In recent years, China's military modernization and assertive actions have led to more frequent and dangerous encounters between the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the militaries of key regional players in the Indo-Pacific. Each encounter heightens the chance of a military conflict in the region. A new report published by the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) assesses the PLA’s strategic thinking on escalation control, analyzing the potential for conflict in the region and exploring regional responses and implications for deterrence.

Edited by Chinese military expert Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at APARC and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the report, "Encounters and Escalation in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives on China’s Military and Implications for Regional Security," comprises six essays, each detailing an encounter with the PLA. These case studies include China’s maritime disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam and its increasingly aggressive military activities vis-à-vis Australia, India, and Taiwan.

The authors of the essays are current and former practitioners with insight into their government’s experiences and thinking. Their assessments emphasize the need for Asia-Pacific countries to reevaluate their defense capabilities and adopt clear and consistent policy approaches to navigate the complex geopolitical landscape in the region.

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Tactics, Intentions, and Shared Threat Perceptions

As the PLA adopts a more assertive approach beyond its maritime boundaries, nations across the Indo-Pacific region have increasingly experienced perilous encounters with the Chinese military. For example, the PLA's intensifying aggression around Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea led to several incidents of maritime tension with the Philippines. Likewise, a Chinese fighter aircraft intercepted an Australian surveillance aircraft during its routine activity in international airspace over the South China Sea, posing a safety risk to the Australian aircraft and its crew.

The authors of the six case studies in the NBR report agree "that China harbors problematic intentions and is using increasingly aggressive and risk-acceptant tactics to accomplish its goals." While they show that China uses different tactics in different situations and differ in their evaluations of the most troublesome tactics for their respective countries, their analyses share several common themes, which Mastro reviews in her introduction to the report, titled "Close Encounters with the PLA: Regional Experiences and Implications for Deterrence."

First, “China doctrinally does not take any responsibility for the deterioration in the strategic environment,” writes Mastro. “All six case studies mention China’s tendency to publicly blame the other country for whatever crisis unfolded.”

China also sees crises as opportunities, Mastro explains, and most case studies indicate that the crises at stake were deliberate acts of PLA escalation. All case studies also reflect Chinese strategic thinking on deterrence as serving dual purposes: firstly, to discourage adversaries from certain actions, and secondly, to influence their behavior in line with the deterrer's intentions, ultimately requiring them to comply with the deterrer's preferences.

Another common theme is that the PLA's assertive actions have prompted all six nations studied in the report to boost security cooperation with the United States and other regional powers, albeit to varying extents. For example, in addition to enhancing its strategic partnership with the United States, India has enhanced its defense ties with the two other Quad members (Japan and Australia) and regional partners such as Vietnam, Singapore, and the Philippines.

Moreover, based on their encounters with the PLA, almost all regional players have concluded that strengthening their military capabilities will discourage Chinese aggressive behavior in the future, Mastro says, noting that “changes in defense posture have perhaps been the most drastic in Japan.”

Policy Implications

The report's case studies offer policy recommendations for deterring China, emphasizing the importance of a consistent approach that includes strengthening deterrence capabilities through military modernization, firm stances on border disputes, and close security cooperation with the United States, its allies, and other like-minded nations. While there is consensus that military deterrence needs to be balanced with diplomatic engagements to reduce tensions, each regional player views the effectiveness of diplomacy and cooperation with China differently.

“Ultimately,” Mastro concludes, “the path forward for maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region requires a cohesive strategy that prioritizes long-term security interests, demonstrating the essential role of international cooperation and the strategic interplay between military readiness and diplomatic efforts in navigating China’s aggression.”

Learn more about the report and download Mastro’s introductory essay > 

On May 2, 2024, Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) marked the inauguration of its new Taiwan Program at the conference Innovate Taiwan: Shaping the Future of a Postindustrial Society. The program will produce policy-relevant research to tackle the challenges facing Taiwan’s economy and society in a new era of global relations. It will also prepare the next generation of students to become experts on Taiwan and foster interactions between the Stanford community and Taiwanese stakeholders.

The program’s inaugural conference reflected this triadic mission. It gathered leading industry and academic experts from the United States and Taiwan with Stanford students to engage in diverse panel discussions. The all-day event saw a high turnout of attendees from Stanford and the broader community, including alumni and stakeholders from Taiwan.

