Scarborough Shoal, a tiny rocky outcropping and lagoon off the west coast of the Philippines, sits at the center of the latest South China Sea tug-of-war. Protesters took to the streets in Manila on May 11 to criticize China’s support of fishermen who entered the disputed territory a month ago and sparked a yet unresolved naval standoff between the Philippines and China. On May 9, while ships from both sides maneuvered in the area, Manila's secretary of defense assured Filipinos that if Beijing attacked, Washington would come to the country’s defense.  

That expectation had been strengthened in Manila in November 2011 when the visiting American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, referred to the South China Sea as the “West Philippine Sea.” Clinton’s slip of the tongue was not a major diplomatic incident. But some Flipinos saw it as a sign of U.S. support for their government's maritime claims.

Washington’s refusal to side with any of the claimant states had not changed. What had changed was the level of American concern. In the November 2011 issue of Foreign Policy Clinton had defended the idea of a “pivot” toward Asia, meaning a renewed U.S. focus on Asia after a decade of intense military activity in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The term “pivot” has fallen out of favor in Washington, but the Obama administration’s heightened interest in Asia is real and ongoing, says Donald K. Emmerson, director of Stanford’s Southeast Asia Forum. He recently discussed the nuances of what he describes as an important but “lopsided pivot.”

How does the pivot fit into the larger global picture?

In the continuing debate as to whether the United States is in decline, the key question is: relative to what? Certainly, if we compare the situation now with the period immediately after World War II, the United States is less powerful relative to the power of other states. But 1945 ushered in a uniquely unipolar moment in American history. Americans had escaped the physical devastation wreaked on Europe and much of Asia. Germany and Japan lay in ruins. Twenty million Russians were dead. China’s long-running civil war would soon resume. Suddenly America had no credible competitors for global power.

Today? Conventional wisdom holds that Asia has become the center of gravity in the global economy. Yet even if we use purchasing power parity rather than exchange rates to measure the American share of world GDP, that share has only modestly decreased. Meanwhile, China’s remarkable rise may be leveling off. The evidence is less that the United States is in secular decline than that the world is changing in ways to which Americans need to adapt if they are to regain economic health. If the pivot facilitates that adaptation, it will have been a success.

Do you interpret the pivot to the Asia-Pacific as more hype or reality?

The pivot is definitely a reality, but the reality is partly about symbolism and atmospherics. The pivot conveys reassurance, particularly to Southeast Asia, that the United States cares about the Asia-Pacific region and that it is willing to cooperate more than before with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Part of that is simply “showing up”—a willingness to attend ASEAN regional meetings. Another part of the pivot, however, involves raising the American security profile in the region, which has so far strengthened ASEAN’s diplomatic hand in dealing with China’s sweeping claim to the South China Sea.

How has the pivot been received and interpreted in Asia?

Generally speaking, the pivot has been welcomed in Southeast Asia, despite worries that if it becomes an effort to contain China, a Sino-American cold war could result. The specific responses of Southeast Asian governments have differed, however, on a spectrum from passive acquiescence to active support.

In Japan, the rotation of prime ministers in and out of office has understandably focused that country’s politics more on domestic concerns, and the still not fully resolved disposition of U.S. forces on Okinawa has drawn energy from the bilateral relationship.

As a “middle power,” South Korea has been supportive of multilateral frameworks and solutions. Seoul is pleased to see a renewed American interest in working with Asians in multilateral settings such as ASEAN and the East Asia Summit.

China’s response has varied between cool and hostile. The foreign ministry has treated the pivot with some equanimity compared with the hostility of those in the People’s Liberation Army who view increased American involvement in Asia as a threat to Chinese aims and claims, especially regarding the South China Sea. China’s foreign policy is the outcome of contestation between various groups inside the country that do not necessarily see eye to eye on how best to handle the United States.

What do you see as the main implications, repercussions, and complications of the pivot?

The pivot, as Hillary Clinton advertised it in her Foreign Policy article, signals a shift in U.S. priorities away from Iraq and Afghanistan. For a time following the 9/11 attacks on America in 2001, the United States tended either to neglect Southeast Asia or to treat it as a second front in the “war on terror.” Economically, the pivot implies an acknowledgment that if America is to prosper in this century it will have to pay closer attention to Asia as an engine of global economic growth. Diplomatically, the pivot implies that with regard to Asian states, Washington cannot merely manage its relations bilaterally as the hub where their spokes meet, but must cultivate multilateral diplomacy as well. Militarily, the pivot implies that even while the American global force posture is drawn down in some parts of the world, it needs to be upgraded in Asia in response to Asian and American concerns over the terms on which China’s rise will take place.

