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Shorenstein APARC's annual report for the academic year 2023-24 is now available.

Learn about the research, publications, and events produced by the Center and its programs over the last academic year. Read the feature sections, which look at the historic meeting at Stanford between the leaders of Korea and Japan and the launch of the Center's new Taiwan Program; learn about the research our faculty and postdoctoral fellows engaged in, including a study on China's integration of urban-rural health insurance and the policy work done by the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL); and catch up on the Center's policy work, education initiatives, publications, and policy outreach. Download your copy or read it online below.

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Team members of the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) recently presented findings from several of the lab’s research projects at forums and meetings with policy and academic communities in Washington, D.C. Their activities included a joint symposium with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a presentation at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, and meetings with think tanks and Congress members. These policy engagements are supported by a Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies grant.

SNAPL, which is housed at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), is led by sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, a senior fellow at FSI, and the director of APARC and the Korea Program. SNAPL is committed to generating evidence-based policy recommendations and promoting transnational collaboration with academic and policy institutions to advance the future prosperity of Asia and U.S.-Asia relations.

On September 16, 2024, SNAPL and CSIS co-hosted the symposium “A New Cold War?: Congressional Rhetoric and Regional Reactions to the U.S.-China Rivalry.” At this event, SNAPL team members presented fresh perspectives on the U.S.-China relationship, grounded in two original studies that challenge the application of the “new Cold War” narrative to frame the competition between the two powers. Both studies are part of SNAPL’s U.S.-Asia Relations research track.

Research Fellow Xinru Ma shared the first study, “A New Cold War? An Analysis of Congressional Discourse on U.S. Rivalries with the USSR, Japan, and China.” Discussant Evan Medeiros, Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies and the Cling Family Senior Fellow in US-China Relations at Georgetown University, commented on the study. In a following session, Postdoctoral Fellow Gidong Kim presented a second study, “The U.S. Alliance and Public Attitudes toward China: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific Region.” Discussant Matthew Kroenig, professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, offered feedback on the research.

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Moving Beyond Cold War Comparisons


Ma’s study, which analyzes over 41,000 Congressional speeches, upends the notion that today’s U.S.-China tensions mirror Cold War dynamics. The research shows that Cold War debates historically focused on two primary themes — ideological expansion and military aggression — with the former as the dominant concern. By contrast, current concerns about China center on human rights issues more than outward ideological expansion, while military concerns focus on budgetary issues rather than the kind of direct confrontations that defined the Cold War.

Ma’s findings also reveal that the current U.S.-China rivalry bears more resemblance to the U.S.-Japan economic competition of the 1980s, where economic concerns and domestic priorities took center stage rather than ideological or military threats. With these findings, the study establishes an empirical baseline for defining the current state of the U.S.-China relationship, illuminating the risks of framing it by the misleading “new Cold War” label.

Risks of the Cold War Analogy: Policy Implications


Ma’s study highlights that Cold War-era strategies are ill-suited for addressing the challenges posed by China today. Clinging to a Cold War analogy presents several risks:

  • Misguided Focus: Framing China as a Cold War-like rival risks overemphasizing military buildup and ideological competition globally, overlooking the true nature of today’s competition, which is primarily economic and technological.
  • Paranoia and Isolationism: The new Cold War analogy could foster a climate of paranoia and isolation, undermining the principles of open engagement and collaboration that have historically supported American leadership. Maintaining open dialogue and people-to-people exchanges that promote democratic values and human rights is more effective for preserving U.S. leadership in addressing ideological differences with China than confrontational ideological warfare.

The study has even further implications for U.S. domestic debates:
 

  • Impacts on the American Workforce: At a bilateral level, the economic tensions that constitute the backbone of today's challenges with China, such as concerns over the loss of American jobs, were virtually missing from the dynamics of the Cold War era. Addressing these tensions requires new strategies and measures such as reinforcing free trade practices, upgrading infrastructure, upskilling the workforce, and fostering technological innovation.
  • Overlooked U.S. Domestic Challenges: The Cold War analogy can also lead to ignorance about challenges rooted in pressing U.S. domestic issues — such as education inequality, the opioid crisis, and political polarization — which could be more consequential to American global leadership than the challenges China poses.
(From left): Gi-Wook Shin, Matthew Kroenig, and Gidong Kim in conversation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. (From left): Gi-Wook Shin, Matthew Kroenig, and Gidong Kim in conversation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS

Public Perceptions of China in U.S. Allies


Kim’s study examines how geopolitical contexts such as the U.S.-China tensions and alliance relationships shape public attitudes toward China among citizens of U.S. allies. It analyzes data from the Gallup World Poll (2006-2022) covering 22 Asia-Pacific countries and the Asian Barometer Survey (2010-2021) from 14 countries.

The study shows that U.S. alliances and the U.S.-China rivalry influence public attitudes toward China. It finds that, as U.S.-China tensions escalate, citizens in U.S. allied countries — unlike those in non-allied nations — are more likely to develop unfavorable views of China. Additionally, public opinions of China and the United States tend to move in opposite directions as the great power competition intensifies because U.S. alliance relationships help strengthen a sense of shared identity during times of geopolitical crisis.

Shapers of Anti-China Sentiments: Policy Implications
 

  • Strengthening Alliances Amid U.S.-China Tensions: The United States should understand that alliance relationships increasingly matter as U.S.-China tensions intensify. Strengthening these ties can be particularly effective in managing escalating tensions with China.
  • Alliance Diplomacy vs. Traditional Value Diplomacy: During periods of geopolitical rivalry, U.S. alliances may have a greater impact than traditional diplomacy based on democratic values. In such times, alliances serve as critical frameworks for shared identity and mutual defense.
  • Understanding Anti-China Sentiment: U.S. allies should recognize that rising anti-China sentiments among citizens are closely related to broader geopolitical dynamics. While anti-Japan or anti-America sentiments in countries like South Korea and the Philippines were historically bilateral issues, today's anti-China views are more structural issues and unlikely to diminish unless U.S.-China relations improve.
  • China’s Need for a Shift in Strategy: China should consider the geopolitical factors contributing to rising anti-China sentiment in U.S.-allied nations. China’s public diplomacy efforts to strengthen its soft power through financial and non-financial measures may be ineffective when applied to U.S. allies. The Chinese government should therefore prioritize improving its relationship with the United States to mitigate anti-China sentiments in U.S. allies.
     

National Understandings of Race and Racism in Asia


On September 17, 2024, Postdoctoral Fellow Junki Nakahara shared findings from a SNAPL project that is part of another Lab research track, Nationalism and Racism, at a discussion titled Deconstructing Racism “Denial” in Asia, hosted by George Washington University’s Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

Nakahara’s study examines how nationalism and racism intersect to create exclusion and marginalization across Asia. By analyzing state reports from 16 Asian countries submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the research investigates how these official reports conceptualize race and racism, uncovering pervasive patterns of their denial — literal, interpretive, and ideological. Nakahara thus offers a comparative view of how these perspectives by Asian nations align with or deviate from global norms. Her analysis also illustrates how historical identities and dominant social, political, and religious values shape national attitudes toward race in Asia.

