Doctors, nurses and other medical staff in Myanmar are wearing black ribbons to protest the appointments of military personnel in the Ministry of Health.

“The Black Ribbon Movement Myanmar 2015,” which began on Facebook in early August, quickly amassed over 42,000 followers, and on Aug. 12, led the minister for health to drop plans to appoint military personnel to over 300 management positions within the ministry.

Writing for The Diplomat, Stanford visiting scholar Phyu Phyu Thin Zaw said the movement shows the dissatisfaction shared among her fellow doctors about the incursion of the military in the healthcare sector. She said it's also representative of greater injustices seen across Myanmar. 

Four years have passed since the country transitioned from military rule toward democratization, and the Ministry of Health among other civic organizations still see the military exert influence over its operations.

Thin Zaw said she remains optimistic, though, and views the movement as a sign of the reemergence of a proactive civil society. The movement continues on this Facebook page.

The article published in The Diplomat can be found by clicking here.

North Korea today threatened military action against South Korea if it did not end its propaganda broadcasts along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) within 48 hours. The broadcasts against the North are being systematically blared by loudspeakers over the border.   

South Korea resumed the broadcasts earlier this week after an 11-year hiatus, in retaliation for North Korea’s planting landmines just outside a South Korean DMZ guard post that crippled two South Korean soldiers on Aug. 4.

David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and a former Korean affairs director at the U.S. Department of State, offers insights on the situation. Straub also spoke on PRI's "The World" radioshow on Aug. 20, the audioclip and summary can be accessed by clicking here.

What’s behind the current tensions on the Korean Peninsula?

Fundamentally, the current situation is just another symptom of the underlying problem, which is the division of Korea into two competing states, with one of them—North Korea—having a Stalinist totalitarian system and a Maoist-style cult of personality. Since North Korea can’t compete with the South economically and diplomatically, it uses the threat of force or the actual use of it to try to intimidate South Korea. The North Koreans know that South Korea tends to “blink first” and step back because it is democratic and its leaders are concerned about civilian casualties.

The current situation is also related to the leadership transition in North Korea, with leader Kim Jong Un succeeding his father Kim Jong Il three years ago. Kim Jong Un still feels insecure, which is clearly evidenced by his execution of his powerful uncle Jang Seong-taek in 2013 and many other leaders there as well. To solidify support for his rule, he also manufactures a South Korean threat to rally his people behind him.

What does North Korea want?

North Korea’s immediate demand is that South Korea stop its propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. The South Korean broadcasts criticize the North Korean system and its leaders, which is something that the North, with its cult of personality, can’t accept. But the South resumed the broadcasts only because the North Koreans recently snuck into the South Korean side of the DMZ and viciously planted landmines just outside a South Korean guard post. These were clearly intended to maim South Korean soldiers. They did just that, blowing the legs off two young men.

The North Korean regime’s long-term aim is not just to survive but also to get the upper hand on South Korea, and eventually try again to reunify the peninsula on its own terms. That explains why North Korea behaves as it does, rather than reform its system and reconcile with the South.

The North also demands an end to all U.S. and South Korean military exercises on the peninsula—even though the North has a much larger military than the South and U.S. forces there combined and is developing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, the North wants to end the U.S.-South Korean alliance and see U.S. forces withdrawn from the peninsula, in the belief that it will open the way to eventual victory over the South.

Why did the South resume the broadcasts? Was it a good idea?

South Korea resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts in retaliation for the maiming of two of its soldiers on August 4th. Rather than retaliate by attacking militarily, the South resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts because the South Korean military knows that North Korean leaders hate them.

The South Korean military believes that North Korean leaders hate the broadcasts because they are effective in educating young North Korean soldiers and civilians in earshot about the nature of the regime and its leaders. The South Korean military seems to assume that the broadcasts are effective in that regard because they anger the North Korean leaders so much. But I think the reason the broadcasts anger the North Korean leaders is due to the cult of personality. The North Korean system can’t accept the idea of its leaders being criticized.

So I don’t think it was necessarily a wise step on the part of the South Korean military to resume the broadcasts. On the other hand, politically, by crippling two South Korean soldiers, the North Koreans had left South Korea with no option but to respond in some way. After the North Koreans killed fifty South Koreans in two separate sneak attacks five years ago, the South Korean government warned that it was not going to sit back the next time. The resumption of the broadcasts has further raised tensions but, frankly, given the danger of war on the peninsula, the South doesn’t have a lot of good ways to respond to North Korean provocations.

How serious is the situation?

North Korea has now threatened military action in 48 hours if South Korea doesn’t end the propaganda broadcasts. The North often makes threats. Usually, it doesn’t carry them out, but sometimes it does.

The United States and South Korea are conducting an annual military exercise together in the South until the end of August—something else that the North Koreans are demanding an end to. Most experts feel that the North is unlikely to launch a major provocation while the American presence is bolstered and the U.S. and South Korean militaries are paying full attention. The North Korean leaders know they are weaker than our side, so they usually avoid frontal assaults and instead engage in sneak attacks, at times and places and in ways of their own choosing.

