As U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to visit Beijing on May 14-15, 2026, for a highly anticipated summit with President Xi Jinping, the world is watching to see if the two leaders can stabilize a U.S.-China relationship strained by disputes over trade, technological race, the future of Taiwan, and the rippling effects of the conflict with Iran.

Trump’s trip to Beijing – already rescheduled once due to the conflict in the Middle East – has been described as having tremendous symbolic significance. Yet, expectations for a breakthrough on specific deliverables should remain low, according to Susan Thornton, a China expert and former U.S. diplomat. Thornton joined APARC Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui on the latest episode of the APARC Briefing video series to analyze the potential outcomes of the Trump-Xi summit and the high-stakes dynamics shaping U.S.-China relations.
 

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Trade and Tech: A Call for a Paradigm Shift

On the economic front, Thornton drew on her deep experience in trade negotiations to critique the lack of focus in U.S. policy.

"The biggest problem for U.S. negotiators is deciding what it is that we want from China," she said. "We tend to give them a long list of revolving priorities, which [makes it easy for the] other side of the negotiating table to just fob them off and not actually commit to anything over years of negotiations.”

On the technology rivalry between the two powers, Thornton urged a shift in strategy. Rather than pursuing sweeping export controls that are often unilateral and incomplete, she advocated for a narrower, multilateral approach focused on the most sensitive technologies, combined with a greater emphasis on American innovation. AI governance is one of the areas Thornton believes could be a common ground for Washington and Beijing to align their policies.

“It's going to be very hard for the United States to contain China's technological ambitions and growth,” she said. “I don't think that we're exactly competing on the same metrics. I question how it is that we're going to be able to keep China from getting technologies that are dual-use but might be useful in some military application when these things are basically economy-wide products.”

When it comes to technological competition, "We need to try to run faster than China, not be constantly trying to trip China up and looking in the rearview mirror," Thornton urged. "I don't think that's going to bode well for the long-term development of the U.S. tech sector."

The Taiwan Flashpoint: A Longer-Term Challenge

While Taiwan remains the most dangerous flashpoint that could trigger a kinetic warfare between the United States and China, Thornton believes that the immediate risk of conflict has receded, in accordance with recent U.S. threat assessments that no longer see 2027 as a likely target date for a potential Chinese takeover of the island.

Beijing, she argued, is closely watching the domestic political situation in Taiwan and how the leadership in Taipei views U.S. reliability and support. “I think the Chinese have determined, based on both of those things they've been watching, that they can afford to wait a bit longer, see what happens.”

Thornton cautioned, however, that, even as a conflict over Taiwan may no longer pose an immediate-term threat, “it is a problem that is going to develop over the coming decade.”

Diplomacy in a Multipolar World Order 

When asked about the future of the global order, Thornton described a trend toward fragmentation. If the United States steps back from its global leadership role, it is difficult to see who else would be willing or able to shoulder the cost of providing global public goods, she said. A “thinner world order,” with the United Nations at its center, may eventually find favor with countries that can afford to pay for some of those goods, she reflected.

In a closing advice for aspiring foreign service officers, Thornton argued that the emergence of a multipolar world reinforces the need for skilled diplomacy. “As the global order changes and more countries come into the mix of the councils of politics in the world, the United States will have to lean back toward diplomacy more,” she predicted.

“We're going to need very good diplomats,” she concluded, because it will be significantly harder to be an American diplomat in a fragmented world order in which the United States is no longer the single overwhelmingly dominant power.

Corruption is typically understood as a sign of weak institutions and failed governance. But what if it is a deliberate political technology used to consolidate power, discipline rivals, and reshape political systems?

This is the argument advanced by University of Chicago sociologist Kimberly Kay Hoang in the latest episode of the APARC Briefing series. Drawing on years of ethnographic research across Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Myanmar, Hong Kong, and Singapore, as well as offshore tax havens, Hoang uses a comparative Asian lens to show how both democratic and authoritarian governments strategically align with private capital, reinforcing elite power. Hoang joined APARC Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui to share core insights from her work.
 

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Kimberly Kay Hoang speaks on the APARC Briefing series with host Kiyoteru Tsutsui.

