Ideas, issues and interests in U.S.-Asia relations
As the U.S. presidential election swiftly approaches, many wonder what policy approach the next president - be it Barack Obama or Mitt Romney - will take with regard to China. Thomas Fingar, FSI’s Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, considers how the outcome of the election could impact U.S.-China relations, and how the United States could focus its priorities in Asia.
Q. How does China see a Mitt Romney presidency?
Fingar: Conventional wisdom about China has long held that Beijing prefers Republicans to Democrats, primarily because Republicans are thought to be more interested in trade and less concerned about human rights. I'm not sure that particular characterization of Beijing's views was ever correct, but to the extent that it was, it is of decreasing importance and almost entirely absent now. The Chinese have been anxious about Governor Romney’s positions on China during the campaign, seeing his statements as excessive or unjustifiably critical and indicative of a determination to contain or constrain China's economic rise.
Beijing has expressed concern that Romney intends to act in ways that threaten China's continued rapid economic growth and undermine the communist-led regime. Such concerns were likely alleviated during the final debate when Romney said he views China as a potential partner, not an adversary. However, the Chinese will likely assume that Romney's call for more defense spending is aimed at containing China, since the United States’ only other declared security threat is Iran.
Q. Romney says he would label China a currency manipulator on “day one” of his presidency. Do presidents have the power to do such a thing? Could this trigger a trade war?
Fingar: Presidents can certainly announce rhetorical positions, but it is highly unlikely that such a declaration would lead to actions that could trigger a trade war. It could launch a political and bureaucratic process in which advocates with competing objectives and strategies would seek to fashion policy adjustments in order to achieve them. It would not, however, lead automatically to actions that would damage a relationship in which Americans, as well as the Chinese, have an enormously important stake.
Q. What positive or problematic developments could impact U.S.-China relations if Obama wins a second term?
Fingar: I anticipate many issues and problems, but no crises. The foundation for the relationship – interdependence and mutual benefit – is strong and growing stronger. That said, what happens in China will be important to the United States and command presidential attention. If China's economy continues to slow, it will slow recovery of the U.S. economy, both directly and by reducing Chinese purchases and sales to and from third countries that use earnings from sales to China to purchase goods and services from the United States. Continued deferral of resolving territorial disputes in the Sea of Japan and South China Sea will exacerbate perceptions that the United States should serve as a counterbalance to China, complicating U.S.-China relations. Another issue sure to be on the table is Chinese failure to honor World Trade Organization and intellectual property rights commitments.
Q. Obama’s rhetoric on China has become increasingly aggressive. Do you anticipate a tougher stand toward China if he is re-elected?
Fingar: Nothing that President Obama has said during the campaign suggests to me that he would make significant changes to U.S. policy toward China if he were re-elected. It would be a mistake to read too much into the number of times China is mentioned relative to other countries, as “China” is often used as a proxy for all foreign economic competition and the effects of globalization. Beijing should not take this personally; this is part of the price of becoming the world’s second-largest economy and having the biggest trade deficit with the United States. Far more important than such rhetoric are Obama’s and Romney’s references to seeking a partnership with China and the need for China to “play by the rules” with respect to WTO commitments, intellectual property rights and the treatment of foreign firms operating in China. I am confident Obama has no desire to make China into an enemy and no intention to contain or constrain China’s “rise.”
Q. Some doubt the Pentagon has the resources to deter Iran while pivoting to Asia. Which is more urgent for the new administration?
Fingar: The United States continues to have enormous military capabilities. Moreover, it counts as allies and partners most other major nations and military powers. Iran knows that, but threats to use military force are not likely to persuade Tehran to abandon the potential to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, such threats would likely bolster the arguments of people who claim Iran needs nuclear weapons to deter stronger and hostile adversaries. Diplomacy, backed by international sanctions, and enlightened Iranian self-interest offer a far better path to deterring Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Q. Do you expect the so-called Asia pivot to continue under the foreign policy team of the incoming president?