Stanford President Richard Saller congratulated the program's establishment, noting it will advance Stanford as a global university by producing scholarship that transcends academic boundaries. “The program will do what Stanford does best — provide a cross-disciplinary, university-wide hub, where scholars from across campus and beyond can convene to study contemporary Taiwan,” said Saller. He described Taiwan as a beacon of democracy and the program’s establishment as demonstrating the university’s belief in the importance of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.

APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and a professor of sociology in the School of Humanities and Sciences, remarked that students and community members have increasingly expressed interest in studying Taiwan. “This is an opportune time to launch a Taiwan program with a comprehensive focus on economic, social, cultural, educational, and health-related matters,” he said. Shin underscored the program’s commitment to inspire new generations of Stanford students to engage with Taiwan.

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Taiwan's Evolving Cultural Landscape

The first panel delved into contemporary research on Taiwan's societal and cultural trends and reflected on the nature of Taiwan studies. Pei-Chia Lan, a professor of sociology at National Taiwan University, shared findings from her research into the emerging formation of second-generation identity in Taiwan. She explained that an influx of immigrants and their bicultural children are transforming Taiwan’s self-perceived racial and ethnic homogeneity. For Lan, “Migration provides a critical lens for investigating Taiwan's history, transformation, and globalized development.”

Jing Tsu, Yale University’s Jonathan D. Spence Chair Professor of Comparative Literature & East Asian Languages and Literatures, offered a captivating account of the increasing appeal of Taiwan’s folk religious tradition exemplified in Mazu pilgrimages honoring the Goddess of the Sea or Taiwan’s “heavenly mother.” Tsu positioned the phenomenon of Mazu worship relative to Taiwanese identity, framing Taiwan's cultural heritage within a global context.

Ruo-Fan Liu, a PhD candidate in sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and incoming postdoctoral fellow at APARC, zoomed out from her research on education and culture in Taiwan to a larger vision of Taiwan studies in North America. She outlined three strategies to propel the field forward: enhancing data accessibility, bolstering theorizing capability, and expanding transnational and global comparisons. APARC Deputy Director and Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui moderated the conversation, integrating the diverse perspectives into a discussion of Taiwan's societal milieu.

Technology, Innovation, and Economic Growth

The conference emphasized Taiwan's success as a modernization exemplar while addressing its challenges on the journey toward a sustainable economic future.

The second panel examined Taiwan's strides in healthcare innovation and biotechnological advancements, with industry leaders offering glimpses into the transformative potential of AI-driven healthcare solutions. Ted Chang, CTO of Quanta Computer, Bobby Sheng, Group CEO of Bora Pharmaceuticals, and C. Jason Wang, Stanford’s LCY Tan Lan Lee Professor of Pediatrics and Health Policy, reflected on the convergence of technology and healthcare delivery and the new era it heralds for personalized medicine and digital health solutions. APARC’s Asia Health Policy Program Director Karen Eggleston moderated the discussion, prompting the panelists to consider questions of equitable access and trust in healthcare technology.

Larry Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, led a following conversation on the strategic imperatives for Taiwan's economic future and global positioning. Four experts joined him: Steve Chen, co-founder of YouTube, Jason Hsu, former legislator of the Legislative Yuan Taiwan, investment banker CY Huang, founder and president of FCC Partners, and digital commerce leader Rose Tsou, a former executive at Verizon Media, MTV, and Yahoo.

The panelists agreed that Taiwan must address its strained cross-Strait relations, develop a more diversified economy, move beyond sole reliance on semiconductors, and modify its energy policy to meet growing electricity demand and the transition to a low-carbon economy.

Another consensus emerged about the need for government intervention to create an environment more conducive to entrepreneurship and global talent. Chen, who relocated his family to Taiwan in 2019 after two decades in Silicon Valley, shared his efforts in cultivating the island's startup ecosystem and experience being the inaugural recipient of the Taiwan Gold Card Visa, issued by the Taiwanese government to attract foreign talent for residence and employment.

Taiwanese Identity and Taiwan Studies at Stanford

Highlighting the role of youth and community engagement, the conference also included a student panel centered on Taiwanese identity and Taiwan studies on campus. Second-year student in Management Science and Engineering Tiffany Chang, who is also a pageant queen and research assistant at APARC, shared her introspective journey of self-discovery through her experience becoming Miss Asia USA, representing the Taiwanese community, and acting as an ambassador for Asian communities at large.

