On April 26, 2023, in recognition of the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-Korea alliance, President Joe Biden will host President Yoon Suk Yeol for a State Visit to the United States. According to Ambassador Jung-Seung Shin, the fact that Yoon received the second such invitation of the Biden administration is a testimony to the centrality of the Korea-U.S. alliance to the peace and stability of the East Asian regions, especially at a time when the frayed U.S.-China relationship continues to degrade into a new Cold War, with a potential Taiwan contingency looming on the horizon. 

Shin, former South Korea's ambassador to China and former director general of the Asia Pacific Affairs Bureau at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is the Winter 2023 Payne Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and a visiting scholar at APARC. He headlined this quarter’s Payne Lecture, speaking to an audience that gathered on March 1 for a timely discussion titled Sino-U.S. Relations and South Korea, co-hosted by APARC and FSI.

The Payne Lectureship at FSI, named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, aims to raise public understanding of the complex policy issues facing the global community and advance international cooperation. The lectureship brings to Stanford internationally esteemed leaders from academia and the policy world who combine visionary thinking and a broad, practical grasp of their fields with the capacity to provide insights into pressing challenges of global concern. Throughout the 2022-23 academic year, the Payne Lectureship hosts experts from Asia who examine crucial questions in U.S.-China relations.

Ambassador Shin is uniquely qualified to offer insight into South Korea's response to the pressures created by the U.S.-China rivalry, said APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin, who chaired the event that included a discussion with Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro, an expert on Chinese military and Asia security.

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China’s Dreams

Painting a picture of Chinese ambitions, Ambassador Shin enumerated China’s goals and the steps it has taken to achieve them. “The Chinese dream,” he said, “is to regain the colonial behavior of the Qing Dynasty, when China was a great power with about one-third of the global GDP.” To achieve this dream, China's leaders have pushed for its continued economic development while arousing patriotism and nationalism domestically. Through its military modernization campaign, China has rapidly shown its ambition to become the top-rated global military power by 2049, the centennial of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, he noted.

Ambassador Shin indicated that China has prepared for a long-term competition with the U.S. in the economic arena, as Xi Jinping introduced the dual circulation economic policy, which aims to reorient the country's economy by prioritizing domestic consumption while remaining open to international trade and investment. This policy, Shin argues, “is designed, in part, to make the [Chinese] economy less affected by external factors including the supply chain reset of the U.S.” As such, China has stressed the importance of innovation and has made massive investments in science and technology to reduce its reliance on Western economies. Moreover, China has promoted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its political and economic influence.

“China became the second largest economic power and began to show assertiveness in its foreign policy, particularly by emphasizing the safeguarding of Chinese interests, namely, sovereignty and territorial integrity, state security and development interest,” stated Shin. To achieve these goals, “Chinese diplomats have voiced their arguments in an abrasive style, ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ as it is called by Westerners.” This form of proactive engagement with the rest of the world has resulted in an intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China, which has made it increasingly difficult for South Korea to maintain simultaneous ties with both great powers.

No Longer on the Fence

Shin noted that “The strategic distrust and intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China have put substantial pressure on South Korea…and South Korea's long-term policy to make a Korea-U.S. alliance compatible with its partnership with China is becoming more difficult.” In recent years, South Korea has moved even closer to the U.S.

The joint communique issued when President Moon Jae-in visited Washington two years ago, already showed South Korea’s tilt toward the U.S. At the time, heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula by the North Korean nuclear and missile provocation necessitated the alliance. Now, an ascendant China, “together with the lessons of Ukraine, have made South Korean people pay close attention to the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance,” stated Shin, noting that both nations openly stress the importance of freedom, democracy, and rule-based order. South Korea has become enthusiastic about tripartite cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, in tune with American policies. 

