Last January, Fumio Kishida made his first visit to Washington D.C. as Japan's Prime Minister, reaffirming the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As the U.S.–China relationship continues to fracture, Japan has remained in close alignment with the United States, even signaling a paradigm shift in its recently revised National Security Strategy, naming China an “unprecedented strategic challenge,” and unveiling a record defense budget. “This is a revolutionary event in Japan's security policy," said Professor Ryosei Kokubun about Tokyo’s hike in military expenditure.

Kokubun, the Spring 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a visiting scholar at APARC, headlined this quarter’s Payne Lecture. Held on May 3, 2023, and co-hosted by APARC and FSI, the event focused on the U.S.-China rivalry and Japan’s position.

The Payne Lectureship at FSI, named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, aims to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community and advance international cooperation. The lectureship brings to Stanford internationally esteemed leaders from academia and the policy world who combine visionary thinking and a broad, practical grasp of their fields with the capacity to provide insights into pressing challenges of global concern. Throughout the 2022-23 academic year, the Payne Lectureship hosts experts from Asia who examine crucial questions in U.S.-China relations.

As the president of Japan's National Defense Academy from 2012 to 2021 and a longtime faculty member at Keio University, Professor Kokubun is uniquely qualified to share insights into Japan's perspectives on the rising security fears in the Asia-Pacific region. Following Kokubun's address was a panel discussion with Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, an expert on China and U.S. foreign policy, and FSI Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and Asia-Pacific security. Kiyoteru Tsutsui, director of the Japan Program at APARC and the Center’s deputy director, moderated the conversation.

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The Legacy of "Strategic Engagement

Although recent years have seen an escalation in the tense relationship between China and the United States, Professor Kokubun began his lecture by emphasizing the relatively recent nature of these tensions. He reminded the audience that the years following the formal re-establishment of diplomatic ties between the United States and China in 1979 saw a broad expansion of the U.S.–China relationship on nearly every front, from student exchange to diplomatic cooperation. During that time, Deng Xiaoping led China through the era of “reform and opening up,” integrating China into the global economy. Kokubun emphasized that U.S. leaders had hoped this policy of “strategic engagement” would push China towards democratization and the end of repressive domestic policies, and that, through reform and marketization, China would become more like the United States.

Kokubun depicted the era between 1979 and 2010 as a period of cautious optimism not only between the United States and China but also between China and Japan. Xi Jinping's presidency, however, has seen a complete reversal of this attitude. China's relationships with both Japan and the United States have become strained, and channels for communication and cooperation have steadily diminished. Kokubun pointed out that this has led to a substantial drop in U.S. public opinion of China, asking the audience, “Why is the U.S. so China-hating?” He sees this trend as a function of the failed “strategic engagement” policy. When the policy of engagement did not lead to democratization in China, U.S. officials and citizens felt a sense of betrayal and mistrust. The engagement policy and the hopes that came with it ended under the Trump administration, and Professor Kokubun predicts that the present U.S. hardline stance on China is here to stay.

How Would Japan Respond to a Taiwan Contingency?

In Kokubun’s view, Japan’s main concern is whether or not a Taiwan contingency is a real risk. He noted that the future depends on the decisions of the Taiwanese and Chinese leadership. “Whether Taiwan will move toward independence or move closer to the mainland lies at the crossroads,” he said. He pointed out that Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s president, has not made any hardline statements supporting independence. 

However, even if Taiwan’s government were to shift closer to the mainland, a continuation of the status quo is not guaranteed. Kokubun emphasized the uncertainty of the situation and said that, regardless of how Taiwan’s government acts, China’s actions depend on how Xi sees his opponents’ actions. “The final decision will depend on how Xi Jinping views the future policies of Taiwan and the United States, and whether he sees them as having crossed a line,” said Kokubun. “However, the criteria for that line are also arbitrary and entirely up to Xi Jinping’s judgment.” Ultimately, Kokubun returned to the intractability of the mounting conflict. “The key to the Taiwan issue is one thing: Xi’s resolve. China will never abandon the possibility of an armed invasion of Taiwan.”

Concerns about rising threats from China and North Korea and the alarm raised by the war in Ukraine have put security at the forefront of national consciousness in Japan. In December 2022, Japan’s government announced an enormous increase in national defense spending to 2% of national GDP over a five-year period, which will give the country the third-largest defense budget in the world. “This is a revolutionary event in Japan's security policy," stated Kokubun." Japan has traditionally discussed the threat of North Korea and China, of course, but this has not led to a significant increase in real defense spending or a strengthening of defense capabilities. However, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine...serious discussions about the possibility of a Taiwan contingency began.”

