This op-ed by Kiyoteru Tsutsui originally appeared in Nikkei Asia.

In one of the few unscripted moments in the meticulously planned U.S.-Japan summit meeting last Friday, President Joe Biden referred to Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga as "vice president" before quickly correcting himself.

In a different era, this could have turned into a diplomatic incident, with right-leaning Japanese pundits calling it evidence of the U.S.'s patronizing approach to Japan. Fortunately for Biden, the current geopolitical environment is not conducive to such provocation, and no major media picked up on the slip.

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Much has been made of Suga being the first foreign leader to meet Biden in person. According to the U.S. State Department Office of the Historian, this is only the second time ever that a Japanese prime minister became the first foreign leader to meet a new president in the White House.

The other time was in 1989, when Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita visited President George H.W. Bush. Back then, Japan was a major threat to U.S. economic hegemony. Today, China is that threat, and not just in the economic domain. China is the first bona fide competitor to the U.S. since the Soviet Union, and its threat extends to every nook and cranny of the globe.

To counter China's ascension, the U.S. needs its allies, and Japan is the most important partner for that purpose. This is the context in which Suga visited the White House despite all the COVID-related restrictions.

Not surprisingly, the statements were carefully crafted to send strong signals to China. Building on the two-plus-two dialogue in March, the joint statement touched on the importance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific, from the East and South China seas to even Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Taiwan.

Japan certainly wanted a reference to the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing claims and calls the Diaoyu, and the applicability there of Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Biden administration had made that commitment earlier, calming concerns among Japanese leaders that the new administration may be softer on China than the Trump administration.

Biden has, in fact, been quite tough on China and has given almost a perfect answer to what Japanese foreign policymakers wanted. In return, the U.S. wanted Japan to be squarely on Washington's side. The wording of the joint statement — negotiated until the last minute — saw Japan agree to include a reference to Taiwan for the first time in 52 years, but with Japan's preferred wording, encouraging "the peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait issues."

Predictably, China reacted quickly and strongly, accusing the two countries of interfering in its domestic affairs and warning Japan about siding with the U.S. We have yet to see what retaliatory actions China might take, but the reference to Taiwan signals the beginning of a new trilateral relationship between China, Japan and the U.S.

The summit covered other important issues, all with China in the background. One key issue is economic security. In particular, supply chain decoupling will become a battle cry for the U.S. and its allies as they seek to reduce dependence on materials from China. Semiconductors are especially critical, as they power all the major growth areas in the new economy. Taiwan's dominance in the semiconductor industry is the main reason why Taiwan is so important to both sides.

To remain in the driver's seat in the new economy, the joint statement announced a new U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience (CoRe) Partnership. The most concrete proposal was an initial commitment of $4.5 billion from the two governments toward fifth generation (5G) and 6G networks, reflecting concerns about China's dominance in the key digital infrastructure of the future.

Human rights is another thorny issue, with the joint statement specifying concerns over Xinjiang and Hong Kong. With some companies joining the boycott campaign on cotton from Xinjiang, and China countering by criticizing racial division in the U.S., the clash between China and the U.S. will intensify in this area as well. Japan has stepped out of its comfort zone and criticized China on human rights, following the American approach more explicitly than before. In this regard, it is notable that Suga also referred to rising violence against Asians in the U.S.

One area in which China might be more of a partner than a competitor is climate change, with all three countries committing to zero emissions by mid-21st century. Almost concurrently with the Biden-Suga meeting, American and Chinese climate envoys — John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua — met in China and issued a joint statement affirming their commitment to work together on global climate challenges.

All these initiatives and commitments are potentially meaningful and consequential developments that can reshape the Indo-Pacific, although more concrete ideas are needed before we can evaluate their impact. The biggest take-away ought to be the confirmation that the U.S.-Japan alliance is gearing up for a new era of competition with China.

