In light of the rise of Asia in research and development (R&D) and the challenge it poses on American supremacy, SPRIE invited industry and academic R&D leaders for a panel discussion entitled "The Globalization of R&D" on February 10, 2005. The panel included Dr. John Seely Brown, visiting scholar, Annenberg Center, USC; Dr. Kris Halvorsen, vice president and director, Solutions and Services Research Center, Hewlett-Packard; and Dr. Yoshio Nishi, director of research at the Center for Integrated Systems, director of Stanford Nanofabrication Facility, National Nanotechnology Infrastructure Network. Participants discussed a wide array of issues, including the economic rationale for new models of R&D, national/regional comparative advantage in R&D, and the coordination of global R&D.

The Economic Rationale for New Models of R&D

Dr. Nishi highlighted the economic rationale behind the quest for new models of R&D. While back in the early 1990s, a $200 million investment in R&D would grant a semiconductor company a one-year lead in technology, by the early 2000s, a one-year lag would transpire with the same investment level. Such an escalation of R&D cost points to the mounting importance of the efficiency of R&D--or as Dr. Nishi put it, the importance of generating "the right technology at the right time for the right cost." The economic forces will not only alter how R&D activities are organized and distributed within and across firms, markets, regions, and countries but also influence the breadth and depth of knowledge searches. For example, R&D alliance might become a viable and lucrative scheme for cost/risk sharing in R&D. The search for non-silicon-based devices might rise in importance as silicon fabrication reaches its limits. By the same token, the division of innovative labor across nations/regions might deepen to further exploit respective comparative advantages.

Regional Comparative Advantage in R&D

One strand of development is the globalization of R&D, which necessitates comparative advantages across regions. Dr. Brown maintained, "I'm moving my analysis from individual firms to [regional] 'niches.' What I see happening is that thousands of [regional] niches are developing all over the place. What's interesting is how dynamic these niches are in building their unique capabilities." The availability of innovative talents, for example, varies significantly across regions. Invoking "the law of large numbers," Dr. Brown pointed out that given its enormous population size, Asia could produce a large number of engineers, even if they are only a tiny fraction of the total population. Currently, the U.S. produces 50,000 engineers every year; the number is 500,000 for Asia--and it is rapidly growing. Meanwhile, more and more immigrant talents choose to return to their home countries after receiving higher education and some work experience in the U.S. Few U.S. companies can afford to ignore such alarming trends. "We need to move with the market for talent," commented Dr. Halvorsen who overseas HP's global R&D activities. Take HP's R&D effort in Bangalore, India as an example. The effort had a humble start in the mid-1980s. Yet, within ten years, the number of local technical staff grew to 3,000. Today, the number is approaching 10,000.

Market-specific demand also pushes R&D to relocate. As Dr. Halvorsen put it, "when success depends on [geographical] closeness, … you need to do design in close loop with the rest of the activities." Furthermore, overseas R&D might well find its way back into the U.S. As explained by Dr. Brown, "The rise of the middle class in China and India at 1/10 of the price point [of the U.S.]" could spur innovations at 1/10 of the price point. Innovations taking place in China or India might be totally unheard of in the U.S. and eventually finds its way into the U.S. market.

The Coordination of Global R&D

While the globalization of R&D brings many promises, it also poses acute challenges to firms that need to coordinate R&D efforts across national boundaries. As Professor William Miller pointed out, "Increase in R&D cost forces specialization. Then you have to put together an assembly of specialists. The problem is that they are everywhere. Therefore, being able to pull them together becomes the differentiator." The story of Li & Fung serves as a perfect example. Li & Fung is a global leader in the apparel business. In 2002, the company contracted with 7,500 factories in 37 countries and generated a revenue of $5 billion. In an industry with thin margins of a few percent, the company continues to uphold a return-on-equity of 30-50%. Yet, Li & Fung owns no factories. Its competitive advantage lies entirely in its expertise in assessing and orchestrating the unique capabilities of each of the 7,500 suppliers. As Dr. Brown summed up, "Making money will depend less on what you own than on what you can mobilize--[i.e. the ability to] orchestrate."

In a parallel argument, Dr. Halvorsen proposed the new model of "meta-national" R&D. Different from the traditional multinational setup, where R&D is orchestrated from the center and diffused to the peripheral, in a meta-national setup, innovation for different parts of the system are consciously placed in different parts of the world. Advances are made in parallel and feedbacks flow bi-directionally.