Fingar: East Asia is the most dynamic region in the world and the United States has many important interests and ties there. We are a Pacific power and a Pacific player and must remain heavily engaged in the region. The “pivot” toward Asia is a misnomer because it implies that we left and are now returning. We never left and never will. The “rebalancing” toward Asia is intended to reduce uncertainty about American intentions and to help prolong the period of peace and stability that has been critical to the achievement of prosperity and interdependence in the region. I hope the new administration, whoever wins, will redouble efforts to build a new, inclusive security arrangement for the region.
President Obama and Mitt Romney meet for their third debate to discuss foreign policy on Monday, when moderator Bob Schieffer is sure to ask them about last month's terrorist attack in Libya and the nuclear capabilities of Iran.
In anticipation of the final match between the presidential candidates, researchers from five centers at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies ask the additional questions they want answered and explain what voters should keep in mind.
What can we learn from the Arab Spring about how to balance our values and our interests when people in authoritarian regimes rise up to demand freedom?
What to listen for: First, the candidates should address whether they believe the U.S. has a moral obligation to support other peoples’ aspirations for freedom and democracy. Second, they need to say how we should respond when longtime allies like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak confront movements for democratic change.
And that leads to more specific questions pertaining to Arab states that the candidates need to answer: What price have we paid in terms of our moral standing in the region by tacitly accepting the savage repression by the monarchy in Bahrain of that country's movement for democracy and human rights? How much would they risk in terms of our strategic relationship with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia by denouncing and seeking to restrain this repression? What human rights and humanitarian obligations do we have in the Syrian crisis? And do we have a national interest in taking more concrete steps to assist the Syrian resistance? On the other hand, how can we assist the resistance in a way that does not empower Islamist extremists or draw us into another regional war?
Look for how the candidates will wrestle with difficult trade-offs, and whether either will rise above the partisan debate to recognize the enduring bipartisan commitment in the Congress to supporting democratic development abroad. And watch for some sign of where they stand on the spectrum between “idealism” and “realism” in American foreign policy. Will they see that pressing Arab states to move in the direction of democracy, and supporting other efforts around the world to build and sustain democracy, is positioning the United States on “the right side of history”?
~Larry Diamond, director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
What do you consider to be the greatest threats our country faces, and how would you address them in an environment of profound partisan divisions and tightly constrained budgets?
What to listen for: History teaches that some of the most effective presidential administrations understand America's external challenges but also recognize the interdependence between America's place in the world and its domestic situation.
Accordingly, Americans should expect their president to be deeply knowledgeable about the United States and its larger global context, but also possessed of the vision and determination to build the country's domestic strength.
The president should understand the threats posed by nuclear proliferation and terrorist organizations. The president should be ready to lead in managing the complex risks Americans face from potential pandemics, global warming, possible cyber attacks on a vulnerable infrastructure, and failing states.
Just as important, the president needs to be capable of leading an often-polarized legislative process and effectively addressing fiscal challenges such as the looming sequestration of budgets for the Department of Defense and other key agencies. The president needs to recognize that America's place in the world is at risk when the vast bulk of middle class students are performing at levels comparable to students in Estonia, Latvia and Bulgaria, and needs to be capable of engaging American citizens fully in addressing these shared domestic and international challenges.
~Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Should our government help American farmers cope with climate impacts on food production, and should this assistance be extended to other countries – particularly poor countries – whose food production is also threatened by climate variability and climate change?
What to listen for: Most representatives in Congress would like to eliminate government handouts, and many would also like to turn away from any discussion of climate change. Yet this year, U.S. taxpayers are set to pay up to $20 billion to farmers for crop insurance after extreme drought and heat conditions damaged yields in the Midwest.
With the 2012 farm bill stalled in Congress, the candidates need to be clear about whether they support government subsidized crop insurance for American farmers. They should also articulate their views on climate threats to food production in the U.S. and abroad.
Without a substantial crop insurance program, American farmers will face serious risks of income losses and loan defaults. And without foreign assistance for climate adaptation, the number of people going hungry could well exceed 15 percent of the world's population.
~Rosamond L. Naylor, director of the Center on Food Security and the Environment
What is your vision for the United States’ future relationship with Europe?
