This essay first appeared in The Diplomat.

For decades, South Korean strategy rested on a stable hierarchy within the international order. The alliance with the United States provided security; Seoul then managed relations with Japan, Europe, China, and regional institutions around that anchor. The alliance remains indispensable, but Seoul can no longer assume that this foundation will stay stable.

The evidence is visible in the way Washington now deals with allies. In 2025, the United States initially announced sharply differentiated “reciprocal” tariffs on South Korea, Japan, and the European Union. Negotiations later produced a 15 percent baseline framework for all three, but the process mattered as much as the final rate. Trade access, industrial investment, defense procurement, and alliance politics were increasingly handled as one bargaining package. Allies were not exempt from economic pressure because they were allies.

At the same time, Europe and Asia have been building connections that would have seemed highly ambitious a decade ago. The European Union signed security and defense partnerships with Japan and South Korea in November 2024. This year, the EU and Japan launched a defense-industry dialogue, while the EU and South Korea signed a digital trade agreement and began implementing cooperation on maritime security, cyber and hybrid threats, information manipulation, space, and the defense industry. The strategic map is becoming more networked. 

The network, however, remains uneven. Japan already has a mature economic partnership with the EU and rapidly expanding defense-industry ties. EU-South Korea relations are deepening, but they still lack the density and regular strategic consultation found in EU-Japan ties. A trilateral format would therefore do more than add another meeting: it would reduce asymmetry among three partners whose capabilities are increasingly complementary.

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South Korea, Japan, and the EU now face four converging challenges and pressures.

The first is demographic. South Korea is aging faster than any other OECD society; Japan’s working-age population has been shrinking for decades; and the EU’s fertility rate reached a new low in 2024. Demography is not a social-policy sidebar. It affects defense recruitment, industrial capacity, fiscal room, technological adoption, and the ability to sustain long-term commitments. Each actor is experimenting with immigration, automation, workforce policy, and welfare reform, but the security implications remain largely compartmentalized.

The second is concentrated economic dependence. None of the three can or should decouple from China. Yet South Korea’s experience after the THAAD deployment, Europe’s debates over economic coercion, and China’s export controls on gallium, germanium, and other strategic inputs have shown that interdependence can be converted into leverage. De-risking therefore requires more than national stockpiles. It requires shared risk maps, compatible certification, co-investment in alternative suppliers, and advance consultation before export controls or industrial subsidies create collateral damage among partners.

The third challenge is U.S. volatility. The United States is still the only actor capable of providing extended nuclear deterrence to South Korea and Japan, and NATO remains central to European defense. But dependence on U.S. power now coexists with uncertainty about U.S. policy. The classic alliance dilemmas of abandonment and entrapment are no longer opposite ends of a spectrum. Today, U.S. allies fear both being left out and being drawn into bargains or contingencies they did not shape.

The fourth pressure is the collapse of the old geographic separation between European and Asian security. North Korean munitions, missiles, and troops have supported Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow, in turn, has provided Pyongyang with political cover, economic support, and the prospect of military know-how. What happens on a European battlefield is changing the military balance on the Korean Peninsula. A regional response to a cross-regional threat is structurally inadequate.

This is the case for an EU-Japan-South Korea strategic dialogue. This framework should not be described as strategic autonomy, equidistance, or a hedge against the United States. A better term would be institutionalized hedging: risk diversification through standing, rule-based consultation among allies and partners that remain anchored in the broader U.S.-led system.

The proposal is more feasible than ever before. Japan-South Korea relations have improved significantly in recent years. The January 2026 summit in Nara and the reciprocal summit in South Korea in May demonstrated continuity across leadership changes in both countries since June 2025. The EU already has free-trade, digital, green, and security frameworks with both countries. The task is not to invent three new bilateral relationships; it is to connect existing ones.

The dialogue should begin modestly, through a Track 1.5 process involving officials, experts, and industry. Its early agenda must be concrete and specific: a joint critical minerals and supply chain risk assessment; consultation on export controls and investment screening; cooperation on AI, cyber resilience, and digital standards; exchanges on demographic and defense workforce adaptation; and shared monitoring of North Korea-Russia military cooperation. Successful projects could then be elevated to ministerial working groups.

Two design choices are essential. First, the initiative must remain function-driven. It is not NATO, not the Quad, and not an anti-China coalition. Its purpose is to reduce vulnerability without demanding economic separation. Second, it should be complementary to relations with Washington and transparent about that purpose. Horizontal networks strengthen alliances when they help allies absorb shocks, coordinate positions, and arrive at consultations with greater capacity.

For South Korea, the need is particularly acute. Japan already has the G7, a mature economic partnership with the EU, and expanding European defense ties. Seoul’s international weight has grown faster than its institutional depth. An EU-Japan-South Korea dialogue would help close that gap.

Horizontalizing alliances is not a vote of no confidence in the United States. It is insurance for the moments when the United States wavers, overreaches, or changes course. The postwar hierarchy cannot simply be preserved by demanding more reassurance from Washington. Its resilience will depend on whether allies can build connective tissue among themselves before the next crisis forces them to improvise.

