For the past sixty years, most analysts have assumed that Japan's security policies would reinforce American interests in Asia. The political and military profile of Asia is changing rapidly, however. Korea's nuclear program, China's rise, and the relative decline of US power have commanded strategic review in Tokyo just as they have in Washington. What is the next step for Japan's security policy? Will confluence with U.S. interests--and the alliance--survive intact? Will it be transformed? Will Japan become more autonomous?

Richard J. Samuels is Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for International Studies. He is also the founding director of the MIT Japan Program. In 2001 he became chairman of the Japan-US Friendship Commission, an independent federal grant-making agency that supports Japanese studies and policy-oriented research in the United States. In 2005 he was elected a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Professor Samuels served as head of the MIT Department of Political Science between 1992-1997 and as vice-chairman of the Committee on Japan of the National Research Council until 1996. Grants from the Fulbright Commission, the Abe Fellowship Fund, the National Science Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation have supported nine years of field research in Japan.

Dr. Samuels' recent book, Securing Japan, was published in 2007 by Cornell University Press.

His previous books include Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan, a comparative political and economic history of political leadership in Italy and Japan, "Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective, and Politics of Regional Policy in Japan.

His articles have appeared in International Organization, Foreign Affairs, International Security, The Journal of Modern Italian Studies, The Journal of Japanese Studies, Daedalus, The Washington Quarterly, and other scholarly journals.

Dr. Samuels received his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1980.

Burma (Myanmar) has been under military rule since 1962. It is the least free country in Southeast Asia by the latest Freedom House ranking of political rights and civil liberties. The current junta's leader, Senior General Than Shwe, has made Daw Aung San Suu Kyi arguably the best known political prisoner in the world. In August-September 2007, following steep hikes in fuel prices, scores of protesters marched in silence and were dispersed or arrested. The protests spread beyond the capital and included at least one by Buddhist monks--a significant development in a largely Buddhist country. Meanwhile, delegates to a national convention convened by the regime completed guidelines for a future constitution. This step on a supposed road map to democracy was criticized by some observers as a ploy to institutionalize army control. Others treated the guidelines less skeptically on the grounds that even regime-favoring rules might be used to nudge the country toward reform, and were thus better than no rules at all.

How should outsiders respond to these conditions? With policies of isolation? Or of engagement? Which of the two logics is more powerful: that isolation will deprive the junta of needed support and thus help spark democratization? Or that engagement will expose the country to liberalization and thus incrementally undermine the regime? Is there a mixed logic worth implementing between these extremes? Or have the mounting protests inside Burma opened a crucial window of opportunity that replaces these alternatives with a radical new logic of carpe diem:that outsiders should actively intervene in support of the opposition and in favor of regime change now? Not to mention the junta's own rationale for retaining power: that military rule is preferable to any alternative.

Maureen Aung-Thwin, while working on Burma at the Open Society Institute (founded by financier/philanthropist George Soros), is an active member of the Asia Committee of Human Rights Watch. She is a trustee of the Burma Studies Foundation, which oversees the Center for Burma Studies at Northern Illinois University. She received a BA from Northwestern University and did graduate work at NYU.

Zarni, while researching democratic transition at Oxford, has been active in "Track II" negotiations with the Burmese junta. In 1995 he founded the Free Burma Coalition, which favored sanctions. Later his position evolved toward engagement. He edited Active Citizens under Political Wraps: Experiences from Myanmar/Burma and Vietnam (2006). He received a PhD from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Co-sponsored with the Asia Society Northern California and the Center for Southeast Asia Studies at UC-Berkeley.

Nuclear weapons play a modest but significant role in the national security strategies of key states in the Asian security region. Relevant in a small number of situations and augmenting conventional forces, their role is frequently indirect. The primary role of nuclear weapons is basic or central deterrence.

Despite ongoing efforts, the offense and defense roles of nuclear weapons continue to be limited. Contemporary conceptions and practices of deterrence, however, span a wide spectrum and differ substantially from that of the Cold War. Absence of severe confrontations, multiple threats of unequal urgency, and the relatively small size of Asian nuclear forces have made general deterrence (as opposed to immediate deterrence) the norm. Extended deterrence continues to be relevant, but is largely psychological and symbolic to assure allies and prevent them from pursuing independent nuclear options.

Nuclear weapons have not fundamentally altered the strategic picture in Asia. They have had a limited impact on the distribution of power, lines of amity and enmity, alliances, and conflict resolution. Although there could be some destabilizing consequences, on net nuclear weapons have contributed to security and stability in Asia that is underpinned by several pillars.

Muthiah Alagappa is a distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, Hawaii. He has held several appointments at the East-West Center including director of the East-West Center Washington (2001-2007) and director of studies (1999-2001). He has been a visiting professor at Columbia University, Stanford University, Keio University, and the Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia; and adjunct faculty at George Washington University, University of Malaya, and National University of Malaysia.

Dr. Alagappa is the series editor for the Asian Security book series published by Stanford University Press and is on the editorial board of several journals. His research interests include international politics and security in Asia and the Pacific and comparative politics of Asia. He has a Ph.D. in international affairs from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

His recent publications include Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, author and ed., Stanford University Press, 2004, Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features, Stanford University Press 2002, and Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford University Press 2001. He is currently editing a book on nuclear weapons and security in twenty-first century Asia.

On March 18, 1871, Taewongun (Grand Prince) who held real power when King Kojong (r. 1863-1907) assumed power at the age of 12, issued a historical order that was enforced nationwide: All Confucian private academies ever built, except for the forty-seven royal-chartered ones, were to be destroyed. To justify this unprecedented repression, Taewongun argued that the academies were "the fundamental causes for the decaying nation." During the period from 1865 to 1871, over 800 academies were abolished and these intermediate organizations largely disappeared from the central scene of the Korean history and politics. Taewongun's startling regulation of private academies was rather surprising. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, Choson monarchs enthusiastically encouraged and sponsored the establishment of the academies on the ground that the academy growth would contribute to country's moral reform and state-building. Why did the dramatic change of governmental policy on the academies occur? How can we resolve this historical enigma? To answer these questions, Koo situates this historical drama in a broader -structural- sociological context involving political competition between the state and nascent civil society, in association with his aim of overcoming the current historical explanations emphasizing more imminent causes of the abolition, such as military and fiscal abuses of the academies.

Jeong-Woo Koo is a visiting scholar at the department of sociology, Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from Stanford University in 2007. His interests include comparative-historical sociology, organizations, sociology of education, political sociology, quantitative method, and East-Asian studies. His dissertation explores a long term political competition between state and civil society in Choson Korea. He is currently working on two projects, one on the worldwide expansion of international human rights and its impact on nation-states (with John Meyer and Francisco Ramirez), and the other on the formation of regionalism in East Asia (with Gi-Wook Shin). His publications include "The Origins of the Public Sphere and Civil Society: Private Academies and Petitions in Korea, 1506-1800," Social Science History 31: 3 (Fall 2007), and "World Society and Human Rights: Worldwide Foundings of National Human Rights Institutions, 1978-2004," Korean Journal of Sociology 41: 3 (Spring 2007).