What to listen for: Between the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, it was the United States and Europe that ensured world peace. But in recent years, it seems that “Europe” and “European” have become pejoratives in American political discourse. There’s been an uneasiness over whether we’re still friends and whether we still need each other. But of course we do.
Europe and the European Union share with the United States of America the most fundamental values, such as individual freedom, freedom of speech, freedom to live and work where you choose. There’s a shared respect of basic human rights. There are big differences with the Chinese, and big differences with the Russians. When you look around, it’s really the U.S. and Europe together with robust democracies such as Canada and Australia that have the strongest sense of shared values.
So the candidates should talk about what they would do as president to make sure those values are preserved and protected and how they would make the cooperation between the U.S. and Europe more effective and substantive as the world is confronting so many challenges like international terrorism, cyber security threats, human rights abuses, underdevelopment and bad governance.
~Amir Eshel, director of The Europe Center
Historical and territorial issues are bedeviling relations in East Asia, particularly among Japan, China, South Korea, and Southeast Asian countries. What should the United States do to try to reduce tensions and resolve these issues?
What to listen for: Far from easing as time passes, unresolved historical, territorial, and maritime issues in East Asia have worsened over the past few years. There have been naval clashes, major demonstrations, assaults on individuals, economic boycotts, and harsh diplomatic exchanges. If the present trend continues, military clashes – possibly involving American allies – are possible.
All of the issues are rooted in history. Many stem from Imperial Japan’s aggression a century ago, and some derive from China’s more assertive behavior toward its neighbors as it continues its dramatic economic and military growth. But almost all of problems are related in some way or another to decisions that the United States took—or did not take—in its leadership of the postwar settlement with Japan.
The United States’ response to the worsening situation so far has been to declare a strategic “rebalancing” toward East Asia, aimed largely at maintaining its military presence in the region during a time of increasing fiscal constraint at home. Meanwhile, the historic roots of the controversies go unaddressed.
The United States should no longer assume that the regional tensions will ease by themselves and rely on its military presence to manage the situation. It should conduct a major policy review, aimed at using its influence creatively and to the maximum to resolve the historical issues that threaten peace in the present day.
~David Straub, associate director of the Korea Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorentein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Compiled by Adam Gorlick.
Certain East Asian territorial disputes have simmered, unresolved, since the arrangements concluding the Second World War: Japan, China, and Taiwan contest sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu(tai) islands and their surrounding waters; South Korea and Japan both assert a claim to Dokto/Takeshima island (also called Liancourt Rocks); Japan and Russia have not yet signed a formal peace treaty ending the war, mainly because of their continuing dispute regarding sovereignty over the Northern Territories/southern Kuriles; and China, Taiwan and Vietnam plus three other nations assert sovereignty over one or more of the Spratly Island group in the South China Sea. These contending claims arise -- and generate heat -- from conflicting historical memories, national identities, nationalistic impulses, regional power rivalries, and potentially rich economic benefits. China's rising military power and concomitantly more assertive foreign policy posture have added to that volatile mix. The United States was, in a sense, "present at the creation" of the specific postwar arrangements -- that failed adequately to resolve historical issues and left the contested East China Sea islands in a legally uncertain status. The Obama administration's announced "pivot" or "rebalancing" toward Asia was accompanied by public affirmations of enduring U.S. policy interests in Asia and by a call for China to settle its South China Sea disputes through multilateral negotiations. So the U.S. is involved to a greater or lesser degree in each of the contemporary East Asian territorial disputes. Keyser will discuss the U.S. policymaker's perspective on these territorial conflicts including whether the U.S. government can and should play an active role in facilitating resolutions.
Donald W. Keyser retired from the U.S. Department of State in September 2004 after a 32-year career. He had extensive domestic and foreign experience in senior policy positions, conflict resolution, intelligence operations and analysis, and law enforcement programs. His career focused geographically on U.S. policy toward East Asia, particularly China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Fluent in Chinese and professionally conversant in Japanese, Russian and French, he served three tours at the American Embassy in Beijing and two tours at the American Embassy in Tokyo. A Russian language and Soviet/Russian area studies specialist in his undergraduate and early graduate-level work, Keyser served 1998-99 as Special Negotiator and Ambassador for Regional Conflicts in the Former USSR. He is currently a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, U.K.