A major constructive repercussion of the pivot has been the evolution of China’s own diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Previously China had disavowed multilateral diplomacy with Southeast Asians over claims to the South China Sea—a bilateralist strategy that in Southeast Asian eyes resembled an effort to “divide and rule.” America’s willingness to reach out to ASEAN and take part in ASEAN events has helped diplomats in any one Southeast Asian country to resist having to face China alone. Multilateral discussions, involving China and meant to prepare the way toward an eventual Code of Conduct, are now underway.

But as we saw recently during Hillary Clinton’s visit to the Philippines, it is important for Washington to maintain its independence and impartiality while facilitating peace in the region.

Complications? Yes, there is a danger that Washington could be dragged into supporting, or appearing to support, the claims of one of the Southeast Asian parties to the dispute. The Obama administration is aware of this risk, however, and I strongly doubt that an American official will again refer to the “West Philippine Sea.” 

A more serious complication in the longer run may arise from the pivot’s emphasis to date on Asian-Pacific security, and its relative lack of attention to creating and cultivating American economic opportunities in Asia.

China’s economic footprint in Asia is large and growing. It has moved up to become the main trading partner of many countries that used to trade proportionally more with the United States. An unbalanced relationship in which China saves and lends what Americans borrow and spend is unhealthy for both countries, and it cannot last. The pivot should forestall an invidious division of labor whereby Washington through the Seventh Fleet subsidizes the regional peace that enables Asians to prosper doing business with China. A higher priority needs to be placed on promoting American trade and investment in Asia, including China.

The Obama administration is hoping to persuade more Asian economies to join an arrangement called the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), but the bar that it sets is high. The TPP’s strict protections for the environment, labor, and intellectual property rights and its comprehensive cuts in both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade have raised its quality but lowered its appeal, especially to the region’s larger economies. Meanwhile, anticipated cuts in American budgets for defense will only intensify the need to refocus the pivot on economic as well as military access to Asia.

Related Resources

Foreign Policy: “America’s Pacific Century”
November 2011 article by Hillary Clinton introducing the concept of the "Asia pivot."

Stanford Daily: "Obama pivots policy toward Asia"
Summary of Donald K. Emmerson's May 1, 2012 talk.

LinkAsia: "Treat Scarborough Shoal Incident as a 'Wake Up Call'"

What do running a business and flying an airplane have in common?

“Starting a business is like takeoff and cruising,” says Yasunori Kakemizu, a Corporate Affiliates Visiting Fellow at Stanford’s Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC). “But exiting from it is very difficult—like landing—because you need to try to make a profit.” 

Kakemizu should know. He has spent over a decade promoting business development at Japan’s Sumitomo Corporation and its affiliate company Jupiter Telecommunications (J:COM). He is also currently training in his free time for his pilot’s license.

Assistant to the general manager of the Cable TV Department in Sumitomo’s Media Division, Kakemizu has spent the past year at Stanford studying the strategies of major American cable companies in adapting to industry changes like the rise of online streaming media. He has examined, for example, the launch of Comcast’s Xfinity streaming service, and how the company has successfully grown it into a profitable part of its business.

“I’m looking for lessons J:COM and other affiliates can use in the next steps of their own streaming services, which is still relatively new in Japan,” Kakemizu says.

Kakemizu is also taking advantage of Stanford’s close ties to Silicon Valley by attending entrepreneurship seminars and enrolling in classes like cloud computing and investment finance. He is fascinated by the opportunities Stanford students have to work on projects with Silicon Valley companies, and the important role Stanford plays in the regional and global business world.

“This university gathers people from around the world and educates them on how to create new companies,” he says. “They then transmit this knowledge globally.”

During the academic year, Kakemizu has enjoyed taking part in the Corporate Affiliates Program site visits to cutting-edge local tech companies, such as Facebook. He found the visit to Cypress Envirosystems, a company that merges digital technology with older HVAC analog technology, especially intriguing.

“Most businesses are ‘forward thinking,’ but they’re focusing on older technologies,” Kakemizu says. “As a result, they don’t have any market competitors. From a business point of view, their strategy is very clever.”