Carissa Cheng, a third-year student in International Relations, described her advocacy for community cohesion via Stanford’s Taiwanese Cultural Society. Yi-Ting Chung, a PhD candidate in the Department of History, recounted her experience designing and teaching a course in Taiwanese history. She argued that Taiwanese history merits being taught in a dedicated history class rather than as a subset of Chinese or Japanese history. ”The existence of a Taiwanese history class at Stanford is a statement and a way for students to have a vested interest in Taiwan,” she said. Third-year student in international Relations Marco Widodo moderated the dynamic conversation.

Marked by multidisciplinary inquiry and cross-cultural exchange, the conference ignited dialogue on Taiwan’s future and generated enthusiasm for collaboration on building a leading program on Taiwan at Stanford.

Media coverage of the "Innovate Taiwan" conference is available via:

Central News Agency >
Radio Taiwan International >

Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) proudly announces the launch of the Taiwan Program, which will serve as an interdisciplinary research and education hub on contemporary Taiwan. The program will investigate Taiwan’s strides as a modernization exemplar and the challenges its economy and society face in seeking to drive dynamism and growth in an era marked by shifting global relations. On May 2, 2024, APARC will host the program’s inaugural conference, Innovate Taiwan: Shaping the Future of a Postindustrial Society. Registration for the conference is now open.

Mirroring the dilemmas of other postindustrial societies, Taiwan today finds itself pressed by multiple imperatives. These include the need to generate novel economic competitiveness models amid rapid technological advancement and declining multilateral cooperation, address changing demographic realities, foster cultural diversity and tolerance, fulfill the action pathway to achieve net-zero emissions, and create the institutional and policy conditions to enable these adaptations. The Taiwan Program will explore how Taiwan can effectively address these challenges and seize the opportunities they afford for it to remain at the forefront of vibrancy and progress in the 21st century. 

Housed within APARC, part of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), the Taiwan Program will pursue a mission encompassing research endeavors, education and learning initiatives, and exchange opportunities. By investing in these three core areas, the program will produce interdisciplinary, policy-relevant research to understand and address Taiwan’s challenges of economic, social, technological, environmental, and institutional adaptation in the coming decades; prepare the next generation of students to become experts on Taiwan; and facilitate meaningful interactions between Stanford faculty, researchers, and students with their Taiwanese counterparts and with policy experts, industry leaders, and civil society stakeholders in Taiwan. In all these areas, the program will leverage APARC’s expertise and networks and build upon the center’s strong track record of academic research and policy engagement with East Asia. This includes leveraging the proven model and rich experience of APARC’s esteemed programs on contemporary China, Japan, and Korea.

"The Taiwan Program underscores our commitment to deepening understanding of and engagement with Taiwan,” said Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and director of APARC. “We aim to foster research-practice partnerships between the United States and Taiwan while contributing to Taiwan's long-term development," added Shin, who is also a professor of sociology, a senior fellow at FSI, and director of the Korea Program at APARC.

The program will be led by a distinguished scholar of contemporary Taiwan to be recruited by the university in an international search. APARC will soon announce its inaugural postdoctoral fellow on contemporary Taiwan, who will help organize the program’s activities in the next academic year. The new program is made possible thanks to tremendous support from several Stanford donors who care deeply about Taiwan’s role on the global stage and U.S.-Taiwan relations. 

"We are profoundly grateful to our supporters for their partnership and commitment to advancing understanding of Taiwan and the U.S.-Taiwan relationship in this pivotal Asia-Pacific region," noted Shin. “This new investment will help us establish a world-leading program on Taiwan at Stanford.”

To inaugurate the new program, APARC will host the conference "Innovate Taiwan: Shaping the Future of a Postindustrial Society." Held on May 2 at the Bechtel Conference Center in Encina Hall, this full-day event will convene esteemed academic and industry leaders to engage in panel discussions covering topics such as migration, culture, and societal trends; health policy and biotechnology; economic growth and innovation; and the dynamics of domestic and international Taiwanese industries. Visit the conference webpage to learn more and register to attend in person.