On the other hand, China warned South Korea to respect China's core interests while expressing its concerns on several strategic issues. Shin stated that “China began to demand the Yoon government to continue the three policy positions of the previous government, namely, no more deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), no participation in the American missile defense system, and no military alliance among Korea, Japan, and the U.S.” However, the current Foreign Minister Park Jin made it clear to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang that the policy positions of the previous government do not bind the new government, Shin indicated.
 

The Taiwan Contingency

Shin indicated the precarious nature of the contingency, stating, “South Korea has no intention of challenging the One China claim. However, the peace and stability of Taiwan Strait are also very important for South Korea, as the security situation of the Taiwan Strait is connected to the Korean peninsula.” Indeed, a military collision in the Taiwan Strait would be impossible to contain locally. “The U.S. and Japan are supposed to immediately help Taiwan to repel China’s military attack, and American bases are located in South Korea and Japan, including Okinawa,” he said.

Therefore, military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is likely to escalate to Northeast Asia, and a certain portion of American forces in South Korea could move to the Taiwan Strait in the contingency according to the strategic flexibility of forces, “which might induce North Korea's misjudgment to invade South Korea,” Shin predicted.
 

Looking to National Identity

The Cost of Deterrence

Preventing Overextension

Overextension represents one of the largest limits on U.S. power projection. According to Mastro, one of the primary reasons that the Biden administration has not been talking about North Korea significantly, is the fact that the U.S. cannot fight a war on the Korean Peninsula and compete effectively with China.

Thus, Mastro proposes that the South Koreans play a greater role in their defense, a topic that comes up with NATO partners and allies in Europe as well. More specifically, Mastro suggests that the U.S. transfer operational command to South Korean forces, and that the South Korean military should allow the U.S. to practice greater strategic flexibility, to use its forces on the Korean Peninsula for operations or contingencies that are off the peninsula. Up until this point, that permission has been denied, but Mastro contends that it would be useful and could enhance deterrence. 

“If the South Koreans, along with their statements about wanting a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, also explicitly allowed for that strategic flexibility to take place to say that they understand that the role of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula is primarily to deter and defend South Korea against North Korea, that could also play a potential role in wider contingencies,” she said.

Furthermore, Mastro believes that South Korea must play a greater role in the production and provision of certain types of munitions. “This is an area where the U.S. has struggled with its own manufacturing base that is considering licensing production and potentially doing it elsewhere. So the question is whether the U.S. could count on South Korea for some critical supplies during a conflict that could reduce the U.S. logistical burden,” she speculated.

South Korea is a small country, and it has limited resources, but it also has the second-largest reserve force and paramilitary force in the world, and the eighth-largest active duty force in the world. According to Mastro, “The South Korean military is technically 20 times larger than that of Japan's…it has punched above its own weight, like the Australian military has.”

It remains to be seen whether the U.S.-South Korea alliance will need to be tested in the coming years, but tensions with China will likely continue to define the two nation’s foreign policies. A potential Taiwan contingency remains one of the largest looming threats to the status quo and the most probable pathway to regional escalation, which, in Shin’s view, could draw North Korea and its nuclear arsenal into the fold.

The Payne Lectureship will return in the spring quarter, continuing with the theme of Asian perspectives on the U.S.-China relationship. We will be joined by Kokubun Ryosei, professor emeritus at Keio University and adjunct adviser at the Fujitsu Future Studies Center.

This article first appeared in The Diplomat magazine.

U.S. President Joe Biden will first meet new South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol in Seoul on May 21. It will be an important meeting for both leaders – not only to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance but also to collaborate on a range of pressing issues, from North Korea to the Russia-Ukraine War to the protection of liberal democracy. The summit, to be held just 11 days after Yoon was inaugurated as president, will be his debut as a political leader on the international stage. Unlike political veteran Biden, Yoon formally entered politics only last summer and has yet to develop a policy track record. What should we expect from the new South Korean president at this first summit?

