Japanese Public Sets High Bar for Immigrants
Japanese Public Sets High Bar for Immigrants
The latest findings of the Stanford Japan Barometer show that the Japanese public’s opinion on immigration depends heavily on applicants' skills, language ability, and country of origin, and on whether politicians emphasize economic benefits or stoke security and cultural anti-immigration rhetoric.
In Brief
- Japanese public opinion on immigration is highly selective, depending on occupation and language skills.
- The Japanese public favors applicants from Western countries and is most resistant to Chinese immigrants.
- Economic messaging can build support for immigration, while security and cultural rhetoric reduce it.
Japan is confronting an intensifying national debate over outsiders, including tourists, immigrants, and foreign workers, fueled by concerns about social cohesion, national identity, and economic stagnation. A three-wave panel survey of the Stanford Japan Barometer (SJB), fielded around the February 8, 2026, Japanese general election, reveals that Japanese public opinion on immigration is highly conditional on the attributes of immigrants considered for admission and the framing of the immigration debate.
The findings show a strong preference for high-skilled, Japanese-speaking professionals and suggest that framing immigration as an economic benefit can boost public support, while invoking security and cultural rhetoric has the opposite effect.
SJB is a large-scale, multi-wave public opinion survey on political, economic, and social issues in Japan. A project of the Japan Program at Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), SJB is led by Stanford sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the director of APARC and the Japan Program, and political scientist Charles Crabtree.
To identify what drives public attitudes toward potential immigrants and the arguments that resonate or backfire in the public debate over immigration, SJB conducted a series of experiments across a three-wave panel: before the 2026 Japanese general election, a week after the election, and a month after the election.
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An Experiment in Preferences
Using conjoint experiments, the survey presented respondents with pairs of hypothetical profiles of potential immigrants and asked them to choose which one they preferred for admission to Japan. Each immigrant profile varied randomly across nine attributes: country of origin, reason for application, prior visits to Japan, occupation, work experience, employment plan, sex, Japanese language ability, and education. By analyzing thousands of these choices, the researchers can precisely measure how much each attribute drives public preference.
Key Finding 1: Strong Preference for Highly Skilled, Japanese-Speaking Applicants
The findings reveal that occupation and language skills rank top of mind in determining public attitudes toward potential immigrants. Respondents overwhelmingly favor high-skilled professionals – physicians, IT engineers, and research scientists – over care workers, construction laborers, cleaners, and convenience store clerks.
Japanese language ability proved to be another critical gateway. Fluency in Japanese was one of the single most powerful positive traits an applicant could have, suggesting that language integration is a cornerstone of public acceptance.
Key Finding 2: Clear Preference for Western Applicants
Respondents strongly favor immigrants from Germany and the United States (around 55%), with Vietnam, India, Turkey, and Brazil close behind (51–53%). South Korean applicants fall slightly below average (48%).
Applicants from China, however, are chosen only 37-39% of the time, a dramatically lower percentage than every other origin country tested. This gap persists even when controlling for occupation, education, and language ability. Thus, for Chinese applicants, Japanese language fluency provides a much smaller boost than for applicants from other countries. These findings suggest the resistance to Chinese immigrants stems from geopolitical concerns rather than doubts about skills or integration.
The February 8, 2026, election and the subsequent government formation do not appear to have meaningfully shifted the conjoint-measured immigration preferences by occupation, language ability, and national origin.
The Power of Framing
In a companion experiment, the researchers tested how framing influences the Japanese public’s opinion on immigration. Participants were randomly assigned to read a short article framing immigration as an economic benefit, a cultural challenge, a security concern, or using no framing at all. They were then asked to answer a question about their views.
Key Finding 3: Economic Framing Opens Minds; Cultural and Security Fears Close Them
The way immigration is discussed matters immensely. The results show that positive economic framing significantly increases support for immigration, but positive cultural and security framings had no such statistically significant effect in any wave. By contrast, fear appears to be a powerful motivator, as negative framing of immigration reduces public support, with security-negative framing showing the largest and most consistent effect observed.
Furthermore, the February 8, 2026, election and the subsequent government formation appear to have had a meaningful impact on immigration preference by framing. The impact of negative framings has become measurably larger one month after the election, suggesting that the Japanese public may be more responsive to anti-immigration rhetoric.
Immigration Becomes Key Issue in Japan’s Gubernatorial Races
In a March 2, 2026, report on the prominence of the "foreigner problem" in Japan's gubernatorial races, the Asahi Shimbun cited the latest data from SJB.
The Asahi Shimbun reporter, Mari Fujisaki, writes:
“Data also shows heightened election interest in ‘foreigner issues.’ The Japan Barometer – a Stanford University Japan Program online survey of thousands on Japanese society and politics – presented over 10 policy options in November 2022, April 2023, and February 2026 (twice), asking respondents to rate their level of support or opposition. Regarding one policy, ‘accepting foreign workers,’ opposition stood at 35.5% and 36.6% in 2022 and 2023, respectively. By contrast, in the two surveys conducted in February 2026, opposition rose to 53.1% and 53.4%, marking an increase of approximately 17 percentage points between 2022 and 2026. For most other items, opposition rates either decreased or remained unchanged, with increases limited to a few percentage points at most.”
You can view a PDF version of the article. The online version and further reporting by the Asahi Shimbun on the SJB’s latest survey findings are forthcoming.
SJB has published findings on Japanese public opinions on issues ranging from national security policy and the Taiwan contingency to same-sex marriage, marital surname choices, and women's leadership. Learn more >