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China's defense budget has grown over the past two decades to become the second largest in the world, though still far below that of the United States. The steady growth of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) capabilities and effectiveness influence not only Beijing's security policies, but the behavior of states within, and increasingly beyond, East Asia, including the United States. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, whose experience with the Chinese military includes assignments as the U.S. defense attaché and assistant army attaché to the People's Republic of China (PRC), will discuss the PLA's modernization efforts and address the evolving role of the military in the PRC's comprehensive national security strategy.

Karl Eikenberry is the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University (FSI). Within FSI he is an affiliated faculty member with the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He is also and an affiliated researcher with the Europe Center. Prior to his arrival at Stanford, he served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from May 2009 until July 2011, where he led the civilian surge directed by President Obama to reverse insurgent momentum and set the conditions for a transition to full Afghan sovereignty.


**Please note: All remarks are off the record.**

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Karl Eikenberry Payne Distinguished Lecturer, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Speaker Stanford University
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In an agreement with Washington, Pyongyang will allow nuclear inspectors into North Korea and also receive much-needed nutritional assistance. David Straub speaks with the media on Pyongyang's moratorium on nuclear testing, cautioning that denuclearization is still a distant goal but arguing that the deal is a positive move overall.
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (center) visits a Korean People's Army unit in a picture released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency in January 2012. | Distributed by Reuters
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Newly printed “no smoking” signs went up across China when the government rolled out a nationwide public indoor smoking ban in May 2011. A sticky gray layer of smoke residue now coats many signs, representing the challenges China’s growing tobacco-control movement faces against a multibillion-dollar government-run industry and deeply embedded social practices.

How has the cigarette become so integrated into the fabric of everyday life across the People’s Republic of China (PRC)?

To get to the heart of this question, historians, health policy specialists, sociologists, anthropologists, business scholars, and other experts met Mar. 26 and 27 in Beijing for a conference organized by Stanford’s Asia Health Policy Program. They examined connections intricately woven over the past 60 years between marketing and cigarette gifting, production and consumer demand, government policy and economic profit, and many other dimensions of China’s cigarette culture.

Anthropologist Matthew Kohrman, a specialist on tobacco in China, led the conference, which was held at the new Stanford Center at Peking University. In an interview, he spoke about the history of China’s cigarette industry, cigarettes and society, and the tobacco-control movement.

The early years

Tobacco first entered China through missionary contact in the 1600s, says Kohrman, but it was not until the early 20th century when cigarettes began gaining popularity. The first cigarette advertising was a “confused tapestry” of messages as marketers figured out what spoke to the public. “There were just as many images of neo-Confucian filial piety as there were of cosmopolitan ‘modern women,’” says Kohrman.

Through improved marketing and aggressive factory building, British American Tobacco and Nanyang Brothers, China’s two largest pre-war firms, helped increase the demand for cigarettes. The Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) disrupted the cigarette supply, but their popularity had taken hold. Some cigarette firms shifted during the war to the relative safety of southwest China, where tobacco production has remained concentrated ever since.

Post-1949

After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the tobacco industry was nationalized and strong relationships between the central government and cigarette manufacturers in the provinces were formed. Cigarettes also began to be viewed as a part of everyday life. “Ration coupons for cigarettes were issued alongside grain, sugar, and bicycle coupons,” says Kohman. “The Maoist regime legitimized cigarettes as the right of every citizen."

During the Deng Xiaoping era (1978–1997), China’s cigarette industry really took off as manufacturers competed with one another for foreign currency to purchase cutting-edge European equipment and newer varieties of tobacco seed stock. Increased production and the return of full-scale advertising fueled greater consumer demand, and manufacturers began producing more and more varieties of cigarette. Vendors displayed glass cases filled with a colorful patchwork of cigarette packs bearing names like Panda, Double Happiness, and Red Pagoda.

The tobacco industry remained under government control as other industries privatized in the 1980s and 1990s. Party-state management of the cigarette became even more centralized in the early 1980s with the creation of the China Tobacco Monopoly Administration and its parallel external counterpart, the China Tobacco Corporation.

Since 1949, provincial protectionism has marked the cigarette market. It is now possible to purchase Beijing cigarettes in Kunming, Chengdu brands in Shanghai, and so on, but to distribute cigarettes in another province, a manufacturer must cut a deal with provincial government officials. Provincial administrations are loath to cut such deals because central government policy dictates that the portion of cigarette sales tax which does not go to the central government always is channeled to the finance bureau of the province of original production. China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization opened the market ever so slightly to international brands like Marlboro and Kent, but domestic brands continue to dominate because of fierce protectionism.

