On June 6, 2024, Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar spoke at a public forum hosted by the Center for Asia-Pacific Resilience and Innovation (CAPRI) on the nuances of intelligence analysis and their application to policymaking. Dr. Fingar is a former deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council. He previously served as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Under his leadership, the federal intelligence bureau gained a reputation for quality and unbiased analysis.

Held at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan, the CAPRI public forum drew government leaders, diplomats, business representatives, scholars, and students. Watch the discussion:

In his remarks, Fingar delved into the intricacies of tailoring intelligence reports to policymakers' needs. He noted that the key criterion is not absolute accuracy but the usefulness of the input.

Describing what he coined “wicked problems," he cited various scenarios exhibiting complex issues requiring long-term and multifaceted approaches to intelligence. These scenarios include the Russian-Ukraine war, polio resurgence, climate change, migration, nuclear stability, and green technology. He elaborated on the interconnectedness of these topics, and how the effects of one crisis create a ripple effect on other markets and economies.

Fingar highlighted the need to ensure that one international player does not negate the solution implemented by another in dealing with such issues. What makes problems wicked is that a single government can’t solve them, he said.

As the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis from 2005 through 2008, Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar had to implement legislation intended to enact sweeping reforms of intelligence procedure, establish a new federal agency, and integrate and improve the performance of 16 intelligence agencies. Synthesizing this experience, Fingar’s new book, From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform, explains how he carried out that tremendous charge. Identifying and codifying the commonalities that shape and constrain prospects for success, the book provides a practical guide that every new government appointee could use.

In a conversation with FSI Director Michael McFaul, Fingar discussed some of the themes and lessons he shares in the book, from prioritizing and sequencing interconnected objectives through determining organizational structures and staff arrangements, to building support and managing opposition.

“One of the first jobs of any new appointee is to determine which prescribed and suggested tasks are necessary and which ones are possible,” said Fingar. “The flip side of that is making judgments about what isn’t immediately necessary, or maybe necessary but not urgent, and what really isn’t possible under the circumstances.”

All government appointments come with a mix of tasks, responsibilities, and opportunities, and oftentimes carry with them a mandate subsuming requirements and authorities, but virtually never do they come with a blueprint detailing the steps to achieve the required and desirable changes over a four-year time horizon.

When Fingar accepted the position of deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, he knew he had to implement the legislative and presidential mandate he was going to be judged by — namely, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which President George W. Bush signed into law in December 2004 — and to meet the ongoing intelligence responsibilities amid reforming and reorienting the organization. But he also prioritized another necessary task, that of restoring confidence in the intelligence community.

After the events of September 11, 2001 and the failure to discover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the intelligence community faced severe criticism and harsh scrutiny. “The loss of confidence began at the top, with President Bush,” said Fingar, “and went down through Congress and senior officials, influencing the morale of the workforce.” He knew that it was impossible to meet the requirements of the mission if the people supported by it did not have confidence.

Next-step considerations must address whether the requisite conditions to achieve the prioritized objectives — including staff, information, authorities, and funding — exist or must be obtained. For example, if some tasks require skills that are not currently available, then it is essential to identify and recruit people with the necessary skills and experience. Or if building the capacity to achieve priority goals requires organization restructuring and personnel reassigning, then these tasks require steps to protect or deemphasize legacy activities.

To succeed in their roles, government appointees must also win cooperation and stave off criticism both from opponents and those who believe they could do better. That, in turn, requires one to strike a balance between transparency and flexibility. Knowing what to report and when to report it, having a vision that is clear and easy to explain, and responding to feedback while still conveying an image of resolution and handle on strategy are all invaluable for judgments about what steps to continue, modify, or jettison right away, Fingar writes in his book.

“We captured this with a motto that was also our modus operandi,” he said. "Think Big. Start Small. Fail Cheap. Fix Fast. Listen to feedback. Involve people in the decision-making process.”

Can China’s aggression towards Taiwan be stopped? Oriana Skylar Mastro joins the Munk Debate podcast to argue affirmatively that Chinese military capability has advanced too far for the United States to credibly deter the PRC through military means alone. Michael Beckley, an associate professor of political science at Tufts University and visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, offers the rebuttal. The full debate is available below.

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Many of China’s military development goals were set with a target date of 2020, which means the PRC is currently in a strong place with its offensive and defensive capabilities. By Mastro’s measure, China now has the most advanced ballistic missile program in the world, including the United States. For Taiwan, this means the reality of an aggressive neighbor who possesses offensive weapons that are very difficult to defend against.

China also has geographic benefits when it comes to offensive maneuvering. If a hot conflict began, neither Taiwan nor the United States has a comparable network of sole-sovereign military bases in the area such as China’s. Not only does this mean China can utilize its air defense capabilities — again, now one of the strongest in the world, by Mastro’s account — but it can also support a robust blockade against Taiwan across the strait and devastate the island both militarily and economically.

As Mastro points out, “Taiwan’s economy completely depends on China, so if China decided to use economic coercion, which is defined as a type of aggression, the United States has absolutely no way of protecting Taiwan from any economic harm coming from the PRC.”

Because of this potential for combined military and economic aggression, Mastro pushed for urgency on deterrence in Taiwan. “The United States and international community do not have forever. The Chinese are not happy with maintaining the status quo, and they will soon believe they have the military capability to [take Taiwan].”

Rather than continuing to act alone, Mastro hopes the United States will lead out in organizing an international coalition that includes other regional partners such as Australia, Japan, and India as actively contributing participants. With the United States no longer seen as a monolith in Beijing, only broad, coordinated cooperation will provide effective deterrence and security for Taiwan.

On another podcast, Conversation Six, Mastro joins Abraham Denmark to discuss China's Taiwan strategy and what the United States can do to deter China from invading Taiwan. The threat of non-military intervention by the United States and its allies is the way forward, she says. "The US needs to do more in non-military realms," she argues.