In activist communities worldwide, globalization has had an enormous impact, both in the composition of activist groups and the content of their messages. At the same time, regional concerns are playing a significant role in the ways protests are organized, managed, and deployed.

Regardless of their location or their target, it is clear that protest campaigns have, on the one hand, become increasingly globalized. The protests that took place during the July 2008 G8 Toyako Summit in Japan offer a case in point. Approximately one hundred transnational activists flew into Sapporo, a city located near the summit site, and joined various civil and protest activities. Over a loudspeaker, they broadcast statements denouncing the summit meeting as “antidemocratic” and “discriminatory against the poor.” These activists were drawn from East, Southeast, and Central Asia, as well as Europe and North America, and they voiced correspondingly global concerns—for human rights, global peace, and democracy, and against inequality and poverty. These themes echoed those of other major global protests, including demonstrations that took place against the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, the latter most notably in 1999 in Seattle. Indeed, protests of this kind represent what might be called an antiglobalization movement

On the other hand, global movements of this kind also appear to be organized on an increasingly regional basis. Though the activists who protested the Toyako Summit came from all over the world, and addressed topics of global importance, most of the participants came mainly from South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Given this apparent dichotomy, the question arises: Will global social movements become regional?

One could argue that global social movements are and will remain regional, at least for the time being, for two practical reasons. First, the costs associated with flight to activist hubs near protest sites can be expensive. Second, the amount of time spent in transition to the protest site becomes a burden. The time doubles when taking into consideration the time spent to return to the originating country. These factors can be prohibitive especially to those based far away, but are less burdensome to regional activists, thus making it easier for nearby protesters to participate.

While time and cost are no doubt a concern, they may not be as important when compared with the other factors. Language is among these factors. Cooperative activities beyond the national borders are on the rise, yet many foreign activists do not speak the languages spoken in the countries where they protest. They invariably rely on English, widely accepted as the “global” language. Yet the levels of English fluency differ among participating activists, and this is a key factor. With their English ability, activists from Europe and North America tend to communicate with others on an individual basis, while those from nearby countries often rely on interpreters, especially when discussions delve into the details of the planned activity and necessary arrangements associated with it. Typically, interpreters are group leaders, well educated and knowledgeable about regional and global issues—and these individuals facilitate most intergroup communication.

Preestablished ties and preexisting communication can influence negotiation and cooperation processes among activists. Global social movements tend to enhance crossnational cooperation among participating activists—that is, activists who come together from different countries often regroup elsewhere, building on their previous cooperative activities. In the case of the 2008 G8 summit protests, regionalization was very much at work. Several months prior to the summit, Japanese media activists planned a temporary umbrella organization called the G8 Media Network, which helped to accommodate incoming foreign media activists and arranged international cooperative activities during the summit. As it happened, the foreign activists and groups that interacted with the G8 Media Network were actually regional, originating mainly from South Korea and Hong Kong. Under the auspices of the G8 Media Network, these groups of activists arrived prior to the summit and stayed until it concluded. Afterward, the same media groups discussed the continuation of crossnational cooperation. Though technically foreign, the dominant actors and groups who sought to continue cooperative activities were, in fact, only from neighboring countries.

Looking more closely at participants in the global protest activities provides further insight into contemporary global protest movements. At the 2008 G8 Summit protests, two different types of foreign participants were on display—those who had prior ties to host activist groups in Japan, and those who did not. The former group could be described as professional activists, whose preestablished ties ensure that they have good knowledge of a given protest’s scheduled activities. The professional group also organizes its own plans of action, precoordinated with domestic groups. The latter group tends to be traveling activists, a more or less independent and unorganized collection of individuals who enjoy traveling the globe and joining the activities offered at protest sites worldwide. The professional activist group is often drawn largely from neighboring countries in the region.

Most global social movements feature participants from around the world. At the same time, signs of regionalization also exist, making most protests both global and regional in nature. One could claim that the future of global social movements is regional. But whether global or regional, it is vital that we continue to study the composition of global protest movements and their abiding impact on civil society.

