Vietnam's Uniqueness in a Globalized World
Ambassador Ton-Nu-Thi Ninh is a member of Viet Nam's law-making body, the National Assembly, representing the southern coastal province of Ba Ria Vung Tau. In her position as Vice-Chair of the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee, her mission has been to develop and enhance Viet Nam's relations with the countries of North America (particularly, the United States) and Western Europe. She travels frequently to the United States and Europe and regularly interacts with senior government and business leaders both abroad and in Viet Nam. She has also represented Viet Nam in international conferences among world leaders to discuss issues with global implications. She is widely recognized as an effective spokesperson for Viet Nam.
Prior to holding her current position, Mme Ninh served, for over two decades, as a diplomat in Viet Nam's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specializing in multilateral institutions (the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, Francophonie, The Association of South East Asian Nations) and global issues (international peace and security, development, environment, governance, human rights, etc.) As advisor to Viet Nam's Minister of Foreign Affairs, she was responsible for key international efforts on behalf of Viet Nam, such as the holding of the Summit of French-Speaking Countries in 1997 in Ha Noi. From 2000 to 2003, she was Viet Nam's Ambassador to Belgium, Luxembourg and Head of the Mission to the European Union in Brussels.
Mme Ninh grew up in France, was educated at Sorbonne University and Cambridge University and started her career as an academic. She taught English and English literature at Paris University in the late 1960s and later at Saigon University until 1975.
Born in Hue, Central Viet Nam, into a traditional family, she developed her political commitment to the National Liberation Front for South Viet Nam early on during her student days in Paris. Since then, she has been consistently active in social issues, with a special interest on gender. She served a term on the Central Executive on the Viet Nam Women's Union.
Bechtel Conference Center
China's Rise and Implications for the Korean Peninsula: Why the US-ROK Alliance will Inevitably Change
The US-ROK alliance has come under increasing strains in the past few years. Often this is attributed to emotion: a naive young generation of Koreans or perhaps resentment over Apollo Ohno's victory in the past winter Olympics. However, the strains arise from deeper, more enduring reasons. One factor that is not often discussed is how China's rise is affecting the US-ROK alliance. South Korea, once again, is caught between powers much larger than itself. There are no easy answers, but an understanding of the real pressures on the Korean peninsula is a way to begin.
David Kang is associate professor of government, and adjunct associate professor and research director at the Center for International Business at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. He has scholarly interests in both business-government relations and international relations, with a focus on Asia. At Tuck he teaches courses on doing business in Asia, and also manages teams of MBAs in the Tuck Global Consultancy Program that conduct in-country consulting projects for multinational companies in Asia.
Kang's book, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge University Press, 2002), was named by Choice as one of the 2003 "Outstanding Academic Titles". He is also author of Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (co-authored with Victor Cha) (Columbia University Press, 2003). He has published scholarly articles in journals such as International Organization, International Security, Comparative Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and Foreign Policy.
Philippines Conference Room
David Kang
Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
David Kang is associate professor of government, and adjunct associate professor and research director at the Center for International Business at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. He has scholarly interests in both business-government relations and international relations, with a focus on Asia. At Tuck he teaches courses on doing business in Asia, and also manages teams of MBAs in the Tuck Global Consultancy Program that conduct in-country consulting projects for multinational companies in Asia.
Kang's book, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (Cambridge University Press, 2002), was named by Choice as one of the 2003 "Outstanding Academic Titles". He is also author of Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (co-authored with Victor Cha) (Columbia University Press, 2003). He has published scholarly articles in journals such as International Organization, International Security, Comparative Politics, International Studies Quarterly, and Foreign Policy. He is a frequent radio and television commentator, and has also written opinion pieces in the New York Times, the Financial Times, the Los Angeles Times, Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), Joongang Ilbo (Seoul), and writes a monthly column for the Oriental Morning News (Shanghai). Kang is a member of the editorial boards of Political Science Quarterly, Asia Policy, IRI Review, Business and Politics, and the Journal of International Business Education.
Professor Kang has been a visiting professor at Stanford University, Yale University, Copenhagen Business School (Denmark), the University of Geneva IO-MBA program (Switzerland), Korea University (Seoul, Korea) and the University of California, San Diego. He received an AB with honors from Stanford University and his PhD from University of California, Berkeley.
Daniel Sneider on global lessons for U.S. immigration policies
The fierce debate on immigration ignores a crucial reality -- what is happening to the United States is only one piece, although a big one, of a much larger global picture.
That hit me a couple of weeks ago when I was in Singapore. The Southeast Asian island nation has long been hailed as an economic model, the business capital for the entire region.
But it is an economy facing demographic peril. Its small population of 4 million is shrinking, thanks to a very low fertility rate. Prosperous Singaporean couples work hard, have fewer children and worry about how to take care of their aging parents. By 2050, Singapore will have a median age of over 52, one of the oldest in the world.
Singapore's answer is to import labor. A third of its workforce are migrants, from construction workers to maids. One out of seven households employs a domestic worker -- low-paid women mostly from neighboring Philippines and Indonesia.
Singapore tries to lure "talents'' -- highly skilled and affluent migrants -- to stay permanently. But the men hauling bricks and the maids washing laundry are in a separate class of temporary guest workers, with no chance to join Singaporean society. If a maid becomes pregnant, she is shipped out within seven days. Employers have to post bonds that must be paid should their servants break the rules and try to stay, putting them in the role of migrant police.
Problems of abuse of domestic workers, including physical and sexual violence and confinement, are serious enough to have prompted a report last December by Human Rights Watch.
Singapore's dependence on migrant labor and its guest-worker policy may be at the extreme end but it's very much on the global spectrum. Labor, like capital and goods before it, is part of a global market. The movement of people across borders in search of wages and work, most of it from developing countries to developed, is growing at a phenomenal pace.
The numbers are staggering. From 1980 to 2000, the number of migrants living in the developed world more than doubled from 48 million to 110 million. Migrants make up an average 12 percent of the workforce in high-income countries. About 4 million migrants cross borders illegally every year.
The demand for labor is driven in part by a demographic disaster -- the falling birth rates of developed countries. Almost all of those countries now have fertility rates that are well below 2.1, the level at which a population replaces itself. At the very low end are Hong Kong (0.94), Korea (1.22) and Singapore in Asia (1.24), along with much of Eastern Europe.
Low fertility means shrinking workforces and aging populations. Without migration, according to a recent study, Europe's population would have declined by 4.4 million from 1995 to 2000. Immigration accounted for 75 percent of U.S. population growth during the same period.
This movement of people cannot be stopped, certainly not by hundreds of miles of fences or even by tens of thousands of border guards. It is an issue that cries out for global cooperation, for common policies that cut across national boundaries. Already, we can benefit from looking at what has worked -- and not worked -- elsewhere.
A Global Commission on International Migration, formed in 2003 by the United Nations secretary-general, has taken an initial stab. Their report, issued last winter, supports the growth of guest-worker programs.
The Senate immigration bill now up for debate includes a provision for a guest-worker program. The bill is clearly preferable to the punitive and ineffective approach of the House version. But the Singapore experience -- and previous guest-worker programs like the German import of Turks -- should prompt second thoughts about going down this road.
One problem is that the guests don't leave. The United States has its own experience with this in the bracero program to import farmworkers, and more recently with the supposedly temporary H1-B visas used so extensively by the high-tech industry here in Silicon Valley.
Most troubling to me, these programs create an underclass of migrants who are never assimilated, as happened in Germany. It sets us on the Singapore road, encouraging inhumane policing mechanisms. And it is a gilded invitation to employers to depress the wages and incomes of American workers, and not just in the dirty jobs that are supposedly so hard to fill.
The United States has been rightfully proud of a tradition that treats all immigrants as citizens in the making. Rather than guest workers, isn't it more American to set realistic immigration quotas and enforce them fairly?
Innovation and the State: High Technology Industries in a World of Fragmented Production - Ireland, Israel, & Taiwan
One of the most unexpected changes of the 1990s was that firms in a number of emerging economies not previously known for high-technology industries moved to the forefront in new information technologies (IT). Surprisingly, from the perspective of comparative political economy theories, the IT industries of these countries use different business models and have carved out different positions in the global IT production networks. Of these emerging economies, the Taiwanese, Israeli, and Irish have successfully nurtured the growth of their IT industries.
Breznitz argues that emerging economies have more than one option for developing their high technology industries. His research shows how state actions shaped the structure of these three IT industries and that the industry's developmental path was influenced by four critical decisions of the state. His work provides a basis to advance a theoretical framework for analyzing how different choices lead to long-term consequences and to the development of successful and radically different industrial systems.
Philippines Conference Room
Danny Breznitz
Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Shall we dance? Shorenstein APARC's Rafiq Dossani comments on President Bush's visit to Asia
When India spectacularly burst into the headlines via its nuclear explosions in May 1998, then US president Bill Clinton had openly vented his fury before aides in the White House. "We are going to come down on those guys like a ton of bricks," he had remarked. Clinton's "volcanic fit" found its echo in the White House statement that expressed "distress" and "displeasure", culminating in Washington imposing a slew of sanctions against India.
These images from the past, culled out from Engaging India, then deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott's book, appear incredible now. Especially as India readies itself to accord a warm reception to US President George W. Bush next week. The entente, the product of laboriously conducted diplomacy as much as geopolitical shifts that yoked the two together as 'natural allies', is now taking deep root. Sure, there will be protest rallies, strident voices will rail against Bush's hegemonic designs, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be cautioned against any tight clinch with Bush. Yet even these voices arise from the awareness that there's a growing relationship between the US and India, realized through knots of strategic partnership and cooperation in every conceivable field - from economy and nuclear technology to education, space and agriculture.
Bush's visit next week prompted Karl Inderfurth, who was assistant secretary of state for South Asia in the Clinton administration, to say, "All of this represents a refreshing degree of continuity in US foreign policy, based on a recognition by the last two American presidents that India is a country that will be a key player in the 21st century." Similarly, Robert Hathaway, of the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, is impressed that "two successive Indian governments representing different political views and parties... both came to the same conclusion that it is in India's interest to forge a better relationship with the US."
From imposing sanctions against India to laying out a blueprint for nuclear cooperation, both New Delhi and Washington have come a long way in an inordinately short time. Ironically, it was Clinton who provided the impetus for this transformation. Talbott says the former president, after coming to terms with the Pokhran II realities, found it "downright distasteful and counterproductive" to impose sanctions against a country he was trying to improve relations with. Consequently, Talbott, Inderfurth and senior director in the National Security Council Bruce Riedal were entrusted with the task of pulling out Indo-US relations from the abyss in which it had been languishing from the beginnings of the Cold War era.What followed was a dialog between foreign minister Jaswant Singh and Talbott, both seeking to convey to each other the security and strategic interests of their respective countries.
The dialog started yielding dividends immediately, even during the Kargil conflict. Clinton's confrontation of then Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif at their July 4, 1999, meeting in Washington took trust patterns between the US and India to a new level. "Throughout this period, we kept the Indian government informed of what we were doing to try to ease the crisis," recalls Inderfurth, who played a key role in the dialog with Sharif. "All of this turned into an important confidence-builder in our new relationship with India."
"The July 4 meeting was the turning point," agrees Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington. "It demonstrated that US engagement in the India-Pakistan imbroglio would not be detrimental to New Delhi's interests, and it shifted the Clinton administration's focus from proliferation to engagement." The trust was manifest in Clinton's spectacularly successful visit to India in March 2000. An enabling factor in the budding Indo-US romance, says former ambassador Richard Celeste, was the now-forgotten Y2K factor. "The crisis introduced India's enormously talented manpower to our business leaders. Today, the 24/7 bond between companies in the US and service providers in India is the stuff of books and myth-making."
The budding romance acquired a new meaning with the advent of Bush in the White House. His most perspicacious decision was to appoint confidant Robert D. Blackwill as ambassador to India. Blackwill appealed to the popular imagination; his unequivocal pronouncements against Pakistan for fomenting terrorism in India further bolstered the trust between New Delhi and Washington. More importantly, he sought to impart a new heft to the relationship by putting his formidable weight behind the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership", which envisaged cooperation between the two countries in civil nuclear energy, hi-tech trade, space and dual technology. "If Clinton was the pioneer of the new relationship, Bush is its architect," says Teresita Schaffer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
The impulse for the new relationship is linked to the question: why has India started to matter to the US? Inderfurth cites three reasons: India will become the world's most populous nation, it may well have the world's fastest growing economy by 2020, and it is the world's largest democracy. Krepon adds one more to the list: intellectual capital. "The world expects India to do more heavy lifting," he says.
Ultimately, a relationship in international affairs hinges on convergence of interests. Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who's now advising under secretary of state R. Nicholas Burns, listed a string of "common interests" at a congressional hearing last year. These included:
preventing Asia from being dominated by any single power that has the capacity to crowd out others and which may use aggressive assertion of national self-interest to threaten American presence, American alliances, and American ties with the states of the region; eliminating the threat posed by state sponsors of terrorism; protecting the global commons, especially the sea lanes of communications, through which flow not only goods and services critical to the global economy but also undesirable commerce such as drug trafficking, people smuggling and weapons of mass destruction technologies.
So, isn't China the "single power" that Tellis thinks could threaten American interests in Asia? He denied this assumption to Congress, but many feel China is indeed the factor behind Washington's attempts to assist India in becoming a major world power.As author Sunil Khilnani, of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, says, "Many current inhabitants of the Pentagon see an India allied to the US as a potential bulwark to a China whose ambitions are still difficult to read." Washington's long-term view is that since China will not support the US war on terror, it's a threat against which the US needs a counterweight. "Japan has proven it does not have the emotional and intellectual muscle to face China. Hence, India should play that role," explains Rafiq Dossani of Stanford University.
The Bush regime's keenness on India also springs from the disaster his other foreign policy initiatives have been. "Bush would like to leave at least one foreign policy achievement as his legacy. He'd like to claim that he 'delivered' India to the US, just as Nixon could earlier claim the same about China," says Khilnani.
These reasons apart, the relationship has gathered great momentum from business-to-business links over the last decade. Says Anatol Lieven of the New America Foundation in Washington, "India's abandoning of its social democratic economic model, derived from the Nehru period, in favor of globalization and free market economics has made it much more attractive to investment and ideologically sympathetic to the US." Indeed, the more the two countries deepen their economic interdependence, the more each will have a stake in the other. And this economic interdependence can deepen, says Stephen P. Cohen of the Brookings Institution, through the removal of obstacles to US investments. "Infrastructure, (inadequate) liberalization, and education are three real obstacles. These (improvement in the three areas) will make it easy to implement the strategic relationship."
That India matters to the US is no longer a promise of the future. At a recent conference, former state department official Walter Andersen pointed out two US decisions that underscored India's enhanced importance. First, the four-country tsunami relief efforts involving the navies of the US, Japan, Australia and India. Two, the Bush administration's efforts to exempt a nuclear-capable India from exports restrictions on nuclear and dual use technology.
The blossoming ties have enabled significant partnerships in the international arena too. India has supported the war on terror in Afghanistan; its navy protected high-value US cargoes through the Straits of Malacca; more recently, India voted with the US at the International Atomic Energy Agency to declare Iran in "non-compliance" with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
All this doesn't mean the US and India will automatically collaborate on every problem dogging them. "Nobody expects a perfect alignment ever, but increasing alignment is something we hope will come naturally," says Schaffer. Partly this alignment can be brought about through changes in the conduct of foreign policy. For instance, the US, Hathaway admits, needs to recognize that India expects to be treated on a basis of equality. Similarly, Khilnani contends, a section of Indian political elites need to shed its instinctive anti-Americanism. "This does not mean renouncing a critical position, or an independent assessment of our own interests. It means engaging more deeply and confidently, and picking battles more selectively and prudently," he says.
Obviously, like any two countries, there will be disagreements. "Indeed, there have been over the past few years on a number of issues, including the war in Iraq," says Inderfurth. But, he adds optimistically, "the fact that this has not disrupted the upward trajectory of our relationship is a good sign and a promising one for future relations."
From Marx and Mao to the Market: The Economics and Politics of Agrarian Transition
This book is the first effort to analyze the economics and politics of agricultural reforms by comparing the reform processes, their causes and their effects across this vast region. The authors draw on a vast set of studies and new data, which compare reforms and economic impacts in more than 25 countries, to come up with a series of conclusions and implications on the role of economic reforms in growth, and the importance of initial conditions and political constraints in explaining the choices that were made and their effects.
The book analyzes some of the most successful sets of agricultural policies in history that have lifted people out of poverty, raising productivity and incomes by staggering amounts. At the same time the book explains the reasons behind dramatic failures in policy processes and reforms that caused hunger, poverty and which had devastating effects on economic growth and development for millions of other people.
Adversaries and Partners: The Impact of the Cross-Straits Economic Relationship on the Development of the Taiwanese and Chinese Economies
The Chen administration has attempted to deal with the growing economic and technological links across the Taiwan Straits through confrontation with and coercion against Taiwanese businesses with investments in the People's Republic of China. These attempts have done little to stop the flow of capital and knowledge from Taiwan to China, but this failure is not necessarily bad for Taiwan even as it is a boon for China. This talk will address in which sectors and in what ways the flow of Taiwanese business activities to China have been beneficial or detrimental to each economy. Looking forward, the talk will also attempt to answer how further integration will benefit each side.
Douglas Fuller has spent over ten years researching technological development in East Asia. Most recently, he completed a doctorate at MIT in political economy. The topic of his thesis was technological development in China's IT industry. For this and previous research, he has interviewed IT firms in Malaysia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China and the US. He has published articles in Industry and Innovation and other peer-reviewed journals.
A wine and cheese reception will follow the seminar.
This is the inaugural seminar of the CDDRL Taiwan Democracy Program and it is co-sponsored by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center.
Philippines Conference Room
MNC R&D Labs in China -- IP Protection and Innovation for the Global Market
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have increasingly located research and development (R&D) in developing countries such as China and India since the 1990s. On the one hand, governments in developing countries are eager to attract R&D to their local economies; on the other hand, developed countries are concerned about losing their competitive advantage due to R&D offshoring. At the same time, intellectual property protection is a growing concern.
What are the MNC R&D labs actually doing in China? Quan noted that her 2004 survey of MNC R&D labs in information technology industries in Beijing found that these MNC R&D labs are not just providing technical support, product localization, or product development for the local market; rather, they are developing products for the global market. Her study documents an emerging spatial division of labor in R&D based on the increasing specialization of R&D activities.
Ensuring returns appropriation
Appropriating returns is essential to continuous R&D investment. However, returns appropriation is not necessarily realized through formal IP protection institutions such as the patent system. As the growing trend of globalization of R&D has evolved to this new stage characterized by MNCs locating R&D labs in developing countries, it provides a good test bed to further explore more theoretical mechanisms of IP protection. Considering the weak intellectual property rights regimes these developing countries typically have, it is crucial for MNCs to find an effective way to protect their valuable technologies thus facilitating returns appropriation from their R&D activities in host developing regions. It is in fact the effective means of IP protection that can greatly assist MNCs' location of R&D offshore, in addition to other well-known incentives such as low cost R&D labor and market attraction.
R&D specialization essential
Using evidence from MNC R&D labs in Beijing and Shanghai, Quan's study proposes that R&D is further specialized within MNCs' global R&D network. Furthermore, IP protection and returns appropriation can be realized through such R&D specialization. The key proposition is formulated as below: 'Hierarchical modular R&D structure can be an effective way for MNC R&D labs to protect their intellectual property and thus facilitate returns appropriation in weak IPR regime developing countries'. This 'hierarchy' includes 'core R&D' and 'peripheral R&D', based on two dimensions--technology value-added, desire and ease of IP protection. While 'core R&D' is mostly done in developed countries, 'peripheral R&D' is conducted in developing countries. Dr. Quan's study suggests that this hierarchical modular R&D structure facilitates the global configuration of MNC R&D labs.
Slides from this presentation can be found at the event link below.
SELECT Magazine interview with Senior Research Scholar Rafiq Dossani about outsourcing
SELECT: What is the current size of the outsourcing market? What percent of U.S. software development, call centers, etc., have already moved to developing nations? Is the amount of outsourcing still increasing?
Dossani: To provide some perspective, although the off-shoring of services has been going on for mans Nears, technology led by the widespread use of the Internet has changed things. The resulting new twist in the provision of services is that the required interaction between the seller and the consumer has been substantially limited. The advances in information technology made possible the parsing of the provision of certain services into components requiring different levels of skill and interactivity As a result, certain portions of the serviced activity that might or might not be skill-intensive, but required low levels of face-to-face interaction could be relocated offshore. The sequence of events that enabled this process is the following:
- First, the digital age allowed (or, at least, revolutionized) the conversion of service flows into stocks of information, making it possible to store a service. For example, a legal opinion that earlier had to be delivered to the client in person could now be prepared as a computer document and transmitted to the client via e-mail or, better yet, encoded into software. Easy storage and transmission allowed for the physical separation of the client and vendor as well as their separation in time. It also induced the separation of services into components that were standardized and could be prepared in advance (such as a template for a legal opinion) and other components that were customized for the client (such as the opinion itself) or remained non-storable. Taking advantage of the possibility of subdividing tasks and the economies that come with the division of labor, this reduced costs by offering the possibility of preparing the standardized components with lower-cost
labor and, possibly at another location.
The second fundamental impact of digitization was the conversion of non-information service flows into information service flows. For example, the sampling of tangible goods by a buyer through visiting a showroom is increasingly being replaced by virtual samples delivered over the Internet. Once converted to an information flow, the service may also he converted into a stock of information and subjected to the above mentioned forces of cost reduction through standardization of components and remote production.
Third, the low-cost transmission of the digitized material accelerated the off-shoring of services. Services such as writing software programs which were off-shored to India in the early 1970s were enabled by digitized storage and, in the 1980s, by the standardization of programming languages. Still later, as digital transmission costs fell in
the 1990s (just as digital storage costs had fallen earlier), even nonstorable
services, such as customer care, could he handled offshore.
The offshore services outsourcing market (excluding software development) is still small and will probably be approximately $10 billion for 2005. It employs about 500,000 people, two thirds of whom are located in India. The rest are widely distributed, with developing Asia and Ireland accounting for most of the remaining employment. About 60% of the employment is in call centers. The U.S. and U.K. call-center industry together employ about five million people, so the percentage of offshore jobs is still small. It is even smaller for other services.
Offshore software development employs approximately another 500,000 people. This compares with U.S. employment of about two million. This is a larger percentage of the total software development labor market. although most of the outsourced work is programming, while work such as systems integration and design continue to be done in the U.S.
The growth rate is still high and there are concerns about whether or not this rapid growth rate will hurt the quality of work done. However. this rate will still likely he in excess of 30% in 2005 and 2006. The reason for this is the massive wage differential.
Clearly there have been massive failures as well as outstanding successes in outsourcing. What are the critical success factors for making outsourcing work?
The infrastructure (telecom. finance, power) has all been standardized, although the solutions might not he the same as in developed countries. The critical success factors are two: the quality of labor and supervision; and managing growth. Unbelievable there is a growing shortage of labor. The result is that the quality of work is declining. Project supervisory skills are also in short supply. Managing growth, especially keeping attrition
under control, training, developing new vertical skills, moving into back-office work, and offering the client turnkey packages are some of the critical managerial factors for success.
Short of being willing to work for $15,000/year, what can western IT professionals do to provide sufficient value to prevent their functions from being outsourced?
The U.S. educational system still turns out a good product. It is sufficiently ahead of the comparable Indian product so that a recent computer science/computer engineering graduate from the average U.S. university can earn a premium of at least 100% over his Indian counterpart from a good university such as the IlTs, with substantially higher premiums for graduates from schools such as MIT and Stanford. The problem occurs more with mid-career professionals. Those with older skills are unable to compete with freshly trained graduates from India. Therefore, they need to update those skills regularly and take advantage of opportunities to globalize and convert them into managerial skills. This may have to he mandated at some point, as has happened in the financial sector, where stockbrokers need to regularly sit for exams to renew their licenses.
That said, most of the offshore jobs are relatively low-skilled. For example, the single largest category of offshore services is outbound calling for the financial services industry for selling mortgages or collecting overdue receivables. The work is routine, based on scripts that pop-up on the computer screen in response to prompts.
Do these findings suggest that developed countries are likely to be only marginally threatened by the globalization of services? Even if high-end work is stays within developed countries, as has happened in the software industry, the problem is that not everyone in developed countries can readily shift to high-end work. Since the 1960s, the shift in the economies of developed nations towards service-based economies certainly increased the number of highly-skilled service workers, but there was an even greater swelling in the number of other less-skilled service workers. This is partly a consequence of the nature of many services as linked, inseparable sets of activities with different
skill levels, combined with a pyramid of labor requirements, i.e., there is more demand for lower-level work than for high-end work. In manufacturing. the unemployment created by the reduction in demand for blue collar labor in developed countries was offset by the absorption of much of the surplus labor into service industries, often with minimal training. But the shift of low-end service workers to high-end workers will require a longer period of re-education and may have significant interim consequences on unemployment rates.
The threat to developed countries is increased by the fact that, apart from software, the largest growth in off-shoring is happening in business services. These are also the sectors with the largest growth in U.S. employment.
Further, there is evidence that even higher skilled functions can be moved offshore or might evolve on their own. For example, interviews with people at a firm earlier this year revealed that they had initially been contracted by an American firm to call its clients with overdue credit card payments. The offshore company eventually purchased the receivables from its client and assumed the collection risk itself. Another firm, Wipro Spectramind, managed the radiology services of Massachusetts General Hospital for its second and third shifts. Thus, American radiologists, who earn an average of $315,000 a year were replaced by Indian radiologists, who earn $20,000 a year on average.
I understand that there is a whole subculture in Pakistan and India of people who go to work in the late afternoon or evening and then work a full day on U.S. time. What effect has outsourcing had on the cultures of the countries that are recipients of much of the outsourced work? Have labor rates dramatically increased? Is it difficult for local companies in India and Pakistan to get quality IT talent?
Indeed such a subculture now exists. It is viewed as very stressful work and not suitable for a long-term career. Companies that do such work try to ameliorate the stress by hiring psychiatric counselors to provide free counseling to stressed-out employees. They also provide free meals and transportation, sports facilities, etc.
However, labor rates have increased only, a little. This is more than offset by
the rise in productivity of this labor over time.
Outsourcing is clearly a temporary solution. As labor rates equalize, the benefit of outsourcing decreases. In Pakistan and China, there are still huge differences in labor costs, but in Turkey, rates are closer to what they are in the 11.5. and other Western states. Realistically, how long can we gain a significant benefit form outsourcing?
India and China, and to some extent, Pakistan, have large labor pools. That is why, in manufacturing, Chinese wage rates have not changed despite massive employment growth over the past three decades. I think that wage rates in India will actually fall because of increasing supply, which is being drawn into outsourcing. This would mean several more decades of benefit from outsourcing.
One way in which developed countries may retain value is if their firms control the work done, either through providing the risk capital or through subsidiaries. While it is difficult to predict which organizational types will dominate, a number of firm-specific factors that influence the liability of off-shoring and organization structure are summarized here:
- The knowledge component of the activity. A higher knowledge component makes the firm more concerned about whether the quality of the service will change due to a location change or the transfer process.
The interactive components of the process.
The ability to modularize the process
Savings from concentrating an activity in one location, leading to
benefits of scale and scope.
Reengineering as part of the transfer process. To transfer a business process, it is necessary to study it intensively and script the transfer. In the process of study, often there will he aspects of the current methodology for discharging the process that do not add value. Very often these aspects are legacies of earlier methodologies that were not eliminated as the production process evolved. During the act of transfer these are easier to abandon than at an existing facility' where they have become a "natural' part of the daily routine. Our interviews identified other unexpected benefits that go beyond the efficiency effects. Simply examining the business processes may reveal previously undetected inefficiencies. During the transfer process, these inefficiencies can be addressed without disrupting work patterns. Workers in the new location then use the reengineered process which is usually more efficient.
The time-sensitive nature of the work.