Many experts have speculated as to Japan’s role in a potential Taiwan contingency. Despite Japan’s close ties with Taiwan and longstanding alliance with the United States, Japan’s ability to respond to a Taiwan contingency is severely restricted by the Peace Constitution, which forbids Japan from maintaining offensive capabilities and prohibits offensive actions by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Though some U.S. officials hope that Japan might defend Taiwan until U.S. forces arrive in the case of a Taiwan contingency, Kokubun noted that “this is completely impossible under the current Japanese legal system, and there is no way to move in that direction under the current circumstances.”

However, were an armed conflict to truly erupt in the Pacific, Japan might have no choice but to get involved. Kokubun said, “For Japan, the question is how to rescue the Japanese in Taiwan,” and if Taiwan were to attack the mainland in retaliation, “how to rescue the five times as many Japanese in China. They are hostages.” President Tsai’s position on retaliation against an invasion of Taiwan has complicated the situation for Japanese leadership. In addition, Chinese leadership has long contended that several Japanese possessions in the Pacific should be returned to Chinese sovereignty, including the Senkaku islands and Okinawa. To emphasize this point, Professor Kokubun cited a conversation he’d had with a high-level official in Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party: “If the U.S. and China really go to war, the battlefield would not be Taiwan, but Okinawa.”

East Asia’s Security Situation

Despite the complications of a Taiwan contingency, Kokubun noted that “if Okinawa or Senkaku islands were attacked, Japan would naturally fight back in close cooperation with the U.S. military. This makes a U.S.-China war very likely.” In Kokubun’s view, due to the absence of communication channels with North Korea and the continuing loss of communication channels with China, “the security environment in East Asia is approaching the worst situation since the end of World War II.” 

“What Japan should do is, on the one hand, strengthen its security deterrence while at the same time strengthening its alliance with the United States, of course, and on the other hand, strengthen its ties with Australia, India, and South Korea, which share the same values,” said Kokubun. “On the basis of this partnership, Japan has no choice but to continue dialogue with China at all levels, along with the rest of the world.”

Finally, Kokubun addressed the logistics of a Chinese occupation of Taiwan, emphasizing that there are already “dissatisfied elements” in mainland China, not only in Tibet but also in low- and middle-class communities, who no longer enjoy the benefits of economic growth. “How much power will it really take to govern a Taiwan filled with people who hate the mainland?” asked Kokubun. He suggested that the Chinese government benefits from maintaining the annexation of Taiwan as a political objective without acting on it. Once the island has been seized, China will no longer be able to rally its population around this national goal. “I think that once the ultimate goal is accomplished, the objective is lost,” said Kokubun. “Taiwan unification seems to me to be the most stable goal as it is.”

Tech investors are increasingly turning their interest towards revolutionary emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, and experts are curious about what role these powerful technologies will play in the unfolding political and economic competition between the United States and China. Vinod Khosla, the co-founder of SUN Microsystems and founder of Khosla Ventures, sees more than competition. Rather, he warns of an escalation of international competition into a full-scale "tech war."

Mr. Khosla explained his view of such an upcoming “techno-economic war” between the world’s two superpowers at a recent discussion hosted by APARC’s China Program. Laura Stone, APARC's inaugural China Policy Fellow, joined Mr. Khosla for a fireside chat.

The event took place at a critical juncture in the U.S.-China tech competition, just weeks after U.S. members of a House panel united to emphasize their concerns over the popular app TikTok. TikTok's uncertain future in the U.S. has added strain on the U.S.-China relationship.

Mr. Khosla sees bipartisan criticism of TikTok as a validation of his concern about Chinese influence in the United States. He declared, "There's zero chance TikTok won't be controlled by the Communist Party. Zero chance," and went on to ask the audience, "Do we want that in this country?" 

Mr. Khosla believes that countries’ ability to harness critical emerging technologies like AI and fusion energy will determine who will become a dominant power in the technological landscape of the 21st century. He went on to describe how technological competition has become a proxy for the ideological struggle between Western values and the Chinese political system. In his view, the United States must take measures to secure dominance in the tech field if it is to remain competitive on the world stage.