Japan more than reaffirmed its commitment to the alliance with the U.S., risking its economic relations with China. The U.S. will be sure to ask for more concrete actions from Japan on the basis of the joint statement, and Japan can no longer evade questions about what it would do in a confrontation with China. Japan has to navigate a tough terrain of standing with the U.S. in the competition with China while preventing the escalation of tensions between Beijing and Washington, and at the same time protecting its own national interests.

A new phase of the trilateral relationship has just begun, and like it or not, other Asian nations might face the same decision that Japan faced, and sooner rather than later.

The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the pleasure of hosting Ryan Hass, Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution for the program "Partner, Competitor, and Challenger: Thoughts on the Future of America’s China Strategy." Hass explored cooperation and competition between the United States and China before engaging in a lively Q&A session with the audience. Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

Presently, China is at once a major and increasingly hostile competitor to the U.S., a formidable challenger to U.S. regional and global leadership, and an important partner on a range of transnational challenges. An important and pressing question for many is whether or not it will be possible for both sides to coexist amidst intensifying competition. In his talk, Ryan Hass explored this question by delving into the present and future of US-China relations, as well as the discourse that shapes and is shaped by that relationship. He also discussed the likelihood of conflict between the two countries, particularly surrounding Taiwan, suggesting that it might not be as likely as many of us fear. Listen now: 

This op-ed by Oriana Skylar Mastro was originally published in Foreign Affairs.

A new administration in Washington faces a familiar problem: North Korea is once again testing missiles, including ballistic missiles, in contravention of a UN Security Council resolution. Rather than retread dead-end paths, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has pledged to think anew on North Korea, and it has already distinguished itself from its predecessor by signaling that it will consult with U.S. allies and partners to formulate a strong response to Pyongyang that does not rule out diplomacy.

Such a reorientation is welcome. But if the new administration really wants to move the needle on North Korea, it will need to rethink the assumptions it has inherited about China’s role there. So far, the Biden team has cleaved to the long-held view that the United States and China share a common interest in the nuclear disarmament of North Korea and that U.S. policy there must make use of Beijing’s tremendous influence over the government in Pyongyang. During his visit to Seoul last week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken asserted that “Beijing has an interest, a clear self-interest, in helping to pursue the denuclearization of [North Korea] because it is a source of instability.” Blinken further paid tribute to China’s “critical role" and “unique relationship" with North Korea.

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But Beijing has demonstrated for almost three decades where its self-interest really lies, and that is in maintaining the status quo. China certainly doesn’t want to see North Korea weakened and the United States strengthened on the Korean Peninsula. But neither does it want the balance to tip so strongly toward North Korea that the United States feels compelled to bulk up its military posture. China is toeing a careful line to keep the prospect of peaceful denuclearization alive without provoking Pyongyang or aggravating tensions with the United States.

If Beijing were to do nothing to assist in denuclearization, the United States could lose confidence in diplomacy and decide instead to increase its military presence on the peninsula or even to take military action. But if Beijing does too much to help the United States, North Korea could collapse, and the whole peninsula could fall within the U.S. orbit. China’s North Korea policy is therefore an elaborate balancing act. Through it, Beijing seeks to maintain influence over the regime of Kim Jong Un without emboldening it; participate in multilateral efforts to pressure North Korea, such as the UN sanctions program, without exposing Pyongyang to pressure that could precipitate regime collapse; and offer the United States just enough hope for a diplomatic solution to forestall military intervention while simultaneously ensuring that any resolution contributes to China’s relative power, not that of the United States.

China’s Balance

For better or worse, the past year has been one of great change in Chinese strategy and policy, especially toward its neighbors. China flew an unprecedented number of sorties into Taiwanese airspace, placed trade sanctions on Australia after the latter supported inquiries into the origins of COVID-19, and came to blows with India over a border dispute that had not seen armed conflict in decades. But in the case of North Korea, China has stuck to its balancing act.

Beijing and Pyongyang have been on tepid terms the past few years. On paper, the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty makes the two countries allies. But in practice, the Chinese government has distanced itself from the alliance, stating that if North Korea provoked a conflict, Beijing had no obligation to defend it. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson remarked in 2006 that China was not an ally of North Korea, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has characterized the relationship as “normal state-to-state relations.”