...If it chooses to do so, China is in a position to lead and change the landscape in a very profound way.
-Matthew Kohrman, Professor of Anthropology, Stanford

A new era

In 2003, the World Health Organization established the first global health treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Although the United States still has not yet ratified the FCTC, China signed the treaty in 2003 and ratified it in 2005. Kohrman says China’s tobacco industry giants fear competition from international cigarette brands more than they worry about tobacco-control measures related to the FCTC.

Nonetheless, the FCTC ushered in a new era of public health research about tobacco and has helped increase public awareness about the dangers of smoking. New restrictions have been imposed on print and television advertising for cigarettes, and international organizations, such as the Bloomberg Family Foundation, have begun funding anti-tobacco work in China.

A big challenge to tobacco-control campaigns, says Kohrman, is the sheer amount of money that tobacco companies have available for marketing. “In 2010, China’s tobacco industry posted profits in excess of U.S. $90 billion—that’s huge. Tobacco control research and advocacy now annually receive a few million dollars, and much of that is coming through outside funders, which have very specific projects in mind.”

China’s tobacco advertisers have adapted to the new restrictions that prevent them from openly promoting cigarettes in the media. They have instead moved to point-of-sale and soft-marketing tactics, including misinformation campaigns about the “dangers” of quitting smoking. “The actual expenditure on marketing probably hasn’t dropped very much,” says Kohrman.

Cigarettes and society

Strong marketing and the legitimization of cigarettes as a part of everyday life have led to the deep integration of cigarettes into Chinese society. While only 3 to 4 percent of women in China smoke, cigarettes are an important part of male identity and social mobility. The wide range of cigarette brands has led to the growth of high-end varieties favored by businessmen and politicians, with some brands costing as much as $50 a pack. The custom of cigarette gifting has existed in China for decades, and it is difficult for a young man to turn down a package of cigarettes from a senior colleague or supervisor.

There is also the fact that nicotine is highly addictive, and quitting is difficult in an environment where smoking cigarettes is socially sanctioned. Kohrman says, “When you take an incredibly addictive substance like nicotine and throw it into the mix of all of these norms and customs, it creates a pretty toxic brew.”

The future?

Tobacco control presents a formidable challenge in China, one that requires understanding the historical context and complex dimensions of the cigarette industry. “Cigarettes have been insinuated into so many aspects of daily life across China, and the market for this product has now become so closely enmeshed with matters of government finance and operations,” says Kohrman.

What happens in China could have implications for the entire world. “There’s a tobacco-induced human annihilation unfolding right now in almost every country and questions about how society and Big Tobacco are enmeshed, and how cigarette culture and government finance have become mutually supportive are pivotal,” says Kohrman. “Every country except Bhutan has legalized cigarette sales and is subject to many of the same general issues as China—only in China they’re on a much larger scale. But if it chooses to do so, China is in a position to lead and change the landscape in a very profound way.”   

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Premium Chinese cigarette brand Panda for sale in a duty-free shop at Dubai's airport. | Flickr/Bernard Oh
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Since opening its doors to the world in 1978, China has pursued a sometimes erratic but reasonably steady course leading to increasing global economic and political interaction. Its interests now extend from Pyongyang to New York and Sydney to Riyadh. U.S. President Barack Obama’s announcement of a new “pivot” toward Asia, recent events on the Korean Peninsula, and China’s upcoming leadership transition provide additional reasons to seek greater understanding of China’s goals and interactions with other nations.

Thomas Fingar, Stanford’s Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, is leading a new multiphase Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) initiative to explore the nuances and complexity of China’s foreign relations and domestic issues. The China and the World research project aims to contextualize and better understand China’s regional and global interactions, both from the perspective of China itself and from that of other countries. Beginning with Northeast Asia, the project will analyze China’s relations region-by-region throughout the world, and will involve experts from Stanford, China, and the regions studied. It kicks off with a Shorenstein APARC-organized workshop held Mar. 19 and 20 at the new Stanford Center at Peking University.

Fingar discusses the development of China’s foreign relations since 1978, and describes the project and workshop’s background.

In the three decades since Deng Xiaoping enacted his 1978 Open Door reforms, what have been the main trends in China’s global engagement?

