Authors
Noa Ronkin
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

On the centennial of the March First Independence Movement of Korea, APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin and Rennie Moon, associate professor at Yonsei University’s Underwood International College and former Koret fellow in Korean studies at APARC, discuss the origins of the movement and its impact and legacy for anti-imperialist movements in Asia and beyond.

The year 2019 is the centennial of several anti-colonialist movements that emerged in Asia, including the March First Movement of Korea. On that day a century ago, protesters shouting “Mansei!” (“Long live Korean independence!”) gathered in Seoul and formed what would become the first nationwide political protest in Korea under Japanese colonial rule. Although the movement failed to achieve national sovereignty, it left important legacies for Korea and other parts of Asia under foreign dominance.

In a new essay for The Journal of Asian Studies,1919 in Korea: National Resistance and Contending Legacies,” APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin and Rennie Moon, associate professor at Yonsei University’s Underwood International College and former Koret fellow in Korean studies at APARC, discuss the origins of the March First Movement, its impact on colonial Korea and other parts of Asia that fought against imperialist dominance, and its implications for postcolonial and contemporary Korea, North and South. Their essay is part of the journal’s special forum entitled “Anti-colonialism in Asia: The Centenary of 1919,” which explains why 1919 was not only a single year of important events in Asia, but also a center point for the larger movements of anti-colonialism that emerged globally in the early decades of the twentieth century.

Korea became Japan's protectorate in 1905 and was “annexed” to Imperial Japan five years later. Soon after, Koreans experienced a decade of severe suppression and minimal rights under a brutal military colonial regime. In the aftermath of World War I, however, Shin and Moon write, the international geopolitical climate began to shift. Inspired by the Russian revolution of 1917 and by Wilsonian ideals of national self-determination, Korean intellectuals and leaders began secretly collaborating both inside Korea and abroad, with support from religious leaders and their nationwide mobilizing networks.

On March 1, 1919, twenty-nine leaders gathered in downtown Seoul and read aloud a declaration for Korean independence, sparking a movement that spread quickly from Seoul and Pyongyang throughout the country, with more than one million people protesting. The Japanese, who were caught by surprise, responded with brutal crackdown on protestors.

The March First Movement eventually did not achieve national independence from Japanese rule, but it forced Japan to shift from the earlier military rule to a colonial policy known as bunka seiji (cultural rule), which selectively accommodated Korean demands in nonpolitical spheres and gave rise to many cultural, educational, and media organizations and activities.

It also left Korean leaders divided over what to do next, leading to a schism between moderates, who were willing to work with the new cultural policy in preparation for future national independence, and the socialist radicals, who rejected compromise and went on to establish the Korean Communist Party in 1925. This bifurcation, note Shin and Moon, is seen by many scholars “as the primary origin of the postcolonial national division that would incite a civil war in 1950.”

South Korea recognizes the March First Movement as the basis of the founding of the republic, though conservatives and progressives still disagree about its founding date. When the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in the North, however, it downgraded and rewrote the movement in various ways to fit it into its own version of history that traces the legitimacy of the regime to an anti-imperialist, democratic revolution spearheaded by Kim Il-Sung, who became the leader of the DPRK after 1945.

Beyond Korea, explain Shin and Moon, the March First Movement influenced the rise of the anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement in China two months later, inspired the 1919 anti-imperialist resistance that took place in the Philippines and Egypt, and was an impetus that can be seen in the Satyagraha, or nonviolent resistance in India. “By considering the March First and other political movements of 1919 in other Asian countries from a comparative, transnational perspective,” Shin and Moon say, “we can recognize interrelationships and diffusion processes traditionally ignored in historical writings prior to the ‘historiographic revolution’ in the 1990s.”

Read the full article in The Journal of Asian Studies >>

 

All News button
1
Authors
Gi-Wook Shin
Joyce Lee
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

27 April 2019 marked the first anniversary of the historic Panmunjom summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean leader Moon Jae-in.

The meeting jumpstarted the whirlwind of North Korea’s summit diplomacy and prompted a new wave of hope that diplomacy could be effective after years of confrontation and tensions.