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The U.S.-Japan relationship is not much in the headlines these days—and when it is the stories seem to focus on issues, such as Okinawa and beef, that have bedeviled ties seemingly for decades. But, in the midst of seismic shifts in Asia-Pacific security and global economic relations, shouldn’t the two countries be talking about something else?
Many in American industry have thought so and in 2009 the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan released a white paper calling for a new set of discussions with Japan directed at capturing the innovation and growth potential of the emerging global Internet economy. Accompanying the call were a set of over 70 specific recommendations for discussion in areas ranging from privacy, security, intellectual property, spectrum management, cyber security to competition—an agenda for the future not the past.
The paper found resonance with the new Democratic Party government in Japan and the Obama administration that were searching for a new direction and vocabulary for U.S.-Japan economic relations and were mindful that partnership with Japan in this area strengthened the U.S. hand in dealing with preemptive attempts elsewhere to define rule of the road for the Internet and “cloud computing.”
The Dialogue was formally launched in the fall of 2010 and its third plenary session is taking place in Washington, D.C. October 16 to 19, 2012. Professor Jim Foster is participating in the Dialogue as a leading member of the U.S. private sector delegation to the talks. He will be coming to Stanford immediately following the joint industry-government meeting on October 18 (the governments will continue in closed-door session through the 19th) and will offer his analysis and insight into the discussions in Washington and their implications for future cooperation between Japan and the U.S. industry in the cloud computing field and for the two governments on challenging issues of broader Internet governance.
Jim Foster is currently a professor in the Graduate School of Media and Governance at Keio University, where he teaches and researches on U.S. foreign policy issues and global Internet policy. He is the co-director of Keio’s Internet and Society Institute. Foster worked as a U.S. diplomat from 1981 to 2006, serving in Japan, Korea, the Philippines and at the U.S. Mission to the EU. He was director for corporate affairs at Microsoft Japan from 2006 to 2011. He is a former vice president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan and a co-author of the ACCJ White Paper on the Internet Economy.
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Min Zin is a Burmese journalist, and a regular contributor to The Foreign Policy’s Transition. He also serves as Burma’s country analyst for several research foundations including Freedom House. He took part in Burma’s democracy movement in 1988 as a high school student activist, and went into hiding in 1989 to avoid arrest by the junta. His underground activist-cum-writer life lasted for nine years until he fled to the Thai-Burma border in August 1997. His writings appear in The Journal of Democracy, The Foreign Policy, The Irrawaddy, The Bangkok Post, Far Eastern Economic Review, Wall Street Journal, and other publications. He is now pursuing a PhD in the political science department at UC Berkeley.
At Stanford University, Diamond is also professor by courtesy of political science and sociology. He teaches courses on comparative democratic development and post-conflict democracy building, and advises many Stanford students. In May 2007, he was named "Teacher of the Year" by the Associated Students of Stanford University for teaching that "transcends political and ideological barriers." At the June 2007 Commencement ceremony, Diamond was honored by Stanford University with the Dinkelspiel Award for Distinctive Contributions to Undergraduate Education. He was cited, inter alia, for fostering dialogue between Jewish and Muslim students; for "his inspired teaching and commitment to undergraduate education; for the example he sets as a scholar and public intellectual, sharing his passion for democratization, peaceful transitions, and the idea that each of us can contribute to making the world a better place; and for helping make Stanford an ideal place for undergraduates."
During the first three months of 2004, Diamond served as a senior adviser on governance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. Since then, he has lectured and written extensively on U.S. policy in Iraq and the wider challenges of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, and was one of the advisors to the Iraq Study Group. His 2005 book, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, was one of the first books to critically analyze America's postwar engagement in Iraq. He has also participated in several working groups on the Middle East. During 2004-5, was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Independent Task Force on United States Policy toward Arab Reform. With Abbas Milani, he coordinates the Hoover Institution Project on Democracy in Iran.
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