"Gender has emerged as a force of political polarization in South Korea in the recent decade and Yoojung’s thesis explores the reasons for its emergence," notes Gi-Wook Shin, Director, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and Professor, Department of Sociology. "It is an important scholarly contribution, as in it, Yoojung illuminates how the case of South Korea challenges conventional scholarly wisdom, which posits that women are primarily responsible for gender gaps in electoral behavior as modernization has led to liberal attitudes among women. Yoojung instead investigates the male experience – ironically understudied in discussions on gender – and demonstrates that instead of women, in South Korea, it is men that drive the gender gap."

Lee contextualizes her thesis: "On May 10, 2022, Yoon Seok-yeol was inaugurated as the 20th president of South Korea. His victory, however, was hardly a landslide: the conservative candidate won by a mere margin of 0.73% after securing core support among young male voters. Meanwhile, most young female voters opted for the Democratic candidate Lee Jae-myung.

Many salient explanations about the origin of gender differences in voting currently exist in literature. The review of the literature suggests that variations in the electoral gender gap over time have been a direct product of changes in female political judgements. However, such an interpretation underplays the role and viewpoints of men.”

Lee further elaborates, “my thesis attends to the overlooked male experience. It uses the Korean General Social Survey (2003 – 2021) to determine whether 1) Korean men have become more conservative in their partisan preferences and 2) these right-leaning tendencies are correlated with higher unemployment. The results of my logistic regression ultimately demonstrated that the belief in an enduring modern gender gap by virtue of female progressivism is misplaced, since Korean men, markedly disaffected by their economic conditions, have been giving more support to the conservative parties. In light of these findings, it would certainly be interesting to look at whether unemployment is a salient source of gender cleavage in other countries."

Sponsored by the Korea Program and the Center for East Asian Studies, the writing prize recognizes and rewards outstanding examples of writing by Stanford students in an essay, term paper, or thesis produced during the current academic year in any discipline within the area of Korean studies, broadly defined. The competition is open to both undergraduate and graduate students.

Past Recipients:
11th Annual Prize (2022)
10th Annual Prize (2021)
9th Annual Prize (2020)
8th Annual Prize (2019)
7th Annual Prize (2018)
6th Annual Prize (2017)
5th Annual Prize (2016)
4th Annual Prize (2015)
3rd Annual Prize (2014)
2nd Annual Prize (2013)
1st Annual Prize (2012)

The April 10 parliamentary elections in South Korea resulted in a landslide victory for the liberal opposition, dealing a resounding setback to President Yoon Suk Yeol and his ruling conservative People Power Party. While the liberal Democratic Party fell short of achieving a super majority, the outcome reflects pervasive public discontent with Yoon's administration amid economic challenges and political controversies, placing Yoon in a difficult position for the remainder of his three-year term.

“In a sense, this was a rematch between President Yoon and Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung, whom Yoon defeated in the 2022 presidential race by a razor-thin margin, and Lee won in a big way,” explains Stanford sociologist and APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin. “Now the Democratic Party really became Lee’s party.”

Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and the director of the Korea Program at APARC, joined the Korea Society for a livestreamed election analysis session. Watch it here:

The election outcomes reflect the increased political division and polarization gripping South Korea, which is poised to be a major issue for Korean politics in the coming years, Shin notes. Shin has written extensively about the roles of illiberalism, populism, and polarization in the decline of Korean democracy and their implications for Korean society and politics.

“I have said before that Korea is facing a crisis in democracy. Now I can say that Korea is also facing a crisis in political leadership,” he tells Korea Society Policy Program Officer Chelsie Alexandre.

In this session, Shin explores in detail what the election results mean for Korea’s political, economic, and social policy, its alliance with the United States, and its relations with regional states.

Shin has also contributed to election analysis in national and international media.

Reboot of Adversarial Politics

South Korean voters’ verdict on the Yoon government’s performance reflects deep disappointment and even resentment about some of his policies and leadership styles, Shin shares with Bloomberg News. As the opposition holds a large majority in the National Assembly, Yoon appears destined to complete his remaining three years in office as a lame duck, unable to push for any major policy initiatives, domestic or foreign. We should expect a reboot of adversarial politics in South Korea as the opposition looks to obstruct Yoon’s legislative agenda, Shin predicts. 