Following Nakahara’s presentation, discussants Hiromi Ishizawa, associate professor of sociology at George Washington University, and Erin Aeran Chung, the Charles D. Miller Professor of East Asian Politics and Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, provided insightful commentary. They emphasized the importance of studying race and racism in the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for marginalized communities. The event also sparked an engaging dialogue with the audience, addressing how racism in Asia remains a “blind spot” overlooked in policy, media, and public discourse.

See the coverage of the event in George Washington’s student newspaper >

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Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab Receives Grants to Advance Policy Engagement and Research Collaboration

New grants to inform U.S. Asia policy and fuel cross-disciplinary research on Asia’s role in the global system of the 21st century.
Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab Receives Grants to Advance Policy Engagement and Research Collaboration
Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond
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Walking Out: New Book Unravels the Shift in America's Trade Policy and Its Global Consequences

A new book by APARC Visiting Scholar Michael Beeman offers a timely analysis of the shift in United States' foreign trade policy, examines its recent choices to “walk out” on the principles that had defined the global trade system it had created, and offers recommendations for a redefined and more productive trade policy strategy.
Walking Out: New Book Unravels the Shift in America's Trade Policy and Its Global Consequences
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Lab members recently shared data-driven insights into U.S.-China tensions, public attitudes toward China, and racial dynamics in Asia, urging policy and academic communities in Washington, D.C. to rethink the Cold War analogy applied to China and views of race and racism in Asian nations.

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The United States remains a leader in the global economy, yet over the past decade, it has taken a sharp turn away from its traditional support of free, rules-based trade. Since 2016, Washington has withdrawn from international trade agreements it once championed, opting for a more unilateral approach and pivoting from many of the obligations and norms it had shaped and insisted others honor to make trade fair, equitable, and mutually beneficial. How did the United States arrive here, and what steps should it take to leverage its strengths in the global trade system moving forward?

APARC visiting scholar Michael Beeman addresses these questions in his new book Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (published by APARC, distributed by Stanford University Press). As a former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC, Beeman brings an insider’s perspective to the recent transformation of U.S. trade policy. He provides a timely analysis of the forces driving this shift, examines its implications for America’s role in the global economy, and offers prescriptions for a robust U.S. trade policy that still serves American interests while allowing for compromise among competing ones.

Join Dr. Beeman on campus for our book launch event on October 17. Reserve your spot today >

Beeman joined APARC Communications Manager Michael Breger to discuss his new book. Listen to the conversation on our SoundCloud or YouTube channels. You can also download a transcript of the conversation.

Sign up for APARC newsletters to receive our event invitations and scholar updates >


A Departure From the Norm


In Beeman's analysis, the tactic of "walking out" as a means to renegotiate international agreements reflects a fundamental shift in U.S. trade policy, marked by a rejection of established conditions, obligations, and norms that had previously facilitated global trade and reduced conflict. This shift has had significant repercussions, as Washington has increasingly distanced itself from the principles it once championed, such as non-discrimination, transparency, openness, and reciprocity in trade. The change represents more than the inability to agree to a specific trade deal. According to Beeman, it is a rejection of Washington's long-held principles in pursuit of new goals.

Beeman attributes the collapse of the decades-long bipartisan consensus supporting free trade to a domestic political climate, where “the emergence of America’s zero-sum-centered politics [is] the new, defining feature of its political system.” In this new system, trade is viewed not as mutually beneficial but as a competition for limited resources. This transformation began gaining traction during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which galvanized new political movements, like the Tea Party and the so-called New Right, that simultaneously criticized free trade agreements.

Acknowledging the effects of domestic politics on trade policy, Beeman explores how the current political landscape, marked by extreme division, shapes trade decisions and reflects broader societal tensions. The author draws parallels between historical trade policy and the contemporary environment, noting that just as the 1930s saw dramatic swings in U.S. tariff policies, today’s new political geometry is “forged from extreme new levels of domestic political division [...] On trade, it is a geometry of acute angles and no longer one of curves and tangents.”

This political backdrop has resulted in an increasingly politicized trade policy that hampers efforts to find consensus. Beeman emphasizes that the transformation of U.S. trade policy is not merely a reflection of external pressures but a byproduct of internal political dynamics that redefine the goals and assumptions underpinning U.S. trade strategy.

“As a set of social values and domestic priorities in search of a means to express themselves through America’s external trade policies, [the Biden] Administration attempted to explain its approach in ways that often only raised contradictory distinctions.”
Michael Beeman

Trade Policy Tensions
 

Among the many trade agreements that the U.S. has recently abandoned was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). According to Beeman, internal divisions regarding the TPP's stringent rules and demands — especially concerning auto manufacturing — highlighted a rift between America's expectations of its trading partners and its willingness to accept compromise.

Various rules and regulations dictated by the TPP stoked domestic contention and “had scrambled the usual pathways to achieve the vote margins needed for these agreements. [They] also revealed the sharp new tension between what America expected and wanted from others and what it was willing to agree upon and accept for itself.” The Biden administration's decision to abandon its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) trade agreement in late 2023 further illustrated ongoing tensions in U.S. trade policy, underscoring a lack of coherent strategy following the TPP's collapse.

The book explores how the Trump and Biden Administrations have grappled with the contradictions in their trade policies. While Robert Lighthizer, the former trade representative under Trump, embraced a confrontational approach, Beeman criticizes the fallout from these decisions, arguing they often left established commitments unfulfilled and damaged international relationships. But Beeman also maintains that the Biden Administration's attempts to repair and redefine trade relationships have resulted in a series of inconsistent policies, reflecting internal domestic tensions yet to be resolved.

“As a set of social values and domestic priorities in search of a means to express themselves through America’s external trade policies, [the Biden] Administration attempted to explain its approach in ways that often only raised contradictory distinctions.” Once these “became harder to explain and justify, [it] began developing what amounted to a new theory of global trade disorder and dysfunction in an attempt to more convincingly frame its decisions.”

According to Beeman, disruptions from Covid-19 were a “helpful backdrop,” but, he argues, “if set against the vastly more immense challenges of the late 1940s and early 1950s, when America made an intentional policy choice to work with other countries to commit to open, rules-based trade to lead the world out of crisis, the problems of 2020-21 were challenges that policymakers from that time undoubtedly would have preferred.”

Instead of the mutually beneficial approach the United States took to foreign global trade after World War II, now we see the "us versus them" approach driven by the same zero-sum arguments that have transformed America's domestic and foreign policy.
Michael Beeman

Barriers to Progress
 

The current political landscape has made it challenging for Congress to reach a consensus on trade issues. The failure to renew the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which provided tariff relief to developing countries, exemplifies the paralysis in U.S. trade policy. Beeman remarks upon how, “after the bipartisan mainstream that advanced open and freer trade […] was swept away by America’s New Right and progressive Left, their shared interest in adding new and ever more conditions to America’s imports was insufficient to overcome their sharp disagreements over which conditions to add.” For Beeman, the inability to agree on new conditions for trade reflects broader ideological divides that hinder progress.