During the hotly contested campaign, Yoon’s opponents criticized him as South Korea’s Donald Trump. Western media and pundits also tended to portray him in a similar vein as an “anti-feminist political novice” with a “Trump-style brand of very divisive identity politics.” To be sure, he is not a conventional democratic leader who values negotiation and compromise; he envisions a strong South Korea that can stand up to China and North Korea, echoing Trump’s “America First.” Yet such a characterization risks setting off a false alarm that can badly mislead the United States and other allies in how they approach his administration.

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First and foremost, Yoon is not a “political outsider” in the same sense as Trump. While Yoon, unlike every South Korean president since democratization, has no legislative experience in the National Assembly, he served as prosecutor-general during the Moon Jae-in administration, a leadership position often requiring sound political judgment as well as legal expertise. Yoon built his reputation as a fierce fighter against abuse of power and corruption, shifting public opinion in his favor. This degree of legal, policy, and political experience is a far cry from starring on “The Apprentice.”

Crucially, Yoon curried strong support among conservatives, successfully mobilizing diverse factions to create an anti-Moon coalition and win the election, similar to Biden’s victory in the 2020 election. Whereas the Trump administration was filled with individuals offering only limited policy experience, and many critical appointed positions were left vacant, Yoon is supported by the seasoned conservative establishment joining his administration. In this respect, Yoon recalls George W. Bush, whose first formal foray into Washington politics came after serving as governor of Texas and who relied on the close network of the Republican establishment, such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, for policy and political guidance.

Yoon’s key cabinet and presidential office nominees are well-known figures with extensive policy backgrounds. New Unification Minister Kwon Young-se is a four-time member of the National Assembly and served as Seoul’s envoy to Beijing during the Park Geun-hye administration. Yoon’s national security advisor, Kim Sung-han, is a professor at Korea University who served as the vice minister of foreign affairs and trade during the Lee Myung-bak administration. Yoon is also supported by a powerful group of South Korean elites who attended Seoul National’s law school, his alma mater. Such heavy reliance on experienced hands of the conservative establishment reduces uncertainty for the Biden administration.

Yoon is expected to adopt a largely conventional conservative stance on major policy issues, both domestic and foreign. His economic policy is likely to be market-led and minimize state intervention, replacing Moon’s policies such as “income-driven growth” that Korean conservatives branded as socialist. On foreign policy, Yoon seeks to strengthen the U.S. alliance and restore relations with Japan, which, under Moon, were the most precarious they have been since the normalization of relations in 1965.

It is noteworthy that, as president-elect, Yoon sent his special delegation to the United States and Japan followed by the European Union, but not to China and Russia, departing from past precedent. Yoon is expected to take a firm stance against Beijing and Pyongyang rather than embrace appeasement.

At the upcoming summit, Yoon will have the opportunity to assure global audiences that he is not South Korea’s Trump but a reliable partner of the United States and other allies with shared democratic values. In his inaugural speech, he repeatedly stressed the importance of “freedom” to clearly signal his resolve to protect liberal democracy both at home and abroad. This is great news for Biden, who badly needs support from allies like South Korea in his fight against global autocracy.

Just as Yoon will be tested, the summit presents a chance for Biden to demonstrate he is prepared to work closely together with the new South Korean president, overcoming the concerns unearthed during his campaign, in order to bolster the alliance and democracy.

This essay was originally published in Foreign Affairs magazine.

This is a welcome development for Beijing. Chinese analysts view South Korea as a weak link in the United States’ East Asian alliances, and Beijing is trying to divide Washington and Seoul through a combination of compliments and threats. In August 2020, Chinese media praised South Korea’s efforts to "be objective and keep its friendship with China," and several weeks later, Chinese scholars commended South Korea’s “kindness to China” in a time of “U.S. suppression.” But after South Korean President Moon Jae-in discussed Taiwan with Biden at their May 2021 summit, China’s Foreign Ministry warned South Korea not to “play with fire.” It is telling that Chinese scholars at a government-affiliated institute are arguing openly that China needs to raise the cost of South Korea’s cooperation with the United States on Taiwan.