There is more uncertainty in recent years because of the aggressive and threatening behavior thus far of Kim Jong Un, who is young and inexperienced. He seems anxious about his position in the North and prepared to take risks to bolster it, including rallying the people behind him by raising tensions with the South. We also don’t know if the North feels freer to engage in major provocations because it has developed at least a handful of nuclear devices since its first nuclear test in 2006.

So I myself wouldn’t be afraid to visit Seoul now but the situation bears even closer watching than usual.

Marking seventy years since the end of World War II, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed “profound grief” on Friday for his country’s actions. While pointing to short comings in the statement, the Stanford scholars said the prime minister’s words represented a genuine effort to reflect on the past and provided opportunities to improve relations in the region.

The highly anticipated statement, issued on behalf of the Japanese cabinet, was closely followed by its East Asian neighbors who have raised concerns over Japan’s views of the wartime era.

Leaders of South Korea and China have said Japan has not apologized fully for crimes committed during WWII and each dispute historical narratives seen in the others’ textbooks, popular culture and other domains.

Advancing historical reconciliation in East Asia is a key research area of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The center leads a research project, Divided Memories and Reconciliation, which has produced numerous articles and books, including a ground breaking comparative study of high school history textbooks in China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States.

In May 2014, the center convened an international conference “Pathways to Reconciliation” on historical issues, co-sponsored by the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, the governmental organization promoting Japan-China-South Korea trilateral cooperation.

Earlier this year, the Japan Program asked Stanford scholars to write their own version of the 70^th anniversary statement as if they were the prime minister of Japan. The scholars’ statements were compiled into a report, published in May 2015.

Eight scholars contributed to the exercise in an effort “to understand the diversity of reasonable views on the issue of Japan’s responsibility for the cruel and violent war and Japan’s role in building a peaceful and prosperous world,” the introduction stated.

Themes that emerged in the report included a need for Abe to show heartfelt remorse about Japan’s actions during WWII and its desire to work toward a peaceful future.

Three noted Japan experts who contributed to that report offered their analysis of the prime minister’s statement issued yesterday in Tokyo.

Below are brief summaries of their analysis, you may click on each link to expand in full.

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Duus recognizes that Abe’s statement offers a reiteration of the statements made by Prime Ministers Murayama and Koizumi by including four key words – aggression, colonial rule, apology and remorse. Unlike past statements, however, Abe’s begins by putting war in the historical context and offers a more explicit statement of the victims of the war, not only the three million Japanese but also citizens of China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands. The statement can be viewed as “a small but important step toward a truce in the history wars that have raged in East Asia for the last three decades,” he says. However, Abe's attempt at reconciliation will have little effect if he does not rein in contrary actions by neo-nationalists in his own party.

Peter Duus is the William H. Bonsall Professor of Japanese History, emeritus; and a senior fellow, by courtesy, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

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Response by Takeo Hoshi

Hoshi notes that Abe’s statement mentions past apologies expressed by the Japanese government, but has no explicit apology from the current administration. He says there are two surprising elements about the statement. The first is the length – it is much larger than predecessors Murayama and Koizumi at 1,664 words in English and 3,970 characters in Japanese. The second is the emphasis on history rather than on forward-looking components. He says it is commendable that Abe provided an expanded view of history. Hoshi notes that it is nearly impossible to satisfy everyone’s views in such a statement, as scholars witnessed firsthand when working on the Japan Program project.

Takeo Hoshi is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; a professor (by courtesy) of finance at the Graduate School of Business; and director of the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.

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Response by Daniel Sneider

Sneider says Abe’s statement must be judged on following criteria: that it is a valid effort to draw lessons from Japan’s wartime past and that it contributes to the improvement of relations in Northeast Asia. He says the statement advances these goals, but there remain a few caveats. Sneider says the version of history communicated “will not satisfy many people, including many historians,” but that it does move away from the idea that revisionist Japan was in a war of self-defense not aggression. To move Japan, China and South Korea toward reconciliation, the prime minister and his cabinet must embrace the spirit of the statement in full and open the door to convening a long-delayed trilateral summit.

A version of this essay was also published by Nippon in Japanese and English.

Daniel Sneider is the associate director for research at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University.

Japan has been actively pursuing internationalization of its higher education, and recruiting foreign students has been a major part of this endeavor. In 1983, Japan announced its plan to recruit 100,000 foreign students by the year 2000, and in 2008 instituted a plan to recruit 300,000 foreign students by 2020. Subsequent government-led projects such as the Global 30 (2009-2014) and the Top Global University (2014-2023) projects have also stipulated international student recruitment as a major requirement.

As a result, the number of foreign students in Japanese universities has increased significantly from 10,428 in 1983 to 139,185 in 2014. Likewise, foreign faculty numbers have grown from just 418 (0.8% of total faculty) in 1994 to 6,034 (6.8%) in 2014. Although the figures are still relatively low compared with those in Europe and North America, they bring a potentially powerful force for social change to a country marked by high ethnic homogeneity.

In particular, the influx of foreign students and faculty to Japanese universities creates more culturally diverse campuses, often cited as a desirable result of and a key motive for pursuing internationalization. In the U.S. and Europe, such changes have led to significant discursive and programmatic efforts to create a culture of respect for diversity and inclusion. For example, Europe has, despite its critics, consistently articulated the value of "interculturality," diversity, and respect for cultural differences as a broader discourse for European higher education.

However, this is not the case with Japan and most other Asian nations. One major reason is that Japanese universities primarily attract foreign students as a means to particular ends, such as enhancing university prestige, creating "education hubs," filling the gap in the declining college student population and improving international higher education rankings. As a result, Japanese campuses have become much more diverse than in the past. However, appreciation of the intrinsic educational value of a culturally diverse student and faculty body has not been embraced.

Our study shows a noticeable disjuncture between structural, educational and interpersonal levels of diversity. That is, Japanese universities have accepted more and more students of varying racial and ethnic backgrounds (structural diversity), but the curriculum still offers limited opportunities for students to think more deeply about assumptions concerning race, ethnicity and other individual/group differences (educational diversity).

However, despite the politeness of the Japanese, many of the respondents indicated that making friends with Japanese students is difficult, with some pointing this out to be "the hardest part about being in Japan." One foreign student seemed puzzled: "Making real friends is hard. But I don't know why." One South Korean student we interviewed provided a clue: "People here are very individualistic and very independent, I think. In my laboratory, I will be the one who will approach my lab mates, especially the Japanese. They are very helpful but I have to be the one who starts the conversation."

The Japanese government and universities have worked closely to attract foreign students but due to the lack of interpersonal interaction between Japanese and foreign students, Japan is missing out on crucial opportunities in its higher education internationalization efforts.

First, international students gain many opportunities to interact with each other and learn intercultural skills for global citizenship while Japanese students much less so. As one foreign student said, "It's a very diverse environment because we all come from different countries. We can communicate different ways of thinking and share different ideas." Yet, most Japanese students are hesitant to interact with foreign students, missing the chance to learn intercultural skills. As the number of young Japanese going abroad to study has been on the decline in recent years (82,945 in 2004 to 60,138 in 2012), the contribution of foreign students to global education in Japanese colleges will be all the more important.

Second, diversity is instrumental in promoting innovation, and Japan should take advantage of the diversity that foreign students bring to its society. Much research demonstrates the positive effects of diversity on various academic and social outcomes (ability to form out-group friendship networks, increased cultural awareness, acquiring global citizenship skills, improving the campus climate, innovation, etc.). Facilitating diversity and recognizing their long-term effects for innovation and development should be a major goal of higher education in Japan.

Finally, foreign students can be valuable social capital for Japan, especially playing the role of transnational bridges between Japan and their home countries. Many come to Japan to learn about Japanese society and economy, with plans to become a bridge between Japan and their home countries after graduation. However, due to the lack of interpersonal interaction with Japanese students, foreign students often end up interacting primarily among themselves. Thus, they are also likely to bridge among themselves, rather than with Japanese, and that is a loss, given that Japan has invested so much in attracting foreign students.

Japan wants to make its top universities "super global," but they should first realize that this requires more than simply recruiting foreigners. What is most urgent is producing "global citizens" with inter-cultural skills and that can be achieved through the creation of a campus environment and culture that appreciates and respects diversity. It should also better appreciate the value of foreign students as transnational bridges with Japan.

To achieve such goals, Japanese universities need to establish institutional frameworks or programs to promote interaction between Japanese and foreign students. For example, they should offer more courses that both Japanese and foreign students can take together. Rather than just focusing on teaching Japanese languages and cultures to foreign students, Japanese students should be encouraged to take more courses in English and also those on other cultures and societies, ideally together with foreign students. These courses can instill values of cultural diversity in higher education in Japan. Japanese universities also need to ensure that structural segregation, either between programs, courses, dormitories and campuses, isn't an obstacle for promoting greater interaction between foreign and local students.

Our focus group interviews with Japanese students show that foreign and Japanese students misunderstand each other to a great extent. Foreign students are disappointed that not many Japanese are willing to approach them, but Japanese students are afraid to inconvenience their foreign visitors with their "poor" English. Foreign students are tired from guessing what their Japanese counterparts really feel and think, or their honne, but Japanese students think it is impolite to be too frank and direct even with other Japanese, let alone towards foreign students. To reduce these and other misgivings and gaps in cultural understanding, Japanese universities need to put in place more cross-cultural programs and opportunities for both sides to come into natural contact.

In short, internationalization efforts by Japanese universities should not stop at recruiting foreigners to their campuses. Rather, fostering a tolerant, inclusive university culture where foreigners are considered full, valued members should be considered an important step toward making Japanese universities truly international.

Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin and Yonsei University professor Rennie J. Moon lead the research project, Diversity and Tolerance in Korea and Asia. This Nikkei Asian Review article was originally carried on July 16 and reposted with permission.