Ultimately, Beeman warns that America’s zero-sum approach to trade may lead to a cycle of self-inflicted isolation. He argues that this shift is not solely a reaction to China’s rise but represents a deeper ideological rift in American politics. “International trade adds a foreign, or external, dimension to zero-sum thinking that has facilitated a surprising degree of alignment between the New Right and the progressive Left,” he writes, specifically the “zero-sum belief that America is made worse off by freer trade, which benefits ‘them.’” Such an alignment has created an environment where bipartisan support for trade agreements has eroded, complicating efforts to establish a coherent and effective trade policy moving forward.

An essential read for anyone interested in the international political economy of trade and the future of America’s role in the global economy, “Walking Out” highlights the urgent need for the United States to reconcile its domestic divides to reestablish its role in the global economy. The current trajectory, characterized by a rejection of its foundational principles, risks fostering new conflicts with allies and adversaries alike, contradicting the original goals of the international trading system.

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Open Faculty Positions in Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy, Korean Studies, and Taiwan Studies

Stanford University seeks candidates for a new faculty position in Japanese politics and foreign policy, a faculty position in Korean Studies, and a new faculty position on Taiwan. All three appointments will be at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and affiliated with Shorenstein APARC.
Open Faculty Positions in Japanese Politics and Foreign Policy, Korean Studies, and Taiwan Studies
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A new book by APARC Visiting Scholar Michael Beeman offers a timely analysis of the shift in United States' foreign trade policy, examines its recent choices to “walk out” on the principles that had defined the global trade system it had created, and offers recommendations for a redefined and more productive trade policy strategy.

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This commentary first appeared in Foreign Affairs.


North Korea has long been a source of instability, but a new development over the past year threatens to make things even worse: the country is teaming up with Russia. At a meeting in Pyongyang last July, North Korea’s defense minister, Kang Sun Nam, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, vowed to expand their countries’ military cooperation to “resolutely stand against” their “common enemy,” the United States. Then, at a September summit with President Vladimir Putin in Russia, the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un toasted the Kremlin’s “sacred struggle” against “a band of evil”—a reference to Western countries—and called Putin the “Korean people’s closest friend.”

The North Korean–Russian convergence goes beyond rhetoric. Russia has been propping up the Kim regime with food aid, along with fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles, and equipment for ballistic missile production. There are signs that Russia is sharing its expertise, too. In July, North Korea conducted a test launch of a technologically sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missile, and in November, it managed to send its first military reconnaissance satellite into orbit after several failed attempts.

The transfer of critical supplies goes both ways. North Korea is sending Russia much-needed artillery shells to use in its war in Ukraine, with U.S. officials confirming in October that more than 1,000 containers of arms had arrived in Russia by ship and by train. Pyongyang’s equipment is hardly world-class—its shells have a 20 percent failure rate, whereas most advanced U.S. munitions have failure rates in the low single digits—but many of North Korea’s missiles are difficult for Ukraine to defend itself against because they are long-range, which allows Russian forces to fire from deep within their own territory, and low-tech, which helps them evade detection. North Korean military assistance could therefore be decisive in Russia’s campaign to halt Ukrainian troops’ progress. For Pyongyang, meanwhile, the arms transfer is an opportunity to test its wares in battle.

In addition to undermining U.S. and allied efforts to defend Ukraine, expanding North Korean–Russian cooperation threatens to destabilize the Korean Peninsula. On January 5, less than a week after reports emerged that Russia had launched its first North Korean–made ballistic missiles into Ukraine, North Korea fired hundreds of artillery rounds into the sea near its disputed border with South Korea. On January 14, North Korea conducted its first intermediate-range ballistic missile test of the year and formally announced that it no longer considered South Korea a “partner of reconciliation and reunification” but an enemy that had to be conquered—through nuclear war, if necessary.

The North Korean–Russian relationship undermines China’s influence.
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute

As if this were not enough, China is playing a counterproductive role. Beijing’s security relationship with Russia has deepened: Russia has provided critical weapons and defense-industrial expertise to China, and the two countries are engaging in more frequent and sophisticated joint military exercises. Beijing, in effect, has sanctioned a larger Russian military role in Asia and provided the political cover and economic lifeline Putin needs to continue fighting in Ukraine. China has also shielded North Korea from international sanctions and pressure designed to force Kim to give up his nuclear weapons program. There is historical precedent for the three countries’ working together, too. During the Cold War, China, North Korea, and Russia were all committed to “opposing imperialism”—code for their anti-Western activities. Their cooperation facilitated conflict around the world, including in eastern Europe, on the Korean Peninsula, and across the Taiwan Strait.

The good news, however, is that this trilateral alignment turned out poorly for all three countries during the Cold War—and if the United States plays its cards right, it can fail this time around, too. Chinese and Soviet backing helped North Korea fight South Korea and its allies to a draw, leading to an armistice agreement in 1953, but subsequent decades of poverty and international pariah status can hardly be considered a victory for Pyongyang. As for Beijing and Moscow, cooperation soon gave way to the Sino-Soviet split and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Although today’s circumstances are different, familiar signs of unease are already visible among China, North Korea, and Russia—rifts the United States can exploit.

An Unstable Triangle
 

China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union’s falling out over the course of the 1950s is instructive. The decade began with the two larger powers, China and the Soviet Union, committed to each other’s security and to supporting other communist countries, including North Korea. In 1950, Beijing and Moscow signed an alliance agreement vowing mutual defense in the event of an attack and pledging to coordinate their activities against the West. Both supported Kim Il Sung, the founding father of North Korea and the grandfather of Kim Jong Un, in his bid to attack South Korea the same year. When China sent its own forces into the brutal fighting on the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union backed the Chinese effort with military aid and expertise. 

But this cooperation was not to last. After the death of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in 1953, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, introduced political reforms and pursued “peaceful coexistence” with the United States. The Soviet Union’s pivot threatened to undermine the Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s domestic project, which emulated Stalin’s harsh governance. Meanwhile, Chinese attacks on Taiwanese-controlled islands, China’s 1962 border war with India, and the Great Leap Forward—Beijing’s disastrous economic and social program of that period—elicited contempt in Moscow. Mao’s personal jabs at the Soviet leadership did not help matters, either. By 1960, the Soviet Union had canceled 12 aid agreements and roughly 200 science and technology projects in China.

Back then, as now, Beijing and Moscow were revisionist great powers with limited willingness to advance the other’s ambitions. Both expected more from a partnership than mere protection. Beijing sought financial assistance for its defense-industrial base and political support to lend legitimacy to the regime. Moscow wanted to lead an ever-expanding communist bloc and to secure China’s help in undermining the United States’ position in Asia. Although the two sides shared many of the same interests, their priorities differed. And they would clash over tactics, especially when it came to dealing with third parties. Beijing and Moscow disagreed, for instance, about how to respond to Polish and Hungarian resistance against Soviet control in 1956: Mao even warned that China would support Poland if the Soviet Union dispatched troops to quell the unrest. 

Chinese and Soviet leaders weighed the benefits and risks of teaming up. Great powers can use alliances to strengthen their militaries and enhance their deterrence, but forming a partnership can also provoke a potential adversary or draw one of the great powers, against its wishes, into its ally’s disputes. During the 1950s, for example, Soviet leaders grew concerned that China’s dispute with Taiwan would undermine their plans to discuss détente with the United States. 

