Following March's triple disaster, Japanese policymakers are locked in a debate over nuclear power. Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, discusses the issues creating this political gridlock in the first op-ed of a two-part YaleGlobal series.

Phillip Lipscy, an assistant professor of political science and a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies, is currently conducting research on energy efficiency and financial crisis response. Here he discusses his recent research within the context of contemporary Japan, and comments on current social and political conditions in Japan after the March 2011 disaster.

What is the primary focus of your research right now?

One focus is on the politics of energy efficiency. I am exploring the question: Why do some countries, like Japan, pursue very aggressive efficiency measures, while others, like the United States, choose not to?  

I am also researching the politics of financial crisis response. My key research questions include: What political factors determine the speed and effectiveness of crisis response? When do countries act decisively? What policies are chosen and under what conditions?

In your recent research about energy-efficient policymaking, what are some of the cases and issues in Asia that you have explored?

Japan is a very important case. Its economy is one of the most energy efficient in the world based on measures such as energy intensity. There are a lot of questions, however, about whether any of that is due to policy measures.

I have been examining Japan’s transportation sector with Lee Schipper, a senior research engineer at Stanford’s Precourt Energy Efficiency Center, and our findings are counterintuitive. Most of Japan's relative advantage in transportation sector efficiency is not due to automobile fuel economy, which is what the Japanese government tends to play up. Instead, Japan is characterized by an abnormally high rail share and less total distance traveled. [A great loss to the Stanford community, Dr. Schipper recently passed away. More information is available here.]

What I show in my research is that Japan's efficiency achievements are closely tied to traditional pork barrel politics. High costs have been imposed on the general public—for example, through automobile taxes and highway tolls. The revenue from these measures was traditionally redistributed to key constituencies of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), namely rural residents and the construction industry.

This arrangement worked nicely for several decades, reducing energy consumption while also helping to keep the LDP in power. These arrangements, however, have become unsustainable with political changes since the 1990s, particularly the coming to power of the Democratic Party of Japan. These political changes have put Japan's energy efficiency policy in a state of flux. The current electoral system makes it more difficult to impose diffuse costs on the public—such as through gasoline or CO2 taxes—but there is no obvious alternative mechanism.


A young boy helps with clean-up efforts after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami. (Flickr/DJ Milky)

As far as you can speculate at this point, what impact do you think that the Fukushima nuclear disaster will have on Japan’s future energy policy?

Before the Fukushima disaster, Japan had planned to increase electricity generated by nuclear power to 50 percent by 2030. These plans are almost certainly going to be shelved. Prime Minister Naoto Kan recently announced plans to gradually move away from nuclear power in the coming years.

This discussion is not unique to Japan. Germany, Italy, and Switzerland have all recently announced anti-nuclear policies in response to Fukushima. On a recent trip to Taiwan, I found a similar discussion underway there. Taiwan, however, is very similar to Japan in terms of its high dependence on energy imports. This dependence creates a dilemma.

Japan's economy is already one of the most energy efficient in the world, making it more difficult to realize incremental energy savings through efficiency gains. Oil and natural gas are volatile and subject to geopolitical shocks. Renewables are not yet able to meet the kind of energy demand you have in a large economy like Japan. For the foreseeable future, less nuclear energy means higher costs and greater dependence on fossil fuels. That is going to have negative implications for energy security and climate change.

You recently returned from a trip to Japan. What is your perception of the way that everyday people are dealing with the triple disaster that took place in March? What is your assessment of the political situation?

The most remarkable thing is how quickly the Japanese people came together to support disaster victims and conserve energy. There was an outpouring of help, especially volunteer activities and financial contributions. People are taking energy conservation seriously, keeping air conditioning off even during the unbearably humid summer.

The situation at Fukushima was a big blow to the national psyche though. There have been some media reports overplaying the dangers of radiation, and people are deeply concerned about food safety.

Unfortunately, the political situation has been truly tragic. Even for a political scientist like myself, the inability of Japanese leaders to come together after the disaster is troubling. It took less than a month after the earthquake for bickering and squabbling to return full force. On a more positive note, local government leaders and some private sector actors have filled the void to some degree.

It was striking to find how much the Japanese private sector was stepping in to take over functions that we generally associate with government—things like disaster relief, provision of supplies, and screening food for radiation contamination.


A view of the floor of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. (Flickr/Stefan)

What publications are you currently working on?

I just finished a manuscript, co-authored with my former student Philippe de Koning, on how Japan's defense establishment has dealt with fiscal austerity over the past decade. Now that the United States and Europe are dealing with similar pressures to cut back defense spending, we wanted to see how Japan had managed. We found that Japan's defense planners have fared relatively well within the domestic budgetary process, but they are in an extremely tough situation. Without a major change in  policy, when the short-term coping measures being implemented today run  their course over the next decade, Japan will face a sharp reduction in its military capabilities.

In addition, I collaborated during the past academic year with Hirofumi Takinami, a Shorenstein APARC Visiting Fellow from Japan’s Ministry of Finance, to examine lessons from Japan’s financial crisis in the 1990s. We looked at the extent to which the United States took these lessons into account when it encountered its own economic downturn in 2008. We found that Japan's crisis influenced the U.S. response quite a bit, but there was some variation by policy area based on the degree of politicization. For example, in monetary policy, which is technocratic and politically insulated, the lessons from Japan were implemented quickly. It was slower for financial sector bailouts though, and especially so for fiscal policy.

In this coming academic year what are the courses that you will be teaching?

I will be teaching a graduate seminar on political economy, primarily intended for PhD students in political science, as well as an undergraduate course on the politics of financial crisis.

Japan's massive earthquake and tsunami three weeks ago and the challenging recovery process continue to make news headlines around the world. It is difficult to separate fact and reasonable speculation about the future from the terror-filled coverage about radiation leaking from the Fukushima nuclear complex. In an effort to make sense of recent events, the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) convened a panel of experts for a discussion about the possible future implications arising from this complex and emotionally charged situation for Japan's energy policy, economy, and politics.

Addressing an audience of one hundred students, faculty, and members of the general public on March 30, Shorenstein APARC associate director for research Daniel C. Sneider expressed the center's deep sympathy for those affected by the natural disasters and its profound admiration for the way in which the people of Japan are dealing with the aftermath. Members of the panel echoed these sentiments throughout the event.

Michio Harada, Deputy Counsel General at the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco, cited official government figures indicating that, as of March 28, twenty-eight thousand people were dead or missing and one-hundred-and-eighty thousand people were still in evacuation shelters. Faced with such staggering figures, Japan remains in a rescue and recovery phase, he said, but is receiving a tremendous amount of global support. More than one hundred and thirty countries have provided financial assistance, and eighteen countries and regions have sent rescue teams. Collective public spirit is currently very strong, Deputy Counsel Harada emphasized. Japan's challenge moving forward, he suggested, will be to adopt pragmatic measures to fund reconstruction projects in the areas destroyed or damaged by the natural disasters.

Understanding the situation at the Fukushima nuclear power facility and the information circulating about the potential health risks of radiation exposure is complicated, stressed Siegfried S. Hecker, co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation. He described the intricate design and structure of the reactors and outlined the sequence of events up to the present, explaining the immediate, crucial challenge of continuing to cool the reactors and deal with the leakage of radiation from them. While there are definite and potentially very serious health threats from radiation exposure and contamination, Hecker said, fear and stress about the situation could also negatively affect mental and physical wellbeing. It is too soon to know the long-term implications for energy policy in Japan and other countries, he suggested, emphasizing the significance of learning from this experience in order to improve any future use of nuclear power.

Robert Eberhart, a researcher with the Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, proposed that the global supply chain is flexible enough to absorb any manufacturing disruptions in Japan. He noted that in the past twenty years most of Japan's heavy manufacturing has moved overseas, and that the components made there are a comparatively less significant part of the supply chain. In terms of the overall impact on Japan's economy, Eberhart suggested that the net effect on the GDP would be neutral over the next two years, explaining that the imminent loss of business and investment in some areas would be offset by the growth of firms involved in the reconstruction process.