This commentary originally appeared in The New York Times.

For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

That equilibrium has been upset. China is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing and Washington. War seems likelier each day.

It’s not too late to restore the kind of balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease China’s concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it prevents war.

Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan’s eventual political status.

The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a robust military deterrence. But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the power of reassurance, try to understand China’s deep sensitivities about Taiwan and should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.

During the Cold War, Beijing and Washington signed a series of communiqués related to Taiwan. One of them said the United States “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” This and other wording was deliberately ambiguous, but it was accepted by all sides as a commitment to avoid rocking the boat. China still views this arrangement as binding.

To be clear, it was China that began rocking the boat first.

Since 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected president of Taiwan (succeeding a more China-friendly administration), Xi Jinping has repeatedly brandished China’s military power with large-scale military exercises and other pressure tactics apparently meant to discourage independence sentiment on Taiwan.

U.S. political figures have rightly responded with rhetorical support for democratic Taiwan, by supplying it with weapons and by strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region. But the American reaction is also pouring fuel on the fire.

I have worked on U.S. defense strategy in various military roles for more than a decade. I recently traveled to Beijing, where I met with Chinese government and military officials, leading academics and experts from Communist Party-affiliated think tanks. During these talks it was clear that Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity and toward supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence.

They have plenty of evidence to point to.

In December 2016, Donald Trump became the first U.S. president or president-elect since the normalization of China-U.S. relations in 1979 to speak directly with a Taiwanese leader, when Ms. Tsai called to congratulate him on his election victory. President Biden has, on four occasions, contradicted the U.S. policy of ambiguity by saying we would support Taiwan militarily if China attacked. The number of U.S. Congress members visiting Taiwan — which China views as overt support for the island’s independence — reached a decade high last year, including an August 2022 trip by Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House at the time and the highest-ranking U.S. official travel to Taiwan since the 1990s. That has continued this year: In June a nine-member congressional delegation, the largest in years, arrived in Taipei.

Provocative legislation has not helped. Last year the Taiwan Policy Act, which articulated support for Taiwan’s role in international organizations, was introduced in the Senate, and in July of this year the House passed a similar act. House Republicans introduced a motion in January to recognize Taiwan as an independent country.

Actions like these put great pressure on Mr. Xi, who won’t tolerate going down in history as the Chinese leader to have lost Taiwan. That would be seen in Beijing as an existential threat, potentially fueling separatist sentiment in restive regions like Tibet and Xinjiang.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve.

Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners. The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

There would doubtless be blowback in Washington and Taipei, and Mr. Xi may already have made up his mind to seize Taiwan, regardless of the U.S. stance. But a politically neutral position on Taiwan is what the United States has followed for decades. Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and George H.W. and George W. Bush advocated peaceful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing to resolve their differences.

There also are longer-term repercussions to consider: If the combination of deterrence and reassurance fails and China attacks Taiwan, it will set a precedent in which Chinese leaders kill and destroy to achieve their goals. But if a pathway remains for China to eventually convince Taiwan’s people — through inducements or pressure — that it is in their interest to peacefully unify, then that may be a China that we can live with.

In the best-case scenario, the United States and China would reach a high-level agreement, a new communiqué, in which Washington reiterates its longstanding political neutrality and China commits to dialing back its military threats. This would avert war while giving China political space to work toward peaceful unification. That might mean using its clout to isolate Taiwan and eventually convince the island’s people that it should strike a deal with Beijing. But it isn’t Washington’s place to prevent the unification of the two sides — only to ensure that doesn’t happen through military force or coercion.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict, and that means speaking more softly but carrying a big stick.

Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) invites applications for a postdoctoral fellowship and a visiting scholar position on contemporary Taiwan to begin in Autumn Quarter 2024. These new positions are part of APARC’s expansion of its work on Taiwan, focusing particularly on its economy, society, and culture in a new era of global relations and “postindustrial” development.

About the Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Taiwan

The postdoctoral fellow participates in APARC’s research and engagement activities while undertaking original research on contemporary Taiwan. We welcome fellowship applications from candidates studying issues related to how Taiwan can meet the challenges and opportunities of economic, social, technological, environmental, and institutional adaptation in the coming decades, using a variety of disciplines including the social sciences, public policy, and business.