North Korea’s missile capabilities are helping accomplish this task. The newer rockets more effectively threaten South Korea, and they increase Seoul’s doubts about the efficacy of U.S. deterrence. North Korea has explicitly tied its menacing assets to the issues surrounding the island. Pyongyang has publicly criticized the United States policies’ on Taiwan and threatened that “tragic consequences” will result from U.S. support. “The indiscreet meddling by the U.S. into the issue of Taiwan entails a potential danger of touching off a delicate situation on the Korean peninsula,” North Korea’s vice foreign minister said in a statement. These words could make Seoul think twice about backing the United States in the Taiwan Strait.

Japan is more difficult to split from Washington. But North Korea’s activities can certainly draw some of Japan’s attention away from Beijing. Although Tokyo was getting onboard with playing a greater role in deterring China and defending Taiwan, Japan’s Ministry of Defense has identified North Korea’s military capabilities as a “grave and imminent” threat, and there is no doubt that the government’s focus will shift if Pyongyang escalates its provocations. In the White House’s statement regarding Biden’s January 21 meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, Taiwan was mentioned only once. In comparison, the two leaders cited North Korea three times, condemned the country’s recent missile tests, and committed to work with South Korea more closely. Although Tokyo could theoretically focus on both North Korea and China, in practice it might struggle. Pyongyang poses a far more direct threat to Japanese lives and territory than does Beijing, and it would be hard for Japanese leaders to concentrate on China if North Korea grows more belligerent.

Drawing the Heat

North Korea’s new capabilities don’t help Beijing just diplomatically. The tests provide tangible, military benefits. The United States has been attempting to enlist South Korea in its efforts to strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. But Pyongyang’s new missiles mean Seoul is less likely to focus its military somewhere other than North Korea, especially if it continues the provocations. Indeed, a South Korean expert on Chinese politics has argued that when Washington asks for support in its contest with Beijing, Seoul should explain that it is too busy handling Pyongyang.

To reassure its allies, the United States may also need to refocus military attention on the Korean Peninsula, reducing its ability to operate in other parts of Asia. In 2017, when North Korea conducted ICBM and nuclear tests, the United States responded by sending more strategic assets, including heavy naval power, near the Korean Peninsula. If tensions rise high enough, Washington may have to do so again, including by shifting the Seventh Fleet’s operational focus to the area. Stationed in the middle of Japan, this fleet has been one of the United States’ primary tools for deterring Beijing, conducting patrols near the Taiwan Strait and promoting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. But given past positioning patterns, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula would also most certainly drag the fleet farther north, undermining Washington’s ability to carry out operations elsewhere.

A major war on the Korean Peninsula would prove particularly devastating to the United States’ competition with Beijing. In addition to the Seventh Fleet, the United States Forces Korea’s 28,000 soldiers, 40 F-16 fighters, 90 military aircrafts, 40 attack helicopters, and other assets would immediately become unavailable for operations beyond the peninsula. A majority of the United States Forces Japan’s aircraft, ships, and approximately 55,000 military personnel would also be deployed to Korea. Japan’s own military, which could help the United States if it needed to fight China, would grow busy providing combat support to protect U.S. naval forces—including antisubmarine operations and sea minesweeping—as U.S. troops prepared for an amphibious landing on the peninsula.

Beijing, by comparison, is in a better position. The United States has to worry that China will use a North Korea–spurred crisis to invade Taiwan, but the inverse isn’t true: Beijing isn’t concerned that Seoul or Washington will start a war over Taiwan if Pyongyang launches an attack. China’s commitment to North Korea is also not as comprehensive as the United States’ is to Seoul. In the event of a renewed Korean war, China plans to send mostly ground forces into the North. Its air and naval assets would remain focused across the Taiwan Strait.

