After stirring international media attention and drawing criticism from its neighbors and the United States, North Korea’s controversial launch of a rocket under the guise of installing an “Earth observation” satellite in orbit took place on Apr. 13.

David Straub, associate director of Stanford’s Korean Studies Program, assesses the likely responses of the United States and other concerned countries, and provides historical context for the actions of North Korea’s leadership.

How is the launch going to impact North Korea’s relations with the United States and other countries?

We have already “been there, done that.” This will be the third North Korean test of a long-range rocket in six years. Shortly after the launches in 2006 and 2009, the North Koreans tested their first nuclear devices. The concern is that they will again use the expected international condemnation of their launch as a pretext for conducting another nuclear test.

But sometimes experience changes perspective. The United States and other countries will want to try to respond to the rocket test in a way that complicates any North Korean effort to justify a new nuclear test.

The international community really cannot remain silent, because United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1874, which was passed in 2009, forbids North Korea from conducting precisely this kind of launch. I anticipate the UNSC will meet to discuss the situation but will not be able to issue a formal resolution. It will probably wind up issuing only a UNSC presidential statement criticizing the launch. China is the main obstacle. It does not approve of North Korea’s activities, but it is more concerned that putting great pressure on North Korea will result in instability. 

The United States, South Korea, and Japan will continue to consult and coordinate closely with one another. They may take additional measures to collect intelligence about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. They may also look to bolster their cooperation on missile defense, and take further steps to restrict North Korea’s access to nuclear- and missile-related materials and technology. They may apply additional economic sanctions to show their disapproval of North Korea’s actions.

Do you think the launch is going make it more difficult for North Korea to conduct trade and obtain aid and development assistance?

North Korea’s behavior now is part and parcel of its behavior over the past several decades. For the North Korean regime, the wellbeing of its people is clearly a secondary priority compared to its own survival.

At least since the end of the cold war, North Korea has faced a dilemma: Open up or fail, or open up and fail. In other words, it needs to open up to receive outside investment and technology if it is ever to have a successful economy. If it does not do that, the regime is unsustainable over the long run. But North Korea’s leaders fear that opening to the outside world would bring down their regime because it will expose the country’s weaknesses to its people. In order to get out of this dilemma, they have reached for weapons of mass destruction—particularly nuclear devices and the missiles they hope eventually can carry them. That is why there is no indication the North Korean leadership is prepared to completely give up those programs, at least on any terms that the United States, Japan, or South Korea could accept.

This is a long-term challenge for the United States and its allies. We have to see the situation for what it is, and deal with it accordingly. That means we must never “accept” North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. As long as North Korea maintains these programs, we must make it clear that we will not establish diplomatic relations or ease sanctions. But that also does not mean that we should not continue to hold out to North Korea the possibility of a negotiated settlement, should it really be prepared to completely give up these programs.  

What are some of the key things to keep in mind about North Korea’s recent actions and about the country in general?

To understand what North Korea is doing, we have to get back to basics. The fundamental situation stems from the 1945 division of the Korean Peninsula into two separate states. North Korea’s Stalinist-style system developed into a totalitarian dictatorship with a personality cult, and it has been spectacularly unsuccessful, especially compared to its rival state South Korea.

The leaders in North Korea are reasonably well-informed and intelligent people. They saw what happened to the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and decided it would not happen to them. For them, the lesson was: Do not open up or even receive aid, unless it is completely controlled to minimize outside influences. Most of the North Korean elite believes their regime is the legitimate Korean regime. They also understand that regime collapse could well mean absorption of the North by the South, and the possibility that they could go on trial for crimes against their own people. I anticipate that most of the elite will try very hard to hold the regime together in the coming years, even if it means continuing to pursue nuclear and missile programs and threatening and even attacking South Korea again.

But sooner or later major change is inevitable in such a rigid system. This requires the concerned countries to have a clear-headed analysis of the situation, take a long-term perspective, and consistently implement a principled policy. It is very challenging to do this with so many countries involved. But it can be done. Over the long term, the strengths of democracies far outweigh their weaknesses in dealing with countries like North Korea.  

Nearly a year has passed since an earthquake triggered a tsunami that swept away entire communities on Japan’s northeastern coast, leading to a series of accidents at the Fukushima nuclear complex. Since the March 11 disaster, Japan is experiencing a growing sense of community, and it faces a potential opportunity for innovation in the energy industry and economy. Masahiko Aoki and Kenji E. Kushida discuss post-March 11 developments, and a related conference at Stanford scheduled for February 27.