The general trend since 1978 has been for China to become increasingly active and engaged in a growing number of places around the world. There have been a number of phases to this.

The “honeymoon period” of U.S.-China relations (1979–1989) was a period of essentially no competition to China’s interaction within the U.S.-led world economic system. China concentrated on the OECD countries—especially the United States, Japan, and Western Europe—that had money to invest and willingness to trade.

After the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, China’s international options became more constrained as its relations with the developed world plateaued. It began to reach out to the places that would deal with it: Southeast Asia and particularly Africa. This was in part diplomatically motivated, and in part a search for new markets for the low-end goods it was beginning to produce. It was also the beginning of its search for energy.

Around 2000, China transitioned from building a more modern economy towards being one—beginning the era of its “rise.” China’s demand for resources went up, as did its capacity to supply more markets and its ability to invest more of its growing foreign exchange earnings. It became globally active, proclaiming that it had a new, less exploitative model than what the United States and Europe offered.

What Northeast Asia issues do you think China will focus on this year, especially as it plans for a major leadership transition?

North Korea’s stability and China’s growing investments in the DPRK. Beijing is acutely interested in whether Kim Jong Un will prove a viable leader and whether the regime will be able to manage its new challenges. China is concerned about possible North Korean provocations that might trigger responses by South Korea and/or the United States, putting at risk the peaceful regional and international situation China needs for its political and economic development.

The second issue is answering the question: what does the U.S. pivot toward Asia mean? What does it mean in terms of security, economics, and relations with Japan and Korea? China is the largest trading partner for each of these countries. They value it as a market, and as a source of resources. Yet they also worry about being excessively dependent on China. They appear not to have worried about this quite so much when their dependence on the U.S. market was comparable.

Two full workshop sessions will be devoted to Japan and South Korea, both countries with close U.S. ties. What are the most important factors with regard to China’s rise for these two countries? What about for Southeast Asia?

One of the reasons for our upcoming Beijing workshop is to develop a general template of questions we can ask for each region. We want to avoid focusing the questions too narrowly on Northeast Asia.

For Japan and Korea, one factor has to do with economic opportunities and with their own vulnerabilities. The other has to do with the security challenges of China’s rise, and the uncertainty of its military aspirations. Japan and Korea do not want to be drawn into U.S.-led activities, but they still value the United States for protection. They are concerned about managing the decoupling of economic and security dependence, about no longer being dependent on the same country for both.

Many regional issues are interrelated, such as maritime territorial claims and naval expansion. China is an economic player in Southeast Asia, and the Philippines and Thailand have an alliance with the United States. Indonesia is a rising county in Southeast Asia, and India is an outside player in the region. The U.S. 7th Fleet currently defends the shipping lanes to Northeast Asia that go through Southeast Asia, which probably is not the long-term solution.  

Russia played an important role in shaping the political ideology in the early days of the People’s Republic of China, and the politics of both countries—especially Russia—have changed so much. What is their relationship like now?

Correct and limited. The West imposed a military hardware embargo on China after Tiananmen, so Russia is a limited alternative for that, and it is also a source of energy and other resources. It is fair to say China has something close to disdain for Russia, for what it sees as political confusion and economic mismanagement. The idea of a strategic triangle—using Russia to balance U.S. influence—is something China sees as unviable.

As you move forward with this project, what is the ultimate goal?

The goal is to understand the dynamics of interaction—to understand the bigger picture. Other countries have objectives and concerns with regard to China, while China has objectives and concerns of its own. It is about identifying things such as where they see the same and different kinds of opportunities; what concerns they have about third country interests or involvement; and how they evaluate the success of policies to date.  

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"Focus straight ahead on the development of Pudong [Shanghai commercial district]," says Deng Xiaoping on a poster at the 2010 Shanghai World Expo. | Flickr/sbszine
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Nearly a year has passed since an earthquake triggered a tsunami that swept away entire communities on Japan’s northeastern coast, leading to a series of accidents at the Fukushima nuclear complex. Since the March 11 disaster, Japan is experiencing a growing sense of community, and it faces a potential opportunity for innovation in the energy industry and economy. Masahiko Aoki and Kenji E. Kushida discuss post-March 11 developments, and a related conference at Stanford scheduled for February 27.

Aoki is the Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor Emeritus of Japanese Studies, and director of the Japan Studies Program at the Shorenstein-Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

Kushida is the Takahashi Research Associate in Japanese Studies at Shorenstein APARC, and a Stanford graduate (BA ’01, and MA ’03).