Phillip Lipscy, a center fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and an assistant professor with the Department of Political Science, stated that events and immediate needs during the early stages of reconstruction may have long-term affects on policymaking and the government structure in Japan. For example, the continued use of nuclear energy—a relatively clean and efficient source of power accounting for 30 percent of Japan's total energy consumption—will face public opposition due to rising concerns about safety and pressing energy needs. In addition, while Prime Minister Naoto Kan's prompt response after the natural disasters helped boost popular sentiment for him and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), how they fare in the long term—especially with regard to the DPJ's relationship with the opposition Liberal Democratic Party and reconstruction-related modifications to its key economic policies—remains to be seen, Lipscy said.

Sneider closed the event with a comparison between the events in Japan and the April 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, pointing to criticism that the Obama and Kan administrations have received for not regulating large corporations closely enough. A prompt resolution to the dangerous—and contentious—situation at the Fukushima nuclear complex is the most immediate concern, and one that will help foretell the long-term political implications for Japan's government, he concluded.

Although there is still a long road ahead in Japan—especially until the accident at Fukushima's nuclear reactor is contained and the actual after-effects of radiation are better understood—the underlying message during the panel discussion was that Japan will indeed recover and that the terrible events of the past weeks have brought people—and even the competing political parties—closer together.

An international forum on North Korea was held in Palo Alto on October 26, 2010, in an effort to educate the public on reunifying the two Koreas. The San Francisco Chapter of the National Unification Advisory Council organized the forum. Approximately 150 audience members heard panelists speak about the economic, social, and political challenges that face South Korea today in its preparation for a peaceful reunification, as well as about their visions for the future of North Korea.

Gi-Wook Shin, the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), moderated the presentations and the panel discussion. The panel of four experts included John Everard, 2010-2011 Pantech Fellow at APARC and a former British ambassador to North Korea, speaking about diplomacy and security; Greg Scarlatoiu, director of public affairs and business issues at the Korea Economic Institute, on economic issues; Sang-Hun Choe, 2010-2011 Fellow in Korean Studies at APARC and a reporter at the International Herald Tribune, on factionalism; and Jung Kwan Lee, the South Korean Consul General in San Francisco, on South Korea's policy toward North Korea.

Everad analyzed North Korea's development during the Cold War of a diplomatic technique by which it repeatedly attempted to play one ally off against another in its relationships with the Soviet Union and China. While arguing that North Korea continues to make effective use of this technique against South Korea, the United States, and the European Union, Everad noted that North Korea's current political uncertainty, following the succession, and its ongoing economic concerns will together create a situation in which it may be very difficult for North Korea to maintain political solidarity.

Scarlatoiu, meanwhile, contended that North Korea's is a post-Stalinist, neo-patrimonial economy. Thus, with recent efforts such as the 2002 market reforms and the 2009 currency reform, the North Korean regime has found itself confronted with a major dilemma. According to Scarlatoiu, while economic reforms are necessary to the long-term survival of the regime, they could also lead to the regime's collapse. This predicament, he added, must be considered as the regime undergoes a leadership transition in the succession to Kim Jong-un.

Choe spoke on the process of succession to Kim Jong-un as well, pointing out that while Kim Jong-un is indisputably the heir to the leadership of North Korea, he has yet to prove his competency as North Korea's future leader. In addition, Choe emphasized that difficulties judging North Korea's intentions and anticipating its behavior stem from the outside world's inability to understand the North Korean leadership and the goals that it truly has in mind.

Finally, Lee stressed that the basic objectives of South Korea's policy on North Korea are to promote a common prosperity and to peacefully resolve North Korean nuclear issues. However, he also made it clear that the South Korean government is seeking to keep North Korean nuclear issues distinct from the issue of inter-Korean relations.