An even more decentralized model was advanced by Dr. Brown. Dubbed a "swarm ecosystem," such a system is characterized by one (or more) assemblers and hyper-competition among a constellation of component suppliers. The assembler merely provides the focal model with no detailed design, and leaves it to the component suppliers to compete for coming up with the best fit. In this model, the assembler does not orchestrate the development process from top-down; rather, progress is made from the bottom-up. Yet, at the end of the day, only the fittest component suppliers survive and the result is a highly efficient and competitive system that best exploits its own niches.

Other Issues

Panelists and the audience also engaged in lively discussions about intellectual property rights, organizational learning, institutional innovations, the role of public policy, and the impact of culture on innovation. The globalization of R&D--particularly rising competencies in Greater China and their network of relations to Silicon Valley and their worldwide implications--is a new priority area of research for SPRIE.

President Bush has claimed a renewed mandate, and has begun to reshuffle his national security team. Condi Rice will move to State; Steve Hadley will move up at the NSC. Rich Armitage and Jim Kelly, who have borne much of the day-to-day responsibility for U.S. policy in Asia, are leaving along with Colin Powell. What might we expect of the Bush administration in its second term?

Generally speaking, continuity rather than change is likely to be the watchword in foreign policy. Above all, the Middle East and South Asia are likely to remain the principal preoccupations of American concerns. In Iraq, Washington will seek to acquit its commitments - to hold elections, train Iraqi security forces, and accelerate reconstruction projects - with whatever measure of dignity and honor it can muster in the face of excruciatingly difficult choices. With Yassar Arafat's death, American engagement in Israeli-Palestinian issues is destined to increase. And Iran's bid for nuclear weapons will continue to challenge the United States and Europe.

Thus Asia will not have pride of place on the Bush agenda. Yet it will continue to command Washington's attention. Why? Because it is in Asia that the interests of the great powers intersect most directly. Asia is the world's most dynamic economic area, and it is becoming more tightly integrated. Washington cannot afford to neglect South and Southeast Asia, for in these areas Islam presents a relatively moderate face. And North Korea, of course, poses a direct and growing challenge to the administration's nonproliferation policy.

Fortuitously, the United States is better positioned in Asia than in most other regions. Our military presence remains sizable and retains mobility and flexibility. Our economy continues to generate solid demand for Asian exports and is a robust source of direct investment. While criticism of American policy is widespread in the region, it is not expressed with the virulence that is seen in Europe and the Middle East. Above all, Washington has cultivated the Asian great powers assiduously, and has managed to improve relations with Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi - a substantial accomplishment. It remains to be seen whether it can work in concert with others to ameliorate the sources of discord on the Korean Peninsula and over the Taiwan Straits.

The United States, to be sure, confronts some daunting challenges in Asia. If the U.S.-Japan alliance is in excellent condition, defense cooperation with Seoul remains troubled by the sharp divergence in U.S. and Korean perspectives on North Korean aims and strategy. Nor have we found a solid basis for pursuing with Pyeongyang's neighbors a coordinated approach to the six-nation talks. Regional economic cooperation is taking shape along pan-Asian rather than trans-Pacific lines. Developments in the Middle East threaten to "Arabize Islam" in Southeast Asia. And the "Johnny One Note" quality of American diplomacy - i.e. its preoccupation with international terrorism - often plays poorly against Beijing's more broadly based effort to provide regional leadership.

Nor is America unconstrained in its policy efforts in the region. Our military forces are stretched thin globally, impelling some downsizing of deployments in Asia. Huge fiscal deficits loom, and with growing bills falling due in both Iraq and Afghanistan, resources available for policy initiatives elsewhere are likely to be tight. The president has succeeded in pushing negotiations with North Korea into a multilateral framework, yet Washington is being pressed by its negotiating partners to adopt a more conciliatory posture. The democratization of Asian nations, while welcome, does not automatically facilitate U.S. diplomatic objectives. Recent elections in South Korea and Taiwan were decisively shaped by a new generation of voters. Governments in Seoul and Taipei are increasingly accountable, yet viewed from the United States, they are not extraordinarily sensitive to Washington's views, let alone deferential to its lead.

With these considerations in mind, one should expect President Bush and his foreign policy team to continue cultivating close ties with the Asian powers. Whether Washington can effectively utilize those relationships to roll back North Korea's nuclear program and avert crises in the Taiwan Straits will depend heavily on its relationships with the governments in Seoul and Taipei. And at the moment South Korea appears determined to expand economic ties with the North virtually without reference to Pyeongyang's nuclear activities. Taipei remains preoccupied with efforts to assert its own identity while counting on American protection.

In the end, of course, foreign policy rarely sees carefully laid plans bear fruit. Someone once asked a new British prime minister, Harold MacMillan, what would drive foreign policy in his government. He answered without hesitation, "Events, dear boy, events." I expect the same may be true for Mr. Bush.