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Above all, Mr. Khosla stressed that artificial intelligence technologies will radically redefine the world's economic systems and that as much as eighty percent of all economically valuable labor might be performed by AI in as short a timeframe as the coming twenty years. If this change comes to fruition, goods, especially professional expertise, will become much cheaper and more accessible, while at the same time income disparity grows drastically. In addition, he emphasized that AI will change the fields of national security and cybersecurity. With these coming foundational challenges to our current economic system and domestic security measures, he argued, the United States must take a more proactive stance towards promoting the development of technologies domestically and protecting them from foreign espionage.

However, Mr. Khosla believes that this "war" for technological supremacy reaches beyond the U.S.-China relationship. In his view, it is a "war for political philosophy: Western values and political philosophy versus Chinese political philosophy." In his eyes, this conflict of fundamental values stands at the center of the ongoing competition for technological development. 

Forecasting Change

Mr. Khosla pointed out that economic benefits brought about by advanced technologies will be in high demand in developing countries. Developed nations that can provide advanced technological solutions, especially AI solutions, to developing nations will therefore become even more influential, carving a primary avenue of soft power and influence for whichever nation succeeds. 

China's motivation is beyond national pride, "they believe they have a superior system," said Khosla. His primary anxiety is that a long-held assumption that the West will win this war for ideological supremacy may not be true, citing the rising trend of open-source technology as one factor that may tip the scales. Open-sourcing technology, he argued, allows foreign nations to take technology and benefit from it without adjusting their value systems or making a real contribution of their own. He warned that technology is not just an enabler of economic power, but also of political influence, and should be treated as such. Khosla warned, "It’s literally the dominant political philosophy of the planet that's at stake here.”

When asked to describe his views on the differing approaches to institutional regulation taken by Beijing and Washington, Khosla emphasized that the large technological innovations of the past century have rarely come from established institutions and businesses, referencing the examples of Uber, Airbnb, Tesla, and Amazon as innovative startups that could not have come from established large corporations. 

He went on to cite the work of Philip Tetlock, describing the failure of expert opinion to forecast change. "Experts are almost never right," he continued, "and this is very important for the China question." Khosla argues that rather than focusing on how each nation regulates its large institutions, experts and analysts should turn their attention toward innovators and smaller actors making changes in a broad range of industries.

The conversation then turned to Mr. Khosla's participation in the Hill and Valley Forum, a China-critical alliance of Washington lawmakers and Silicon Valley executives. Mr. Khosla said that the importance of the forum is its bipartisan nature and how it provides a platform for collaboration to evaluate U.S. competitiveness against China.

Overall, Mr. Khosla's critical analysis focused largely on the risk posed by an imbalance in technological advances between the United States and China, especially in the context of heated economic competition between the two world powers. Khosla concluded the discussion with a sharp criticism of diplomacy that relies too heavily on mutual trust and expressed skepticism towards aims for cooperation between the United States and China.

The rise of antibiotic resistance is a global public health issue that poses a severe threat to the effectiveness of modern medicine. Antibiotic resistance can lead to prolonged hospital stays, increased mortality rates, and higher medical costs. The World Health Organization warns that there are not enough new antibacterial treatments in development to keep up with the growing resistance. The need to regulate the use of antibiotics is, therefore, critical. But Patients' lack of information intensifies the problem: misconceptions about antibiotics are prevalent and exacerbate unnecessary drug use.

In response to this challenge, a team of researchers, including Dr. Jianan Yang, a 2022-23 Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellow at APARC, conducted a study to test the efficacy of informing patients directly of the risks of antibiotics overuse. In partnership with a community healthcare center in China, which is among the countries with the highest per capita usage of antibiotics, the researchers designed a randomized controlled trial to evaluate whether the provision of information on the impacts of antibiotic resistance via text messages could induce behavioral changes and reduce the unnecessary use of antibiotics. The results of the study, published in the Journal of Development Economics, suggest that social-health messaging could be a powerful tool in addressing antibiotics overuse as well as a variety of public health challenges with externalities.

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The researchers’ findings show that patients who received text messages highlighting the threat of antibiotic resistance to society reduced their antibiotics purchases by 17% relative to the control group. The reduction did not come at the cost of a decline in other observed dimensions of healthcare utilization, including the number of visits, examination and service spending, and the purchase of other medicines.