But the anniversary was marked with mixed messages and dissonant attitudes — it was celebrated by the South Koreans alone. North Korea remained unresponsive to the South’s invitation to the anniversary ceremony, and North Korea’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country openly demanded that the South explore ‘more active measures’ to improve inter-Korean ties. The inter-Korean rapprochement efforts borne out of Panmunjom are stranded by the stalemate on the nuclear track...

Read the full article on East Asia Forum

All News button
1
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

Scholar Andray Abrahamian organized many projects to promote economic change in North Korea over the past decade, including that country’s first two ultimate frisbee tournaments. So when he spoke at Carleton College in Northfield last week, the first thing Abrahamian did was acknowledge the school’s prominence in the sport. [Its intercollegiate team is a perennial power and most of the school’s students play in intramural leagues.]

“It’s really fun for me to come to one of the spiritual homes of ultimate frisbee,” he said. When the U.S. lifts a travel ban on North Korea, he added, he’d like to organize another tournament there.

Abrahamian was a co-founder of Chosen Exchange, a Singapore-based organization that for years taught business and marketing skills to North Koreans with programs inside the country and classes in other countries. Its activities declined after the North’s nuclear tests in 2016 prompted an international backlash that included a widening of sanctions.

This academic year, he’s [the 2018-2019 Koret Fellow] in the Korea program at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, but he was in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, early last month...

Read the full article in the StarTribune.

All News button
1
Paragraphs
Kim Jong-un showcased a series of summit meetings throughout 2018, including the first-ever meeting of a North Korean leader with a sitting US president. North Korea improved its strained relations with China and South Korea. The country’s denuclearization has yet to be seen, but these events sparked considerable debate about the future.
 
All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Journal Articles
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Asian Survey
Authors
Gi-Wook Shin
Rennie Moon
-

Image
sagan 3x2 copy
The volatile relationship between the United States and North Korea has left the American public questioning whether North Korea is a threat or not. Existing polls suffer from poor design and, thus, provide a confusing and often contradictory narrative of U.S. public opinion on North Korea. As a result, a number of critical questions remain unanswered: Are Americans willing to live with the North Korean nuclear threat? Under what conditions would the public support using military force to accomplish what sanctions and diplomacy have not? What are the characteristics of the individuals willing to risk war against North Korea today? Professor Scott D. Sagan will discuss the findings of a recent survey experiment and offer a unique perspective to the ongoing public debate.

Scott D. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, the Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University. From 1984 to 1985, he served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. Sagan has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his pioneering work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons accidents and the causes of nuclear proliferation.     

 

Okimoto Conference Room
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Serra Street, Stanford

Scott D. Sagan <i>Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, Stanford University</i>
Seminars
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

On the heels of the abrupt ending of the Hanoi summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with the future of the diplomacy of denuclearization in question, the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC convened the 11th Koret Workshop, appropriately titled this year “North Korea and the World in Flux.”

The workshop, an annual gathering made possible through generous funding from the Koret Foundation, brought together international experts in Korean affairs for a full day of panel discussions. Participants assessed the U.S.-DPRK summit diplomacy, examined the challenges and opportunities in media coverage related to the negotiations between the two countries, and considered the prospects and pitfalls for summitry with North Korea in the near term. A report on the workshop proceedings is forthcoming.

At a midday public keynote, General Vincent Brooks, U.S. Army (Ret.), spoke before a packed audience about the challenges and opportunities in Korea. Brooks, who recently retired from active duty as the four-star general in command of all U.S. Forces in Korea, provided his unique and very-timely assessment of the situation on the Korean peninsula, and offered his insights on where the diplomacy of denuclearization may go next.

Gen. Brooks’ public address was followed by a conversation with Karl Eikenberry, director of APARC’s U.S.-Asia Security Initative.

Watch the video recording of Gen. Brooks’ remarks:

 

All News button
1
-

North Korea is the land of punditry, controversy and bad intelligence.  Policy debates swirl in Washington over how U.S. policy should address this foreign policy challenge.  Much of these debates is informed by a mix of opinion, ideology and politics.   How do we make sense of it all? Victor Cha and his Beyond Parallel microsite at CSIS try to cut through the noise to bring data to the study of North Korea and foreign policy.  He will discuss five data points that are critical to an understanding of the North Korea problem today and its policy challenges.