This article was written by Dr. Thomas Fingar, who played an early role in the establishment of SPICE before helping to establish and then leading Stanford’s U.S.–China Relations Program before moving to the U.S. State Department where he served twice as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research. He later served as Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council before returning to Stanford in 2009. This is the sixth of several articles—focusing on the 50-year history of SPICE—that will be posted this year.

The celebration of SPICE’s 50th anniversary attests to the continuing vitality, impact, and success of ideas and constructive activism engendered by unique circumstances at Stanford in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Bay Area China Education Project (BAYCEP) and its successor organization, the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE), did not just happen and its success was not assured. Many innovative projects were launched during that turbulent and transformative period but few survived or had a lasting impact. It is worth reflecting on what made this Stanford initiative different and more successful.

Context matters and it is useful to recall the political and academic environment at the time. It was the golden age of area studies when universities and the national affairs enterprise struggled to understand the societies, cultures, politics, and policies of the more than 100 ‘new’ nations that regained independence or emerged from revolution after World War II. New social science methodologies were developed to support this undertaking, and new ways to teach foreign languages and foreign cultures broadened horizons and facilitated people-to-people interactions that transformed exotic ‘others’ into fellow travelers on planet earth. Stanford was at the forefront of both the area studies and methodological revolutions.

The Vietnam War was a second critical shaper of information and ideas. This was the first ‘television war’ and it gave an immediacy to what was happening in Washington and on the other side of the world. The ‘enemy’ was humanized and the draft forced ordinary Americans to think about people, places, and government policies that were opaque and increasingly personal. Antiwar activism included demonstrations and ‘teach ins’ to educate the public about what was happening and why. These activities occurred in the context of growing dissatisfaction with many gaps between American values and everyday injustice affecting racial minorities, women, the elderly, and the poor. Determination to do something about increasingly unacceptable conditions was rampant.

These factors, and others such as the large size of the area studies community at Stanford and the leadership of key faculty, coalesced in ways that galvanized determination and efforts to link area studies-focused academic research to political action, classroom instruction, and public education. The logic was straightforward. Those at the leading edge of area studies had both an opportunity and an obligation to use what they learned about other countries and cultures to inform and influence politicians and policymakers so that they would see the error of their ways in Vietnam and Asia more broadly and adopt policies more conducive to mutual understanding, peace, and shared prosperity.

The logic of the situation and our understanding of the importance of public opinion in a democracy also drove us to seek ways to use our understanding of Asia to bring Asia and Asians into American classrooms. That meant, among other things, expanding coverage of Asian culture and history in American secondary school textbooks and developing teaching materials and training programs for high school teachers. Fifty years later, it is difficult to imagine how little information and teaching material was available. One reason that is the case is that the founders of SPICE used their knowledge of American education, textbook publishing, and teacher training to move beyond the Europe-centric content of what was and is taught in the United States.

The energy and activism during the formative period did not dissipate when graduate students earned their degrees and embarked upon the next stage of their careers. Some continued to work in and through the SPICE structures. Others accepted positions in the U.S. Government and other nonacademic institutions so that they could play direct and indirect roles in shaping official understanding and public policies. Their activities both contributed to public understanding and utilized increased public awareness and understanding to influence public policy. 

There is a bigger story to be told than the narrow component that was and is the SPICE program, but to say that is not to diminish the importance and impact of the classroom and public education achievements of the people and projects undertaken in the decades since SPICE was originally conceived. I am proud to have been a part of those early efforts and even prouder of the fact that SPICE remains as vital and vibrant as it is today and that I still have opportunities to lecture in its programs. 

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In its June 20, 2026, edition, the Nikkei Shimbun's Market Beat financial analysis column, titled US Stocks Attract Japanese Money, examines how the U.S. stock market is becoming a "major league" that is increasingly attracting capital from Japanese individual investors. Several factors drive this phenomenon:

• Massive IPOs: Unprecedentedly large IPOs, as seen by SpaceX, are capturing global attention and investment.
• Structural Advantages: U.S. markets are moving fast to include new, large companies in major stock indices, which forces index-tracking funds to buy shares and creates automatic demand.
• 24-Hour Trading: U.S. exchanges like the NYSE and Nasdaq are moving toward near 24-hour trading to specifically capture Asian daytime investors, making it easier for them to participate.

The column describes how Japanese investors are increasingly bypassing domestic options to capture the immense growth driven by American AI, data infrastructure, and advanced technology IPOs. "Founders and early-stage investors prefer large-scale markets that offer price discovery, liquidity, and visibility. This is likely to accelerate the concentration of innovative companies in the United States," says Curtis Milhaupt, the William F. Baxter-Visa International Professor of Law and APARC faculty affiliate.

The article notes that the speculative nature of advanced tech sectors inevitably fuels market volatility and could pose risks for Japanese investors looking across the Pacific, urging Japanese investors to identify promising domestic companies.