The study also reveals that messages with information on the social impacts of antibiotic resistance had a more pronounced effect than those with information on the harmful consequences for individual patients: text messages that emphasized the threats of antibiotics overuse to recipients’ own health showed negligible effects on antibiotics purchases.

The results provide evidence that prosocial messaging can have a substantial impact on health-related behavior and identify a cost-effective, low-touch intervention means of addressing concerns over antibiotics misuse and overuse. The rapid increase in mobile phone penetration makes text messaging easily scalable, highly inclusive, and inexpensive to implement public health interventions. While the study focused on antibiotic use in China, the findings may have broader implications for public health interventions across different countries and cultures.

The study results also suggest that social-health messaging could be an effective tool to address public health challenges with externalities beyond antibiotic resistance, such as low vaccination rates. For example, many governments have been attempting to increase COVID-19 vaccination rates among their populations. People might be more willing to act if they receive relevant information on the social impacts of their behavior from an institution that they trust.

Future studies that evaluate the effectiveness of this approach in different institutional contexts and their welfare implications with richer clinical data would be valuable.

Amid escalating tensions between the United States and China and as the U.S. government is exploring how to further limit China's access to U.S. technology, discussions about the possibility of decoupling between the two countries have intensified. As businesses operating in China grapple with the potential consequences of decoupling, APARC’s China Program hosted a panel of executives across industries from tech, retail, and finance currently engaged in reshaping their China businesses to provide a view from the ground and consider the future of decoupling with China.

The event was the second installment in a special series celebrating APARC’s 40th anniversary. Titled Asia in 2030, APARC@40, the series highlights core areas of the center’s expertise, examines Asia’s transformation over the past four decades, and considers the drivers and shapers of the region’s future.

The panel featured Dan Brody, the managing director of Tencent Investments, who is responsible for the company’s overseas investments; Frits Van Paasschen, a change management expert, former CEO of Starwood Hotels and Resorts, and former president of EMEA at Nike; and Stuart Schonberger, a founding partner of CDH Investments, one of the leading China-focused alternative asset managers. China Program Director Jean Oi chaired the panel.

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Risks and Opportunities

Van Paasschen described his extensive experience developing strategies for expanding licensing and retail in China, which involved navigating the country's infrastructure and legal framework and, as CEO of Starwood Hotels, overseeing the construction of over 100 hotels. He ascribed his success in the country to his recognition of China’s strengths and weaknesses and his finding ways to interact positively with Chinese stakeholders.

The term decoupling is an oversimplification of the relationship between the complex Chinese and U.S. economies, said Van Paasschen. He noted that retailers in many cases are looking to sources from alternative markets to China, but that he believes there are still opportunities for investment in and co-development with China that remain unaffected by current frictions. He highlighted in this context the interplay between the U.S. and Chinese travel and tourism industries before the COVID-19 pandemic.

Schonberger, who also challenged the notion of decoupling as a misleading shorthand, emphasized the need for cognitive empathy between the world’s two great powers and understanding the motivation behind China's actions. He noted that the challenges facing China today are complex, including debt problems, real estate slowdown, and productivity stagnation, but said these are "known knowns" that the Chinese government is actively working to correct.

Schonberger sees two distinct issues facing institutional equity investors worried about China: government policies that negatively affect growth and corporate prospects, and longer-term risks arising from China's geopolitical position. For private investors who are focused on total return and can tolerate overt political pressures, China remains investable, as Chinese stocks have been some of the best performers on the public markets recently, said Schonberger. The challenges are greater, however, for public entities and bond investors who are more affected by political risk in their decisions. While the risks are higher, Schonberger's firm continues to invest in Chinese companies in multiple sectors.

Changes Underway

Brody said that China remains a key player in the global economy. As a personal anecdote, he noted that, while he makes fewer trips to the United States, he is traveling more frequently to Europe, India, Japan, and Southeast Asia. According to Brody, the extent to which the Chinese economy would be affected by international fluctuations is unclear, but he expects the country to continue its economic growth and attract foreign investors. He stated that a huge amount of value in the tech sector is still being created in America, so economically driven foreign investors in the tech sector still pay close attention to developments in Silicon Valley.