As the academic year winds down, Kakemizu will wrap up his research project and present the results at a seminar. He and the other Visiting Fellows will have a chance to receive feedback and respond to questions from Shorenstein APARC faculty.

Kakemizu will also finish up his pilot’s license training before he returns to Japan. If you hear an airplane flying over campus one day this spring, it might just be him.

“The view of Stanford from the air is very beautiful,” he says.

After stirring international media attention and drawing criticism from its neighbors and the United States, North Korea’s controversial launch of a rocket under the guise of installing an “Earth observation” satellite in orbit took place on Apr. 13.

David Straub, associate director of Stanford’s Korean Studies Program, assesses the likely responses of the United States and other concerned countries, and provides historical context for the actions of North Korea’s leadership.

How is the launch going to impact North Korea’s relations with the United States and other countries?

We have already “been there, done that.” This will be the third North Korean test of a long-range rocket in six years. Shortly after the launches in 2006 and 2009, the North Koreans tested their first nuclear devices. The concern is that they will again use the expected international condemnation of their launch as a pretext for conducting another nuclear test.

But sometimes experience changes perspective. The United States and other countries will want to try to respond to the rocket test in a way that complicates any North Korean effort to justify a new nuclear test.

The international community really cannot remain silent, because United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1874, which was passed in 2009, forbids North Korea from conducting precisely this kind of launch. I anticipate the UNSC will meet to discuss the situation but will not be able to issue a formal resolution. It will probably wind up issuing only a UNSC presidential statement criticizing the launch. China is the main obstacle. It does not approve of North Korea’s activities, but it is more concerned that putting great pressure on North Korea will result in instability. 

The United States, South Korea, and Japan will continue to consult and coordinate closely with one another. They may take additional measures to collect intelligence about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. They may also look to bolster their cooperation on missile defense, and take further steps to restrict North Korea’s access to nuclear- and missile-related materials and technology. They may apply additional economic sanctions to show their disapproval of North Korea’s actions.

Do you think the launch is going make it more difficult for North Korea to conduct trade and obtain aid and development assistance?

North Korea’s behavior now is part and parcel of its behavior over the past several decades. For the North Korean regime, the wellbeing of its people is clearly a secondary priority compared to its own survival.

At least since the end of the cold war, North Korea has faced a dilemma: Open up or fail, or open up and fail. In other words, it needs to open up to receive outside investment and technology if it is ever to have a successful economy. If it does not do that, the regime is unsustainable over the long run. But North Korea’s leaders fear that opening to the outside world would bring down their regime because it will expose the country’s weaknesses to its people. In order to get out of this dilemma, they have reached for weapons of mass destruction—particularly nuclear devices and the missiles they hope eventually can carry them. That is why there is no indication the North Korean leadership is prepared to completely give up those programs, at least on any terms that the United States, Japan, or South Korea could accept.

This is a long-term challenge for the United States and its allies. We have to see the situation for what it is, and deal with it accordingly. That means we must never “accept” North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. As long as North Korea maintains these programs, we must make it clear that we will not establish diplomatic relations or ease sanctions. But that also does not mean that we should not continue to hold out to North Korea the possibility of a negotiated settlement, should it really be prepared to completely give up these programs.  

What are some of the key things to keep in mind about North Korea’s recent actions and about the country in general?

To understand what North Korea is doing, we have to get back to basics. The fundamental situation stems from the 1945 division of the Korean Peninsula into two separate states. North Korea’s Stalinist-style system developed into a totalitarian dictatorship with a personality cult, and it has been spectacularly unsuccessful, especially compared to its rival state South Korea.

The leaders in North Korea are reasonably well-informed and intelligent people. They saw what happened to the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and decided it would not happen to them. For them, the lesson was: Do not open up or even receive aid, unless it is completely controlled to minimize outside influences. Most of the North Korean elite believes their regime is the legitimate Korean regime. They also understand that regime collapse could well mean absorption of the North by the South, and the possibility that they could go on trial for crimes against their own people. I anticipate that most of the elite will try very hard to hold the regime together in the coming years, even if it means continuing to pursue nuclear and missile programs and threatening and even attacking South Korea again.

But sooner or later major change is inevitable in such a rigid system. This requires the concerned countries to have a clear-headed analysis of the situation, take a long-term perspective, and consistently implement a principled policy. It is very challenging to do this with so many countries involved. But it can be done. Over the long term, the strengths of democracies far outweigh their weaknesses in dealing with countries like North Korea.