An international forum on North Korea was held in Palo Alto on October 26, 2010, in an effort to educate the public on reunifying the two Koreas. The San Francisco Chapter of the National Unification Advisory Council organized the forum. Approximately 150 audience members heard panelists speak about the economic, social, and political challenges that face South Korea today in its preparation for a peaceful reunification, as well as about their visions for the future of North Korea.

Gi-Wook Shin, the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), moderated the presentations and the panel discussion. The panel of four experts included John Everard, 2010-2011 Pantech Fellow at APARC and a former British ambassador to North Korea, speaking about diplomacy and security; Greg Scarlatoiu, director of public affairs and business issues at the Korea Economic Institute, on economic issues; Sang-Hun Choe, 2010-2011 Fellow in Korean Studies at APARC and a reporter at the International Herald Tribune, on factionalism; and Jung Kwan Lee, the South Korean Consul General in San Francisco, on South Korea's policy toward North Korea.

Everad analyzed North Korea's development during the Cold War of a diplomatic technique by which it repeatedly attempted to play one ally off against another in its relationships with the Soviet Union and China. While arguing that North Korea continues to make effective use of this technique against South Korea, the United States, and the European Union, Everad noted that North Korea's current political uncertainty, following the succession, and its ongoing economic concerns will together create a situation in which it may be very difficult for North Korea to maintain political solidarity.

Scarlatoiu, meanwhile, contended that North Korea's is a post-Stalinist, neo-patrimonial economy. Thus, with recent efforts such as the 2002 market reforms and the 2009 currency reform, the North Korean regime has found itself confronted with a major dilemma. According to Scarlatoiu, while economic reforms are necessary to the long-term survival of the regime, they could also lead to the regime's collapse. This predicament, he added, must be considered as the regime undergoes a leadership transition in the succession to Kim Jong-un.

Choe spoke on the process of succession to Kim Jong-un as well, pointing out that while Kim Jong-un is indisputably the heir to the leadership of North Korea, he has yet to prove his competency as North Korea's future leader. In addition, Choe emphasized that difficulties judging North Korea's intentions and anticipating its behavior stem from the outside world's inability to understand the North Korean leadership and the goals that it truly has in mind.

Finally, Lee stressed that the basic objectives of South Korea's policy on North Korea are to promote a common prosperity and to peacefully resolve North Korean nuclear issues. However, he also made it clear that the South Korean government is seeking to keep North Korean nuclear issues distinct from the issue of inter-Korean relations.

 I gained my definition of success through Stanford . . .

-Makoto Takeuchi, 2004-2005 Corporate Affiliates Program fellow

When Makoto Takeuchi came to the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as a Corporate Affiliates Program fellow during the 2004-2005 academic year, he was working as a senior manager with the Business Development Group of Kansai Electric Power Company, located in Osaka, Japan. Osaka, part of Japan's Kansai region, is a bustling metropolis and an important economic and historical center of Japan. Kansai Electric Power Company is a large energy company that utilizes a combination of energy sources, including nuclear power, which makes up over 50 percent of its power supply, as well as thermal (oil, coal, and liquid natural gas) and hydropower.

Takeuchi found the environment of Stanford University, including its situation in Silicon Valley, stimulating. "I was excited by the diversity and speed of dynamic innovation in Silicon Valley, and the people who utilize their knowledge and skills in order to achieve their dreams," he said. Drawing from this, he carried out a research project exploring complementary strategies for sustainable corporate growth. He concluded that such sustainable growth comes from a balance of internal and external resources and short- and long-term gains, driven by innovation, integration, and interaction.

During his time at Shorenstein APARC, Takeuchi also developed his understanding of working as a part of a team on a project. "I learned that the success of projects requires orchestrating the talents and efforts of many people," he said. He now applies his knowledge of teamwork to the work that he does today, including the essential skill of communicating with colleagues from different cultural and professional backgrounds. Being sensitive to the values of others is crucial when it comes to collaboration, he learned.

Prior to coming to Stanford University, Takeuchi had not yet defined his own idea of "success." He now measures success by the positive impact that he has on society, which to him is evidenced by the "smiles on the faces of my customers, stakeholders, and family." Takeuchi has the opportunity to effect positive economic and energy development in his new position as a senior energy specialist with the World Bank's East Asia Sustainable Development Department. "When I considered how I could make the most of my skills . . . the answer was to provide clean energy through a sophisticated power system with renewable energy and to contribute to what people in the region really want," he explained. In his role with the World Bank, Takeuchi is working toward increasing access to cleaner energy and laying the foundation for sustainable growth in developing countries, and, of course, to gain smiles in the process.