One Year After Japan's 3/11 Disaster will bring together experts from Stanford, Japan, and Europe for a discussion of the major economic, political, energy, and societal challenges and growth in post-Fukushima Japan.   

Looking back a year later, what do you think are important lessons we can learn from March 11?

Masahiko Aoki: Japan has often faced disasters leading to the complete destruction of cities and enormous losses of life. In the last century alone, there was the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923; wartime damage in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and other metropolitan areas; the Kobe earthquake of 1995; and so on. Each time, Japan rebuilt its life and infrastructure anew. Accepting the reality of a disaster and making efforts to rebuild is in a sense deeply embedded in Japan’s collective DNA. However, the March 11 disaster was not only just a natural disaster. People are now well aware that there were lots of elements of human and institutional error in terms of preparing for and coping with natural disasters. Recent geographical studies and historical documents reveal that large-scale earthquake-tsunami disasters comparable to March 11 have occurred four times in the last 4,000 years. It provides Japan with a good opportunity for thinking about how to build sustainable societies and cities.  

Kenji Kushida: Big shocks always cause big changes, and the type of change depends on the kind of shock. With March 11, there was the human tragedy of people literally getting washed away. It also raised the question of how to restructure energy markets, which is an area where outcomes in Japan can affect worldwide restructuring. This particular shock then is triggering a whole set of fairly slow moving, but very transformative changes that could take place over the next few years.

What trends are we seeing in Japan’s energy industry now, and what are the implications for Japan’s future energy policy?

Aoki: When I flew into Tokyo the day after the great earthquake, the city was quite dark. But by the summertime, it was not only lit up, but there was a blue hue to the light—this was due to the wide adoption of energy-efficient LED lighting. Even with the nuclear plants down and 25 percent of the electric capacity gone, there were no major blackouts thanks to energy-saving measures. This kind of incident motivates people to explore ways to innovate the energy industry. For example, Japan’s energy-efficient auto industry took off in the late 1970s in reaction to the Oil Shock.

Japan’s energy industry is currently run by regional monopolies. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), for example, monopolizes everything from power generation to retail distribution. In the past, there had been an attempt to break up the different parts of the power monopolies into separate entities. But only a bit of reform was made because of very strong resistance from TEPCO. Now TEPCO is on the verge of insolvency, so Japan has a very good chance to restructure its power industry. People are again starting to think about breaking up the regional monopolies and about innovation, which several experts will discuss during our conference.

Kushida: We will also draw on Stanford’s being in California to think about how to prevent Enron-style market manipulation and rolling blackouts from happening in Japan. A lot of it has to do with the rules and regulations that create an energy market. In the tsunami-devastated areas of Japan, there is also a tremendous opportunity for ground-up investment in new forms of energy. Silicon Valley technologies and companies can help design the next generation of renewable, sustainable energy systems in those areas.
In Japan, there is a sense that people have rediscovered their ties to one another after the disaster.

-Masahiko Aoki, Director, Japan Studies Program


During the recovery, many Japanese citizens demonstrated a remarkable strength and collaborative spirit. Has this changed?

Aoki: Annually on New Year’s Day in Japan, a high-level Buddhist priest writes the calligraphy for a word representing the spirit of the people. This year he wrote “絆”—“bond” (kizuna)—signifying the ties both among Japan’s citizens, and between Japanese and the generous help and aid that poured in after March 11.

In Japan, there is a sense that people have rediscovered their ties to one another after the disaster. Before March 11, there was some worry that young people were not so concerned about others and about tradition. Many young people now want to become volunteers, and there is also a better sense of community.

What has the impact been on Japan’s economy, and what are the prospects for recovery?

Aoki: There is an increasing awareness that Japan cannot sustain the same kinds of export-oriented, manufacturing-based industrial structures it has over the past decades.

Since 2007, Japan’s net foreign exchange receipts from royalties, investments, and the like have exceeded those from trade. The economic structure is becoming less export oriented, so the March 11 disaster might trigger the acceleration of a more domestic-oriented economy. It might also lead to an increase in foreign direct investment, prompted in part by population aging and partly by appreciation of the yen. Japan will become more domestic market oriented, while at the same time more internationally active. A lot next year depends on what will happen with Europe’s economy, but otherwise the prospect for Japan’s GDP is not bad because of reconstruction demand.