Similar stresses could now be opening fissures between China and its partners. Closer cooperation between North Korea and Russia has highlighted a fundamental tension in Russia’s relationship with China: unlike Pyongyang, Beijing has been unwilling to aid Moscow’s war effort directly. Russia’s requests for military equipment and aid from China have gone unanswered. (Russian officials have claimed that China secretly agreed to provide lethal weapons, but U.S. assessments have found no evidence that this is true.) Beijing’s official stance on the war in Ukraine is to remain neutral. It has called for de-escalation, reiterated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons, and affirmed the sovereignty of all nations. None of China’s statements have contained explicit rebukes of Russia, but they have not expressed full-throated support, either. The fact that Russia had to turn to North Korea for aid shows how little material assistance Moscow is receiving from Beijing. In the immediate term, Russia has no choice but to take what help it can get, but eventually the discovery that its “no limits” partnership with China does, in fact, have limits may force a reckoning with the risks of relying on Beijing. 

For China’s part, the North Korean–Russian relationship undermines Beijing’s influence on the Korean Peninsula. With no indication of having consulted China, Russia opted to ignore United Nations trade sanctions (which both China and Russia had signed on to) and sell North Korea the advanced military technology its leaders have long desired. Now that Russia is willing to provide benefits that China will not, Pyongyang is turning closer to Moscow, and Beijing has lost significant leverage. To be sure, China is still North Korea’s largest trading partner. And even when North Korea was almost wholly dependent on China, Kim sometimes felt free to dismiss Chinese leaders’ preferences. But Russian support gives Pyongyang a stronger hand to take action that could impede Beijing’s regional and global ambitions. For example, Beijing will not want North Korea—or Russia, for that matter—to jeopardize its attempts to unify Taiwan with mainland China. But a crisis on the Korean Peninsula could spoil China’s plans by driving the United States and its allies toward deeper defense integration, just as the North’s 1950 invasion of the South pushed the United States to rethink its security interests in the region and sign a defense pact with Taiwan in 1954.

Beijing is clearly concerned that Moscow and Pyongyang’s actions will do China more harm than good.
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute

The most damning consequence of North Korea’s military cooperation with Russia may be that it is damaging China’s broader diplomatic and security environment. An emboldened North Korea and an aggressive Russia do nothing to improve China’s image or help it compete with the United States. Nothing unites U.S. allies more than shared concerns about North Korean or Russian belligerence. And as a partner of both countries, China is expected to use its own political capital to solve the problems they cause. At a December summit with EU leaders in Beijing, for example, Chinese officials wanted to focus on long-term plans for bilateral relations and caution against a European “de-risking” strategy that threatens China’s technological ambitions and economic interests. But the European delegation instead opened the talks by urging China to leverage its economic influence over Russia “to put an end to the Russian aggression against Ukraine.” 

China has long regarded a trilateral alliance among Japan, South Korea, and the United States as a critical threat to its security, even seeking guarantees from Seoul and Tokyo that they would not enter such a pact. Part of the case Beijing is making to reassure both capitals is that China is prepared to serve as the “stabilizer” of Northeast Asia—a message it repeated in a meeting with Japanese and South Korean officials after North Korea launched its spy satellite in November. At the same meeting, South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin urged Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to encourage North Korea to halt its provocations and pursue denuclearization. But China’s commitment to playing “a constructive role” could amount to little if North Korea, bolstered by Russia, does not respond to Beijing’s overtures. At a certain point, even if other countries in the region do not see China as complicit in North Korea’s bellicose actions, Japan, South Korea, and the United States are bound to make defense decisions that will be unwelcome in Beijing.

China, recognizing the danger of being grouped with North Korea and Russia, has tried to publicly distance itself from the two countries. In late January, Liu Pengyu, the spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington, told Voice of America that he was “unaware” that North Korea and Russia were cooperating on military matters. China has also denied playing any role in the two countries’ recent collaboration. In line with that claim, when Moscow suggested that North Korea join Chinese-Russian naval drills in September, Beijing did not respond. The official Chinese media has also downplayed the idea of a trilateral alliance among China, North Korea, and Russia. In China’s telling, such a partnership is “concocted” by Western media to justify closer military cooperation among Japan, South Korea, and the United States and generate a Cold War mindset by framing regional politics in terms of two opposing blocs. Beijing still sees real, if limited, benefits from its relationships with North Korea and Russia, but it is clearly concerned that Moscow and Pyongyang’s actions will do China more harm than good.

Let the Chips Fall

The United States and its allies can encourage fissures in the emerging autocratic bloc, but they must proceed with caution. Erecting obstacles is the wrong approach. Taking a page from history, Washington should recognize that China, North Korea, and Russia will sabotage their triangular alignment all on their own. During the Korean War, for instance, Soviet air support for Chinese forces was not forthcoming despite promises from Moscow, and in the 1960s, the Soviet Union reneged on commitments to lend its nuclear expertise to China. Moscow’s continued reluctance to support Beijing, let alone extend security assistance, in times of crisis was a major contributor to the Sino-Soviet split.

Recently, the war in Ukraine provided a perfect opportunity for China to disappoint its partner by refusing to fully back Russia’s military campaign. But the Biden administration squandered that opportunity by threatening China with “consequences” should it assist the Russian war effort and by adding Chinese companies that it asserted were supporting the Russian military to a trade blacklist. Even without these warnings, Beijing would have been unlikely to provide significant aid. Now, however, Beijing can contain the damage to its relationship with Moscow by blaming the United States for China’s failure to help a friend. If Washington had left the issue alone or confined its threats to private channels, China and Russia’s disagreement might have snowballed into an even larger rift.

The best way for the United States to counter the Chinese-Russian alignment is by using it to rally U.S. allies and partners. Shared perceptions of a threat create a fertile environment for deepening alliances and breaking ground on new areas of defense cooperation. Such a mindset has already allowed Japan and South Korea to look past their historic animosities and work together more closely than ever before. Each country decided to reinstate the other’s preferred trade partner status last spring, and in December they resumed high-level economic talks after an eight-year hiatus. U.S. allies in Europe that were previously reluctant to push back against Beijing may also change their minds as they come to see China and Russia as a unified threat—perhaps enough to persuade them to help the United States deter Chinese aggression in Asia. China has been reluctant to support Russia’s military and political goals in Europe in part because Beijing values its economic relationships with European countries. If those countries join the United States in taking a harder line on China, Beijing may conclude that an association with Russia and its disruptive tactics comes with too high a cost.

For now, coordination between North Korea and Russia makes it harder for the United States and its allies to compel either country to leave behind its revisionist, aggressive tendencies and assume a constructive role in the international community. But if their relationship sufficiently threatens China, Beijing may choose to distance itself from both Moscow and Pyongyang. It might even go so far as to try to push North Korea and Russia apart. The United States and its allies were not the primary reason for the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War, and they will not be the cause of the next Chinese-Russian rift—but they can make the most of the regional dynamics hastening a divide.

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China, Russia, and North Korea’s New Team Is Not Built to Last

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North Korea’s military provocations including ICBM tests and spy satellite launches have intensified tensions on the Korean peninsula and beyond, and many questions have arisen about how South Korea and its allies will manage this increased threat. APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin recently joined Arirang News for a conversation in an episode of “Within the Frame” to examine the geopolitical uncertainty surrounding the Korean Peninsula in 2024. 