Aoki is the Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor Emeritus of Japanese Studies, and director of the Japan Studies Program at the Shorenstein-Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

Kushida is the Takahashi Research Associate in Japanese Studies at Shorenstein APARC, and a Stanford graduate (BA ’01, and MA ’03).

One Year After Japan's 3/11 Disaster will bring together experts from Stanford, Japan, and Europe for a discussion of the major economic, political, energy, and societal challenges and growth in post-Fukushima Japan.   

Looking back a year later, what do you think are important lessons we can learn from March 11?

Masahiko Aoki: Japan has often faced disasters leading to the complete destruction of cities and enormous losses of life. In the last century alone, there was the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923; wartime damage in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and other metropolitan areas; the Kobe earthquake of 1995; and so on. Each time, Japan rebuilt its life and infrastructure anew. Accepting the reality of a disaster and making efforts to rebuild is in a sense deeply embedded in Japan’s collective DNA. However, the March 11 disaster was not only just a natural disaster. People are now well aware that there were lots of elements of human and institutional error in terms of preparing for and coping with natural disasters. Recent geographical studies and historical documents reveal that large-scale earthquake-tsunami disasters comparable to March 11 have occurred four times in the last 4,000 years. It provides Japan with a good opportunity for thinking about how to build sustainable societies and cities.  

Kenji Kushida: Big shocks always cause big changes, and the type of change depends on the kind of shock. With March 11, there was the human tragedy of people literally getting washed away. It also raised the question of how to restructure energy markets, which is an area where outcomes in Japan can affect worldwide restructuring. This particular shock then is triggering a whole set of fairly slow moving, but very transformative changes that could take place over the next few years.

What trends are we seeing in Japan’s energy industry now, and what are the implications for Japan’s future energy policy?

Aoki: When I flew into Tokyo the day after the great earthquake, the city was quite dark. But by the summertime, it was not only lit up, but there was a blue hue to the light—this was due to the wide adoption of energy-efficient LED lighting. Even with the nuclear plants down and 25 percent of the electric capacity gone, there were no major blackouts thanks to energy-saving measures. This kind of incident motivates people to explore ways to innovate the energy industry. For example, Japan’s energy-efficient auto industry took off in the late 1970s in reaction to the Oil Shock.

Japan’s energy industry is currently run by regional monopolies. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), for example, monopolizes everything from power generation to retail distribution. In the past, there had been an attempt to break up the different parts of the power monopolies into separate entities. But only a bit of reform was made because of very strong resistance from TEPCO. Now TEPCO is on the verge of insolvency, so Japan has a very good chance to restructure its power industry. People are again starting to think about breaking up the regional monopolies and about innovation, which several experts will discuss during our conference.

Kushida: We will also draw on Stanford’s being in California to think about how to prevent Enron-style market manipulation and rolling blackouts from happening in Japan. A lot of it has to do with the rules and regulations that create an energy market. In the tsunami-devastated areas of Japan, there is also a tremendous opportunity for ground-up investment in new forms of energy. Silicon Valley technologies and companies can help design the next generation of renewable, sustainable energy systems in those areas.
In Japan, there is a sense that people have rediscovered their ties to one another after the disaster.

-Masahiko Aoki, Director, Japan Studies Program

During the recovery, many Japanese citizens demonstrated a remarkable strength and collaborative spirit. Has this changed?

Aoki: Annually on New Year’s Day in Japan, a high-level Buddhist priest writes the calligraphy for a word representing the spirit of the people. This year he wrote “絆”—“bond” (kizuna)—signifying the ties both among Japan’s citizens, and between Japanese and the generous help and aid that poured in after March 11.

In Japan, there is a sense that people have rediscovered their ties to one another after the disaster. Before March 11, there was some worry that young people were not so concerned about others and about tradition. Many young people now want to become volunteers, and there is also a better sense of community.

What has the impact been on Japan’s economy, and what are the prospects for recovery?

Aoki: There is an increasing awareness that Japan cannot sustain the same kinds of export-oriented, manufacturing-based industrial structures it has over the past decades.