Van Paasschen, by contrast, pointed out that by decoupling with China, the United States would miss out on a generational opportunity for development and could potentially lose out to other countries. China still presents an enormous opportunity for businesses, he said, particularly in the hotel industry, given the country’s rate of urbanization. He reminded the audience that every country and region presents its own set of challenges and risks for investors. The imperative is to ensure Beijing and Washington maintain a dialogue and businesses are willing to take risks to invest in China.

Van Paasschen went on to describe how the U.S.-China political tensions are affecting business operations in various sectors. For instance, in the biotechnology sector, companies might consider protecting intellectual property and ensuring sustainability in their supply chain. In the apparel business, there is a growing concern about human rights and the opacity of the cotton supply chain. Overall, Van Paasschen sees a transition underway from a bilateral and straightforward approach to trade to a much more nuanced and complicated approach.

When asked if political tensions would affect some sectors more than others, Van Paasschen responded affirmatively. He gave the example of a sovereign wealth fund that refused to support investments in Chinese hotels because of the uncertainty zero-COVID policies had created. He also said that further uncertainty could arise from countries' reactions to China’s foreign policy stance, such as China's support of Russia in Ukraine.

What advice would the three business experts give Washington?

Van Paasschen expressed his hope the United States finds ways to avoid being reactive. Schonberger, urging policymakers to keep working towards peaceful coexistence, emphasized it would be counter-productive to frame China as an enemy. He also highlighted the importance of redundancy and efficiency in trade relationships and cautioned against overlooking the cost of decoupling, reminding the audience that engagement with China has boosted global trade, lifted millions out of poverty, and created a vibrant society.

From Brody’s perspective, predictability is crucial for business, regardless of the country one is conducting business in. He also stressed that, from a personal perspective and regardless of one’s political stance on China, the reduction in people-to-people ties between China and the United States due to recent travel restrictions is unfortunate. Ultimately, these ties have always been a net positive, and it is important to recognize their value even in the midst of tensions between the two nations. While political leaders may grapple with complex geopolitical issues, the connections between ordinary citizens remain a vital foundation for maintaining a constructive relationship. By fostering personal exchanges, the United States and China can build bridges and promote mutual understanding, even in the face of challenging circumstances.

In February 1986, Scot Marciel was driving home after midnight and went past what he assumed was just another protest near military facilities in downtown Manila. The gathering, less than a year into his first overseas assignment with the Foreign Service, turned out to be the early days of the Philippine People Power revolution, leading to the end of the Ferdinand Marcos regime. This was just one of several times during his 35-year career in the State Department that Marciel would find himself witnessing historic moments in Southeast Asia and in the U.S. relationship with the countries of the region.

That illustrious career includes being the first U.S. diplomat to work in Hanoi since the end of the Vietnam War and serving as the first U.S. ambassador for ASEAN Affairs and as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia and Myanmar.

Marciel, Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at FSI and affiliated with APARC, has distilled his experiences and observations into his new book, Imperfect Partners: The United States and Southeast Asia (Shorenstein APARC/ Rowman & Littlefield, 2023). In it, he offers his on-the-ground account of the ups and downs of critical U.S. relationships in the region — focusing on the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia — and examines the role of ASEAN and China’s influence in Southeast Asia.

To mark the book’s release, we talked with Marciel about recent events in the region and his views on how the United States should approach Southeast Asian countries in the context of China’s efforts to sow closer ties with them. Watch the conversation:

A Return to the Philippines

The Philippines under President Ferdinand “Bong Bong” Marcos, Jr. is now allowing U.S. forces expanded access to four of its bases. Marciel, who first met Marcos, Jr. as the provincial governor of Ilocos Norte in 1985, expressed some surprise at the Philippine president’s rapid shift to strengthen the country’s alliance with the United States. He noted, however, that even in the last year of the Duterte presidency, which frequently was at odds with the United States, there was some recognition in the Philippines that the relationship with China wasn’t bearing the fruit that had been anticipated. Marciel also pointed out that the deal with the United States does not mean Marcos has abandoned China: he is still working on keeping the relationship with Beijing healthy and visiting Japan, another important partner.

Although there is some Philippine civil opposition to the renewed presence of U.S. forces, Marciel believes that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) will provide an opportunity for a “more modern and equal partnership,” and hopefully one that can supplant memories of the U.S. colonial history in the Philippines.

Southeast Asian Charm Competition?