The conversation covered a wide range of topics, including North Korea's intentions and recent provocations, Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral cooperation, Seoul-Beijing relations, tensions over Taiwan, and South Korean politics and soft power. Watch the full interview below (an excerpted version is also available here):

Shin said that North Korea’s intentions to become a nuclear state are clear and that it will continue to develop its nuclear arsenal and conventional military capabilities in 2024. He also argued that few in the international community are currently focused on halting North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. 

In terms of the Japan-U.S.-South Korea alliance, Shin mentioned that the Yoon government has done a very good job of strengthening trilateral cooperation, but the outcome of the 2024 U.S. election may affect the dynamics of the alliance, especially if Donald Trump becomes President again. 

When asked about a potential “new Cold War” paradigm focusing on China, North Korea, and Russia's alignment, Shin warned that this characterization is strategically risky and stated that “we shouldn’t be creating a Cold War that doesn’t exist.” Shin pointed out that the current paradigm is much more interdependent and much more complicated. “I don’t think China wants to side with Russia or North Korea all the time because its relations with the global community are different from those of Russia or North Korea. We shouldn’t fall into this false logic of a Cold War in Northeast Asia.” 

Another topic discussed was South Korean relations with China. In Shin’s view, South Korea must deal with its domestic anti-China sentiment to improve Seoul-Beijing relations and must also promote more people-to-people exchange. He noted the sharp drop in the number of South Korean students going to China to study and the number of Chinese students coming to South Korea.

Shin also discussed the tensions surrounding a potential military conflict in Taiwan, suggesting that a contingency might become one of the most difficult foreign policy challenges for the South Korean government, perhaps even more challenging than its relations with North Korea. 

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APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin joined Arirang News to examine geopolitical uncertainty surrounding the Korean Peninsula in 2024, North Korea's intentions, Japan-U.S.-South Korea trilateral cooperation, Seoul-Beijing relations, tensions over Taiwan, and South Korean politics and soft power.

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This article originally appeared in the Stanford Report.


The future of clean energy, quantum technology, and innovation were among the topics of discussion between Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol at an event held at Stanford University.

The historic meeting, which took place on Nov. 17 during the last day of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, was hosted by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and the Hoover Institution. It was one of seven convenings between the two leaders this year to strengthen bilateral relations between their countries. Such a meeting would have been unthinkable just over a year ago because of decades of tense relations. Since Yoon and Kishida took office, they have taken steps towards rapprochement and building trust that their predecessors could not achieve.

“We at Stanford are deeply honored to be hosting these two leaders on the same stage for another historic chapter in relations between their two countries,” said Michael McFaul, the director of FSI, in his opening remarks.

Condoleezza Rice, the Tad and Dianne Taube Director of the Hoover Institution, moderated the discussion, which centered around innovation and the future of science and technology.

“Democratic allies need very much to discuss both the challenges and the opportunities that technologies bring,” said Rice, who served as the 66th secretary of state of the United States.

The event was one of several visits that saw dignitaries from Asia visiting the Stanford campus while they were in the Bay Area for the APEC summit in San Francisco.

Calls for collaboration

Balancing the risks and opportunities of technology was a recurring theme during the discussion between the leaders of Japan and South Korea, with each of them calling for increased collaboration and cooperation among countries with shared values.

“In the field of science and technology, no one country alone can drive innovation that will change the world,” said Kishida in his opening remarks.

For example, Kishida said, various countries now contribute key elements to innovations such as semiconductors, quantum computing, and generative AI.

“If there is one element missing, there will be no innovation,” Kishida said. “New ideas emerge through a multi-layered exchange between diverse people.”

Convening at Stanford

In Yoon’s opening remarks, he reflected on how Stanford is entwined with Korea’s own efforts to expand educational opportunities in the field of science and technology.

Yoon shared how in the 1960s, then-President Park Chung Hee reached out to the U.S. for help in cultivating South Korea’s engineering talent.

Frederick Terman – who served as dean of the School of Engineering from 1944 to 1958 and provost from 1955 to 1965 and is known as “the father of Silicon Valley” – visited Korea and compiled his observations in The Terman Report. This report, which included contributions from four other experts, led to the creation of the Korea Advanced Institute of Science in 1971, which later was renamed Korea Institute of Science and Technology, or “KIST.”

“At that time, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world, but policies for establishing a scientific and technological state with KIST at the core has resulted in Korea achieving the current status of freedom and prosperity,” Yoon said. “Just like the motto of Stanford, the winds of freedom blew all the way across to Korea.”

Now, Yoon said he and Kishida are expanding the scope of Korea-Japan relations to include cultivating collaboration in science and technology in their diplomacy.

Technology can propel economic growth, creating new jobs and opportunities, Yoon said. But he also warned that technology can leave some people behind.

Yoon emphasized that the three countries must work together to reduce the digital divide and ensure that the world has fair access to new technologies – “and thereby contribute to the sustainable peace and prosperity of the international community through such trilateral cooperation,” he said.

Yoon also urged for trilateral cooperation in accelerating the pace of advancement towards carbon neutrality goals with carbon-free energy technologies such as nuclear power and hydrogen. Yoon also said he “is looking forward to proposing the establishment of a hydrogen ammonia global value chain in which Japan and Korea will be the main participants.”

Addressing the climate challenge

The leaders referenced equity, carbon neutrality, and clean energy again when Rice asked them about their plan to address the current climate challenge.

Yoon shared his concerns about the uneven effects of carbon emissions, pointing out how advanced economies have emitted more carbon dioxide compared to developing or low-developed countries, yet it has been the developing nations that are most negatively impacted.

“We have to cooperate internationally to help bridge the climate divide,” Yoon said.

Kishida cited the Doerr School of Sustainability – which was made possible through a generous gift by the engineer and venture capitalist John Doerr – as an example of entrepreneurs making investments in innovative, sustainable solutions to the climate crisis.

The potential in quantum technology

Rice also asked the leaders about quantum technology, which the Biden administration has invested over $1 trillion in advancing.

Kishida said how the full transformation of quantum technology has yet to be imagined – “quantum technology is a complete game changer,” he said.

For example, Yoon said, quantum technology has the potential to disable encryption systems or wiretapping. He also pointed out how it can also lead to improvements in the detection of submarines – prompting new implications for national security.

Yoon and Kishida both saw opportunities for Japan, Korea, and the U.S. to work together, emphasizing how each country has strengths and weaknesses that can complement one another.

“Quantum technology, I believe, is the area where global cooperation is the most crucial because there is no one country in the world that has a complete understanding of it,” Yoon said.

New mindset to advancing carbon neutrality

During the Q&A portion of the event, the leaders were asked how their countries are ensuring the world is united in solving the global climate crisis.

“Climate change is the biggest global challenge we face today and I think all countries share a common sense of crisis,” Kishida responded. Kishida emphasized Yoon’s earlier point about how each country experiences climate change differently – therefore, there must be “diverse pathways” to innovation that “transcend national borders.”

Yoon said that transitioning to carbon-free energy should not be viewed as a cost but rather as an investment in a new market and industry.