Image
victor cha small
Victor Cha holds the D.S. Song-KF Professorship in Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University. In 2009, he was also named as Senior Adviser for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He left the White House in 2007 after serving since 2004 as Director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council.  At the White House, he was responsible primarily for Japan, the Korean peninsula, Australia/New Zealand and Pacific Island nation affairs.  Dr. Cha was also the Deputy Head of Delegation for the United States at the Six Party Talks in Beijing, and received two Outstanding Service commendations during his tenure at the NSC.  He is the author of five books, including the award-winning Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford University Press) (winner of the 2000 Ohira Book Prize), and The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (Harper Collins Ecco, 2012) which was selected by Foreign Affairs as a “Best Book on the Asia-Pacific for 2012.” His newest book is Powerplay: Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton University Press, 2016). He has testified before Congress numerous times on Asian security issues.  In 2018, he joined NBC and MSNBC as a News Contributor.  Prior to joining NBC, he had been a guest analyst for various media including CNN, ABC, NBC, CBS, The Colbert Report, Sports Illustrated, ESPN, Fox News, PBS, Huffington Post, Wall Street Journal, MSNBC, CNBC, BBC, and National Public Radio.  His op-eds have appeared in the Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, USA Today, Foreign Policy, Japan Times, and Financial Times. He holds a B.A., an M.I.A., and a Ph.D. from Columbia University, as well as an M.A. from Oxford University.

 

 

 

 

Philippines Conference Room
Encina Hall, 3rd Floor
616 Serra Mall, Stanford, CA 94305

Victor Cha <i>Professor of Government, Georgetown University</i>
Seminars
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

An air of uncertainty remains prevalent in the Indo-Pacific region. The South China Sea continues to be in contention, with six governments exerting claims on overlapping areas. The threat of a full-blown trade war between China and the United States puts the stability of the regional (and global) economy in question. Meanwhile, the Korean peninsula appears to swing between the brink of conflict to the possibility of dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs. It was in the midst of this precarious period for the region that the third annual gathering of the U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Dialogue Series took place in Tokyo from January 30 to February 1.

The 2019 meeting was co-sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and APARC’s U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI). For the past three years, the series has convened senior Japanese and American policymakers, military leaders, scholars, and regional experts to discuss Japan's security strategy and the alliance between Japan and the United States. Support for the workshop came from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Since its inception in 2016, the dialogue series has provided a venue for in-depth discourse on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues, and has helped build bridges between American and Asian academics, government and military officials, and other defense and security policy specialists. “We have continued to expand the range of attendees from the Japanese and U.S. government and military,” said USASI Director Karl Eikenberry. “This has ensured for our dialogue even greater policy relevance with each iteration.”

“The U.S.-Japan security dialogue is unique because it combines civilians and military officers, both retired and serving, which simply does not take place elsewhere,” observed Stanford Lecturer in International Policy Daniel Sneider, a regular participant. “It also avoids the sometimes-empty rhetoric about our alliance in favor of an operational, but strategically informed, approach that gets at not only what is being accomplished, but where the gaps exist in our alliance.”

Threats, Challenges, and the Appropriate Responses

L to R: Amb. Karl Eikenberry and Lt. General Noboru Yamaguchi (Workshop Co-Chairs)

The 2019 dialogue opened with a day of discussions on many of the challenges facing the U.S.-Japan security alliance, including an assessment of the latest security trends in the Indo-Pacific, as well as Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). Passed by the Japanese Cabinet only a month earlier, the NDPG was the focus of two sessions on day one, including a discussion of its implications for Indo-Pacific security, as well as a session on the guideline’s ramifications for concepts of Integrated Air and Missile Defense and Archipelagic Defense

“Unsurprisingly, the global rise of China—along with the U.S. and Japan’s separate and combined responses to PRC strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region—helped shape both our agenda and the selection of participants,” observed Eikenberry. “We were specifically interested in the implications for the maritime domain and certain operational aspects of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.”

The day one closing ceremony featured remarks from the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the Honorable William Hagerty.

 

L to R: Dan Sneider, Amb. William Hagerty, and Lt. General Noboru Yamaguchi
 

Developing Policy Recommendations, Meeting with Policymakers

L to R: Major Rodger Welding and Colonel Daniel Munter (United States Pacific Air Forces), and Lt. Colonel Yuka Nakazato, (Japan Air Self-Defense Force)

Days two and three were designed for small group sessions. Referred to as “Core Group”, its U.S. and Japanese members met the morning of January 31 to review the preceding day’s workshop and develop corresponding policy recommendations. The quality and depth of the conversations underscored just how great an impact the expanded range of participants had on the resulting policy.