As concern continues to rise about a possible invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China, some have questioned the effectiveness of the U.S. capability to compete with China, particularly in terms of a diplomatic offensive. Marciel responded to a recent New York Times article on U.S. and Chinese efforts to “woo” Indonesia. As China continues to seal trade deals in Southeast Asia, some of which are part of its Belt and Road Initiative, we asked whether the United States can compete with China’s free-flowing cash.

Marciel, taking a step back, cautions that “Indonesia is not a prize to be won,” and that we should not be “scoring diplomatic relations like a sporting event” when we look at improving ties with the countries of Southeast Asia. Indonesia, for example, has a long history with the Non-Aligned Movement, so while it attempts to attract foreign investment, it will resist aligning with any one major power. China tends to offer attractive investment packages with minimal conditions, but “you can’t always count on those investments to happen,” notes Marciel, and even when they do, there can be issues with corruption, as well as social and environmental consequences. The United States tries to put together investments that consider issues like labor and the environment, but Marciel believes that “sometimes we aim a little high” and the conditions make U.S. offerings less attractive.

The Continuing Crisis in Myanmar

We spoke with Marciel just after the second anniversary of the 2021 coup in Myanmar. He began his term as U.S. ambassador to that country in 2016, just before Aung Sang Suu Kyi’s new government was about to take office. As he puts it, it was a time of “euphoria,” not only in Myanmar but also in terms of U.S. hopes for democracy there. It turned out to be a difficult four years for Myanmar and Marciel, as the Rohingya crisis repeatedly erupted and the Myanmar military reacted with violent operations that drove hundreds of thousands of Rohingya out of Myanmar. As Marciel relates in his book, he soon found that even using the word “Rohingya” in U.S. embassy statements could create a diplomatic crisis.

Even with the horrific Rohingya genocide, Marciel cautiously notes that by 2020, when he left the country, most people in Myanmar had more opportunity and freedom under four years of a democratically elected government—the Rohingya themselves being the obvious exception. But in 2021, the “military coup basically eliminated that hope and opportunity.”

Marciel doesn’t hold much hope for an end to the coup anytime soon, but he does see at least one “positive development” over the last two years. During the worst of the Rohingya crisis, many in the majority Bamar community did not believe the reports of massacres, or even worse, did not care. But now, after two years of military rule, “more and more Myanmar people are explicitly recognizing the legitimate grievances and the suffering of many of the ethnic minority populations, including the Rohingya, over the past years, and [there is] some recognition that they were fed a lot of propaganda for a long time about what was really happening.”

Establishing Relations with Vietnam

One of Marciel’s great success stories is the normalization of U.S. ties with Vietnam. It was an improbable success with any number of obstacles likely to prevent it from happening, not the least being the debate about the fate of U.S. prisoners of war and servicemen reported as missing in action. Saigon fell in 1975, and yet in 1995, just 20 years later, diplomatic relations were restored and the U.S. embassy opened in Hanoi.

According to Marciel, it took patience, pragmatism, but also the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. No longer able to rely on Soviet help for their economy, the Vietnamese became more open to work with the United States, particularly on POW-MIA issues, allowing Vietnamese imprisoned in re-education camps to flee the country, and withdrawing Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

Marciel sees the U.S.-Vietnam relationship today as a “good-news story” that shows the degree of progress that can be attained when two countries are willing to be rational and work together. The United States still has significant concerns about human rights in Vietnam yet “both sides have agreed to talk about that issue, but not let it define or limit the relationship excessively.”

How the United States Can Improve Relations in Southeast Asia

When pressed for a prescription on what the United States can do to further improve its relationships with the countries in the region, Marciel said, “In brief, show up and engage consistently, with humility, and with a focus on the countries that we’re talking to, not on China, because what they’re looking for, for the most part is, ‘Can we count on the United States being a long-term partner?’”

By ensuring the reliability of the partnership, countries in Southeast Asia have more freedom of maneuver, and they can, if necessary, be more capable to “make decisions China might not like.” The flip side of that—the failure to show up at presidential and high governmental levels, like what happened during the Trump administration—means “you’ve undone all the good that you had done in previous years by investing in those relationships.” The price of isolationism, of neglecting U.S. diplomatic relations in Southeast Asia, is that those countries lose confidence in the United States as a reliable partner. 

On April 26, 2023, in recognition of the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-Korea alliance, President Joe Biden will host President Yoon Suk Yeol for a State Visit to the United States. According to Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin, the fact that Yoon received the second such invitation of the Biden administration is a testimony to the centrality of the Korea-U.S. alliance to the peace and stability of the East Asian regions, especially at a time when the frayed U.S.-China relationship continues to degrade into a new Cold War, with a potential Taiwan contingency looming on the horizon. 