Since 2007, Japan’s net foreign exchange receipts from royalties, investments, and the like have exceeded those from trade. The economic structure is becoming less export oriented, so the March 11 disaster might trigger the acceleration of a more domestic-oriented economy. It might also lead to an increase in foreign direct investment, prompted in part by population aging and partly by appreciation of the yen. Japan will become more domestic market oriented, while at the same time more internationally active. A lot next year depends on what will happen with Europe’s economy, but otherwise the prospect for Japan’s GDP is not bad because of reconstruction demand.

Kushida: Recovering from March 11 presents a potentially more productive experience than the 2008 global financial crisis. In 2008, Japan’s exports dropped dramatically for a few months and then there was a sharp recession that recovered quickly. There was not a whole lot that people or companies could do, other than adjust to the potential decline. March 11 provides more opportunities for innovation at the company and individual level. 

As it is finding growth in the domestic market, Japan has been criticized lately for being “inward-looking.” But two things from this latest crisis are contributing to looking outward a little more. One is the sense of vulnerability and transience, so strengthening Japan’s economic base becomes a much more urgent matter. The second is that in the aftermath of the euro crisis, the very strong yen has also led to a huge move toward outward acquisitions that are becoming integrated with the domestic economy.

Between 2008 and 2009, approximately 25 new private engineering colleges opened in India every week—adding 2500 schools in only two years. Engineering education is also on the rise in the other so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, and China). But does quantity guarantee quality? And what should government policymakers keep in mind to ensure that their higher education investments pay off?

Rafiq Dossani, a senior research scholar at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, recently collaborated with Stanford professor of education Martin Carnoy and a team of scholars in Russia, China, and India on a leading-edge comparative study of higher education systems in BRIC countries. Carnoy led the project, which focused on engineering education, and he, Dossani, and other researchers are currently writing a book coming out in 2012. Dossani speaks here about the project.

What is unique to the approach that you have taken with this study compared to anything similar previously conducted?

This is the first systematic study based on a large data collection. Over 7,000 students were surveyed in China and India respectively, and 2,300 students were surveyed in Russia. Brazil regularly collects detailed data on a very large nationwide sample of university students, and we have used this in our study. We also surveyed over 100 educational institutions, including several dozen face-to-face interviews with trustees, heads of institutions, heads of departments, faculty, administrators, and students.

We focus on engineering education in our study because it is the field that attracts the largest number of students. For example, in China, about 63% of students in 2009, or about 1.8 million students, entered through the science track, which is the route to an engineering degree. In India, 1.4 million freshmen engineering students were enrolled in 2011, which is over 40% of the total number of freshmen.

In our study, we ask how governance and finance affect outcomes in higher education. Every country’s educational system shares certain objectives: quality, access, and equity. What has not been studied for the BRIC countries is whether the governance and finance of higher education is consistent with some of these objectives but not others, and how this impacts the shape and effectiveness of the higher education system. The choice of governance and finance are themselves outcomes of the institutional settings in each country. For example, in India, the dramatic transfer of political power in the last two decades from the national government to the provinces has been the key driver of change.

As a result of this shift in political power, the states took charge of higher education and focused on increasing access and equity as their political goals. Given the extreme shortage of funds, they contracted out the actual provision of education to the private sector on attractive terms. The private sector responded briskly. Of the 1.4 million freshmen enrollees in engineering studies in 2011, 98% were enrolled in private institutions, compared with less than 5% in 1990. The rate of growth was so high that in just two years, 2008 and 2009, 2500 new engineering colleges opened their doors. That works out to about five new colleges for each working day!

There were upsides and downsides to this growth. On the positive side, the state offered attractive financial terms for new institutions located in underprivileged areas and mandated that about 50% of seats be reserved for underprivileged students (mostly identified by caste). It also kept tuition fees for the reserved seats very low at about $500 per student per year and allowed the colleges to recover costs and margins by charging a higher fee for the rest. The result was that growth has been geographically spread and access by underprivileged students is high—in our study, 55% of the students came from underprivileged categories.

The downside is that quality remains elusive. Although this does not show up in job placement rates due to pent-up demand, comparisons with the other BRIC countries suggest that the quality is low. The reason is that private providers, for the moment, find it more profitable to provide minimal infrastructure and employ inadequate faculty than to invest in building up quality for the long-term. In fact, given that the investment in long-term quality is likely to be unaffordable, one of our conclusions is that we question the sustainability of the Indian governance and finance model vis-à-vis the other countries in our study, particularly China, where the central government is taking an activist approach in trying to increase quality, at least in the elite universities.