Kushida: Recovering from March 11 presents a potentially more productive experience than the 2008 global financial crisis. In 2008, Japan’s exports dropped dramatically for a few months and then there was a sharp recession that recovered quickly. There was not a whole lot that people or companies could do, other than adjust to the potential decline. March 11 provides more opportunities for innovation at the company and individual level. 

As it is finding growth in the domestic market, Japan has been criticized lately for being “inward-looking.” But two things from this latest crisis are contributing to looking outward a little more. One is the sense of vulnerability and transience, so strengthening Japan’s economic base becomes a much more urgent matter. The second is that in the aftermath of the euro crisis, the very strong yen has also led to a huge move toward outward acquisitions that are becoming integrated with the domestic economy.

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At present, the tobacco industry produces some six trillion cigarettes worldwide every year. Six trillion cigarettes per annum, each ready to release smoke filled with highly addictive nicotine and powerful carcinogens. A third of all these sticks were produced in China last year. In 2011, the world’s largest cigarette maker by volume, the China National Tobacco Corporation, contributed an all-time high of U.S. $214 billion in profits and taxes to the Chinese government, up 22 percent year-on-year. Currently the greatest cause of preventable death in the world, the cigarette is likely to kill ten times as many people in the 21st century as it did in the 20th century, epidemiologists tell us, with China bearing the largest burden. Until now, much global health research and intervention has focused with limited success on the cigarette consumer—addressing how one or another variable prompts people to take up or quit smoking, whether the cue for the consumer is biological, psychological, spatial, financial or symbolic. What though of the industrial sources of tobacco-related diseases? Where are the six trillion cigarettes that are released into circulation each year manufactured? Where are they rolled, wrapped, and boxed for shipment? This presentation will introduce the Cigarette Citadels Project, an innovative application of participatory GIS. With special attention given to China’s network of cigarette factories, Matthew Kohrman will explain how the Cigarette Citadels Project not only reveals conceptual roadblocks in public health policy but also lacuna in social theory pertaining to the state and the politics of life.


Matthew Kohrman joined Stanford’s faculty in 1999. His research and writing bring multiple methods to bear on the ways health, culture, and politics are interrelated. Focusing on the People's Republic of China, he engages various intellectual terrains such as governmentality, gender theory, political economy, critical science studies, and embodiment. His first monograph, Bodies of Difference: Experiences of Disability and Institutional Advocacy in the Making of Modern China, examines links between the emergence of a state-sponsored disability-advocacy organization and the lives of Chinese men who have trouble walking. In recent years, Kohrman has been conducting research projects aimed at analyzing and intervening in the biopolitics of cigarette smoking and production. These projects expand upon analytical themes of Kohrman’s disability research and engage in novel ways techniques of public health.

This event is part of the China's Looming Challenges series. 

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Building 50, Central Quad
Stanford, California 94305-2034

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Associate Professor of Anthropology
Senior Fellow, by courtesy, at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Faculty Affiliate at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Faculty Affiliate at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
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Matthew Kohrman joined Stanford’s faculty in 1999. His research and writing bring multiple methods to bear on the ways health, culture, and politics are interrelated. Focusing on the People's Republic of China, he engages various intellectual terrains such as governmentality, gender theory, political economy, critical science studies, and embodiment. His first monograph, Bodies of Difference: Experiences of Disability and Institutional Advocacy in the Making of Modern China, examines links between the emergence of a state-sponsored disability-advocacy organization and the lives of Chinese men who have trouble walking. In recent years, Kohrman has been conducting research projects aimed at analyzing and intervening in the biopolitics of cigarette smoking and production. These projects expand upon analytical themes of Kohrman’s disability research and engage in novel ways techniques of public health.

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Matthew Kohrman Associate Professor of Anthropology and Senior Fellow Speaker FSI
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While Chernobyl, and now Fukushima, are household words, far fewer people have heard of Maiak in the southern Urals and Hanford in eastern Washington State where Soviet and American engineers built plutonium plants to fuel the Cold War nuclear arsenal. Within nuclear "buffer zones," plant managers, who were pushed to produce as much plutonium as quickly as possible, polluted freely, liberally and disastrously. During the plutonium disasters that ensued, each plant issued over 200 million curies of radioactive isotopes into the surrounding environment, at least twice the amount released at Chernobyl. Under cover of nuclear security and powered by generous corporate welfare, plant managers employed influential public relations campaigns, restricted medical research, deployed temporary, migrant workers as ‘"jumpers" for the dirtiest work, and generally denied the existence and hazards of radioactive contamination. This was the house plutonium built. Kate Brown argues these histories are important because they supplied models, staff, blueprints and subsequent ready-made disasters for Chernobyl and Fukushima.