For China, therefore, a crisis on the peninsula—especially one that evolves into a conflict—would be a golden opportunity to expand its power. It may even make it possible to defeat Taipei. With U.S. intelligence assets supporting troops in Korea, a Chinese amphibious force might be able to move on the island without giving the United States advanced warning. China could establish beachheads on Taiwan long before U.S. forces, bogged down on the peninsula, have time to arrive. The war’s eventual outcome would be a fait accompli.

North Korea’s latest tests may have already made a Chinese attack more likely. As Chinese media happily pointed out, Pyongyang’s January 11 missile launch briefly confused the United States Northern Command’s warning system, grounding some commercial airplanes for 15 minutes. China has the most advanced ballistic and cruise missile program in the world. If North Korea’s offensive strike capability can jeopardize the U.S. early warning system, it surely bodes well for Beijing’s ability to surprise and defeat Washington’s forces.

Better Together

To counter North Korea’s new missile threats and prevent them from helping China, the Biden administration needs a stronger North Korea strategy—one that deters further provocations, reassures South Korea, and demonstrates Washington’s continued resolve and credibility to Beijing. That means Washington must support South Korea’s efforts to advance its offensive capabilities, such as the development of nuclear-powered submarines. South Korea, meanwhile, must scale up its combined exercises with the United States. A stronger U.S.–South Korean alliance will improve the two countries’ combat readiness, which is especially critical at a time when North Korea appears to be building up to another round of ICBM and nuclear tests. Finally, closer ties would make it easier for the United States to marshal allies in its competition against China, including in the Taiwan Strait.

The United States should also use the renewed tensions on the Korean Peninsula to encourage closer Japanese–South Korean cooperation. Seoul has long had highly fraught relations with its former colonial ruler, and the two states have especially struggled to get along in recent years. But for better or worse, the Korean Peninsula, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait are increasingly intertwined in the current era of strategic competition. Pyongyang's provocations against the United States and its allies on the peninsula can embolden the Chinese Communist Party to act in other regions. And if Beijing can weaken or defeat the United States and its Asian allies anywhere, both the Chinese Communist Party and the Kim regime will be emboldened to act on the peninsula. To cope with this changing security environment, it makes sense for strategists in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to package these issues together. By demonstrating greater coordination, the three countries would also make it harder for China or North Korea to fracture Washington’s East Asia alliances, regardless of the contingency.

Finally, these three states must prepare for simultaneous provocations in East Asia, including concurrent conflicts in Taiwan and on the Korean Peninsula. In consultation with one another, the United States and its allies must demonstrate a strong willingness to cooperate and take strategic risks. They should hold more trilateral defense minister meetings, more thoroughly review various contingency scenarios, and discuss how to enhance their combined capabilities. Hopefully, these countries will never need to put these plans and abilities into practice. But to deter Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, they need to prove that they can fight two wars—and win both—if the need arises.

Despite the coronavirus pandemic, North Korea continues to carry out weapons testing and to declare that not a single COVID-19 patient has emerged in the country. Analysts and medical experts, however, are highly skeptical of Pyongyang’s claims. A coronavirus outbreak would overwhelm the North’s weak healthcare system and would be devastating to its people, who suffer from relatively high levels of malnutrition and have no access to information about the pandemic.   

North Korea is one of the worst human rights violators in modern history. In February 2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council published the landmark Report of the Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, a comprehensive account of human rights abuses committed by the authoritarian country’s leadership against its people. It was seen as a major milestone in the effort to shine a light on the gravity and scope of the problem and to hold the perpetrators accountable by bringing them before the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.

Over the past three years, however, the momentum for action on the report’s recommendations has faded and the human rights issue has been largely viewed as less serious a concern than the regional and global security threat posed by the North Korean nuclear program and long-range missiles.