“It should be understood as an asset or an industry that would translate into this becoming a market,” said Yoon, who reiterated the need for cooperation to be fair and just. “We need to change our mindset.”

The event closed with remarks from Gi-Wook Shin, the director of APARC and a professor of sociology in the School of Humanities and Sciences.

“This momentous occasion has built on deepening ties between Japan and the Republic of Korea,” said Shin. “We are so honored to be part of this journey.”


In the Media

The historic meeting of the Japanese and South Korean leaders on the Stanford campus received wide coverage in the media. Selected coverage includes:

See also the report by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

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Trade Experts Gather to Discuss APEC’s Role and Relevance

Ahead of the 2023 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) convening in San Francisco, APARC kicked off its fall seminar series, Exploring APEC’s Role in Facilitating Regional Cooperation, with a panel discussion that examined APEC’s role and continued relevance in a rapidly-evolving Asia-Pacific region.
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At a historic meeting held at Stanford, the leaders of Japan and Korea discussed the perils and promises of new innovations and the importance of collaboration.

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This event is at full capacity and has closed for registration. There is no waitlist.
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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is honored to host the Prime Minister of Japan, Kishida Fumio, and the President of the Republic of Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol, for a special summit discussion. The event co-hosts are the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and Hoover Institution.

Portraits of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan and President Yoon Suk Yeol of the Republic of Korea.


Following remarks by Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon on the challenges and future of science and technology, they will engage in a moderated conversation with Secretary Condoleezza Rice, the Tad and Dianne Taube Director of the Hoover Institution. Discussion topics include decarbonization and clean energy, quantum technology, and startup innovation.

Speakers will also include Professors Gi-Wook Shin and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Director and Deputy Director of APARC, respectively, and Professor Michael McFaul, Director of FSI.

This historic gathering on the Stanford campus of the leaders of the two key U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific — a convening that would have been almost unthinkable just over a year ago — follows a period in which the two leaders have made extraordinary progress in strengthening Japan-ROK bilateral relations, and is particularly significant in the aftermath of the August 2023 Camp David U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral summit, which has been touted as the beginning of a new era in trilateral cooperation among the three allies as they seek to advance peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

This event is available to in-person attendees and will not be livestreamed.

When registering, please be sure to read carefully the terms and conditions for attendance.

Members of the press should follow the media advisory below. For press/media inquiries, please contact aparc-communications@stanford.edu.

We will keep registrants informed of any program revisions subject to Japanese, Korean, and U.S. government protocols.

1:00 p.m. 
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1:30 p.m.
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2:10 p.m.
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2:30 p.m.
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Welcome
Michael McFaul
Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science
Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution

Remarks
The Honorable Kishida Fumio
Prime Minister of Japan

The Honorable Yoon Suk Yeol
President of the Republic of Korea

Discussion
Moderated by 
Condoleezza Rice
Tad and Dianne Taube Director, Hoover Institution
Thomas and Barbara Stephenson Senior Fellow on Public Policy, Hoover Institution
Denning Professor in Global Business and the Economy, Stanford Graduate School of Business
Senior Fellow, by courtesy, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Q&A Session
Guided by 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Sociology
Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Deputy Director, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Director, Japan Program

Closing Remarks
Gi-Wook Shin
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Sociology
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Director, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Director, Korea Program


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On April 26, 2023, in recognition of the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-Korea alliance, President Joe Biden will host President Yoon Suk Yeol for a State Visit to the United States. According to Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin, the fact that Yoon received the second such invitation of the Biden administration is a testimony to the centrality of the Korea-U.S. alliance to the peace and stability of the East Asian regions, especially at a time when the frayed U.S.-China relationship continues to degrade into a new Cold War, with a potential Taiwan contingency looming on the horizon. 

Shin, former South Korea's ambassador to China and former director general of the Asia Pacific Affairs Bureau at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is the Winter 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a visiting scholar at APARC. He headlined this quarter’s Payne Lecture, speaking to an audience that gathered on March 1 for a timely discussion titled Sino-U.S. Relations and South Korea, co-hosted by APARC and FSI.

The Payne Lectureship at FSI, named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, aims to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community and advance international cooperation. The lectureship brings to Stanford internationally esteemed leaders from academia and the policy world who combine visionary thinking and a broad, practical grasp of their fields with the capacity to provide insights into pressing challenges of global concern. Throughout the 2022-23 academic year, the Payne Lectureship hosts experts from Asia who examine crucial questions in U.S.-China relations.

Ambassador Shin is uniquely qualified to offer insight into South Korea's response to the pressures created by the U.S.-China rivalry, said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin, who chaired the event that included a discussion with Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and Asia security.


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The strategic distrust and intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China have put substantial pressure on South Korea, and South Korea's long-term policy to make a Korea-U.S. alliance compatible with its partnership with China is becoming more difficult.
Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin
Winter 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow

China’s Dreams

Painting a picture of Chinese ambitions, Ambassador Shin enumerated China’s goals and the steps it has taken to achieve them. “The Chinese dream,” he said, “is to regain the colonial behavior of the Qing Dynasty, when China was a great power with about one-third of the global GDP.” To achieve this dream, China's leaders have pushed for its continued economic development while arousing patriotism and nationalism domestically. Through its military modernization campaign, China has rapidly shown its ambition to become the top-rated global military power by 2049, the centennial of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, he noted.

Ambassador Shin indicated that China has prepared for a long-term competition with the U.S. in the economic arena, as Xi Jinping introduced the dual circulation economic policy, which aims to reorient the country's economy by prioritizing domestic consumption while remaining open to international trade and investment. This policy, Shin argues, “is designed, in part, to make the [Chinese] economy less affected by external factors including the supply chain reset of the U.S.” As such, China has stressed the importance of innovation and has made massive investments in science and technology to reduce its reliance on Western economies. Moreover, China has promoted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its political and economic influence.

“China became the second largest economic power and began to show assertiveness in its foreign policy, particularly by emphasizing the safeguarding of Chinese interests, namely, sovereignty and territorial integrity, state security and development interest,” stated Shin. To achieve these goals, “Chinese diplomats have voiced their arguments in an abrasive style, ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ as it is called by Westerners.” This form of proactive engagement with the rest of the world has resulted in an intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China, which has made it increasingly difficult for South Korea to maintain simultaneous ties with both great powers.

No Longer on the Fence

Shin noted that “The strategic distrust and intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China have put substantial pressure on South Korea…and South Korea's long-term policy to make a Korea-U.S. alliance compatible with its partnership with China is becoming more difficult.” In recent years, South Korea has moved even closer to the U.S.

The joint communique issued when President Moon Jae-in visited Washington two years ago, already showed South Korea’s tilt toward the U.S. At the time, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula by the North Korean nuclear and missile provocation necessitated the alliance. Now, an ascendant China, “together with the lessons of Ukraine, have made South Korean people pay close attention to the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance,” stated Shin, noting that both nations openly stress the importance of freedom, democracy, and rule-based order. South Korea has become enthusiastic about tripartite cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, in tune with American policies. 

