society's persistent resistance to diversity and disruption. Used to the comfort of living and working with similar people, Japan has been criticized for its reluctance to accept immigrants.

In response, the Japanese government has rather clumsily allowed immigrant workers in recent decades, first encouraging the migration of Japanese-Brazilians on the basis of shared ethnic roots that were supposed to make it easy for them to assimilate.

Learning that the reality of Japanese-Brazilians' life in Japan did not support this idea, Japan then adopted trainee programs to bring in foreign workers on a temporary basis. With the emphasis squarely on the temporary nature of their stay, those who came to Japan under this scheme could not contribute toward the country's long-term diversity.

Faced with a declining population, Japan needs immigrant labor, and its business leaders have consistently supported accepting more migrant workers. In addition to addressing the labor shortage, a more diverse workforce would likely stimulate innovation and facilitate adaptation to changing economic environments. Much social science research has demonstrated positive relationships between diversity and innovation.

Yet Japan's leaders are having a hard time pressing ahead. While it is easy for the public to come to a consensus for policies that boost all Japanese, it has proved difficult for them to support any policy that would undermine Japan's homogeneity.

Aside from ethnic diversity, Japan's consensus-oriented society is generally resistant to change. Valuing the protection of all members, companies have been slow to streamline and transform their operations to adapt to the changing economic environment, resulting in the prolonged economic decline since the 1990s.

While Brazil is home to the world's largest overseas Japanese population, many Japanese-Brazilians who moved to Japan discovered it was not easy for them to assimilate.

Urged on by American consultants, Japan imported America's neoliberal economic model to revitalize its economy through this period, and the lifetime employment and seniority-based salary system has given way to a rise in temp workers and various attempts to introduce a merit-based salary system. These efforts have not met with much success, leaving behind a questionable legacy, including the suppression of wages after the labor shortage of recent years.

In the U.S., racial division undermines the provision of public goods that would reduce economic inequality. But its acceptance of diversity contributes to innovation and economic revitalization that keeps the U.S. at the vanguard of a new economy.

In Japan, ethno-racial harmony facilitates public goods provision that prevents economic inequality from spiraling out of control. But aversion to diversity and dissent makes it difficult to accept much-needed immigrant labor and to adapt to changes in the economic environment.

In both countries, these characteristics are ingrained into their social fabric and resistant to change. However, the two largest economies with a democratic polity have much to learn from each other, and they should work together to find solutions for their problems.

Otherwise, China's nondemocratic model could become the dominant model for economic success, with its top-down forced consensus and suppression of diversity.

Democracies have long proven better at correcting their mistakes and adjusting to changes in their environment. As the two largest democratic economies in the world, the U.S. and Japan should be able to overcome the cost of racial division and the cost of homogeneity respectively even if it takes decades to achieve that.