Coinciding with the sixth anniversary of the COI report, it was the goal of the Korea Program’s twelfth annual Koret Workshop to regenerate awareness of the role of human rights in policy toward North Korea by gathering experts at Stanford to discuss the topic and generate concrete recommendations for action. In this post, we share highlights from select presentations prepared for this workshop that was canceled due to the COVID-19 crisis.

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Human Rights and Denuclearization

As the Trump administration shifted from a “war of words” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to prioritizing summit diplomacy, the focus on the human rights problem receded and many stakeholders, both within and outside the administration, preferred to play it down so as not to jeopardize the negotiation over a denuclearization agreement.

Yet the irony, argues Asian affairs and security expert Victor Cha, is that the denuclearization and human rights agendas are inextricably intertwined. “Human rights is an integral and unavoidable component of a comprehensive North Korea strategy,” he says. Cha, professor of government and holder of the D.S. Song-KF Chair in Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, joined APARC as the Koret Fellow in Korean Studies for the winter quarter of 2020.

Cha notes that revenues gained from forced labor exports and other human rights abuses help the Kim regime finance its proliferation activities. Furthermore, improvements in the country’s human rights condition would reflect the leadership’s commitment to reform and make a denuclearization commitment by the DPRK more credible. The United States, claims Cha, must take actionable steps to include the human rights issue in bilateral relations with Pyongyang: establish a rights-first approach in future negotiations, resume humanitarian assistance, and fill the position of a Special Envoy for Human Rights as mandated by the Congress.

Watch Professor Cha discuss these issues in our recent virtual Q&A:

Tae-Ung Baik, professor of Law and director of the Center for Korean Studies at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, calls for a step-by-step approach, advancing small, concrete changes that will have a cumulative effect toward better protection of the rights of the people of North Korea. For example, cooperation and consultation on human rights protection should be exerted to promote reform in specific areas such as the North Korean judicial and criminal justice systems.

Ambassador Robert King, who served as a special envoy for North Korean human rights issues at the U.S. Department of State in the Obama administration, also stresses that addressing the human rights problem is essential to making progress toward denuclearization and security goals. King argues that North Korea must accept international norms and standards for denuclearization, but its acceptance of international human rights standards is necessary if it is to win international legitimacy.

Listen to highlights from King’s talk at the Korea Program’s seminar, which he delivered in the fall quarter of 2019 while being affiliated with APARC as the Koret Fellow in Korean Studies:

Freedom of Information

Although the human rights condition in North Korea has not improved, the information landscape in the country has changed significantly over the past quarter-century. Nat Kretchun, deputy director of the Open Technology Fund, describes the transformation as “trending up from an extremely low base toward greater openness and access before, more recently, retrenching.”

In the years following the famine of the mid-1990s, information flowed into the country like never before, exposing North Korean citizens to a range of new content via an array of non-networked technologies, including information from China, South Korean entertainment media, radio broadcasts from NGOs, and outside broadcasts by Voice of America and Radio Free Asia. As they regained some measure of economic stability, however, the North Korean authorities began to reestablish control over information flows. The recent available data demonstrates that access to information is falling off and the era of more socially normalized consumption of outside information is over, says Kretchun. “The government has begun implementing a far more technologically savvy information control strategy than it previously had the capacity to do […in an] effort to move communications and media consumption onto state-controlled networks via state-controlled devices.”

Indeed, Martyn Williams, a veteran watcher of North Korea’s information technology sector, shows that, while the digitization of media was the catalyst that led to the mass spread of foreign content across the country, so too has the same technology been employed to help the government combat it. For example, every Android tablet and smartphone in North Korea logs every page a person visits with the web browser and randomly takes screenshots during his/her use of the device. Users are allowed to see this database of collected screenshots but cannot delete them. “The system is sinister in its simplicity. It reminds users that everything they do on the device can be recorded and later viewed by officials […] it insidiously forces North Koreans to self-censor in fear of a device check that might never happen.”