On the other hand, China warned South Korea to respect China's core interests while expressing its concerns on several strategic issues. Shin stated that “China began to demand the Yoon government to continue the three policy positions of the previous government, namely, no more deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), no participation in the American missile defense system, and no military alliance among Korea, Japan, and the U.S.” However, the current Foreign Minister Park Jin made it clear to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang that the policy positions of the previous government do not bind the new government, Shin indicated.
 

The Taiwan Contingency

China also demands that South Korea not interfere in the Taiwan issue, arguing that Taiwan is a part of China, and the Taiwan Strait is part of China's internal affairs. When the joint communique after the moon-Biden summit two years ago touched on the Taiwan Strait for the first time, “the Chinese spokesperson warned South Korea not to play with fire,” said Shin. The Taiwan Strait is also regarded as an important sea transportation lane for South Korean goods and energy supply. “It is in South Korea's interest to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” he said.
Amb. Jung-Seung Shin at the Payne Lecture
Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin, the Winter 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow, offers his insights into the dynamics of the trilateral U.S.-China-South Korea relationship.

Shin indicated the precarious nature of the contingency, stating, “South Korea has no intention of challenging the One China claim. However, the peace and stability of Taiwan Strait are also very important for South Korea, as the security situation of the Taiwan Strait is connected to the Korean peninsula.” Indeed, a military collision in the Taiwan Strait would be impossible to contain locally. “The U.S. and Japan are supposed to immediately help Taiwan to repel China’s military attack, and American bases are located in South Korea and Japan, including Okinawa,” he said.

Therefore, military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is likely to escalate to Northeast Asia, and a certain portion of American forces in South Korea could move to the Taiwan Strait in the contingency according to the strategic flexibility of forces, “which might induce North Korea's misjudgment to invade South Korea,” Shin predicted.
 

Looking to National Identity

According to Shin, South Korea’s foreign policies should be based on its national interests and reflect its identity and the values its people share. Therefore, South Korea should not only make efforts to further strengthen the KORUS alliance for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the region, but to properly manage its relations with China, Shin indicated. “Under these situations, the best scenario for South Korea would be that there is no strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China, but rather proactive cooperation between them…But nobody in this room thinks it's realistic,” he said.
South Korea needs to have more consistent foreign policies based on its national interest in values shared by most South Koreans, and distance itself from polarized party politics.
Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin
Winter 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow
Recognizing the difficulty in crafting a unified front in a time of deep political divides, Shin argued that “South Korea needs to have more consistent foreign policies based on its national interest in values shared by most South Koreans, and distance itself from polarized party politics. South Korean national interest is supposed to reflect its national identity. For example, South Korea is relatively small in the size of the land and population compared with neighboring countries.”
 
In addition to the geostrategic limitations of the nation, the Korean peninsula remains divided, and North Korea still holds weapons of mass destruction, representing a continual existential threat. “South Korea has been faced with constant challenges in the security and economic environments, yet the most important thing among others is that South Korea should further enhance its economic strengths, technological progress, and cultural power. South Korea is a democratic country with a market economy and it has been developed to the level of the Western countries, so there is a growing demand for more contribution to regional and global issues, particularly with human security in mind,” Shin stated.
 
However, Shin believes South Korea’s aims should not solely be limited to growth and alignment with the U.S., arguing that “Relations with China should be properly managed. China's cooperation is also needed for eventual peace and stability on the Korean peninsula…China is still the place with a considerable potential for South Korean trade and investment.”
 

The Cost of Deterrence

In her comments, Oriana Skylar Mastro agreed with Shin’s proposals and went on to suggest that it is in the best interest of all countries in the region to work together to try to enhance deterrence. In Mastro’s view, China is much more fearful of horizontal escalation, the involvement of other countries, than they are of vertical escalation, or increased violence with the U.S. While the South Korean role might not be a direct involvement, or fighting China, freeing up U.S. resources, or supporting the U.S. in more defensive or indirect roles could significantly tilt the balance such that China decides the use of force is not in its best interests.
 
Mastro described an ideal situation in which the U.S. and South Korea work together to enhance deterrence to the region, noting that “Deterrence is very costly, and it's very risky business for all the reasons that the professor laid out about the economic costs and peacetime potential downsides geopolitically of upsetting China or presenting a greater threat to China. But my own view is that while deterrence is difficult and costly, obviously war is even worse.”
 
Proceeding to examine the nature of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, Mastro proposed a broadening of the public conception of how alliances can work, stating that, “I like to think about how the two countries can work together to enhance South Korea's independent capacity and military capacity and ways that the U.S. and South Korea can fight together that aren't offensive in orientation.” Yet, the North Korea contingency remains an important and dangerous prospect. Mastro identified the persistent threat on South Korea’s border, stating that, “If U.S. forces get pulled off the peninsula, that could undermine deterrence vis-a-vis North Korea.”
 

Preventing Overextension

Overextension represents one of the largest limits on U.S. power projection. According to Mastro, one of the primary reasons that the Biden administration has not been talking about North Korea significantly, is the fact that the U.S. cannot fight a war on the Korean Peninsula and compete effectively with China.

The question is whether the U.S. could count on South Korea for some critical supplies during a conflict that could reduce the U.S. logistical burden.
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Center Fellow

Thus, Mastro proposes that the South Koreans play a greater role in their defense, a topic that comes up with NATO partners and allies in Europe as well. More specifically, Mastro suggests that the U.S. transfer operational command to South Korean forces, and that the South Korean military should allow the U.S. to practice greater strategic flexibility, to use its forces on the Korean Peninsula for operations or contingencies that are off the peninsula. Up until this point, that permission has been denied, but Mastro contends that it would be useful and could enhance deterrence. 

“If the South Koreans, along with their statements about wanting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, also explicitly allowed for that strategic flexibility to take place to say that they understand that the role of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula is primarily to deter and defend South Korea against North Korea, that could also play a potential role in wider contingencies,” she said.

Furthermore, Mastro believes that South Korea must play a greater role in the production and provision of certain types of munitions. “This is an area where the U.S. has struggled with its own manufacturing base that is considering licensing production and potentially doing it elsewhere. So the question is whether the U.S. could count on South Korea for some critical supplies during a conflict that could reduce the U.S. logistical burden,” she speculated.

South Korea is a small country, and it has limited resources, but it also has the second-largest reserve force and paramilitary force in the world, and the eighth-largest active duty force in the world. According to Mastro, “The South Korean military is technically 20 times larger than that of Japan's…it has punched above its own weight, like the Australian military has.”

It remains to be seen whether the U.S.-South Korea alliance will need to be tested in the coming years, but tensions with China will likely continue to define the two nation’s foreign policies. A potential Taiwan contingency remains one of the largest looming threats to the status quo and the most probable pathway to regional escalation, which, in Shin’s view, could draw North Korea and its nuclear arsenal into the fold.


The Payne Lectureship will return in the spring quarter, continuing with the theme of Asian perspectives on the U.S.-China relationship. We will be joined by Kokubun Ryosei, professor emeritus at Keio University and adjunct adviser at the Fujitsu Future Studies Center.

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Caught in the Middle: How Asian Nations Are Navigating the U.S.-China Competition

This fall, APARC brought together scholars and policy experts to examine the security competition that has come to define an era from the perspectives of Asian nations.
Caught in the Middle: How Asian Nations Are Navigating the U.S.-China Competition
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Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin, the Winter 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow, offered insights into the dynamics of the trilateral U.S.-China-South Korea relationship, the impacts of the great power competition between the United States and China on South Korea, and the prospects for enhanced Korea-U.S. collaboration.