Kate Brown is an associate professor of history at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. She is the author of a Biography of No Place: From Ethnic Borderland to Soviet Heartland (Harvard 2004), which won the American Historical Association’s George Louis Beer Prize for the Best Book in International European History. Brown is a 2009 Guggenheim Fellow and is working on a book called Plutopolia, a tandem history of the world’s first plutonium cities, to be published by Oxford University Press in 2012.

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Special Japan Studies Program and CEAS Series: Winter-Spring 2011-12

Looking Back, Looking Forward: Japan's March 11 Disasters One Year Later

The earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster that hit Japan in March 2011 had both immediate catastrophic consequences and long term repercussions. Fundamental areas of Japan’s environment, economy, society, and collective national psyche were deeply affected, giving rise to a broad range of urgent issues. These include economic debates about how to meet the country’s energy demands with nuclear power plants offline, and what path to take for the country’s energy future; political crises, including criticism of the government’s disaster response; the psychological challenges of coping with trauma and grief; a daunting environmental clean-up; and social developments, including a new wave of civil society activism. This series brings together scholars and activists from a wide range of specialties to take stock of how the Japanese have been affected by the disasters, and to assess the efforts of residents, volunteers, and policy makers to recover and move forward.

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The past year unfolded with Japan’s unprecedented triple disaster and closed with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s historic trip to Myanmar. Moving into 2012, Europe’s economy creaks along uncertainly and China gears up for a major leadership change. In an interview with the Ukranian magazine Glavred, political science professor Phillip Lipscy discusses landmark Asian economic and political events of 2011, and what they could mean in the coming year.

What was the most significant event in terms of Asia’s economy in 2011?

The March 11 Great Tohoku earthquake and tsunami: Besides the tragic loss of life and property, the disaster disrupted global supply chains and plunged the Japanese economy into a recession. The nuclear meltdown in Fukushima also led many countries to question the future of nuclear energy—this will have long-lasting consequences for global energy markets and efforts to deal with climate change.

What was the most significant political event?

Signs of political opening in Burma/Myanmar could have profound consequences not only for that country but for the rest of Asia as well. Hillary Clinton became the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit the country in 50 years. Aung San Suu Kyi has been released from detention and the National League for Democracy has re-registered as a political party. If this leads to democratization, it will be remembered as an important turning point.

What new policy and economic trends appeared in 2011? Which of them will continue into the coming year?

There seems to be a subtle shift in views towards China's economy. Chinese government officials are deeply concerned about the "middle income trap." China has reached a level of development where many countries saw their economic growth slow down sharply. Rising incomes are eroding China's advantage in low-cost manufacturing. There is much talk of multinational companies relocating their operations to even cheaper countries, such as Vietnam. This is an important transition for China, and it will remain an important issue in coming years.

In terms of people, who do you feel was the most notable, and who was
the most disappointing this past year?


The people of Japan, who responded with remarkable perseverance, order, and discipline to such a tragic natural disaster.  

The most disappointing were the political leaders of Japan, who could not set aside
their differences and come together for the sake of their country.

Will China continue to spread its influence in 2012, and might any countries oppose this process?

China is now the second largest economy in the world and an important military power. It is inevitable that China will rise in international stature and influence. However, Chinese leaders also face some important challenges—rising inequality, an overheated housing market, and bad loans in its financial system. The focus of international attention should be on integrating China into the world order as a peaceful, responsible stakeholder—not on confrontation.

What impact could the economic crisis in Europe have on the economics and international policy of the Asia-Pacific region?

If the financial crisis in Europe is mismanaged, nobody will escape the consequences. Europe is a crucial export market for Asian countries, and European financial institutions are major lenders to emerging economies in the region. Equally as important, repeated financial crises and political mismanagement in the United States, Japan, and Europe could begin to undermine perceptions of democratic government and capitalism.

What will be most important event in Asia next year?

China's leadership transition, particularly given the many immediate challenges the country faces.

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U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits Aung San Suu Kyi at her house in Rangoon, Myanmar, Dec. 2011. | Flickr/U.S. State Department
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