Voter turnout for the parliamentary elections reached 67 percent, marking the highest turnout for general elections in 32 years. Liberals expressed discontent with the government by sending a strong message through voting, while the ruling conservative party tried to mobilize its supporters to minimize losses. Ultimately "there were no major policy debates between the ruling and main opposition parties," says Shin in an interview with Singaporean public broadcast service CNA.

Shin anticipates the Democratic Party will likely contest Yoon's stance toward Tokyo and Washington. Speaking with French international news agency AFP, Shin explains the potential return of former U.S. President Donald Trump, who held high-profile but unsuccessful summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his presidency, could add to the tension. If Trump were to reengage with North Korea, then the Yoon government would have to decide whether to shift from its hardline policies against the North or risk friction between Washington and Seoul, Shin says.

The election outcomes could also hinder the Yoon government’s momentum for improving ties with Japan, especially since Japanese Prime Minister Kishida, too, is facing low domestic approval ratings, Shin tells The Korea Herald. "It is unfortunate for the Korea-Japan relationship that both leaders are politically struggling."

Despite facing legal issues, controversial opposition leader Lee Jae-myung remains a leading contender for the presidency when Yoon's term ends in 2027, echoing the situation with former U.S. President Donald Trump, he tells AFP.

Gender and Generational Gaps

The parliamentary election has also brought to relief the tremendous underrepresentation of women and young people in Korean politics. Only 20% of parliamentary seats are held by women, and over 85% of elected members are over the age of 50. The older establishment and the conservative People Power Party have failed to connect with South Korea's young people, Shin says. While the country is a global cultural force and excelling in semiconductor exports, South Korea’s younger people are facing intense competition in education, limited job prospects, and soaring housing prices. “The lack of understanding of the challenges the youth face is contributing to the country's rising generational conflict,” Shin explains via AFP.

The Korean Peninsula stands at a perilous crossroads. Recent missile tests and provocations, coupled with historical trends, paint a worrisome picture of the current state of affairs, prompting some analysts to warn of a looming conflict. The Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC recently hosted two events to analyze these escalating tensions that have sparked global concern.

On February 21, the seminar “Slow Boil: What to Expect from North Korea in 2024,” featured Victor Cha, D.S. Song-KF Chair, Professor of Government at Georgetown University, and Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Cha discussed historical behavioral patterns of North Korean missile tests, military provocations, and weapons demonstrations, and what all these might mean for security on the Korean peninsula.

The following week, on March 7, at the seminar  “Is North Korea Preparing for War?,” we were joined by Robert Carlin, a non-resident scholar at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and Siegfried Hecker, a professor of practice at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, and in the Department of Nuclear Engineering at Texas A&M University. Carlin and Hecker, both formerly our colleagues at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation, discussed their recent 38 North article, “Is Kim Jong Un Preparing for War?,” which posits that Pyongyang has already made the strategic decision to go to war. 

The speakers at both events delved into the various rationales behind North Korea's actions and provided contrasting viewpoints on the trajectory of the situation. While Carlin and Hecker painted a grim picture of North Korea's intentions to engage in warfare and advocated for robust security measures, Cha argued that, while 2024 will be a challenging year, established approaches such as diplomacy and deterrence will remain effective in managing relations with Pyongyang. 

Rhetorical Preparations for Conflict

Carlin and Hecker provided a grave assessment, suggesting that “Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war,” akin to his grandfather's stance in 1950. Hecker provided historical context, indicating that despite attempts at normalization with the United States, each North Korean leader has simultaneously explored the development of its nuclear weapons arsenal and accumulation of its conventional armaments. Hecker argued, "The Korean War was never settled, it was an armistice, and so, more or less, North Korea has been preparing for war, but this is different and we are really concerned.”

Carlin noted a shift that occurred at the Workers’ Party plenum at the end of 2022, in which “Pyongyang announced new measures that demonstrated that the old policy with the U.S. was over and that they were going to move much more towards the Russians.” The plenum also marked a rhetorical shift where Kim Jong Un introduced the phrase “war preparations.” “Some people say, ‘Oh that's normal North Korean rhetoric’ — it's not normal. They had not been talking at that level to their own people about war preparations […] they talked a lot about deterrence which meant building up, but not war preparations,” said Carlin.