How do your findings in India’s higher education system for engineering compare to the other BRIC countries, especially China as the study’s other Asian country?

In terms of sheer growth and the number of engineering freshmen, China exceeds India. The cost of education is lower in India. In terms of quality, China, Brazil, and Russia, do better. Part of the reason is a superior entering cohort in the case of China and Russia. But the main reason appears to be that governance in the other BRIC countries is more faculty-driven than driven by profit-oriented trustees. We found that the former model is more likely to deliver quality. In the case of China, for example, academic departments determine courses, course content, and the types of disciplines available, whereas in India, trustees make such choices, with poorer quality outcomes.

You have previously said that India’s higher education system is very politicized—how did it come to be this way?

The politicization began at the country’s independence in 1947. Prior to independence, higher education was managed by provinces to produce graduates from the upper classes who would join the colonial civil service. After independence, the state governments faced new demands for higher education from the middle classes. Since these were also important voting classes, the state responded by setting up a large number of public universities. The state controlled all aspects of the university to ensure that their priorities were met, in terms of location, fees, and personnel hired. For example, the state government was represented in the senate of every university and public college. Every senior-level hire needed to be approved by the state government. State government nominees on the senate also reviewed textbook selections and disciplinary choices.

As may be imagined, educational quality suffered and continues to do so in the public colleges. In the mid-1990s, the states faced demands from new voter categories, particularly lower-caste groups. These were earlier excluded from political power but acquired power in the federalization of politics that took place from 1990 onwards. This time around, though, the states decided to subcontract the work to the private sector rather than set up public colleges. This was largely a matter of cost management—the state thought that the private sector would respond to the incentive of providing technical education to those willing to pay full-cost, and invest the needed capital. This would free up the state’s capital for other demands, including for education, such as for primary and secondary education. To ensure that the lower-caste groups were part of the expansion, the state mandated quotas and subsidized fees. In the name of preserving quality—although, in fact, it preserves quality only at low levels—the state continued to exercise other controls. For example, it imposes common curricula and assessment, and, in most cases, certifies a private college only if it is part of a publicly owned university system.

The state’s policies also led to a shift in the profile of the graduates towards technical and professional education, since these were the fields in which the private sector was willing to establish new institutions. This was greatly stimulated by rising income payoffs to higher education engineering and business training. Private colleges account for 60% of the growth in educational provision between 1995 and 2011, and almost all of that growth is in engineering, management, and other professional fields. The value of this is debatable: it reflects the “market” but, deprived of state support, some fields that may be considered to be socially valuable, such as the liberal arts, are in steep decline.

Has the state of higher education in BRIC countries, such as India, led students to seek education opportunities abroad?

In China and India, these are important reasons for student migration to the West. For example, 500,000 students enroll as freshmen overseas from India alone every year. They come mostly from elite families, since the costs of an overseas education are very high.

What long-term policy changes are you hoping to influence through this study and your forthcoming book?

First, we show that the evolution of higher education in the BRICs can be explained by the role of the state (the government sector) and the policy choices it makes in governance and finance.

Second, we show that private provision can substitute for public provision, but with certain disadvantages in terms of quality and educational diversity. In this context, we show that state policy can still influence some outcomes positively, such as access, equity, and cost-control. However, the long-term implications for quality are much more negative through such a model. 

Third, we show that the provincial governance of education offers certain advantages and disadvantages over national regulation. This is a hotly debated topic in China and India. In India, the national regulators seek greater control out of concern about the implications of too politicized an environment created by the states and the poor quality emerging from private colleges. However, we argue that there may be downsides to centralized control, as was witnessed in an earlier period (during the tenure of Indira Gandhi).

Finally, we make the case that the current ”trend” among governments in developing countries of focusing on the creation of a few world-class universities can succeed in the limited sense of creating a few high-quality teaching and research institutions. However, it comes at a very high cost and in no sense guarantees a trickle-down of quality to the remaining institutions. This is particularly the case in the current model in China and Russia, where the emphasis on world-class universities is greatest and these high-cost elite institutions are given increasing funding per student. At the same time, mass universities absorb increasing numbers of students at low and possibly declining per-student funding.