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She argues that corruption discourse often operates as a political tool, widely seen across Asian political economies and increasingly evident in the United States during the Trump era. This rhetoric, she says, tends not so much to dismantle institutions but to reshape them, concentrating authority in the executive and weakening checks and balances. According to Hoang, these patterns reflect a broader global shift toward more oligarchic forms of governance, where political power is increasingly concentrated among transnational elites.

"We often think of corruption as a failure of governance – that it's a weak state, and weak states can’t govern," Hoang says. "But in Southeast Asia and in other parts of East Asia, it has become an instrument for governance. It's a way of consolidating political power, weaponizing corruption."

From Vietnam's Hostess Bars to Global Finance

Hoang's research journey began in an unexpected place: working 12-hour shifts in Vietnamese hostess bars in 2009-2010, shortly after the global financial crisis. What started as an ethnographic study of the sex industry and human trafficking in Vietnam evolved into something far larger: a story of Asian ascendancy and Western decline playing out in micro-transactions.

"I started to witness local Vietnamese men turning down deals with Western businessmen and taking extraordinary deals from investors from China, parts of Southeast Asia – Hong Kong and Singapore – and Korea, Taiwan," Hoang recalls. When she examined foreign direct investment data, "the numbers lined up to what I was seeing at a micro level."

But when she presented these findings in the United States, the response was skeptical, even hostile. "People would say, 'Okay, yes, the economy is in decline, but America still has the strongest military,' or 'China is really dependent on the American economy, so if the American economy collapses, so will China's,'" she remembers. "It was a huge oversight of American arrogance to just believe that [Asian ascendancy] was impossible."

Her continued research led her to follow not just the money but "the people who move the money" – from Vietnam and Myanmar to Hong Kong and Singapore, and ultimately to offshore tax havens in the British Virgin Islands, Panama, the Seychelles, and the Cayman Islands.

The Architecture of Global Capital

What Hoang uncovered was what she calls an "architecture of global capital" – an invisible financial infrastructure built by "hidden engineers" including specialized wealth managers, lawyers, and financial advisors who coordinate across borders to move elite wealth beyond the reach of any single nation-state.

The scale is staggering: approximately $7.6 trillion in household wealth is hidden offshore globally, with the top 0.01% avoiding about 25% of their tax obligations through legal structures and shell corporations.

"We have to move beyond national boundaries," Hoang argues, "because global oligarchs choose the sovereigns and choose the jurisdictions that govern their financial transactions and activities."

This system creates what Hoang describes in her book, Spiderweb Capitalism: How Global Elites Exploit Frontier Markets (Princeton University Press), as a web of legal and financial gray zones that allow wealth to compound while evading accountability.

Corruption as Governance Mechanism

Hoang’s work exposes the connections between the rise of global elites, corruption, and the emergence of oligarchic governance. Across both Asia and the United States, she explains, corruption discourse operates as a mechanism for reshaping democratic governance by means of dissolving the boundary between political authority and economic power.

"What does that mean? It means that we no longer rely on institutions," she says. "People who have executive authority can just go after their rivals."

This creates what Hoang calls "anticipatory compliance," a situation in which political and economic elites preemptively align themselves with power centers. The mechanism works through strategic ambiguity: when corruption charges can be selectively deployed, everyone becomes potentially vulnerable, leading to self-regulation through fear.

While this pattern is well-established in countries like China and Vietnam, Hoang sees similar dynamics emerging in the United States. "Under the Trump administration, we've seen charges of corruption being weaponized as a tool of governance," she notes, while emphasizing that elements of this already appeared under the Biden administration.

Democratic Reordering, Not Collapse

When explaining the impacts of corruption discourse on democratic governance, Hoang is careful to distinguish between democratic collapse and what she terms "democratic reordering." Rather than overtly capturing the state, global oligarchs work through existing institutions, gradually redefining their function through moralized narratives, weakened oversight, selective enforcement, and strategic risk management. The outward forms of democracy remain intact, but the independence of courts, election fairness, and accountability mechanisms are steadily eroded. "They increasingly serve concentrated elite interests."