The postdoctoral fellowship appointment begins in Autumn Quarter 2024 and is for one academic year, with a possibility of extension contingent on satisfactory performance and funding.

The fellowship is limited to recent PhDs: applicants cannot be more than three years past the awarding of their doctoral degree when the fellowship starts. They must have degree conferral and official approval/certification no later than June 30 prior to the fellowship start date (that is, no later than June 30, 2024, for 2024-25 fellowships starting in autumn 2024).

Postdoctoral fellows are required to be in residence for the duration of the appointment and to take part in APARC activities throughout the academic year. Fellows are also expected to support programmatic needs such as colloquiums and participate in research collaboration through the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL). The postdoctoral fellowship is a 10-month appointment with a salary of approximately $65,000 (annual rate of $78,000), or commensurate with Stanford policy and set minimums, plus up to $3,000 for research expenses.

The application deadline is January 1, 2024. Read on for the application guidelines.

Apply for the Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Taiwan

Interested candidates must follow these requirements:

I. Fill out the online application form;

II. Upload the following materials to the online form (in English, PDF format):

• Curriculum vitae;
• A short research statement (not to exceed five typed pages, double-spaced) that describes the research and writing to be undertaken during the fellowship period, as well as the proposed publishable product.

III. Submit the completed application form along with the required materials;

IV. Submit Letters of Recommendation: 
Email THREE (3) letters of recommendation (in PDF format) to taiwanprogramfellowship@stanford.edu. We will accept official letters of recommendation from the applicant, a dossier service, or directly from references.

All applications must be received by 11:59 p.m. Pacific Time on Monday, January 1, 2024.

Once we have received all components of your application, including three recommendations, we will send you an email confirming the completion of your application. If you have not received this email, you may send an email checking your application status. 

Note: Please be advised that Stanford University will close for winter break from December 21, 2023, through January 3, 2024, and response time to inquiries during this period may be delayed.

About the Visiting Scholarship on Contemporary Taiwan

The visiting scholar on contemporary Taiwan will work collaboratively with APARC faculty and researchers, Stanford faculty, and students to conduct research related to how Taiwan can meet the challenges and opportunities of economic, social, technological, environmental, and institutional adaptation in the coming decades, using a variety of disciplines including the social sciences, public policy, and business.

The visiting scholar position is available to researchers and professionals with PhD degrees or substantial records of professional achievement related to contemporary Taiwan. Applicants must be visiting from and affiliated with an outside institution or organization and must be proficient in the English language. There is a preference for mid-career professionals with a strong research and publication record. Visiting fellows are selected on the basis of prior professional achievements and the quality of research and publication proposals.

The appointment begins in Autumn Quarter 2024 and is for one academic year. The visiting scholar will be offered $30,000 as a supplementary stipend.

Visiting scholars are required to be in residence for the duration of the appointment, take part in APARC activities throughout the academic year, and meet with collaborators and stakeholders as needed. They are also expected to support programmatic needs such as colloquiums and participate in research collaboration through the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL). Additional privileges include access to Stanford research facilities, the opportunity to audit relevant University lecture courses without a fee (subject to permission of the instructor), and the opportunity to participate in events at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and elsewhere on campus.

The center is still accepting applications for the 2024-2025 visiting fellowship. Read on for the application guidelines.

Apply for the Visiting Scholar Position on Contemporary Taiwan

I. Fill out the online application form;

II. Upload the following materials to the online form (in English, PDF format):

• A formal letter of request containing a detailed proposal of the work to be carried out while in residency at APARC;
• A formal and complete academic curriculum vitae, including a list of publications.

III. Submit the completed application form along with the required materials;

IV. Submit two (2) letters of reference. The letters of reference should be emailed to taiwanprogramfellowship@stanford.edu. The candidate’s legal name and email address must be included on top of each required document.

Contact

For questions about the application process for the postdoctoral fellowship and visiting scholar position, please contact Kristen Lee at taiwanprogramfellowship@stanford.edu. 

About APARC

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) addresses critical issues affecting the countries of Asia, their regional and global affairs, and U.S.-Asia relations. As Stanford University’s hub for the interdisciplinary study of contemporary Asia, we produce policy-relevant research, provide education and training to students, scholars, and practitioners, and strengthen dialogue and cooperation between counterparts in the Asia-Pacific and the United States. For more information, visit aparc.stanford.edu.

Stanford University is an equal opportunity employer, and we welcome applications from diverse backgrounds that would bring additional dimensions to the university's research and teaching missions. Diversity includes, but is not limited to, culture, socioeconomic background, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, physical capabilities, and life experience.

More Fellowship Opportunities at APARC

APARC offers additional Fall 2024 Asia Studies Fellowships that are now open for applications. We have opportunities for both emerging scholars and established professionals:

• Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellowship
• Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Japan
• Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Asia
• Stanford Next Asia Policy Postdoctoral and Visiting Fellowships
• Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Fellowship on Southeast Asia

This commentary first appeared as part of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Interpret:China series. 

Tensions at the Taiwan Strait are at an all-time high. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit marked the highest level of exchange between U.S. and Taiwanese officials since 1997. China used the visit as a pretext to conduct large-scale military exercises encircling the island, coupled with rhetoric about how it could successfully use force to unify if it decided to do so.

The dynamics between China and the United States over Taiwan are eerily like those laid out in Zuo Xiying’s balanced, informative article. Zuo accurately captures the U.S. deterrence strategy toward Russia before its invasion of Ukraine—highlighting key components such as threatening economic sanctions and international isolation, as well as providing training and equipment to Ukraine to enhance its ability to defend itself. But deterrence failed, the reasons (according to Zuo) being that the United States did not do more to reassure Russia of its peaceful intentions and that ultimately costs are difficult to calculate ahead of time. Once war broke out, as Zuo also points out, the United States escalated its involvement by providing military aid to Ukraine, which increased the costs of the war to Russia.

What does all this mean for U.S. deterrence strategy with respect to Taiwan? Zuo recognizes that “for China, the Russia-Ukraine conflict acts as a mirror. . . . China needs to not only study in depth how the United States deters and how it punishes Russia, but also to carefully analyze how Russia perceives the United States’ threats and to derive experience and lessons from therein.” But he leaves the reader wondering what those lessons are. He hints in his discussion on Ukraine that a U.S. strategy to build up Taiwan’s defenses is unlikely to deter China; however, he also indirectly suggests that China may be underestimating the costs of war. Successful deterrence, Zuo notes, “requires not only that the United States itself has powerful forces and strong resolve but that it can make the other side accurately feel the threat and have an accurate calculation of the costs and benefits. But the real world is complicated, and it is difficult to have both conditions present at once.” In other words, he thinks there is an intermediate step needed in a deterrence strategy. The United States has to not only issue a credible threat, but also make the other side accurately assess the costs and benefits of certain actions.

Zuo does not seem optimistic. He implies the United States needs to increase efforts to paint a more specific picture of what it would do if war broke out—but that, even if it did, the message still might not get through. The reader is left with an acute understanding that if there is war over Taiwan, failures in both Beijing and Washington will be to blame.

This commentary originally appeared in Shukan Toyokeizai.

Military tensions between China and Taiwan rise, and the U.S. government informs the Japanese government that it wants to deploy U.S. forces in Japan to defend Taiwan. At the same time, China sends a message through various channels that it will not touch Japan at all if it does not cooperate with the U.S. military and remains neutral.

In the event of a Taiwan contingency, It is highly likely that military conflict between China and Taiwan will lead to a decision by the U.S. military to intervene, followed by the deployment of fighter jets and naval vessels from U.S. military bases in Japan. In the process, Japan will be forced to make a major choice. 

If U.S. forces are deployed to the area around Taiwan, U.S. bases located in Japan, including Okinawa, will serve as bases. Under the so-called “Far East Clause” of Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, U.S. forces can use Japanese facilities and areas “to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.” However, the deployment of U.S. forces under the Far East Clause requires prior consultation with the Japanese side. Nevertheless, there is little chance that the Japanese government will turn the US down for fear of a confrontation with China. If Japan were to refuse at the last minute, the trust between Japan and the U.S. would be damaged, and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty regime would effectively collapse. As a result, Japan would have no choice but to confront China alone. This would be a bad move that would only be a temporary fix. 

However, some officials from the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are concerned about how the public would react. From China's point of view, this is a point to take advantage of, and by communicating that "Japan will be safe if it declares its neutrality," it may be able to divide Japan, the U.S., and Taiwan. 

The phrase "a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency" was introduced by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at a symposium sponsored by a Taiwanese think tank in 2006. This comment was followed by the statement, "It is also a contingency for the Japan-U.S. alliance." How will Japanese public opinion react to the "ultimate choice" in the face of a Taiwan contingency? 

An interesting study, part of the Stanford Japan Barometer, conducted by Stanford University sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui and his colleagues examined this issue using a method called conjoint experiments. 

The subjects were presented with two scenarios: "In the event of an emergency in Taiwan, under what circumstances would you be more likely to support military involvement by the Self-Defense Forces?" The subjects were presented with two scenarios and asked to choose the one in which they would be more likely to support Japan's military involvement. 

In the event of a Taiwan contingency, the researchers presented three options in each of five categories: "Chinese actions," "U.S. actions," "Chinese actions toward Japan," "U.S. actions toward Japan," and "international community reaction. In an experiment in which each of more than 7,000 subjects was asked to answer which of two scenarios in which they were randomly combined would support Japan's military involvement in the event of an emergency in Taiwan. The series of scenarios reflect the opinions of security experts who participated in simulations of a Taiwan contingency conducted by various agencies in the United States. The results show whether support for Japan's military involvement strengthened or weakened when each scenario was presented.

One of these scenarios is precisely related to the aforementioned issue. When China promised Japan that it would not touch Japanese territory, including the Senkaku Islands, support for Japan's military involvement weakened. On the other hand, if China landed on and occupied the Senkaku Islands at the same time as its invasion of Taiwan, support for Japan's military involvement increased. The result is clear: "Japanese people place the highest priority on the impact on Japanese territory," said Professor Tsutsui. 

The survey results indicate that Japan is hesitant to fight China but would respond to a request from the U.S. military for logistical support. How will Japan be involved in a Taiwan contingency? Public opinion is not yet settled. 

In reality, many experts believe that if U.S. forces deployed from bases in Japan clash with Chinese forces, the next request will be for cover by the Self-Defense Forces. It is quite a narrow pass to say that they will not participate in combat and only provide logistical support. 

As for why Japan should get involved in a Taiwan contingency, the debate tends to settle on supply chain issues, particularly in the area of semiconductors, or geopolitical importance. Many Japanese, however, may feel that such reasons alone are not sufficient to make a decision to put the lives of Self-Defense Force personnel on the line and the residents of the Nansei Islands at risk. 
The supply chains that Japanese firms have built in East Asia, including China, would also be severely damaged. In addition, Chinese nationalism would flare up violently if it were to fight Japan again. The cost of fighting China as a neighbor is extremely high for Japan. 

Where Did You Get the Money To Pay for the Succession?
 

The issue of money is also unavoidable. In order to prepare for contingencies, we must also consider financing the cost of war. 

If the armed conflict with China is prolonged, huge fiscal outlays will be required not only for the continuation of the war but also for the repair of domestic infrastructure. In addition to supplementary budgets, it will be necessary to issue government bonds. 

However, Japanese financial institutions alone may not be able to digest the Japanese Government Bonds. For this reason, a simulation by the Japan Strategy Research Forum this year called for the direct underwriting of Japanese Government Bonds by the Bank of Japan. 

Junichi Kanda, a Bank of Japan alumnus in the House of Representatives who served as finance minister, opposed this proposal, saying, "It would cause a sudden loss of confidence in Japan's finances and the yen, leading to a significant depreciation of the yen to over 300 yen to the dollar and an increase in interest rates to over 10%. Such an extreme depreciation of the yen would also hinder the purchase of equipment and materials in foreign currency. 

Instead, Kanda suggested issuing foreign currency-denominated government bonds for foreigners. However, since there has been no such issuance since 1988, it is necessary to gradually issue these bonds from normal times to develop investors, he said. 

The prerequisite is that confidence in Japan's finances is secured. Japan needs to maintain fiscal discipline on a regular basis in case of emergency," said Kanda. Even in peacetime, there is a strong argument in Japan for using government bonds as a source of funds for increased defense spending. If the government cannot even raise taxes, China will question its seriousness. More open and substantive discussions are needed if the Japanese people are to be convinced to accept the costs of a Taiwan contingency.