A flurry of diplomatic activity in 2018 and 2019 gave many the impression that the two countries meant to repair and normalize their relationship. Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un met for the first time in March 2018, marking Kim’s first meeting with any world leader. Four more meetings between the two followed, in May and June 2018 and January and June 2019, and Chinese official media noted that the relationship “radiated a new vitality.” But despite numerous exchanges of platitudes since—just last week, Xi sent a message to Kim affirming that the countries’ traditional friendship is a “valuable asset” and seeming to suggest an intention to strengthen relations—Xi has maintained his distance from Kim and his regime.

The 70th anniversary of China’s entrance in the Korean War passed without a summit or fanfare about the nations’ closeness. Social-distancing requirements undoubtedly had something to do with the lack of a high-level meeting but could not explain the absence of the customary propaganda about how the two countries are like “teeth to lips.” Moreover, Xi continues to avoid referring to North Korea as an ally. After his state visit to Pyongyang in June 2019, Xi described the relationship as one of  “friendly cooperative relations,” and on a January 2021 phone call with Kim, he characterized the bilateral relationship as one of “friendly socialist neighbors linked by mountains and rivers”—in the language of the Chinese government, hardly an expression of closeness and solidarity.

Then there is China’s approach to managing international efforts aimed at reining in North Korea. Here too, China has continued the same dance, trying to come off as a team player while restraining the international community from acting too harshly against the Kim regime. China voted in favor of all three of the UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea in 2017. In 2019, Beijing even garnered praise from then-President Donald Trump, who said that China was “a big help” in dealing with North Korea. On March 25, 2021, Pyongyang conducted two ballistic missile tests in violation of the UN Security Council resolutions, and Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not condemn them but predictably “call[ed] on all parties concerned to work together to maintain the situation of detente, and promote political settlement of the Peninsular issue through dialogue and consultation.”

Beijing has always been skeptical of using sanctions to coerce North Korean compliance on the nuclear issue, expressing concern that too much pressure could push Kim to lash out and undermine international efforts. When the United Nations imposed sanctions in 2017, China at first appeared poised to strictly enforce them. But then Beijing quickly reverted to business as usual, teaming up with Moscow to try to ease sanctions. China also allegedly violated the regulations by supplying North Korea with 22,730 tons of refined oil and helping Pyongyang export about $370 million worth of coal. Three months ago, the United States publicly accused China of circumventing the sanctions to aid North Korea, and China denied having done so.

Beijing’s North Korea policy is primarily motivated by a desire to counter U.S. power in the Asia-Pacific region and increase Chinese influence on the Korean Peninsula. The nuclear issue gives Beijing a pretext to call for the United States to reduce its military presence and activity on the peninsula on the grounds that North Korea would halt weapons development if it felt less threatened.

Beijing decidedly does not want a war on the peninsula. Such a conflict could destabilize the region and end with a unified Korea under U.S. influence. Trump’s “fire and fury” approach and his willingness to meet directly with Kim threatened China’s ability to triangulate between Washington and Pyongyang in order to ensure its own maneuverability. The real possibility that the United States would forcibly displace the North Korean regime convinced Beijing to both strengthen its ties with Kim and put real pressure on his government. But the last Trump-Xi summit, in February 2019, was a failure; the Trump administration seemingly abandoned its focus on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and Beijing returned to business as usual.

Biden’s Choice

To set a new course on North Korea, the Biden administration needs to throw Beijing off balance once more. The status quo—in which Beijing enhances its influence over the future of the peninsula and wins international image points while simultaneously undercutting the United States’ North Korea policy—is no longer acceptable. The United States needs to strike its own balance: one in which Washington makes progress on reducing the threat from North Korea while also gaining ground in its competition with Beijing.