In comparing the United States to China, Hoang notes a crucial difference: "China has a long view. They're playing a 50-year view [...] If we're in this constant [electoral] cycle, and we've delegitimized oversight and political authority, [...] we need to have stronger independent institutions that outlast whoever is in office."

Finding Hope in Resistance

Despite her sobering analysis, Hoang sees reasons for optimism. "What gives me hope is that, if you look carefully, there are a lot of resistance movements," she says. "I think there's a growing battle between the millionaires and billionaires."

She points to resistance not just from grassroots movements but from millionaires who "don't want to live in a billionaire oligarchy world, who feel economically precarious vis-à-vis the extreme inequality."

The challenge, she argues, is that both mainstream and social media highlight extremes while missing the middle-level discourse and resistance movements that are actively organizing.

Kimberly Kay Hoang is Professor of Sociology and the College, and Director of Global Studies at the University of Chicago. In addition to Spiderweb Capitalism, she is the author of Dealing in Desire: Asian Ascendancy, Western Decline, and the Hidden Currencies of Global Sex Work (University of California Press). Her forthcoming work examines U.S.-China power relations in offshore financial centers.

The full APARC Briefing conversation with Hoang is available on APARC’s YouTube channel.

The Japanese public is largely opposed to dispatching the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to the Strait of Hormuz, but framing the issue in terms of Japan’s energy dependence substantially raises support for military involvement in Iran. By contrast, arguments invoking the Japan-U.S. alliance and legal legitimacy for military action have no such effect. These are the findings from a vignette experiment fielded by the Stanford Japan Barometer (SJB) in March, one month after Japan’s February 2026 general election.

The results also reveal that mentioning energy dependence moves opinion in favor of military deployment even among respondents who are told that diplomacy, not deployment, is the right response, suggesting that energy-dependence messaging changes minds regardless of policy recommendation. Alliance- and legal-focused messaging, by contrast, have no measurable effect.

SJB is a large-scale, multi-wave public opinion survey on political, economic, and social issues in Japan. A project of the Japan Program at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), SJB is led by Stanford sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the director of APARC and the Japan Program, and political scientist Charles Crabtree. The vignette experiment on the Japanese public's attitude toward military deployment in Iran was part of the final, three-wave panel survey SJB fielded around Japan’s February 2026 snap election, which focused on identifying public attitudes toward immigration.

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A Public Wary of War

The SJB experiment finds that, without any contextual framing, Japanese respondents lean against JSDF dispatch to the Strait of Hormuz, averaging a score of 2.00 on a four-point scale, where 1 represents "strongly oppose" and 4 represents "strongly support." 

This baseline skepticism reflects the Japanese public’s reluctance to deploy military forces abroad, rooted in Article 9 of the postwar constitution, and a broader wariness of entanglement in the Iran conflict. But the crisis in the Middle East has fueled deep economic fears in Japan, which relies on the region for over 90% of its crude oil imports, making it highly dependent on the Strait of Hormuz for energy security.

The SJB team wanted to know: Could this energy security argument shift the public’s baseline opposition to military deployment, and if so, how, compared with other justifications?

The Energy Argument Works Both Directions

The experiment randomly assigned respondents to read one of several short policy statements before answering whether they supported JSDF dispatch to the Strait of Hormuz. Some arguments favored deployment; others opposed it. Each invoked a different rationale: energy security, the Japan-U.S. alliance, and constitutional legitimacy.

The most striking change in attitude came from the energy-dependence framing.

Respondents who read a pro-dispatch energy argument – emphasizing that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would devastate Japan's economy and living standards, making military involvement necessary – showed a statistically significant increase in support for JSDF deployment, rising approximately 0.12 points above the control group.

Notably, respondents who read a con-dispatch energy argument – which presented the same energy-dependence facts but concluded that Japan should pursue diplomacy through its own channels with Iran rather than deploy forces – showed an even larger increase in support, rising approximately 0.28 points above the control group.

That is, simply mentioning Japan's vulnerability to an oil supply disruption raised support for JSDF involvement, even when the message explicitly argued against military action. “This pattern suggests that the energy-dependence information itself, rather than the normative conclusion drawn from it, is what moves opinion,” the researchers write on the SJB website.

Alliance and Legal Arguments Fall Flat

In contrast, two other commonly invoked arguments – obligations related to the Japan-U.S. alliance and constitutional authority – had virtually no effect on the Japanese public’s support of JSDF deployment.

The alliance framing emphasized that contributing to U.S. operations in the Strait of Hormuz is essential, given the centrality of the U.S.-Japan security partnership to Japan's defense. A counter-argument noted that many international observers view U.S. strikes on Iran as violations of international law and that most European allies are declining to participate.

Neither version significantly moved opinion on JSDF dispatch.

Similarly, arguments about whether the conflict legally qualifies for the exercise of collective self-defense – with one version arguing that new legislation could authorize dispatch and another arguing that no existing legal basis permits it – produced near-zero effects.

These null results are particularly striking given how frequently alliance obligations and constitutional legitimacy dominate elite debates over JSDF deployment in Japan. The data suggest that, at least in this scenario, these arguments resonate far more in policy circles than with the general public.

The findings carry important lessons for Japanese policymakers, who are walking a tightrope between the United States and Iran: “Concrete economic stakes are more resonant than foreign-policy abstractions,” note the SJB researchers. Still, the Japanese public’s default position is opposition to JSDF deployment in Iran. “The framing experiments shift opinion at the margins, but do not reverse the underlying skepticism toward JSDF dispatch.”

Indo-Pacific nations are racing to adapt to a world in which the United States has become fundamentally unpredictable. The 2026 Oksenberg Conference, hosted by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), gathered scholars and foreign service veterans at Stanford University to assess how regional stakeholders are confronting what Canada's Prime Minister Mark Carney had famously named "a rupture, not a transition" in the post-World War II order. The conference took place as Carney was in the midst of an Indo-Pacific trip, visiting Australia, India, and Japan to forge "middle power" trade alliances, and as the United States joined Israel in a war against Iran.

“For Indo-Pacific countries, the question is no longer just how to balance between Washington and Beijing,” said APARC Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui in his welcome remarks, “but how to understand and respond to the emergence of a multipolar world in which the United States is less predictable, less committed to multilateral frameworks, less invested in alliance maintenance, and more willing to pursue narrowly defined national interests at the expense of broader international stability.”

The panelists agreed that, while the U.S. retreat from the eight-decade-old international order it had previously championed creates multiple opportunities for China, Beijing is not naturally filling the vacuum, and regional powers are not pivoting toward it but instead scrambling to diversify security and economic partnerships. The consensus is that the international system is moving toward multipolarity and the world toward an increasingly unstable period, and no one knows yet what will replace the disintegrating post-WWII order.

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China Sees Opportunity in Multipolarity

To commemorate the legacy of the late Michel Oksenberg, a renowned scholar of contemporary China and a pioneer of U.S.-Asia engagement, the Oksenberg Conference, an annual tradition sponsored by APARC and led by the center’s China Program, gathers individuals who have advanced U.S.-Asia dialogue to examine pressing issues affecting China, U.S.-China relations, and broader U.S. Asia policy.

At this year’s convening, the first panel, moderated by Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, focused on how China perceives, interprets, and responds to the new vulnerabilities and opportunities in the international system.

Speaking via video link from Beijing, Da Wei, a professor in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University and the director of its Center for International Security and Strategy, said China views the current moment as neither ideal nor catastrophic but better than recent alternatives.

China has experienced three scenarios, Da explained. First, from the 1990s through the Obama era, China benefited greatly from the U.S.-led liberal order, but was increasingly criticized by the West. Second, during Trump's first term and the Biden administration, while facing mounting pressure of decoupling in a bipolar system, China was forced into a camp with Russia, which Da characterized as Beijing’s “worst scenario.” Now, under Trump's second term, the shift toward multipolarity has redirected pressure away from China and onto multilateral institutions and U.S. allies – "the least bad option" from Beijing’s perspective.

Da argued that “culturally, China has a very low appetite for global governance or leadership.” China sees itself primarily as a regional power, he said. Rather than filling the vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal from international institutions, "we want to be powerful and respected in the region. I don't think China has a very big appetite for leadership in faraway regions, except for economic interests." He contrasted this “Emperor's perspective,” demonstrated by China’s foreign policy, with the U.S. “boss perspective.”

Susan Shirk, a research professor at the University of California, San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy and director emeritus of its 21st Century China Center, noted that China's response to Trump's trade war has been robust, muscular, but disciplined. "The Xi Jinping administration was operating in a more disciplined manner than it had previously," she said, contrasting this approach with what she called Xi's "rash reactions” to Japan and failure to engage Taiwan diplomatically.

Shirk stated that, while Trump's alienation of U.S. allies through extreme tariffs and military interventions has created clear opportunities for China to expand its influence and further divide Washington from Europe and Asian partners, Beijing has only modestly exploited these openings.

She emphasized that Xi's support for Russia in its war against Ukraine represents "self-defeating overreach" that undermines China's ability to improve relations with Europe. "Russia represents an existential threat to Europe," she said. "Xi Jinping really doesn't grasp how important this is."

Mark Lambert, a recently retired U.S. State Department official who served as China coordinator and deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs, contrasted the Biden administration's China strategy with the current U.S. policy vacuum.

The Biden approach, he explained, was rooted in U.S. relations with five Asian treaty allies plus NATO and positioned China as the only country with the means and capabilities to reshape the post-World War II order. It required "all hands on deck" to address this challenge through what U.S. officials called a "lattice work of relations": the Quad involving India, AUKUS with Australia, the Camp David summit between South Korea and Japan, and strengthened linkages between NATO allies and East Asian partners. China's support for Russia's invasion of Ukraine unified Europeans in understanding the China challenge in ways never seen before. The administration also successfully reframed Taiwan's importance, emphasizing that Taiwan's chip dominance was vital to global prosperity.

Today, Lambert argued, the United States either has no China strategy or “one so classified that neither our allies nor our practitioners know what it is.” On security, trade, technology, and international cooperation, the United States has given China “fantastic opportunities,” he noted.

Allies’ Transactional Coping Strategies

The second panel, moderated by Laura Stone, a retired U.S. ambassador and APARC's inaugural China Policy Fellow, turned to other regional states – South Korea, Japan, Russia, and India – and how they read the geopolitical landscape and devise strategies to shape the regional order.

Victor Cha, the D.S. Song-KF Chair and professor of government at Georgetown University and president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), noted that "every U.S. ally around the world is looking at a Plan B," pointing out that, in the first year of the second Trump administration, allies were not acting on these plans, but that "we’re now at a threshold where many of them are executing their Plan B's."

Cha identified seven types of behavior that U.S. partners have adopted when dealing with the Trump administration. These are drawn from a recent CSIS project on ally and partner responses to the paradigm shift in U.S. foreign policy. First is prioritizing face-to-face meetings with Trump himself, "because there's a recognition that the policy process in the United States is broken,” Cha said, “and that policy making is not being informed, as it traditionally has been, by foreign policy professionals. It's all happening at the leader level."

Other strategies include minimizing risk to avoid what Cha called "the Zelensky moment" – the public humiliation Ukraine's president suffered in the Oval Office in February 2025 – and preparing "trophy deliverables," such as South Korea's promise to buy Boeing airplanes and Japan's commitment to purchase Ford trucks.

“The America First policies have effectively put the custodial burden of maintaining the alliance on the partner,” Cha said. “Whether it's Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, or whoever it might be, the burden traditionally has been on the United States, but now it's on the partner. They're the ones who have to try to maintain this relationship. So it's about minimizing risk.” 

South Korea's recent summit with Trump yielded a $350 billion investment package, yet soon after, U.S. immigration authorities raided a Hyundai facility, and Trump threatened 25% tariffs on Korea.

"Why take all this abuse?" Cha asked. His answer: South Korea and Japan see no alternative to the United States on security, and they secured previous concessions in areas such as nuclear submarines, ship building, and enrichment and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, which they do not want to renegotiate. 

One positive outcome, Cha pointed out, has been the unexpectedly warm bilateral relationship between Japan and Korea. Despite having leaders who would normally clash – a far-right conservative in Japan and a progressive in South Korea – the uncertain geopolitical environment has brought the two countries together.

He predicted China would eventually use economic coercion against South Korea over the U.S.-Korea nuclear submarine agreement, just as it did during the 2016-17 THAAD dispute and is currently doing to Japan. "It's not happening now because I don't think China wants bad relations with Japan and Korea at the same time, but it's coming," he said, adding that this development will likely push South Korea closer to the United States and Japan.

Japan Reconsiders Alliance Dependence as Its "Too Big to Fail" Status Proves No Shield

Katherine Monahan, a 2025-26 visiting scholar and Japan Program Fellow at APARC and a foreign service officer with the U.S. Department of State, said Japan's relationship with the United States is "too big to fail," but that has not prevented serious strain between the two allies.

Having served in Tokyo as deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Japan until April 2025, Monahan shared that, when Trump's Liberation Day tariffs hit Japan with a 25% rate, the Japanese could not believe that was the figure next to their name, while other allies were at 20% and 15%. They wondered, “Don't we have any special relationship at all?”

Monahan called attention to a recent Foreign Affairs article by Masataka Okano, Japan's former national security advisor, in which he argues that Japan needs to take strategic autonomy more seriously. When made by a former Japanese official, such a statement represents a significant shift in the nation’s mindset, she said. 

Japan is also reconsidering previously used language around "de-risking" from China in favor of diversifying trade with multiple partners, including China, Canada, and Europe. This shift is happening on the backdrop of the current war with Iran, as 90% of Japanese oil comes through the Strait of Hormuz. “Japan has to start balancing sources and supply chains,” Monahan argued.

Russia Exploits American Unreliability

Russia expert Kathryn Stoner, the Satre Family Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, said America’s unpredictability under Trump represents pure opportunity for Vladimir Putin.

"Putin knows Trump. He gets him," Stoner said. "They have a not-completely dissimilar worldview." Trump's red carpet welcome for Putin at last year's Alaska summit, despite the Russian leader's indictment by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, sent a powerful message, Stoner asserted. So did Trump's lack of concern for democratic values and his criticism of U.S. allies.

She reminded the audience that Putin has been in power for 26 years and has watched multiple U.S. presidents come and go, adapting successfully to each. Putin wants multipolarity, she said, and Trump’s actions have emboldened him. Putin’s goal is to “reclaim Imperial Russia as a global power and restore what he views as its proper sphere of influence,” extending through Ukraine and Belarus into Poland, up to German borders in the west and to the south, through Moldova, Serbia and Bulgaria, to the Black Sea in the east, all the way to the Kamchatka Peninsula. 

According to Stoner, the Russia-China relationship is significantly more durable than many believe. The relationship between the two powers extends beyond oil sales to investment, defense coordination, and sophisticated military exercises. “It kind of doesn't matter whether there's love lost or not. There's an opportunity to be gained on both sides."

"Russia's economy is actually not on the verge of collapse," Stoner added. "It has completely retooled toward the military."

India Feels Betrayed

Emily Tallo, a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, who studies how political elites structure foreign policy debates in democratic countries, especially in India, explained that New Delhi felt especially betrayed by Trump's foreign policy pivot.

The first Trump administration had centered India as a key partner against China. In May 2025, however, when an India-Pakistan conflict flared up, Trump claimed credit for brokering peace, but India took issue with his threat of trade measures to bring an end to the conflict. He then hosted Pakistan's army chief at the White House and signed deals with Islamabad. "This was a twist of the knife for India," Tallo said.

Trump also imposed 50% tariffs on India, including a penalty for buying Russian crude oil, which was not applied to China, and backed out of a QUAD summit in New Delhi.

India now views China as its primary security threat, and the recent India-Pakistan crisis, in which China supplied all of Pakistan's weapon systems and possibly intelligence, made New Delhi’s two-front threat fears a reality. "India is really sensitive to any hints of U.S. retreat in the Indo-Pacific, and any acceptance of Chinese Hegemony in the region," according to Tallo.

She concluded that, like other regional powers, India is committed to preserving the U.S. partnership but is diversifying and seeking a “Plan B.” It finalized free trade agreements with the European Union and the United Kingdom, agreed to purchase French Dassault Rafale jets, and conducted a pragmatic reset with China, citing U.S. unreliability as cover to stabilize a difficult bilateral relationship.