Shin, former South Korea's ambassador to China and former director general of the Asia Pacific Affairs Bureau at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is the Winter 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a visiting scholar at APARC. He headlined this quarter’s Payne Lecture, speaking to an audience that gathered on March 1 for a timely discussion titled Sino-U.S. Relations and South Korea, co-hosted by APARC and FSI.

The Payne Lectureship at FSI, named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, aims to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community and advance international cooperation. The lectureship brings to Stanford internationally esteemed leaders from academia and the policy world who combine visionary thinking and a broad, practical grasp of their fields with the capacity to provide insights into pressing challenges of global concern. Throughout the 2022-23 academic year, the Payne Lectureship hosts experts from Asia who examine crucial questions in U.S.-China relations.

Ambassador Shin is uniquely qualified to offer insight into South Korea's response to the pressures created by the U.S.-China rivalry, said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin, who chaired the event that included a discussion with Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and Asia security.

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China’s Dreams

Painting a picture of Chinese ambitions, Ambassador Shin enumerated China’s goals and the steps it has taken to achieve them. “The Chinese dream,” he said, “is to regain the colonial behavior of the Qing Dynasty, when China was a great power with about one-third of the global GDP.” To achieve this dream, China's leaders have pushed for its continued economic development while arousing patriotism and nationalism domestically. Through its military modernization campaign, China has rapidly shown its ambition to become the top-rated global military power by 2049, the centennial of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, he noted.

Ambassador Shin indicated that China has prepared for a long-term competition with the U.S. in the economic arena, as Xi Jinping introduced the dual circulation economic policy, which aims to reorient the country's economy by prioritizing domestic consumption while remaining open to international trade and investment. This policy, Shin argues, “is designed, in part, to make the [Chinese] economy less affected by external factors including the supply chain reset of the U.S.” As such, China has stressed the importance of innovation and has made massive investments in science and technology to reduce its reliance on Western economies. Moreover, China has promoted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its political and economic influence.

“China became the second largest economic power and began to show assertiveness in its foreign policy, particularly by emphasizing the safeguarding of Chinese interests, namely, sovereignty and territorial integrity, state security and development interest,” stated Shin. To achieve these goals, “Chinese diplomats have voiced their arguments in an abrasive style, ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ as it is called by Westerners.” This form of proactive engagement with the rest of the world has resulted in an intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China, which has made it increasingly difficult for South Korea to maintain simultaneous ties with both great powers.

No Longer on the Fence

Shin noted that “The strategic distrust and intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China have put substantial pressure on South Korea…and South Korea's long-term policy to make a Korea-U.S. alliance compatible with its partnership with China is becoming more difficult.” In recent years, South Korea has moved even closer to the U.S.

The joint communique issued when President Moon Jae-in visited Washington two years ago, already showed South Korea’s tilt toward the U.S. At the time, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula by the North Korean nuclear and missile provocation necessitated the alliance. Now, an ascendant China, “together with the lessons of Ukraine, have made South Korean people pay close attention to the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance,” stated Shin, noting that both nations openly stress the importance of freedom, democracy, and rule-based order. South Korea has become enthusiastic about tripartite cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, in tune with American policies. 

On the other hand, China warned South Korea to respect China's core interests while expressing its concerns on several strategic issues. Shin stated that “China began to demand the Yoon government to continue the three policy positions of the previous government, namely, no more deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), no participation in the American missile defense system, and no military alliance among Korea, Japan, and the U.S.” However, the current Foreign Minister Park Jin made it clear to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang that the policy positions of the previous government do not bind the new government, Shin indicated.
 

The Taiwan Contingency

Shin indicated the precarious nature of the contingency, stating, “South Korea has no intention of challenging the One China claim. However, the peace and stability of Taiwan Strait are also very important for South Korea, as the security situation of the Taiwan Strait is connected to the Korean peninsula.” Indeed, a military collision in the Taiwan Strait would be impossible to contain locally. “The U.S. and Japan are supposed to immediately help Taiwan to repel China’s military attack, and American bases are located in South Korea and Japan, including Okinawa,” he said.