“Participants weren't afraid to address sensitive, big-picture questions,” said Phillip Lipscy, a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford, “like the slow growth of Japanese military spending in the face of increasing regional threats and the challenges posed by unpredictable US administration policies.”

“Even as an expert of Japanese politics, I found the dialogue extremely informative and stimulating,” shared Lipscy.

Sneider agreed as well. “One thing that stood out this year, in contrast to the previous years, was a greater willingness on the part of our Japanese colleagues to air their sense of unease about and even opposition to the direction of American foreign and security policy under the Trump administration,” he said. “In the past, the American participants were much more open about their criticism of their own government, the Japanese tended to be polite—not so much this year, which made for a lively exchange on many issues.”

In the afternoon, core U.S. participants again met with the US Ambassador, along with his embassy team, as well as with senior Cabinet Office officials from the government of Japan.

Field Testing Ideas

During the second annual gathering in 2018, the dialogue began including a visit by the core workshop participants to a combined U.S. military—Japanese Self Defense facility. As part of the 2019 dialogue, the Core Group spent their third and final day visiting Yokota Air Base, the headquarters of both United States Forces Japan and Japan Air Self Defense Force Air Defense Command.

“These visits allow us to better understand Alliance operational challenges in the field,” noted Eikenberry. “Just as importantly, it affords us an immediate opportunity to test out some of the very ideas discussed during the preceding days.”

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/n-yokota-a-20150514.jpg

Yokota Air Base, Japan

Chatham House Rules applied to the dialogue, but a workshop report is forthcoming.

View the reports from the first and second annual workshops.

The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative is part of Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). Led by former U.S. Ambassador and Lieutenant General (Retired) Karl Eikenberry, USASI seeks to further research, education, and policy relevant dialogues at Stanford University on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues.

(L to R: Karl Eikenberry, Michael McFaul, Major Marcus Morgan (U.S. Army LNO to Japan Ground Self Defense Force Northern Army and Stanford University Center for East Asian Studies MA ’18), Phillip Lipscy, Daniel Sneider)

 

 

 

 

All News button
1
Authors
Andray Abrahamian
Siegfried Hecker
Gi-Wook Shin
Noa Ronkin
News Type
Q&As
Date
Paragraphs

Following the abrupt ending of the highly anticipated second bilateral summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi, APARC and CISAC scholars evaluate the result of the summit, its implications for regional relations in Northeast Asia, and the opportunities moving forward towards the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

This Q&A with Noa Ronkin features Andray Abrahamian, the 2018-19 Koret Fellow in Korean Studies at APARC, whose work with the nonprofit Choson Exchange has taken him to the DPRK nearly 30 times; Siegfried S. Hecker, top nuclear security expert, former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Research Professor of Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus, and Senior Fellow at CISAC/FSI, Emeritus; and Gi-Wook Shin, Professor of Sociology, William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, Director of APARC, and founding Director of the Korea Program.

Q: What is your assessment of the summit outcome? Considering Trump's decision to end the summit early, do you support that “no deal is better than a bad deal?” Do you think the summit would have been better off with even a small deal just significant enough to keep the momentum going? 
 
Abrahamian: It's a disappointment, but we don't know yet if it is a catastrophe. I think that, ideally, once it was clear that both sides were escalating towards a grand bargain no one was ready for, the U.S. and DPRK teams could have taken a break and reconvened to attempt something less ambitious. For both sides it is better domestically to go back and be able to look tough rather than concede too much, but I do wonder why there was no intermediary position available between no deal and something too big.
 
Hecker: I am disappointed, but still optimistic. Disappointed because the opportunity to take concrete steps toward denuclearization and normalization was missed. Optimistic, because Trump and Kim did not return to the ‘fire and fury’ days of 2017. They left Hanoi on good terms. I don’t believe it was a question of bad deal or no deal. Rather, it appears the two sides were actually quite close to taking important steps, but couldn’t quite get there this time. It is not clear whether time just ran out or if President Trump’s challenge to Kim Jong-un to “go bigger” moved the goal posts at the last minute. 
 