“India wants to be a regional power aligned with but not allied with the United States [...] They want to be considered as the United States’ main partner in Asia and a major counterbalance to China.”

The optimistic assumptions that shaped the wave of globalization at the turn of the 21st century have given way to geoeconomics, also known as economic statecraft, or the use of economic leverage to advance the geopolitical interests of nation-states. In this environment of "weaponized interdependence," corporations have become actors on the frontlines of the U.S.-China rivalry, the Russia-Ukraine war, China-Taiwan tensions, and other national security conflicts in which they are organizationally ill-suited to play a central role, cautions APARC Faculty Affiliate Curtis J. Milhaupt, the William F. Baxter-Visa International Professor of Law and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. 

Milhaupt, an internationally recognized expert on comparative corporate governance, delivered a keynote speech titled Corporate Governance in an Era of Geoeconomics at the Corporate Governance Conference in Milan, Italy, on February 12, 2026. He described the era of geoeconomics as representing a dramatic departure from early 2000s thinking, when capital markets were viewed as politically neutral, shareholder identity was considered irrelevant, and scholars predicted global convergence on Western corporate governance models. All three assumptions have collapsed, posing significant repercussions for firm-specific legal risks and governance challenges. Watch Milhaupt's presentation:

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Heightened Compliance Risk

The U.S.-China rivalry has created a particularly complex challenge for corporate governance, says Mihaupt. The United States has enacted multiple laws to curtail technology transfers to China, with China responding in a tit-for-tat fashion. The resulting, rapidly shifting and conflicting legal environment makes it "virtually impossible for a compliance department to comply with both U.S. and Chinese regulations."

Milhaupt introduced the concept of "ESG + G," adding geoeconomics to the Environmental, Social, and Governance framework used by investors and companies to assess a company's sustainability, ethical impact, and risk management beyond mere financial performance. Like ESG, geoeconomics involves corporations taking on roles traditionally played by governments. "I think in many respects private companies have become national security partners of their home country governments," he said.

Milhaupt's review of the disclosures of risk factors in the securities filings of public companies in the United States over the past 20 years shows the dramatic shift in corporate risk perception. Mentions of geopolitical risks related to export controls, the China-Taiwan conflict, and supply chain vulnerabilities have spiked sharply since 2020, with a particularly dramatic increase following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Despite these challenges, corporations appear to be unprepared for the exploitation of the vulnerabilities created by economic interdependence in the era of geoeconomics. Only 5% of Russell 3000 companies disclose information on how they monitor geopolitical risk, Milhaupt finds. Among those that do, most provide no details about their strategies. Meanwhile, the expertise necessary for geopolitical risk assessment is declining as a percentage of S&P 500 boards of directors.

Divergent Governance Paths

In the era of globalization, corporate governance systems worldwide largely converged around the liberal vision of shareholder primacy. In today’s geoeconomic era, however, a different kind of convergence may be emerging: one shaped less by market ideology and more by the shared political values and strategic priorities of the home governments of globally active firms. Thus, we are witnessing increasing concern with the national identity of corporations and their shareholders, Milhaupt observes. "The standard legal tests for corporate national identity – jurisdiction of incorporation, or the real seat doctrine – are in danger of being overriden by political determinations such as the one that was applied to TikTok in the United States."

At the same time, Milhaupt argues, we may be witnessing the beginning of a movement in the opposite direction to the Western model of corporate governance: "the spread of what might be thought of as state capitalism in the West." To illustrate this trend, Milhaupt cites the case of the U.S. government's "golden share" in U.S. Steel as a condition for allowing its merger with Japanese company Nippon Steel.

While Milhaupt recognizes the necessity of government actions to protect national security in the corporate sector, he warns against ad hoc informal interventions in the private sector. "I don't think that these are really the answer to competition with Beijing," he said. "I'm particularly concerned about the impact of these government interventions on global investment, which relies on a predictable legal regulatory enforcement regime."

Milhaupt concludes that the era of geoeconomics is "the new normal," and both companies and governments must adapt to a world where economic and national security concerns are inextricably linked.