Therefore, military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is likely to escalate to Northeast Asia, and a certain portion of American forces in South Korea could move to the Taiwan Strait in the contingency according to the strategic flexibility of forces, “which might induce North Korea's misjudgment to invade South Korea,” Shin predicted.
 

Looking to National Identity

The Cost of Deterrence

Preventing Overextension

Overextension represents one of the largest limits on U.S. power projection. According to Mastro, one of the primary reasons that the Biden administration has not been talking about North Korea significantly, is the fact that the U.S. cannot fight a war on the Korean Peninsula and compete effectively with China.

Thus, Mastro proposes that the South Koreans play a greater role in their defense, a topic that comes up with NATO partners and allies in Europe as well. More specifically, Mastro suggests that the U.S. transfer operational command to South Korean forces, and that the South Korean military should allow the U.S. to practice greater strategic flexibility, to use its forces on the Korean Peninsula for operations or contingencies that are off the peninsula. Up until this point, that permission has been denied, but Mastro contends that it would be useful and could enhance deterrence. 

“If the South Koreans, along with their statements about wanting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, also explicitly allowed for that strategic flexibility to take place to say that they understand that the role of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula is primarily to deter and defend South Korea against North Korea, that could also play a potential role in wider contingencies,” she said.

Furthermore, Mastro believes that South Korea must play a greater role in the production and provision of certain types of munitions. “This is an area where the U.S. has struggled with its own manufacturing base that is considering licensing production and potentially doing it elsewhere. So the question is whether the U.S. could count on South Korea for some critical supplies during a conflict that could reduce the U.S. logistical burden,” she speculated.

South Korea is a small country, and it has limited resources, but it also has the second-largest reserve force and paramilitary force in the world, and the eighth-largest active duty force in the world. According to Mastro, “The South Korean military is technically 20 times larger than that of Japan's…it has punched above its own weight, like the Australian military has.”

It remains to be seen whether the U.S.-South Korea alliance will need to be tested in the coming years, but tensions with China will likely continue to define the two nation’s foreign policies. A potential Taiwan contingency remains one of the largest looming threats to the status quo and the most probable pathway to regional escalation, which, in Shin’s view, could draw North Korea and its nuclear arsenal into the fold.

The Payne Lectureship will return in the spring quarter, continuing with the theme of Asian perspectives on the U.S.-China relationship. We will be joined by Kokubun Ryosei, professor emeritus at Keio University and adjunct adviser at the Fujitsu Future Studies Center.

Although Japan’s approach to economic diplomacy under the Fukuda Doctrine initially was subject to criticism because of its stance on non-interference in domestic affairs, now some are in retrospect lauding the approach, according to Kiyoteru Tsutsui, deputy director at Shorenstein APARC and director of the Japan Program, and co-editor of the recent book The Courteous Power: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific Era. This reevaluation comes after consideration of relatively unsuccessful attempts by the United States to “push” democracy onto Southeast Asian countries. 

The better approach is to focus on advancing the rule of law, which the Japanese have done by investing resources in establishing legal infrastructure in the region, Tsutsui tells Shorenstein APARC Visiting Scholar Gita Wirjawan, host of the popular Endgame video podcast. “Liberal democracy in the sense of the rule of law is a good sort of marketing ploy to sell to Southeast Asian countries because that leads to economic benefits, which is critical to making liberal democracy attractive,” he says.

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Tsutsui joined Wirjawan for an Endgame conversation about Japan’s approaches to foreign direct investment (FDI) in Southeast Asia and other topics. One issue that both scholars agreed upon is the difficulty in getting Americans to focus on Southeast Asia, which has been long recognized as a critical region by the Japanese. Part of the problem is proximity, of course, but the region also tends to be overshadowed in American eyes by East Asian countries. 

The conversation also turned to the demographic issue Japan and other Asian countries are facing as populations age and economic growth stagnates. Tsutsui pointed out that, before 1945, the Japanese Empire saw itself as multi-ethnic; it was only after WWII that the nation was perceived as homogenous, a viewpoint bolstered by Japan’s great economic success in the 1960s and 70s. Now, however, Tsutsui says there is no choice: “Japan has to become more heterogenous,” and even conservative voices acknowledge that women need a larger role in the labor force and that immigrant labor will be essential to combat the demographic crisis.

This discussion with Tsutsui is part of an "Endgame" interview series Wirjawan is recording with Stanford experts during his residency at APARC.