For current and future Corporate Affiliates fellows, Takeuchi imparts the wisdom: "As soon as possible, you should discover the criteria for evaluating your own success. Then, you should just run toward it!"

It is widely acknowledged that Southeast Asia stands at a fork in the road. The ratification and adoption of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Charter in 2008 has given the regional body new found legal status, and the proposed establishment of an ASEAN Political-Security Community, Economic Community, Socio-Cultural Community and human rights body raises the potential for the rise of a strengthened form of regionalism in Southeast Asia, where ASEAN becomes not merely a forum for communication between Member States but an actor in its own right. However, working against this momentum has been a discernible stalling of democratisation and continuing commitment to traditional principles such as non-interference and consensus decision-making, which, in the eyes of some critics, produced a lowest common denominator approach to drafting the Charter. Both of these positions are canvassed and reviewed in this excellent collection, which offers sober and well-informed analysis of the predicaments that the region now confronts. Combining broad assessments of the relationship between security, democracy and regionalism with detailed analysis of the Charter and reform process, and telling insights into major controversies, such as the question of human rights in Myanmar, the problem of the haze in Indonesia, and the question of nuclear security, this is a model of balanced and sensible analysis.
 
The book is organised into four main sections, the first being a deeply insightful introduction by the editor. Too often, editorial introductions do little other than summarise the preceding chapters, but in this volume, Emmerson carefully places the key concepts in their proper context, neatly sets out the nature of the dilemmas currently confronting the region and provides insight into some of the most important contemporary crises – especially that relating to Myanmar. Subsequent sections focus on: ‘Assessments’ – of ASEAN and its reform process; ‘Issues’ – spanning democratisations, Myanmar, non-traditional security, the haze and nuclear security; Sukma’s discussion of democratisation and Caballero-Anthony’s account of non-traditional security stand out here; and ‘Arguments’ – namely, David Martin Jones’ calling for the privileging of prudence and decency over idealism and hasty democratisation, and Erik Martinez Kuhonta’s setting out the pros and cons of non-interference and intervention for human rights.
 
Overall, this book is very hard to fault. It combines a range of perspectives, including academic and policy perspectives, canvasses a number of relevant issues and provides the reader with a very good sense of the critical concerns. In short, those interested in understanding Southeast Asia’s contemporary fork in the road should start by reading this excellent volume.
 
Reviewer: Alex Bellamy, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, School of Political Science and International Studies, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.  This review is reproduced with the permission of Asia Pacific Viewpoint.

In the waning days of the Clinton administration, the momentum for engagement with North Korea, building from the earlier agreement to freeze its nuclear program and a moratorium on ballistic missile launches, accelerated to the brink of full-scale normalization of relations. The U.S. presidential election in 2000 brought that diplomatic freight train to an abrupt halt.

Will the 2008 election bring yet another dramatic change in U.S. Korea policy?

The answer, based on the published positions of the two candidates and conversations with his senior Asia policy advisors, seems to be NO. There are important differences of emphasis in the approaches of both candidates, which I will discuss, but the bottom line is that both men are likely to pick up where President George W. Bush leaves off.

There are two fundamental reasons why U.S. policy toward Korea – and more broadly in Northeast Asia --- will not change dramatically. First, Asia will continue to suffer from a deficit of presidential attention. The arc of crisis – Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan -- will necessarily still command, as it has for almost 8 years, the attention of senior American policymakers. Even that will have to fight for space with the growing global financial crisis.

Second, both candidates agree on the broad outlines of an Asia policy, one that does not depart radically from the one pursued by the Bush administration. As a senior McCain advisor put it to me: “There is not a huge difference on Asia between Obama and McCain.” Privately, Obama advisors also stress that there will not be a huge break with current U.S. policy.

Both campaigns are critical of the lack of attention paid to Asia and the need for the U.S. to be more proactive to strengthen existing alliances and to join the discussion about new forms of regional integration. Both candidates support the need to engage, rather than confront, a rising China. Both men call for the U.S. to pay more attention to management of our alliances with South Korea and Japan. And both Obama and McCain support the North Korean nuclear negotiations carried out by President Bush in his second term, although privately both campaigns are critical of the deal that has been struck.

If there are differences, they can be found in two areas – support for the Korea US free trade agreement and the willingness to directly engage North Korea and its regime.

Free Trade and the KORUS Free Trade Agreement

If there is one single issue regarding Korea on which Senators Obama and McCain clearly part company, it is the future of the free trade agreement negotiated with the Bush administration. Senator McCain is an unambiguous supporter of the FTA, not only as a trade pact but also as a symbol of the broader partnership between the U.S. and South Korea.

Senator Obama also supports free trade but is critical of this and other agreements, such as NAFTA, for failing to ensure market access and the protection of labor rights and the environment. Privately, Obama’s advisors understand the symbolic value of the FTA to the alliance, but they plan to ask Seoul to reopen talks on market access, particularly for the automobile industry. Their position reflects the importance of trade unions and the role of some key states – Michigan most of all – in the election outcome. Even if Obama loses, the Democrats are likely to strengthen their control of Congress, making approval of the FTA difficult under any circumstances.

Negotiating with Pyongyang: Back to the Future?

Both the McCain and the Obama camps publicly back the Bush administration’s negotiations with Pyongyang, but both are also privately critical, though for different reasons.

The Obama team is heavily populated by former Clinton administration officials who were involved in the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea. They see the current deal as an inevitably flawed bargain, the result of the refusal of the administration to seriously engage the North directly until it had crossed the red line of nuclear weapons testing. With little leverage, not least the credible threat of coercion, we are left with containing the plutonium production of the North, and hoping that a grand bargain down the line can yield full denuclearization.

Obama recognizes the need for “close coordination and consultation with our allies South Korea and Japan,” as one of his advisors put it in a published interview, and supports continuing the Six Party Talks. But the emphasis is clearly on direct talks with North Korea, though conducted with a principled toughness that the Bush administration has not exhibited in its final months in office.

That readiness to conduct direct negotiations, up to conclusion of a peace treaty with Pyongyang and full normalization of relations, is where the two candidates part company. The Republican nominee is clearly uncomfortable with direct dealings with Pyongyang – his position resembles the first term of the Bush administration more than the second in that respect. His advisory team combines realists, mainly veterans of the Powell State Department, and neoconservatives, reproducing the divisions that thwarted coherent policy-making in that first Bush term.

In the end, the views of McCain himself may be decisive. He was an opponent of the Agreed Framework, an agreement he characterized as “appeasement.” He maintained this stance into the Bush administration, vocally opposing any direct negotiations with the North Koreans as long as they maintained the right to develop nuclear weapons. He has been critical as well of the main deal struck by President Bush in his second term – “I didn’t believe in the KEDO agreement that President Clinton made and I don’t believe in this one,” he said in January.

McCain, according to an interview with one of his senior Asia advisors, would “seek a return to the core principles of denuclearization known as CVID, or complete, verifiable, irreversible, dismantlement.” The demand for CVID was the watchword of the Bush administration’s earlier stance, in effect a call for Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear option as a first step. But that demand was dropped after Pyongyang called the Bush administration’s bluff by exploding a nuclear device in October, 2006.

McCain also wants to “broaden our policy goals related to North Korea” beyond nuclear issues, to including human rights, economic and political reform, and reduction of the conventional military threat from North Korea, goals also set out at the outset of the Bush administration. McCain has repeatedly referred to the North Korean regime, and its leader, Kim Jong Il, in harsh terms and embraced a policy of “rogue state rollback.”

Realistically, however, McCain offers no credible, practical means to reach these goals. He reserves, as does Obama, the option to use force. But concretely he comes back to the strategy of pressing China to bring North Korea to heel. Unfortunately the Bush administration also relied on China and found there were clear limits to Beijing’s ability to control or its willingness to press its North Korean client. In the end, McCain may have little option but to follow Bush to Pyongyang’s doorstep.

One Caveat – Events Matter

Despite the powerful impetus to maintain continuity in U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula, no matter whom is elected in November, there is one important caveat to keep in mind – events matter. Unplanned, and unforeseen, developments could force Korea to the top of the President’s agenda. Already we have seen the reports of Kim Jong Il’s serious illness trigger fresh concerns about a possible collapse of political authority in Pyongyang. A simultaneous rush by China, South Korea and the United States to fill a vacuum of power in the North could upset all calculations. For South Korea, and President Lee Myung-bak, it is always best to prepare for the unexpected.