Shin: Trump made the right move. No deal is better than a small or pointless deal that could hamper future negotiations. His decision sent a warning signal to North Korea that he wouldn’t let the country continue to set the tone and pace for the negotiations. Also, he gained more domestic political slack than the alternative would have gained him. The misfortune in Hanoi may impart a new, different kind of momentum to what is destined to be a fluctuating, arduous diplomatic process.
 
Q: So what's next? What do you expect from the US and DPRK given this new dynamic? What do you think needs to be done at the working level and at the leadership level? And what do you think will be the biggest hurdle in future negotiations? 
 
Abrahamian: Both sides carefully left future talks open through their statements after the summit. If one is searching for a positive outcome, it's that the leaders perhaps now realize that much, much more will have to be agreed upon before they meet again. This should help empower working-level talks. But time is short: a U.S. election looms next year and Donald Trump faces political challenges at home. This was a missed opportunity to consolidate a relationship-building process.
 
Hecker: The American and North Korean statements following the summit paint different pictures of the final bargaining positions, but both were positive and committed to return to the bargaining table. These differences should be surmountable at the bargaining table, but it will take time and a more concerted effort. So long as North Korea ends nuclear and missile testing, we have time to come to a proper compromise, but it must clearly involve some sanctions relief for the North Korean economy. One of the biggest hurdles on the American side is to overcome internal political divisions.
 
Shin: A return to hostility is unlikely. Both sides have refrained from escalating tension and are still committed to a diplomatic solution. The negotiations will resume. The Hanoi summit served as an opportunity for a much-needed reality check, for both sides, of the lingering divergences. The biggest hurdle continues to be how to define the terms and scope of denuclearization and the U.S. corresponding measures (simultaneous and parallel actions). Now that the discrepancies have become more apparent and starker, the working-level discussions need to agree on basic yet fundamental concepts and principles, while Trump and Kim should continue the process of trust-building; confidence and trust are a must in a top-down setting.
 
Q: Are there some roles that other key players can play, such as South Korea and China? Are there any impacts of this outcome on regional relations in Northeast Asia, such as inter-Korean and China-DPRK relations? 
 
Abrahamian: Perhaps South Korea can play a bridging role again, the way it did before the Singapore summit, when Trump "pre-emptively pulled out." In that case, President Moon's intervention helped get things back on track. It is unclear if he has the political capital with either side to make that happen again, but I suspect he will try. The collapse impacts a Kim Jong-un visit to Seoul, as now it would seem to be pressure on the US, rather than operating in space the US created. China is relatively marginalized, but happy to see no secondary sanctions threats or additional testing of missiles. Japan is perhaps the most pleased of all, given how isolated it has become on North Korea issues.
 
Hecker: The Moon Jae-in administration was hoping for a more positive outcome to allow it to promote economic cooperation with the North, which I consider to be one of the most important elements of achieving a peaceful Korean Peninsula. The Hanoi outcome may require an intensified North-South dialogue to assist the North-U.S. deliberations. I am not sure how all of this will affect China-DPRK relations. I would have preferred an outcome that allows DPRK to move closer to South Korea through some sanctions relief, than to have it depend more on China through continued maximum pressure. 
 
Shin: The outcome is clearly a major setback for South Korea, as it was anticipating progress on core issues that could jumpstart inter-Korean projects. It also became unclear whether Kim would make the planned visit to Seoul anytime soon. At the same time, this might be a perfect time for South Korea to play a meaningful role. So far, the country has been seen as advocating North Korea’s position with regards to an end-of-war declaration and to a lifting or easing of sanctions. This time around, President Moon needs to convince Chairman Kim that North Korea’s bold move toward denuclearization cannot be delayed if he wishes not to lose this rare opportunity with a U.S. president who is eager to make a “big” deal.
 
###
For more U.S.-DPRK diplomacy analysis and commentarty by APARC scholars, see our recent media coverage.
 
All News button
1
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
Following the anticlimactic conclusion of the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi, KQED Newsroom spoke with our Korea Program Deputy Director Yong Suk Lee about the surprising outcome of the summit and what's next for U.S.-DPRK diplomacy. Watch: 
 
 

All News button
1
Subscribe to North Korea