According to Carlin, Pyongyang has “primed the pan for a clash in the Yellow Sea […] everything we have seen in the last year suggests very strongly that this is a decision the regime has made, and that it will patiently move in this direction.”

The speakers both argued that Kim's shift stems from a perceived failure of past diplomatic endeavors and a traumatic setback at the 2019 Hanoi summit, when, as Hecker indicated, the North Koreans decided to abandon the 30-year policy of seeking normalization with the United States. “This is a more dangerous time than any time since the start of the Korean War,” Hecker warned.
 

The Inevitable Tensions of Deterrence

In contrast, Cha’s assessment of the situation is more cautiously optimistic, anticipating a surge in North Korean provocations in 2024 but attributing it to historical patterns rather than a definitive strategic shift. According to Cha, we should  expect North Korean belligerence to increase in 2024, while dialogue looks unlikely.” He highlighted North Korea's tendency to ramp up provocations during U.S. election years, produced data on the increasing number of provocations since the 1990s, and emphasized Kim's repeated rejections of dialogue with the Biden administration.

Cha also provided four reasons why he does not expect a war with North Korea in 2024: “First, Pyongyang is not confident enough in its capability to deter U.S. and South Korean retaliation […] Second, the uptempo in U.S.-ROK and U.S.-ROK-Japan exercising […] Third, if North Korea were ready to go to war, they would not be selling all their ammunition to Russia […] and fourth, if North Korea were really ready to go to war, they would not be decoupling from South Korea.”

Cha suggested that, while war is unlikely, “coercion, particularly against South Korea, and North Korea-Russia relations are only going to grow.” He described North Korea’s transfer of armaments from Najin to Dunai in Russia to three munition storage facilities near the Ukrainian front. Cha sees a possible change in the U.S. North Korea policy approach from focusing on denuclearization to curtailing and disincentivizing this behavior.

An Uncertain Year Ahead

Whether or not the escalating tensions since the 2019 Hanoi Summit mean that Pyongyang is headed to war, its increased belligerence is a clear signal that Kim’s government has shifted its efforts. North Korea is now pursuing its security and economic agendas without any indication of attempting to normalize relations with the United States or South Korea. Furthermore, it continues to strengthen its partnership with the China-Russia bloc. The assessment of continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula is undisputed.

Ultimately, both perspectives shared by the speakers highlight the need for vigilance, strategic coordination, and innovative policy solutions to address the escalating tensions in the region.
 

As nationalism and identity politics have come to dominate public spheres around the world, researchers strive to understand the repercussions of such political behavior. How does nationalism affect the health of a democratic system, and when might it foster well-functioning liberal democracy?

This is the central question that Gidong Kim, APARC’s 2023-25 Korea Program Postdoctoral Fellow, seeks to answer. Kim’s research, situated at the intersection of comparative politics and political economy, focuses on nationalism and identity politics, inequality and redistribution, and migration in South Korea and East Asia. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Missouri. In his dissertation, “Nationalism and Redistribution in New Democracies: Nationalist Legacies of Authoritarian Regimes,” he investigated the micro-level underpinnings that sustain weak welfare systems in developmental states. 

As part of his fellowship, Kim works with the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), a new initiative housed at Shorenstein APARC under the directorship of Professor Gi-Wook Shin. The Lab works to provide evidence-based policy recommendations to help implement structural reforms that foster a “Next Asia” characterized by social, cultural, and economic maturity.

On January 24, 2024, Dr. Kim will present his research at a seminar hosted by the Korea Program. You can register for the event, "Narratives of Inclusion: Evidence from South Korea’s Migration Challenge."

We caught up with Dr. Kim to hear more about his fellowship experience this academic year and what’s next. The conversation has been slightly edited for length and clarity. 

First off, can you describe your current research project?

Broadly speaking, as a comparative political scientist, I study nationalism and its behavioral consequences with a regional focus on Korea and East Asia. More specifically, because nationalism is sometimes harmful to liberal democracy, but it can also be helpful, I research when and how national sentiments have either negative or positive effects on liberal democracy through citizens’ political attitudes and behaviors, such as voting behavior, redistribution preferences, migration attitudes, and public opinion on foreign policy.  

How did you come to be interested in this topic?

I was born and raised in South Korea and earned my B.A. and M.A. in political science at a Korean university before pursuing my Ph.D. in the United States. Because I was originally interested in partisan politics, my goal was to understand how American voters think and behave, so that I can explain Korean politics using theories developed in the United States. However, as I took graduate seminars about American politics, I – both as a Korean and as an East Asian – learned that such theories could not be applied well to the Korean and East Asian context.  

It was my second year of the Ph.D. program when I had academic dissatisfaction about the discrepancy between Western theories and East Asian reality. Dr. Aram Hur, my doctoral advisor, has significantly influenced my academic interests and identity. Every conversation that I had with her led me to new insights.

In particular, we focused on nationalism, which can arise not only from each country’s different historical trajectories but also from citizens’ different interpretations and understandings of such trajectories. Since then, based on my personal experience and knowledge of Korea, I tried to challenge the extant political science theories to offer my explanation of Korean and East Asian political dynamics, especially through a lens of nationalism.  

How has your time at APARC as a Korea Program Postdoc helped your research?

APARC provides me with the best academic environment. First, everyone at the Center is open and always welcomes me whenever I need their help. For example, if I want to develop and sharpen my research ideas, I can share my ideas anytime with excellent scholars who always give me constructive feedback. I believe the in-person conversations I can have whenever necessary are the best part of APARC from which I benefit.

Moreover, both the Korea Program and APARC organize many events. Our events feature not only scholars but also policymakers. This is a tremendous help because I believe the ultimate goal of doing research is to make a better society. 

I felt that many U.S. social science Ph.D. programs, including in political science, aim to train their Ph.D. students as researchers who can write papers, less as leaders who can contribute to our communities. But the diverse events at the Korea Program and APARC keep reminding me of the importance of both roles by giving me a balanced perspective.

Are there any individuals who you connected with during your time at APARC?

Since I came here, I met diverse faculty members and excellent students. But I want to share my interactions with Research Fellow Dr. Xinru Ma and Postdoctoral Fellow Dr. Junki Nakahara. Because we share an office, we always have opportunities to discuss our research ideas, different perspectives, and even daily lives. In particular, while I’m a comparative political scientist, Xinru is an international relations (IR) scholar and Junki is a communication scholar. Because we have different academic foundations, this collaborative environment is extremely helpful for me to sharpen my research ideas.

Can you describe the new SNAPL lab and share a bit about your experience?

SNAPL is led by Prof. Gi-Wook Shin, and its full name is ‘Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab.’ As you can see from the name, SNAPL has two main goals. First, we address emerging political, social, economic, and cultural challenges in Asia that can direct the ‘next’ Asia. Second, we also try to provide ‘policy’ solutions to those challenges to make the next Asia better. In other words, our ultimate goal is to upgrade Asia to the next level.  

For those goals, we gather every week. Because Xinru, Junki, and I are leading different, but interconnected, projects at SNAPL, we share ongoing respective research at our weekly meetings with Prof. Shin as well as our two excellent research associates, Haley and Irene. 

When we discuss together, we sometimes criticize each other and sometimes cannot reach a consensus. But eventually, our active debates lead us to come up with new ideas and find solutions together. 

This weekly SNAPL meeting is my favorite time because I can share my research, get insightful feedback from Prof. Shin, learn from Xinru and Junki, and also get excellent support from both Haley Gordon and Irene Kyoung. I believe this is the best way of doing research, which is extremely rare in the social science field.

What is on the horizon for you? What's next?

First, as a junior scholar, I plan to focus on my research into nationalism and its political behavioral consequences. The projects I am leading at SNAPL focus on how the international relations context, such as the growing U.S.-China tensions and dynamics of alliance relationships, shapes global citizens’ attitudes toward neighboring countries and foreign policy. Because these projects are fundamentally related to national sentiments, by focusing on my SNAPL projects, I want to not only contribute to SNAPL as a postdoctoral fellow but also produce good research as an independent scholar.

Second, as my long-term goal, I want to further promote Korean studies in the United States. Despite the growing academic and public interest in Korea, many people still have a limited understanding of the country. 

As a scholar, one way that I can think of to offer a better explanation of Korea is to actively produce scholarly works, such as books and papers, and more importantly, to share them through diverse networks. Thus, someday in the future, I want to lead an institute for Korean Studies and create diverse channels to share such works.