Furthermore, the security software pre-loaded onto North Korean phones and computers cannot be replaced and the state’s digital certificate system makes mobile devices little more than consumption tools for state propaganda and personal memories. “While digital technology has created new pathways for foreign content, the increased networking of products could work against information freedom and eventually lead to the creation of an even more Orwellian society,” concludes Williams.

Minjung Kim, director of the South Korean NGO Save North Korea, emphasizes that a key to addressing the human rights problem in the country lies in discrediting the regime’s ideology in the minds of the North Korean people. It is, therefore, necessary to further produce and deliver content that educates citizens on how the regime shapes and manipulates ideology.

The Role of the United Nations

The Kim Jong Un regime responded to the 2014 COI report with outrage and denunciation, and Pyongyang has continued to refuse to cooperate with UN Special Rapporteurs.

For three consecutive years following the publication of the report, the UN Security Council returned to consider the North Korean human rights record. Since 2018, however, the issue has not been placed back on the Security Council agenda, while the U.S.-DPRK summit denuclearization diplomacy has not included a single statement regarding improving the lives of North Korea’s people.

The North Korean human rights problem has long been subject to political debates. Still, claims Joon Oh, former ambassador of South Korea to the UN and former president of the UN Economic and Social Council, future efforts can focus on helping the North Korean people realize economic and social rights, as these do not necessitate political reforms that threaten the regime. The challenge here, though, Oh recognizes, is that such efforts require technical cooperation and humanitarian assistance, which, in turn, have been narrowed down since the UN security council imposed sanctions on North Korea in 2017 for its nuclear and ballistic missile development.

Former Justice of the High Court of Australia Michael Kirby, the chair of the COI report, who has argued that there will never be peace on the Korean peninsula as long as there are grave human rights abuses occurring in North Korea, claims that “When a state is unwilling or unable to halt or avert [mass atrocity crimes], the wider international community has a collective responsibility to take whatever action is necessary. […] It is not acceptable simply to wring our hands and cry ‘never again.’ Action must be taken, however difficult and even dangerous is the path of pursuing such action can sometimes be.”

Granted, the international community must urgently reduce and eliminate the dangers posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles. However, says Kirby, turning a blind eye to human rights crimes because their mention will upset those who are alleged to have committed them or permitted them to be committed in their name is neither a rational nor a just response.

North Korea continues to declare that it has not had a single case of COVID-19, but health experts find it inconceivable that the infectious disease would not be in the country given its proximity to China and South Korea, two early victims of the pandemic. A coronavirus outbreak in the North could be devastating, says Asian affairs and security expert Victor Cha, as it would act on an extremely vulnerable population with already-compromised immune systems and outdated health care infrastructure.

Cha, professor of government and holder of the D.S. Song-KF Chair in Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University, has joined Shorenstein APARC as the Koret Fellow in Korean Studies for the winter quarter of 2020. He spoke with APARC via videoconferencing about the threat of COVID-19 to North Korea, the deadlock in the diplomacy of denuclearization, and the North Korean human rights problem.

COVID-19 or not, the Kim regime has recently stepped up again its weapons testing. The North typically resorts to missile tests, notes Cha, in periods of non-dialogue with the United States, and the data also shows that North Korea will bolster weapons testing before and after U.S. presidential elections.

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What is to be done about engagement with the North? Cha believes that any new U.S. administration should prioritize three areas: first, focus not only on North Korea’s nuclear program but also on its ballistic missile delivery capability; second, enable the flow of humanitarian assistance into the country; and third, genuinely work with our allies and partners in the region, “who have tended to be neglected lately and seen in largely transactional terms.”

While at Stanford, Cha has been researching a project that he calls “Binary Choices” and that examines how U.S. allies and partners in Asia react when they are forced to choose between the United States and China over various issues. Regardless of how one feels about the U.S.-China trade war, Cha concludes, the question is if we are “calculating the other externalities, in terms of how our allies make choices, into our net assessment of whether a policy towards China is working or not.”