Multilateral diplomacy that takes a more incremental approach to denuclearization, such as a freeze on North Korea’s current program, will not accomplish this end. Beijing would welcome such a move, as many in China thought that Trump’s demand for complete denuclearization was counterproductive and that Washington’s alienation of its allies risked spurring South Korea or Japan to develop nuclear capabilities. China sees a multilateral approach as one that affords it more influence on the relevant players and can help ensure a positive outcome for Beijing.

The White House should instead consider pursuing multilateral diplomacy that excludes Beijing or that at the very least does not give China pride of place. Such an approach would be consistent with the predilections of many of Biden’s advisers, who seek a pragmatic tack that does not rely on Beijing’s goodwill. China would likely react by scrambling to redefine its role in managing peninsular affairs in order to make sure that it is not cut out of any deal. China might tighten its relations with North Korea and Russia in order to influence policy through them as proxies. The United States could then join forces with European allies in response, whether to counter Beijing’s overreaching claims in the South China Sea or to buttress democracies against Chinese political interference.

Greater closeness between China and North Korea could prove useful to the United States. North Korea has in effect placed the harshest imaginable sanctions on itself, shutting its borders completely in January 2020 to prevent the spread of the novel coronavirus. The country’s trade with China is down 81 percent as a result. China’s economic leverage over North Korea has thus dissipated—and with it, the effectiveness of sanctions as a coercive tool. China may now work to create new leverage against North Korea, perhaps through positive inducements, which could supply another tool for the Biden administration to use later on. And if Beijing cannot forge closer ties with Pyongyang, it might even seek to ingratiate itself with Seoul—also a favorable development for Washington, as such relations may allow the United States to pursue deeper military cooperation with South Korea’s regional allies without fear of provoking a strong Chinese response.

Some Biden advisers, including Kurt Campbell, have called for a bolder approach. One possibility is for Washington to shift its focus from denuclearization to arms control. Under this scenario, the United States would accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear state and take measures to enhance deterrence against it, such as stepping up the U.S. military presence and tightening military cooperation with allies in the region. China would have a harder time than before delegitimizing the U.S. military presence in the region and just might be compelled to do what is necessary to induce North Korea’s denuclearization, even at the cost of destabilizing the regime.

Biden’s new approach to North Korea must force China to tip its carefully constructed balance toward either complete cooperation or obvious obstruction. Depending on which way China goes, the United States can then decide whether to include Beijing or cut it out of its North Korea policy efforts. But one thing is clear: conducting business as usual with Beijing hurts U.S. objectives in both denuclearization and competition with China.

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Emmerson draws from his recent book, The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century, to frame the struggle Indonesia faces. Internally, Indonesia faces challenges to its democracy and in managing political and cultural diversity. Externally, there is the challenge of trying to simultaneously work within the often-fractured and disunified structure of ASEAN while still rebutting pressures from China.

In this sense, Indonesia must behave as the mousedeer in local folklore and nimbly navigate around its larger rivals with clever politics and policies. But the realities of the situation are much more complicated. Emmerson and Wirjawan take a deep dive into Indonesia's history, culture, politics, and position in the region and how those factors may affect the country's trajectory towards an endgame. Below is the video version of their conversation.

The China Program at Shorenstein APARC had the privilege of hosting Jude Blanchette, the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies​ (CSIS). The program, entitled "What’s ‘Communist’ about the Communist Party of China?," explored the goals and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as what they might mean for the future of China in the global community. Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program, moderated the event.

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the goals of the CCP became less clear. As the country began to adopt market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, CCP theorists were forced into contortions providing ideological justifications for policies that appeared overtly capitalist. Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” came to be seen as a theoretical fig leaf rather than a description of an egalitarian economic system, and by the 2000s, a consensus emerged that the CCP had completely abandoned any pretense of pursuing the Marxist vision it purported to hold. With the rise of Xi Jinping, however, the Party talks with renewed vigor about Marxism-Leninism and the goal of achieving actual, existing socialism. Has the CCP re-discovered communism?  In his talk, Blanchette discussed the abandoned and existing legacies of Mao Zedong, Marxism-Leninism, and the CCP’s vision of socialism. Watch now: