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Shuichiro Nishioka joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) during the 2015-16 academic year from the West Virginia University’s Department of Economics where he serves as an Associate Professor.

His research covers the broad issues on International Trade, Economic Development, and East Asian Economies. During his time at Shorenstein APARC, Nishioka will conduct research projects on the expanding inequality in China and Japan.

Nishioka previously affiliated for research and teaching at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, the University of Pittsburgh and Hitotsubashi University. He contributes to articles to publications including the Journal of International Economics, the Journal of Development Economics, and European Economic Review.

Nishioka holds a PhD and an MA in Economics from the University of Colorado at Boulder, and a BA in Economics from Yokohama National University. 

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China's tight control over its economy is one reason why it is facing an economic slowdown of global implications, Stanford scholars say.

China's stock market fall is now in its third week, and share prices have lost a third of their value since mid-June, though the market is still higher than a year ago. China has the world's second-largest economy, with deep financial links to the United States.

Nicholas Hope, director of the China Program at the Stanford Center for International Development, which is part of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, said the simple answer behind the slowdown is that "nothing grows at 10 percent forever."

However, the dropoff is sharper than the government of China expected or desires, he noted.

Hope said the deceleration is due to the effects of slow growth globally on international trade, slower progress than hoped in rebalancing the Chinese economy toward spending more on consumption and less on investment, and the inefficiency of much of Chinese investment. Another big problem is the debt load of local and regional governments.

Hope does not think the steep fall of China's stock market is comparable to the American crash of 1929 – "so long as the Shanghai market index remains comfortably above where it was a year ago."

Yet the "frighteningly sharp correction" over the past few weeks highlights the fragility of the Chinese financial system, he said. It also serves as a cautionary tale for the many small investors who speculated on high returns with borrowed money.

"Borrowed funds have financed many risky economic investments in infrastructure by subnational [regional and local] governments as well as stock purchases by unwise investors," he said. "The result threatens to be an unwanted increase in non-performing loans in the banking system as borrowers are unable to repay."

Hope believes China can overcome its problems if it adopts economic reforms aimed at fostering more private enterprise and less state control over the market. Back in 1993, China's Communist Party announced those reforms and updated them in 2013, so they are technically on the books.

"Paradoxically, current weaknesses could be a longer-term source of strength, as the shares of income and consumption in Chinese GDP rise, investment is increasingly more efficiently allocated by a transformed financial system and all factors of production – land, capital and labor – are put to more productive uses," he said.

To counteract the market drop, the government ordered state-owned companies to buy shares, hiked the amount of equities insurance companies can hold and offered more credit to finance trading. Hope said this may cause a problem.

"It is introducing considerable moral hazard by attempting to bail out small investors because of the concern over the potential for social unrest if too many of those investors lose all of their savings," he said.

Charlotte Lee, associate director of the China Program at Stanford's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, says it is too early to tell if the market fall will diminish the credibility of the government and Communist Party in the eyes of the people. China's President, Xi Jinping, does want to maintain his popularity.

"The government's management of the economy is, however, one of the pillars of its credibility," Lee said.

She described this as a "small dent" in that credibility, as the government has many other ways it aids the Chinese people.

Opening up the economy

Stanford Professor Darrell Duffie says that it will be hard for China to maintain its past high growth rates.

"China's growth rate is still very high, but it is less high than it was because most of the giant pool of cheap and underutilized labor that China had 20 years ago has by now been put to work relatively productively," said Duffie, the Dean Witter Distinguished Professor of Finance at the Graduate School of Business.

"Additional sources of productivity gains are harder to find," he added.

Duffie is concerned about excessive leverage in China's equity markets.

"Chinese investors have borrowed a lot of money to invest in equities. This margin financing was used too aggressively. China's corporations and local governments are heavily indebted, and that will be a drag on future growth," he said.

He suggests that China would do well to continue on its current course of opening up its economy to cross-border capital flows and reducing its economy's reliance on state-owned enterprises.

If China's economy slows down, the country will decrease its demand for American goods and services, he added. American businesses that plan to operate in China should learn as much as possible about how China's economy and government works.

And Duffie advised, "Whenever possible work with trusted partners in China."

Asian power games?

With China ramping up its military in recent years, what are the risks to U.S. national security if China's economy plunges?

Amy Zegart, co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, said it is possible that a slowing economy might make China behave differently in terms of its hard and soft power.

"For all the worry about a rising China, a fragile China is bad for the United States. The Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy rests on a promise of economic prosperity. The more China's growth falters, the more party leaders will be driven to stoke the fires of nationalism to secure domestic support," said Zegart, who is also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

She added, "We've seen this movie before. It stars Vladimir Putin behaving recklessly abroad to win political support at home as his economy stalls."

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

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Joon Nak Choi will be the 2015-16 Koret Fellow in the Korea Program at Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), effective Jan. 1, 2016.

A sociologist by training, Choi is an assistant professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His research and teaching areas include economic development, social networks, organizational theory, and global and transnational sociology, within the Korean context.

Choi, a Stanford graduate, has worked jointly with Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin to analyze the transnational bridges linking Asia and the United States. The research project explores how economic development links to foreign skilled workers and diaspora communities.

Most recently, Choi coauthored Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea with Shin, who is also the director of the Korea Program. From 2010-11, Choi developed the manuscript while he was a postdoctoral fellow at Shorenstein APARC.

Mark Granovetter, a professor and chair of Stanford’s sociology department, praised Choi for his work in academia.

“Joon Nak’s dissertation on social influences on hedge fund managers’ success broke important ground in our understanding of financial markets. His recent book Global Talent sheds critical new light on the challenges of Korea and other economies facing high-level labor shortages, and the potential of foreign workers to meet them. As the 2015-16 Koret Fellow, he will bring his considerable talents to bear on the study of Korean society,” Granovetter said.

During his fellowship, Choi will study the challenges of diversity in South Korea and teach a class for Stanford students. Choi’s research will buttress efforts to understand the shifting social and economic patterns in Korea, a now democratic nation seeking to join the ranks of the world’s most advanced countries.

Supported by the Koret Foundation, the fellowship brings leading professionals to Stanford to conduct research on contemporary Korean affairs with the broad aim of strengthening ties between the United States and Korea. The fellowship has expanded its focus to include social, cultural and educational issues in Korea, and aims to identify young promising scholars working on these areas.

“It will be my pleasure and honor to spend the next year at Shorenstein APARC, and have the opportunity to engage in the vibrant research community there," Choi said.

Choi holds a bachelor’s degree in economics, international relations and urban studies from Brown University, and a master’s degree and doctorate in sociology from Stanford University.

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The United States and European countries can take steps to avoid making the same economic mistakes that Japan committed during the latter's "lost decade," a Stanford economist wrote in a new paper.

The study, published in the IMF Economic Review, describes the reasons Japan was not able to pull out of its long recession in the 1990s, offering some lessons for U.S. and European leaders in the wake of the 2007-09 meltdown.

In particular, the delay in bank recapitalization and the lack of structural reforms in the economic sphere kept Japan from realizing a full recovery, wrote Takeo Hoshi, the Henri and Tomoye Takahashi senior fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

"Bank recapitalization" refers to a governmental reorganization of failing banks, often involving the use of public money to keep them solvent. "Structural reforms" describes how a government might overhaul its economic structures to increase business competition – such as deregulation to cut costs for firms.

The shortcomings in these two policy areas "retarded Japan's recovery from the crisis and were responsible for its stagnant post-crisis growth," said Hoshi, whose co-author was Anil K. Kashyap, an economics professor at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.

Risky bank lending

Japan's "lost decade" originally referred to the 1990s, though the country has still not regained the economic power it enjoyed in the 1970s and 1980s. Some say Japan has actually experienced two lost decades if the 2000s are counted as well.

Faced with a huge financial crisis at the dawn of its lost decade, Japan had to navigate challenges that other advanced economies had not confronted since the Great Depression, Hoshi and Kashyap wrote.

However, government leaders made mistakes, Hoshi said. One was failure to rehabilitate the banks and another was to misunderstand the nature of the problems afflicting the Japanese economy. For example, much like the United States in 2007-09, the Japanese banks had made many dubious loans to risky customers.

"Instead of recognizing that major structural adjustments were needed, much of the policy response was calibrated under the assumption that Japan faced a simple cyclical problem that could be addressed with indiscriminate fiscal stimulus," wrote Hoshi, the director of the Japan Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

For example, on the demand side, monetary policy was not as expansionary as it could have been, he said. Deflation persisted for a long time. And fiscal stimulus packages – such as tax cuts – were inconsistent. Meanwhile, much of Japan's fiscal spending took the form of public works projects that had low productivity.

As for structural reforms, the Japanese government lacked a sense of urgency. For example, even in the reform-minded administration of former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, only eight of the proposed 35 reform initiatives would have directly boosted growth. Of the others, 16 might have indirectly supported growth and 11 would have had no effect on growth, Hoshi said.

Drastic change needed

Unfortunately, some European nations seem to be following Japan's lead, Hoshi said.

"In France, Italy and Spain, bank recapitalization has been delayed and the structural reforms have been slow. Without drastic changes, they are likely to follow Japan's path to long economic stagnation," Hoshi and Kashyap wrote.

The problems that held back Japan seem to be less serious in the U.S., Hoshi said: "Employment protection is low in the United States and the labor market shows high mobility. The regulatory advantage for incumbent firms is smaller than in Europe or Japan and starting new business is relatively easy."

As the researchers noted, the United States and Germany are in a bit better economic shape, partly due to the fact that they did undertake structural reforms sooner rather than later. The U.S. was able to recapitalize its banks more quickly, for example.

Still, five years after the failure of the Lehman Brothers investment bank left the world's financial markets in chaos, the U.S. and Europe are not yet back to what had looked normal before the crisis, according to the research. For instance, employment levels have not reached the levels seen before the 2007-09 crash.

"The U.S. recovery has been tepid despite a number of extraordinary macroeconomic policies (at least in the traditional sense). This suggests that the U.S. economy also has problems, but they are just different from those in Japan and in Europe," Hoshi said.

In the years leading up to the financial crisis, the researchers wrote, U.S. growth was fueled by a consumption boom from rapid housing price increases and rising debt levels.

"In a broad sense, the U.S. economy before the crisis was similar to the Japanese or Spanish economies," noted Hoshi, adding that in Japan, the speculative investment boom in the late 1980s masked structural problems.

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

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This paper reexamines Japanese policy choices during its banking crisis in the 1990s and draws some lessons relevant for the United States and Europe in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007–09. The paper focuses on two aspects of postcrisis economic policy of Japan: the delay in bank recapitalization and the lack of structural reforms. These two policy shortcomings retarded Japan’s recovery from the crisis and were responsible for its stagnant postcrisis growth. The paper also suggests some political economy factors that contributed to the Japanese policies. In France, Italy, and Spain bank recapitalization has been delayed and the structural reforms have been slow. Without drastic changes, they are likely to follow Japan’s path to long economic stagnation. The situation in Germany looks somewhat better mainly because the structural reform was undertaken before the crisis. Although the recovery has been slow in the United States as well, the problems are at least different from those faced by Japan then and many European countries now.

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This week the World Education Forum convenes in Incheon, South Korea. Drawing leaders from UNESCO member states and heads of international organizations and NGOs, the 4-day gathering will examine global education priorities and discuss a framework for action and implementation of shared goals and targets.

The Forum, which last met in Dakar in 2000, will explore five major themes: equity, inclusion, quality education and lifelong learning, and also set out an agenda on global citizenship education—how to cultivate in youth the attitudes, values and skills needed in today’s world.

As the Forum approaches, the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center asked Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin to offer his perspectives on global education and his vision for South Korea. He is Korean and an expert on South Korea’s higher-education system, politics and society. He also advises some universities in Asia such as the Center for Asia-Pacific Future Studies at Kyushu University in Japan.

Shin leads two multi-year research projects—one focused on diversity and tolerance in Asia, and another on global social capital, delving into the linkages between innovation, economic globalization and diaspora communities. He recently published key findings in Global Talent with coauthor Joon Nak Choi, a Stanford graduate now professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

Education has played an important role in the social and economic development of South Korea. Can you explain?

Over the past fifty years, South Korea has gone from being one of the least developed countries to one of the most developed—an “economic miracle,” as it is often referred. The country rose from periods of wartime, poverty and social unrest to become a stable high-income developed country, all in an incredibly short time span. Education has played a substantial role in South Korea’s emergence. Nearly 70 percent of Koreans between the ages of 25 and 34 years of age hold an equivalent of a bachelors degree. This is the highest ranking in all Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Investment in its own people, as well as areas of technology and the sciences, catapulted South Korea toward such success. Its education system is lauded globally. President Obama has referred to its system on multiple occasions, saying the respect and level of support given to teachers there helps to empower student learning. Teaching is a very highly respected profession in South Korea.

In pursuit of the “creative economy,” South Korea has sought to capitalize on the knowledge value of its population. How does diversity fit into this context?

South Korea, like many advanced nations, is driving toward a “creative economy,” a policy objective that President Park Geun-hye set out in Feb. 2013. It’s a strategy to move South Korea away from its manufacturing past toward a future of a service-oriented economy. The latter requires greater creative thinking, and human and social capital are necessary ingredients in that process. Many people look to Silicon Valley as a model of success, a place that continues to harness ideas and investment in those ideas. As I say, there is one known “secret” that has contributed to Silicon Valley’s success, and that’s cultural diversity. In fact Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Stanford recently on his state visit to the United States in a bid to underscore his commitment to building a creative economy in Japan. He convened with leaders of major technology firms like Apple and Twitter, and one of the main messages shared with Abe was the scale to which immigrants contributed to the workforce here. So, South Korea, like many Asian nations, would benefit from recognizing the connection between diversity and the economy, and take it one step further and actively encourage a society who accepts foreigners—this, of course, comes with inherent hurdles in any ethnically homogeneous country like South Korea.

How can a society cultivate globally responsible citizens?

Shifting a society to truly respect and value diversity can be an especially difficult task for countries steeped in nationalism and traditional values. In the case of South Korea, policies supporting values of diversity are just starting to appear, but full social integration of minorities remains a distant future. If the government acts to support diversity over the long-term, though, hopefully change is in the closer future. The challenge is for South Korea to strike the right balance between embracing the nation’s historical legacy, while also recognizing what it means to be a “global citizen” in today’s world. I’ve been working with Rennie Moon, a professor at Yonsei University, on this research question. Teachers play a definitive role in the development of students. Providing curriculum that is balanced is an important factor. This means teaching materials—from textbooks to videos—must provide a neutral stance, or even better, show information in a comparative perspective. Teachers themselves must also commit to being facilitators. Encouraging pride in one’s own country, while also showing respect and value toward others’ is a key message that teachers can help reinforce.

Why do foreign students in Korea matter? And, what role can Korean students have when abroad?

Foreign students in Korea represent a positive-sum game. For one, foreign students diversify Korea, and also help fill the national labor shortfall. In my study with Choi, we found that three groups of students prove to be more beneficial to Korean society. “Focused instrumentalists,” students who are pursuing advanced degrees in technical subjects, “focused Koreaphiles,” students who view Korea as special but focus mainly on their studies, and “youthful Koreaphiles,” students who view Korea as special but focus mainly on exploring their social environments. Instrumentalists grow an affinity to Korea by likely working for a firm in Korea upon graduation. Someone who is a Koreaphile will show affinity for Korea because of an admiration for pop culture and other aspects of Korean society—K-pop, hallyu, Korean dramas and so forth.

Increasingly, Korean students are choosing to study abroad. Just over 123,000 Korean students pursued an undergraduate degree abroad in year 2011; 29% of whom studied in the United States. We see chogi yuhak, a trend of Koreans sending their children overseas to avoid the secondary education system, which is often cited for its rigor and stressful entrance exams. Yet, even if Korean students do not return home, they still have an opportunity to contribute back to South Korea. They form a global network and serve as “transnational bridges” between South Korea and their host countries. As a result, information, innovation and other opportunities bounce between and among people on both sides. This same lesson could be applied to any country really.

What policy implications will transnational bridges have in South Korea?

The affects on policy are largely two-fold. First, South Korean universities, companies and the government must seek to promote values of diversity. The Korean government has taken steps to recognize the strategic value of recruiting foreigners. But, the push isn’t big enough yet. For example, we hosted former Seoul National University President Yeon-Cheon Oh as a visiting fellow this year. He voiced that while Korean universities are orienting some of their policies toward ‘internationalization,’ they still aren’t totally committed to the idea. Better support systems should be developed for foreign students, and tenure should be more accessible to foreign faculty members. Second, for Koreans overseas, diaspora networks could be strengthened. About 10 percent of all ethnic Koreans live outside the Korean Peninsula. Creating codified social and cultural forums for diasporans will help instill a sense of the homeland, so that they want to stay engaged.

Are aspects of South Korea’s model translatable in neighboring countries in Asia and elsewhere?

The Korean model is relevant in other developed, nonimmigrant societies. Different from settler societies like the United States or Canada, for instance, who have heterogeneous populations. Germany and Japan provide the closest comparison study; both their national identities are based on shared ethnicity. Japan has in many ways successfully leveraged its diaspora. Ethnic Japanese who left have been recruited back, and foreign unskilled workers, particularly from Asia, infuse the labor market. A large number of foreign students study in Japan. Germany also sees an substantial amount of foreign students each year. Japan now allows students to stay up to one year to search for a job after graduation, and in Germany, the same for six months. But both countries have trouble retaining graduates. Applying the case of South Korea, seeking benefits from transnational bridges could also benefit both societies. Assimilation of diasporans—like ethnic Koreans in Japan and Turkish people in Germany—should be a long-term goal.

Gi-Wook Shin wrote in Nikkei Asian Review about aspects of Silicon Valley that Asian countries should consider adopting to emulate its success, and how foreign skilled workers can provide social capital. He also contributed a post to Stanford University Press blog about steps South Korea could take to counter the "brain drain" phenomenon. Later, Shin and Rennie Moon wrote a piece for The Conversation, expanding upon the challenges that foreign faculty and students face in South Korea and other Asian nations.

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"South Korea's 'Creative Economy' Initiative"

Speaker: Kyeongsik Cho, 2014-15 Visiting Scholar from Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning

In recent years South Korea, home of the economic "miracle on the Han River," has been suffering from low growth. A rapidly aging population means that the potential growth rate is falling, and the country has encountered difficulties adapting to new globally integrated markets. Concerned that low growth and jobless growth might become a permanent fixture, the Korean government has come up with a new vision to develop a "Creative Economy." Visiting scholar Kyeongsik Cho, a senior official in Korea's Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, will explain the origin, content, and implementation of this critically important initiative.

 

"Is South Korea Ready for Internet of Things?"

Speaker: Seunghoon Lee, 2014-15 Visiting Scholar from Maeil Business Newspaper

Visiting scholar Seunghoon Lee will examine the current Internet of Things (IoT) trends and discuss how South Korea can benefit from emerging opportunities of the next technology wave of IoT.

Mr. Lee is a staff reporter at the Maeil Business Newspaper in Korea.

 

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Kyeongsik Cho joins the Shorenstein APARC during the 2014-2015 academic year from the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP) in Korea where he serves as a director general. His research interests encompass how the US is currently solving national issues that involve slow growth, unemployment and how scientific technologies and ICT are used in solving those problems. Kyeongsik Cho holds an MS in finance from the Michigan State University, and a BA in Business Administration from the Korea University.

Shorenstein APARC616 Serra StreetEncina Hall, E301Stanford, CA 94305-6055
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Seung-Hoon Lee joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center during the 2014-15 academic year from Maeil Business Newspaper (leading economic daily in South Korea) where he serves as an economics and industry reporter.  His research interests encompass IoT (Internet of Things) impact on the future of Korea. Since 2007, more 'things or objects' have been connected to the internet than people have. In 2015, world population would be 7.2 billion, and connected devices four times larger than that. In the era of IoT, he will analyze the collision of big data and machine-to-machine connected information.  He was awarded two major media related prizes in Korea: the Grand Prize by CITIGROUP for articles on Korea's economic reform and another Grand Prize by Korea Financial Investment Association for articles on capital market crisis.  He co-authored Great Decision (2012) and Mobile Economy (2010). Lee holds an MBA from KDI School of Public Policy and Management, and a BA in business from Korea University.  He also took a special course from Columbia University's Graduate School of Journalism.
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State socialist economies provided public housing to urban citizens at nominal cost, while allocating larger and better quality apartments to individuals in elite occupations. In transitions to a market economy, ownership is typically transferred to existing occupants at deeply discounted prices, making home equity the largest component of household wealth. Housing privatization is therefore a potentially important avenue for the conversion of bureaucratic privilege into private wealth. We estimate the resulting inequalities with data from successive waves of a Chinese national income survey that details household assets and participation in housing programs. Access to privatization programs was relatively equal across urban residents in state sector occupations. Elite occupations had substantially greater wealth in the form of home equity shortly after privatization, due primarily to their prior allocations of newer and higher quality apartments. The resulting gaps in private wealth were nonetheless small by the standards of established market economies, and despite the inherent biases in the process, housing privatization distributed home equity widely across those who were resident in public housing immediately prior to privatization.

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Transitions from state socialism created a startling range of initial economic outcomes, from renewed growth to deep economic crises. Debates about the causes have largely ignored the political disruptions due to regime change that coincided with sudden initial recessions, and they have defined the problem as relative growth rates over time rather than abrupt short-run collapse. Political disruptions were severe when states broke apart into newly independent units, leading to hyperinflation, armed warfare, or both. Even absent these disruptions, the disintegration of communist parties inherently undermined economic activity by creating uncertainty about the ownership of state assets. The protracted deterioration of the party- state prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union generated widespread conflict over control of assets, which crippled economic activity across the Soviet successor states. A more rapid path to regime change was less disruptive in other post-communist states, and the problem was absent in surviving communist regimes. Comparative accounts of regime change frame an analysis of panel data from 31 countries after 1989 that distinguishes the early 1990s from subsequent years. A wide range of variables associated with alternative explanations have little evident impact in accounting for the onset and severity of the early 1990s recessions.

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Keyu Jin
There is a fundamental misunderstanding and misconception about the Chinese economy - about how it works and what are the true challenges it faces. In the talk, Dr. Keyu Jin will highlight three major myths: on what really drives growth in China, what explains its high savings rate, and the economic consequences of the one child policy. Everyone has something to complain about the Chinese economy: large misallocation of resources, low employment growth, a declining share of the economic pie going to Chinese households, environmental costs, financial repression, and wage suppression. Dr. Jin will argue that all of these phenomena are not disparate problems, but are all part of the same fundamental problem, one of macroeconomic structure. The Chinese economy is not 'imbalanced,' rather it is subject to a vicious cycle. And yet, there is still reason to view the Chinese economy with 'guarded optimism.'

Dr. Keyu Jin is an Assistant professor of Economics at London School of economics. She is from Beijing, China, and holds a B.A., M.A., and PhD from Harvard University. Her field of expertise is international macroeconomics and the Chinese economy. Her research has focused on global imbalances and global asset prices, demographics, as well as international trade and growth. Her research is tightly linked to examining the various economic issues in China. She has multiple publications in the American Economic Review, and has also written opinion pieces for the Financial Times and Project Syndicate. She sits on the Asian advisory board of Richemont Group and is also a World Economic Forum Young Global Leader. 

Please note this event is off the record.

Keyu Jin Assistant professor in Economics London School of Economics
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