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Distressed flags of China, South Korea, and the United States

The intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China has put substantial pressure on South Korea concerning several strategic issues. The U.S.-China rivalry is only likely to continue with the upcoming American presidential election in 2024.

As the South Korean government has recently tilted toward the United States, China wants South Korea to take a more balanced approach in its policies between the two countries. China is also expressing concern on matters of interest to it, such as the THAAD deployment, supply chain reset, and issues of the Taiwan Strait and the regional status of Xinjiang.

As Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin will argue, South Korean foreign policies should be based on its national interests and reflect its identity and the values its people share. Therefore, according to Shin, South Korea should not only make efforts to further strengthen the KORUS alliance for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the region, but to properly manage its relations with China.

Featured Speaker

Ambassador Shin

Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin joins the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as Visiting Scholar and Payne Distinguished Fellow for the 2023 winter quarter. He previously served as Ambassador for the Republic of Korea to the People's Republic of China from 2008 to 2010, and currently serves as Chair Professor at the East Asia Institute at Dongseo University. While at Stanford, he will be conducting research on the strategic relationships between Korea, China, and the United States.

Discussant

Ambassador Shin

Oriana Skylar Mastro is a Center Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where her research focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, nuclear dynamics, and coercive diplomacy. She is also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she works as a strategic planner at INDOPACOM.

She has published widely, including in International Security, Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, International Studies Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Survival, and Asian Security. Her book, The Costs of Conversation: Obstacles to Peace Talks in Wartime, (Cornell University Press, 2019), won the 2020 American Political Science Association International Security Section Best Book by an Untenured Faculty Member.

Moderator

Gi-Wook Shin

Gi-Wook Shin is the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center; the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea; the founding director of the Korea Program; a senior fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; and a professor of sociology, all at Stanford University. As a historical-comparative and political sociologist, his research has concentrated on social movements, nationalism, development, and international relations. 

Shin is the author/editor of more than twenty books and numerous articles. His recent books include South Korea's Democracy in Crisis (2022); The North Korean Conundrum: Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security (2021); Demographics and Innovation in the Asia-Pacific (2021); and Shifting Gears in Innovation Policy from Asia (2020). His new research initiative examines potential benefits of talent flows in the Asia-Pacific region, where countries, cities, and corporations have competed with one another to enhance their stock of "brain power" by drawing on the skills of both their own citizens and those of foreigners.

This event is part of the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Lecture Series. 

The Payne Lectureship is named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, brothers who gained an appreciation for global problems through their international business operations. Their descendants endowed the annual lecture series at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community today and to increase support for informed international cooperation.

The Payne Distinguished Lecturer is chosen for his or her international reputation as a leader, with an emphasis on visionary thinking, a broad, practical grasp of a given field, and the capacity to clearly articulate an important perspective on the global community and its challenges.

Gi-Wook Shin
Gi-Wook Shin

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Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin
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This article first appeared in The Diplomat magazine.


U.S. President Joe Biden will first meet new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol in Seoul on May 21. It will be an important meeting for both leaders – not only to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance but also to collaborate on a range of pressing issues, from North Korea to the Russia-Ukraine War to the protection of liberal democracy. The summit, to be held just 11 days after Yoon was inaugurated as president, will be his debut as a political leader on the international stage. Unlike political veteran Biden, Yoon formally entered politics only last summer and has yet to develop a policy track record. What should we expect from the new South Korean president at this first summit?

During the hotly contested campaign, Yoon’s opponents criticized him as South Korea’s Donald Trump. Western media and pundits also tended to portray him in a similar vein as an “anti-feminist political novice” with a “Trump-style brand of very divisive identity politics.” To be sure, he is not a conventional democratic leader who values negotiation and compromise; he envisions a strong South Korea that can stand up to China and North Korea, echoing Trump’s “America First.” Yet such a characterization risks setting off a false alarm that can badly mislead the United States and other allies in how they approach his administration.


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First and foremost, Yoon is not a “political outsider” in the same sense as Trump. While Yoon, unlike every South Korean president since democratization, has no legislative experience in the National Assembly, he served as prosecutor-general during the Moon Jae-in administration, a leadership position often requiring sound political judgment as well as legal expertise. Yoon built his reputation as a fierce fighter against abuse of power and corruption, shifting public opinion in his favor. This degree of legal, policy, and political experience is a far cry from starring on “The Apprentice.”

Crucially, Yoon curried strong support among conservatives, successfully mobilizing diverse factions to create an anti-Moon coalition and win the election, similar to Biden’s victory in the 2020 election. Whereas the Trump administration was filled with individuals offering only limited policy experience, and many critical appointed positions were left vacant, Yoon is supported by the seasoned conservative establishment joining his administration. In this respect, Yoon recalls George W. Bush, whose first formal foray into Washington politics came after serving as governor of Texas and who relied on the close network of the Republican establishment, such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, for policy and political guidance.

At the upcoming summit, Yoon will have the opportunity to assure global audiences that he is not South Korea’s Trump but a reliable partner of the United States and other allies with shared democratic values.
Gi-Wook Shin and Keli Caywood

Yoon’s key cabinet and presidential office nominees are well-known figures with extensive policy backgrounds. New Unification Minister Kwon Young-se is a four-time member of the National Assembly and served as Seoul’s envoy to Beijing during the Park Geun-hye administration. Yoon’s national security advisor, Kim Sung-han, is a professor at Korea University who served as the vice minister of foreign affairs and trade during the Lee Myung-bak administration. Yoon is also supported by a powerful group of South Korean elites who attended Seoul National’s law school, his alma mater. Such heavy reliance on experienced hands of the conservative establishment reduces uncertainty for the Biden administration.

Yoon is expected to adopt a largely conventional conservative stance on major policy issues, both domestic and foreign. His economic policy is likely to be market-led and minimize state intervention, replacing Moon’s policies such as “income-driven growth” that Korean conservatives branded as socialist. On foreign policy, Yoon seeks to strengthen the U.S. alliance and restore relations with Japan, which, under Moon, were the most precarious they have been since the normalization of relations in 1965.

It is noteworthy that, as president-elect, Yoon sent his special delegation to the United States and Japan followed by the European Union, but not to China and Russia, departing from past precedent. Yoon is expected to take a firm stance against Beijing and Pyongyang rather than embrace appeasement.

At the upcoming summit, Yoon will have the opportunity to assure global audiences that he is not South Korea’s Trump but a reliable partner of the United States and other allies with shared democratic values. In his inaugural speech, he repeatedly stressed the importance of “freedom” to clearly signal his resolve to protect liberal democracy both at home and abroad. This is great news for Biden, who badly needs support from allies like South Korea in his fight against global autocracy.

Just as Yoon will be tested, the summit presents a chance for Biden to demonstrate he is prepared to work closely together with the new South Korean president, overcoming the concerns unearthed during his campaign, in order to bolster the alliance and democracy.

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Yoon has been compared to Biden’s own nemesis, Donald Trump, but he is far from a political iconoclast.

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