At first sight, political turmoil in Thailand and the Philippines—repeated violent protests, impeachment battles, and military coups—gives the impression that democracy in Southeast Asia is on a downward spiral. One country in the region, however, has sustained a stable pluralistic democracy: the Republic of Indonesia.

In 1999, after thirty years of Suharto’s centralistic, authoritarian rule, Indonesia embraced far-reaching decentralization and election reforms. Within a brief period of two years, the Indonesian government reshaped its administrative architecture, including the devolution of local tax and service responsibilities to more than 400 district governments. In view of its deep-seated authoritarian traditions, beginning with Javanese kingdoms and sultanates, moving through Dutch colonialism (1619–1942), and ending with Suharto’s New Order (1965–98), Indonesia’s rapid shift toward democratic decentralization stands out as one of the most remarkable political transitions in recent history.

Particularly notable is the peaceful and competitive conduct of Indonesian elections. Over the last decade, local citizens have elected more than 30,000 local councilors and over 400 mayors, regents, and governors, with little violence or intimidation. High voter turnouts (around 70 percent) and high replacement rates of incumbent executives (roughly 40 percent) bear witness to rising electoral competition in local polities. While subnational elections display considerable flux, the upcoming presidential elections in July 2009 suggest continuity. The latest national polls, for example, predict a comfortable lead for President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (49 percent) over his main competitor, Megawati Soekarnoputri (36 percent).

The institutionalization of democracy and decentralization, however, has yet to translate into substantive public sector reforms. Indonesia continues to score low in global governance assessments. According to Transparency International and the World Bank, Indonesia’s government ranks 126th (out of 180) in terms of corruption, and 129th (out of 181) in terms of administrative efficiency for business start-ups. With the introduction of regional autonomy, these governance problems have, to a considerable extent, been decentralized to hundreds of districts. Yet, despite formally uniform institutional settings, local governments exhibit vast differences in regulatory quality, administrative efficiency, and anticorruption measures.

What motivates some local governments to perform better than others? Implicit in this question, which stands at the center of my research, is the idea that local democracy is not only an end in itself, but also a means for improving government outcomes. The pronounced policy differences that arise in Indonesia’s district polities provide a good opportunity to examine the workings of Indonesian local democracy or, to use a different terminology, the political economy of local decision-making.

The findings from controlled case comparisons and subnational datasets suggest that policy variations are best explained by differences in government leadership. Good policy environments emerge primarily in cases where local regents and mayors, whose career aspirations are tested by direct elections, skillfully use their office powers to forge reform coalitions and supervise bureaucratic practices. Societal reform pressures that arise from local parliaments, business chambers, and nongovernmental organizations, in comparison, tend to be less significant drivers of good governance. While broad-based interest groups continue to struggle with collective-action problems, district council members seem more concerned with provincial/national party elites (and their party list positions) than with representing local constituencies. Thus, in Indonesia’s early stage of democratic transition, where societal pressures are yet to fully unfold, much seems to depend on leadership efforts to initiate, facilitate, and oversee government improvements.

Under what conditions, then, are local leaders likely to act in the public interest, rather for private gain? While direct elections provide basic incentives, the direction and strength of these incentives also hinge upon existing socioeconomic structures. Government leaders need to accommodate interests of powerful economic groups in order to secure support for campaign funding and co-investments in public goods. Whether these interest alignments result in unproductive rent-seeking and corruption, or in constructive government reforms, depends on the constellation and transparency of economic powers.  The more economic powers become concentrated in specific sectors, groups, and firms, and the less public-private interactions are monitored by local media, the greater the likelihood that leaders will pursue self-preferential and collusive strategies.

As a result, it is plausible to assume that a moderate economic concentration and strong media presence are conducive to better governance. At this point, only some districts fall into this category. But as globalization and communication technologies progress, local polities are bound to become more economically diverse and politically informed. With growing political awareness and increased incentives for better leadership, it is likely that Indonesia, over time, will see more public-private symbioses for reform and, thus, bridge the gap between well-functioning elections on the one hand and poor governance
on the other.