Watch the Q&A with Cha above or on our YouTube channel:

The recent escalation of diplomatic and trade disputes between South Korea and Japan has alarmed numerous observers and is rather confusing to many around the world to whom the two countries seem to have much to lose and little to gain by the deterioration of the bilateral relationship. What underlying forces are driving the conflict? Are these new forces, or the same historical forces coming to a head? How much are factors from the international environment, such as the behavior of the United States, influencing the current escalation?

These were some of the questions that took center stage at a recent conference, “Japan and South Korea on the Brink: Escalating Friction Amidst an Uncertain World,” convened jointly by APARC’s Japan Program and Korea Program. The conference brought together experts in the international affairs and trade relations of South Korea, Japan, and the United States to shed light into the current conflict between the two U.S. allies. 

In his welcome remarks, APARC Director and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin reminded the audience that Japan and South Korea have experienced tensions over colonial and wartime history and hence, in that sense, the recent conflict is nothing new. In the past, however, the tensions were mostly kept under control because the two countries well understood that it was in their mutual interest to maintain a cooperative relationship and keep history issues separate from other important economic and security issues. Over the past year, however, tensions over history have permeated economic and security issues amid rising nationalism in both countries.

A Problem of Alliance Management

The conference opened with a panel on diplomacy and international relations. Kak-Soo Shin, former Korean ambassador to Japan, situated the current crisis in the context of the regional strategy environment, noting that the Northern triangle – composed of North Korea, China, and Russia – has been gaining influence, while the Southern triangle – composed of South Korea, Japan, and the United States – has weakened. “The souring Japan-Korea relationship is a big blow to the maintenance of the Southern triangle and its ability to cope with the volatile security environment in Northeast Asia,” Shin cautioned.

Hitoshi Tanaka, chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, ltd., offered an overview of the reasons underlying the escalation in the bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea, foremost of which, he said, is the declining mutual importance of the two nations to each other vis-à-vis China’s emergence as their largest trade partner. “Unless we feel that the future relationship is essential to both nations there is no way to address the conflict,” he said.

Joseph Yun, former deputy assistant secretary of state for Korea and Japan and former special representative on North Korea, emphasized that Tokyo and Seoul are “eroding the trilateral security arrangement that the United States has led in Northeast Asia since the end of the Second World War” – an arrangement that has been responsible for prosperity throughout Northeast Asia. The root problem, he argued, is alliance management, from which the United States “has been conspicuously absent.”

Watch the panel:

A Conflict in an Age of Changing Global Trade Order

The second panel turned eyes to the trade issues involved in the conflict between Japan and South Korea. Professor Yukiko Fukagawa of the School of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University, an expert in Korean economic development, observed that the friction between the two countries has escalated since 2000, when Korean global businesses like Hyundai and Samsung rose to fame. Since then, she argued, what has happened in Korea is a process of economic nationalism and “Korea seems to find it or interpret it as a kind of transitional justice against Japan.”

Seokyoung Choi, former Korean ambassador to the WTO and UN and former deputy minister for trade, explained the background for the Japan-Korea trade row and each side’s arguments. As a way forward, he said, both countries must consider several important imperatives, including the needs to cooperate in an era of tectonic changes to the global trade order, to address expanding fault lines in East Asia given the spillover effects of the U.S.-China trade war, and to complement for deficits of leadership and trust in Northeast Asia. 

Aiko Lane, executive director of the U.S.-Japan Business Council, discussed the main concerns the Japan-Korea friction poses for U.S. businesses, including regulatory uncertainty, supply chain disruptions, and delays in shipment. Further escalation in the relationship, she argued, could potentially inflict long-term damage to the regional ICT and manufacturing industries. Potential impacts include driving costs up for consumers and making it more lucrative for other countries to supply semiconductor materials to Korea.

Watch the panel: