Science and Technology

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
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SPRIE Graduate Research Fellow
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Victoria Wu is a second year masters student in management science and engineering at Stanford University. Her professional experience includes work as a local TV broadcaster and science news journalist, assistant project manager at Genentech, and consultant in international investment and the video game industry. Topics of past research include business resource allocation, semiconductor materials, and high technology market investment in China. Raised in Anhui, China, she received a BS in Chemistry from the University of Science and Technology of China. Victoria has served as president of the Stanford Chapter of the International Society for Life Science Professionals.

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Rafiq Dossani
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Y2K was shorthand for the potentially disastrous failure of computer systems at the turn of the millennium. The problem: Many old software systems might read "00" as 1900--not 2000--a glitch that could lead to a cascade of errors and malfunctions. Year two thousand came, and nothing happened--well, not much anyway. A credit card mistake here. A satellite blackout there. But no lives lost. No global economic catastrophe. Monday, January 3 was just another workday. Yet with the benefit of hindsight the economic impact of Y2K on America was far greater than the $100 billion-plus government and business spent on fixing the computer glitch. Chris Farrell reports.

Chris Farrell: Remember the dot-com boom of the 1990s? It seemed as if every entrepreneur with a good idea and a PC could challenge established companies for customers. Brick-and-mortar companies jumped on the e-commerce bandwagon. The demand for digital workers soared. Long-time computer professionals hopped from job to job, pulling down more money with every employer. Newly minted college graduates juggled multiple job offers. But when the Y2K problem emerged in the latter part of the '90s business and government quickly realized there still weren't enough IT workers on hand to find and repair the computer glitch. The quick fix? Hire computer professionals overseas. And that temporary solution permanently changed the global economy.

Paul Saffo: Y2K was huge in getting the ball rolling on offshoring.

Farrell: Paul Saffo is director of the Institute for the Future, a high-tech think tank in Silicon Valley.

Saffo: But once they went overseas, they discovered it's not just a matter of cost. These programmers overseas are often better than the best you can get in the United States.

Farrell: Ireland, the Philippines, and Israel were among the more popular destinations for offshoring Y2K programming fixes. But India became the offshore capital. It had plenty of high-tech companies staffed with well-educated English speaking digital workers. Thanks to India's steep import barriers in the 1980s, no one could afford new computer systems. So Indian tech workers were the world's leading experts in the older software languages that needed upgrading. Suhas Patil is chairman emeritus of semiconductor maker Cirrus Logic.

Suhas Patil: And they were listening to their customers and what their needs were, and as the recognition came that systems had to be upgraded to not have the problem based on the Y2K issues, that's how they got their break.

Farrell: And made the most of the opportunity. AnnaLee Saxenian is Dean of the School of Information Management and Systems at the University of California, Berkeley.

AnnaLee Saxenian: I think the importance of Y2K was overwhelmingly about establishing Indian companies' reputation among US customers and helping begin a set of customer supplier relationships that have simply taken off in the last four years.

Farrell: Of course, Y2K contracts ended in 2000. Yet many Indian companies took advantage of their now sterling programming reputations to negotiate for more sophisticated work. Research. Software development. Accounting services. Long-distance medical advice. Rafiq Dossani is a senior research scholar at Stanford University.

Rafiq Dossani: India is now growing at 70-80 per cent a year in offshored services ... services which are maintaining an accounting system, maintaining an HR system, doing claims processing, that's growing easily at 70 per cent, maybe even higher.

Farrell: Offshore also came onshore during Y2K. The town of Mountain View lies at the heart of California's Silicon Valley. Housed in one of the many nondescript low-rise office buildings that crowd the region's business avenues is the Indus Entrepreneur, or TIE. It is a networking base for the Indian high-tech Diaspora.

Shankar Muniyappa: Y2K was a big opening as early as 98.

Farrell: Shankar Muniyappa is director of information systems for TIE. He came to America for Y2K-and stayed.

Muniyappa: Myself and many of us believe still believe this is the place where you need to be if you want to be middle of innovation.

Farrell: Some 30,000 Indian IT professionals now live and work in the Valley. Rafiq Dossani of Stanford University:

Dossani: At least 25 per cent of the start ups have Indian employees at fairly senior levels working for them. And ... there's a whole infrastructure therefore being built around them because it's a substantial number now, so you see shopping malls you see business services and so on catering to this particular immigrant community.

Farrell: That community is adding vitality to the American economy. Still, many American high-tech workers are threatened by the offshoring of white collar jobs. The numbers are murky, but according to Mark Zandi of Economy.com 370,000 non-manufacturing jobs moved overseas over the past fours years-with most of the information technology jobs going to India. Salaries are down too. Still, the big factor behind the loss of 1.5 million jobs lost since Y2K is improved business efficiency or productivity - not offshoring. And Y2K also played an important role in boosting business efficiency.

Economists initially looked at Y2K as a productivity killer.

Imagine a town threatened by a rising river. Every able-bodied person in town is put to work stacking sandbags. It's necessary work to save the town - but it's unproductive work. Nothing gets built. No food gets grown.

With the Y2K bug, programmers, chief information officers, project managers, and other digital workers were getting paid to do unproductive work - stacking sandbags of silicon. No innovative investments. No new productivity enhancing software.

But economists were wrong. Y2K wasn't a flood. Instead, think of it as clearing a path choked with underbrush. Once the trail is open, it is much easier to zip from point A to point B. Y2K gave companies an excuse to clean up their software and hardware underbrush - a critical factor in today's improved business productivity. Paul Saffo:

Saffo: A lot of companies said well, gosh, if we're going to have to spend all this money to fix our software let's also see what else we can do at the same time, so it was an invitation to replace a whole bunch of stuff. ... So it forced people to ask hard questions about how they were using things and in the best instances people really did become more efficient.

Farrell: The result? Companies used the new systems they installed to cut costs and work smarter - and hire fewer workers.

[Voice of Leonard Nimoy: "Do you have hard copies of all your important documents ... such as bank statements."]

That's Leonard Nimoy, Mr. Spock from Star Trek. He's narrating the Y2K Family Survival Guide video - one of thousands of products peddled by prophets of doom. Y2K did bring home how reliant we all are on computers. Many of us still don't back up critical data at home. The same isn't true for business and government. Many learned from Y2K just how vulnerable information systems are to a malicious attack or unforeseen disaster. Case in point: Y2K actually helped some businesses survive 9/11.

[News broadcast of President George W. Bush: "I've directed the full resources of intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice."]

The attack on the World Trade Center stopped trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Against the odds, that citadel of capitalism opened six days later.

John Koskinen: The reason the markets, securities markets, were able to open the Monday after the Tuesday of 9-11 was they still had the test scripts that had been developed in 1998 and 99.

Farrell: John Koskinen credits preparations for Y2K. He was President Clinton's Y2K czar.

Koskinen: ... they were able to in effect take all of those Y2K scripts and make sure that all the transactions with all of the major players would close. Without that they never would have been able to do it in the time frame with the confidence they had.

Farrell: A record 2.4 billion shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange the day it reopened.

Y2K was a unique economic event. Earlier jolts to the economy, like the 1973 oil price hike and the 2001 attack of 9/11, were shocks. But the Year 2000 arrived right on schedule. The surprise was how little immediate impact the much-feared transition had on the economy. Yet we're still living and working with the economic impact of Y2K five years later.

For Marketplace and American RadioWorks, I'm Chris Farrell.

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The role of subnational units (states, provinces, cantons, Lander) in international affairs is a growing subject in the literature on federalist affairs. Scholars of political science have traditionally seen the conduct of foreign policy as the exclusive domain of the national government. This would seem an especially apt observation about India's federalist system. The Indian constitution has given the center particularly strong powers -- so strong, in fact, that some have described it as "quasi federal" because of the lack of autonomy it affords to the states. Yet, there is an increasing consensus that the states have not been shy of foreign policy advocacy. Some have argued that the era of coalition governance has increased such advocacy and, potentially, influence, especially in the context of globalization and economic reform and liberalization.

This paper considers the role of Indian border states in the conduct of foreign policy toward their transnational neighbors and asks whether coalition governance results in more power generally or to some state actors more than others. In particular, we explore whether the effectiveness of a state's foreign policy advocacy depends on that state's position in the coalition. Effectiveness may also be influenced by the type of advocacy -- on ethnic issues, for example, as opposed to economic ones -- and by constitutional limits.

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Rafiq Dossani
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In light of the rise of Asia in research and development (R&D) and the challenge it poses on American supremacy, SPRIE invited industry and academic R&D leaders for a panel discussion entitled "The Globalization of R&D" on February 10, 2005. The panel included Dr. John Seely Brown, visiting scholar, Annenberg Center, USC; Dr. Kris Halvorsen, vice president and director, Solutions and Services Research Center, Hewlett-Packard; and Dr. Yoshio Nishi, director of research at the Center for Integrated Systems, director of Stanford Nanofabrication Facility, National Nanotechnology Infrastructure Network. Participants discussed a wide array of issues, including the economic rationale for new models of R&D, national/regional comparative advantage in R&D, and the coordination of global R&D.

The Economic Rationale for New Models of R&D

Dr. Nishi highlighted the economic rationale behind the quest for new models of R&D. While back in the early 1990s, a $200 million investment in R&D would grant a semiconductor company a one-year lead in technology, by the early 2000s, a one-year lag would transpire with the same investment level. Such an escalation of R&D cost points to the mounting importance of the efficiency of R&D--or as Dr. Nishi put it, the importance of generating "the right technology at the right time for the right cost." The economic forces will not only alter how R&D activities are organized and distributed within and across firms, markets, regions, and countries but also influence the breadth and depth of knowledge searches. For example, R&D alliance might become a viable and lucrative scheme for cost/risk sharing in R&D. The search for non-silicon-based devices might rise in importance as silicon fabrication reaches its limits. By the same token, the division of innovative labor across nations/regions might deepen to further exploit respective comparative advantages.

Regional Comparative Advantage in R&D

One strand of development is the globalization of R&D, which necessitates comparative advantages across regions. Dr. Brown maintained, "I'm moving my analysis from individual firms to [regional] 'niches.' What I see happening is that thousands of [regional] niches are developing all over the place. What's interesting is how dynamic these niches are in building their unique capabilities." The availability of innovative talents, for example, varies significantly across regions. Invoking "the law of large numbers," Dr. Brown pointed out that given its enormous population size, Asia could produce a large number of engineers, even if they are only a tiny fraction of the total population. Currently, the U.S. produces 50,000 engineers every year; the number is 500,000 for Asia--and it is rapidly growing. Meanwhile, more and more immigrant talents choose to return to their home countries after receiving higher education and some work experience in the U.S. Few U.S. companies can afford to ignore such alarming trends. "We need to move with the market for talent," commented Dr. Halvorsen who overseas HP's global R&D activities. Take HP's R&D effort in Bangalore, India as an example. The effort had a humble start in the mid-1980s. Yet, within ten years, the number of local technical staff grew to 3,000. Today, the number is approaching 10,000.

Market-specific demand also pushes R&D to relocate. As Dr. Halvorsen put it, "when success depends on [geographical] closeness, … you need to do design in close loop with the rest of the activities." Furthermore, overseas R&D might well find its way back into the U.S. As explained by Dr. Brown, "The rise of the middle class in China and India at 1/10 of the price point [of the U.S.]" could spur innovations at 1/10 of the price point. Innovations taking place in China or India might be totally unheard of in the U.S. and eventually finds its way into the U.S. market.

The Coordination of Global R&D

While the globalization of R&D brings many promises, it also poses acute challenges to firms that need to coordinate R&D efforts across national boundaries. As Professor William Miller pointed out, "Increase in R&D cost forces specialization. Then you have to put together an assembly of specialists. The problem is that they are everywhere. Therefore, being able to pull them together becomes the differentiator." The story of Li & Fung serves as a perfect example. Li & Fung is a global leader in the apparel business. In 2002, the company contracted with 7,500 factories in 37 countries and generated a revenue of $5 billion. In an industry with thin margins of a few percent, the company continues to uphold a return-on-equity of 30-50%. Yet, Li & Fung owns no factories. Its competitive advantage lies entirely in its expertise in assessing and orchestrating the unique capabilities of each of the 7,500 suppliers. As Dr. Brown summed up, "Making money will depend less on what you own than on what you can mobilize--[i.e. the ability to] orchestrate."

In a parallel argument, Dr. Halvorsen proposed the new model of "meta-national" R&D. Different from the traditional multinational setup, where R&D is orchestrated from the center and diffused to the peripheral, in a meta-national setup, innovation for different parts of the system are consciously placed in different parts of the world. Advances are made in parallel and feedbacks flow bi-directionally.

An even more decentralized model was advanced by Dr. Brown. Dubbed a "swarm ecosystem," such a system is characterized by one (or more) assemblers and hyper-competition among a constellation of component suppliers. The assembler merely provides the focal model with no detailed design, and leaves it to the component suppliers to compete for coming up with the best fit. In this model, the assembler does not orchestrate the development process from top-down; rather, progress is made from the bottom-up. Yet, at the end of the day, only the fittest component suppliers survive and the result is a highly efficient and competitive system that best exploits its own niches.

Other Issues

Panelists and the audience also engaged in lively discussions about intellectual property rights, organizational learning, institutional innovations, the role of public policy, and the impact of culture on innovation. The globalization of R&D--particularly rising competencies in Greater China and their network of relations to Silicon Valley and their worldwide implications--is a new priority area of research for SPRIE.

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Greater China is the most rapidly growing region in both production and market share in the semiconductor industry, and Chinese professionals play increasingly important roles for the development in the region. SPRIE/ITRI cooperated with CASPA in conducting a study to assess the perspectives of Chinese professionals on the rise of the IC industry in Greater China, and exploring the factors influencing their movement decisions. This panel will present a preview of data from the 2005 web-based survey and interviews--preliminary results, insights from the interviews, and potential implications for professionals, corporate managers, and policymakers.

CASPA: Chinese American Semiconductor Professional Association. With more than 3500 members and 10 chapters distributed across US and Asia, CASPA is the largest Chinese American semiconductor professional organization worldwide.

ITRI: Industrial Technology Research Institute. ITRI is a major industrial technology research institute in Taiwan, with more than 6,000 employees and annual budget around $US 5 billion. Many major Taiwanese semiconductor companies, such as TSMC and UMC, are ITRI spin-offs.

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Hsing-Hsiung Chen Visiting Scholar of SPRIE and Director of Integrated Research Division Industrial Technology Research Institute
Jian-hung Chen Visiting scholar of SPRIE and researcher Industrial Technology Research Institute
David Wang Vice President, Fibra Inc. and President of CASPA 2003-2004
Seminars

This two-day research workshop at Stanford University aims to bring together experts to explore the nature of the connections between universities/research institutes and industry in the United States , Taiwan , and Mainland China . Within this national and international context, the workshop will focus on several leading cases, including Stanford University , Tsinghua University in Beijing , and the Industrial Technology Research Institute in Hsinchu Science-based Park. The workshop will facilitate exchange of data and ideas among leading scholars and practitioners from several disciplines, institutions, and countries. Workshop proceedings will be published and distributed by SPRIE as part of its Greater China Networks program.

In recent years, the rise of the Knowledge Economy has underscored the essential role technological innovation has played in economic development. As key institutions in the innovation process, universities and public research institutes have become the center of many theoretical and empirical studies, most of which have focused on the various roles of academia in national innovation systems and their linkages with industry in fulfilling these roles.

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Wena Rosario
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This two-day research workshop at Stanford University aims to bring together experts to explore the nature of the connections between universities/research institutes and industry in the United States , Taiwan , and Mainland China . Within this national and international context, the workshop will focus on several leading cases, including Stanford University , Tsinghua University in Beijing , and the Industrial Technology Research Institute in Hsinchu Science-based Park. The workshop will facilitate exchange of data and ideas among leading scholars and practitioners from several disciplines, institutions, and countries. Workshop proceedings will be published and distributed by SPRIE as part of its Greater China Networks program.

In recent years, the rise of the Knowledge Economy has underscored the essential role technological innovation has played in economic development. As key institutions in the innovation process, universities and public research institutes have become the center of many theoretical and empirical studies, most of which have focused on the various roles of academia in national innovation systems and their linkages with industry in fulfilling these roles.

To date, most studies have been based on the experience of industrialized countries such as U.S. and Japan . Few scholars have examined these issues in newly industrialized or developing economies, such as Taiwan and Mainland China . Linkages between universities and commerce vary greatly among countries, among universities within countries, among academic fields within universities, and among industries. American universities have a long history of involvement with commerce and many Chinese ones have been actively engaged with it since economic liberalizing began 25 years ago. In Taiwan , universities have played a less direct role by comparison with its research institutes.

The nature of the linkages varies greatly. How? Why? With what impact? In broad terms, American universities (including often their faculty members) make money from licensing ideas created in them but, with few exceptions, these universities do not directly own companies. The practice is very different in Mainland China . Its leading universities, including Tsinghua, own and operate many companies. (Its Academy of Sciences has also been a major source of high tech companies.) In Taiwan , the pattern has been mainly for research institutes to spin out companies.

That these institutions can make large economic contributions to society is not in doubt, nor that linkages with commerce can be financially rewarding to them. The focus of this workshop is in the policies and methods they use for generating ideas that have potential commercial and technological value, and how these policies and methods balance commercial-related activities with the teaching and research missions of universities. More detailed analysis and greater understanding of the policies, institutions, and practices on university-research institute-industry relations in the U.S. , Taiwan , and Mainland China is.

As the trend of globalization of science and technology continues, academic communities (including public research institutes and universities) in Greater China will increasingly become important partners in a global innovation system. Therefore, the academia-market interface in these economies not only can shed new light on the ongoing debate, but also because the evolution of such relationships will impact the global innovation system. In addition, university-research institute-industry linkages in Taiwan and Mainland China offer unique cases to study the evolving institutional relationships between academia and industry, such as the roles of ITRI or Chinese universities have played in the growth of high-tech industries in Taiwan and Mainland China . A careful examination of these cases and a comparison of them with leading cases in the U.S. , such as Stanford University , will offer insights into the driving factors and implications of the interactions of these institutions in the process of technological development.

Some of the questions addressed in the workshop:

  • What is the current state of linkages between universities/research institutes and industry in the selected regions? What factors are responsible for the observed patterns?
  • What have been the benefits and costs of these linkages to the universities/research institutes? How are they seen from the industry side?
  • What is the evidence that such linkages create more commercially useful ideas and/or speed them to market? What mechanisms or institutional relationships have worked, failed or yet to be judged?
  • What are the rules under which universities and research institutes operate? What are the pitfalls to avoid in fostering such linkages? Is there agreement on best practices in each region?
  • Where are these relationships heading? Will the boundaries between academic and research institutions and companies become further blurred in the 21 st century or will actions be taken to strengthen the boundaries between them?
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