8 Things You Need to Know to Survive in the 21st Century: A View from Indonesia
What will the 21st century be like? Should human beings expect the worst-or the best? After addressing these questions, Dr. Djalal will recommend what nations and individuals must do, in his view, to adapt to what promises to be an amazing period in human history.
Dr. Djalal is an author, activist, film producer, former presidential adviser, and Indonesia's new ambassador to the United States. He will speak at Stanford fresh from the November 2010 summit between Indonesian President Yudhoyono and US President Obama in Jakarta. Since September Dr. Djalal has been his country's ambassador to the US, arguably the youngest Indonesian ever to hold that position. He has published widely on topics ranging from foreign policy to leadership skills. From 2004 to 2010 he was President Yudhoyono's top staff adviser, speech-writer, and spokesperson on foreign affairs. His 2000 doctorate is from the London School of Economics and Political Science.
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Shorenstein APARC scholars discuss President Obama's November 2010 Asia visit
Beyond his childhood ties to Hawai'i and Indonesia and his
self-styled designation as "America's first Pacific President,"
President Barack Obama has demonstrated significant and genuine interest in
Asia and in developing trans-Pacific ties. He embarked on November 5 for the
second presidential visit to Asia during his term, and while there he will
visit India, Indonesia, South Korea to attend the summit of the Group of 20
(G20), and finally to Japan to attend the annual heads of state meeting of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton will travel a week ahead of Obama to attend the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathering and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in
Vietnam, followed by visits to Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and
Australia. Her trip will include an added-in stop to China's Hainan Island. To
address major issues surrounding the President's trip to Asia--including the
"China question" and historic U.S. bilateral alliances--four scholars
from the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC)
gathered for a public panel discussion on October 27.
Thomas Fingar, Oksenberg/Rohlen Distinguished Fellow of the
Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, spoke about the
symbolic aspects of Obama's visit, noting the importance of a presidential
visit for showing a sense of real commitment to the region and an
acknowledgement of the "rise" of countries like China and India. On a
more pragmatic side, he also suggested that meeting in person with other
leaders is crucial in order to "bring about deliverables." The
omission of a visit to China should not be weighed too heavily, Fingar said,
pointing out that the President visited China last year. The stops in Japan and South Korea are tied to
important multilateral meetings, though they will also reaffirm longstanding
ties with those allies, while the visit to India is an indication of growing
relations between the two countries. Of particular importance is Obama's
participation in the G20 Summit in South Korea and the APEC meeting in Japan
because, Fingar stated, a major purpose of the visit is about the "United
States having a role in building new multilateral institutions." Finally,
while much of the success of the Asia trip rests on how well Obama conducts
himself, Fingar expressed confidence that the President would skillfully manage
the visit.
During his visit to Indonesia, Obama will meet with Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for a bilateral
discussion of such issues as economics, security, and higher education. Donald K. Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum, said that the
postponement of earlier-planned visits to Indonesia has lessened some of the
enthusiasm for Obama's "homecoming" to Jakarta. China's omission on
the trip agenda is noteworthy, he suggested, and Clinton's addition of a stop
in Hainan is due, in part, to help alleviate recent tension between the United
States and China regarding China's claim of sovereignty over the South China
Sea. Clinton's involvement in the EAS is an "important multilateral
engagement" for the United States because of the presence of its ally
Japan and the fact that the United States and China both have a voice there,
unlike the ASEAN Plus Three meetings that do not include the United States.
While in recent months the U.S.-China relationship has become more strained,
Emmerson asserted that the "United States is not going to get into a cold
war with China."
Obama will travel from Indonesia to South Korea for the G20 Summit, another
major multilateral engagement during his travels. David Straub,
associate director of the Korean Studies Program, described several significant
aspects of this time in South Korea. While not technically an organization,
Straub said, the Summit is an important forum for the discussion of economic
stability and growth. Similar to Fingar, Straub noted the efficacy and
significance of in-person meetings. The Summit provides an opportunity for
world leaders to have face-to-face discussions on non-economic issues, such as
North Korea's political situation. Straub suggested that President Lee
Myung-bak's investment in the Summit is based, in part, on raising South
Korea's global prestige, which is tied also to increasing the status of the G20
to become the premiere global financial organization. Finally, Straub stated
that alongside the G20 meeting, Obama and Lee are expected discuss bilateral
relations, which are at an all-time high, including the stalled U.S.-South
Korea free trade agreement (Korus FTA). The FTA, which would be the most
significant free trade agreement for the United States since NAFTA, has faced
opposition and mixed support on both sides.
Obama's visit to India will be the third U.S. presidential visit there in the
past decade, which is indicative of changing U.S. perceptions of India brought
about through the IT boom and growing economic ties, suggested Daniel C. Sneider, associate director of research for Shorenstein APARC. Sneider
pointed to a broader shared agenda despite a lack of clarity on some issues,
such as Pakistan, and a focus on India as Asia's "other" growing economy. He
stated that he would be watching for the United States and India to work
together to emphasize India's role in East Asia, highlighted by India's
participation in the EAS. India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has championed
a "look east" policy and expressed stronger interest in East Asia, especially
China. In terms of Obama's visit to the APEC heads of state conference in
Japan, Sneider noted the importance of this trip also for the U.S.-Japan
alliance. The newly formed government of Prime Minister Naoto Kan has
worked to ease tensions in the alliance and both countries hope to use the
visit to bolster a more positive image of the alliance. Certain points of
contention, like the move of the U.S. military base on Okinawa, have been put
aside for the time being. Sneider stated that recent China-Japan tensions have
also served to reinforce the importance of the relationship.
Events during Obama's Asia visit in the next two weeks will help to solidify or possibly call into question his image as the "Pacific President," and undoubtedly influence the role of the United States in Asia for the future.
Donald K. Emmerson discusses possible reasons for Indonesia’s resistance to disaster relief aid
On Monday, an undersea earthquake shook Indonesia's remote Mentawai Islands and triggered a 10-foot tsunami: It has killed at least 272 people, and left 412 missing. The first cargo plane with humanitarian supplies arrived today. Hundreds of miles away in eastern Java, the volcanic Mount Merapi erupted Tuesday and killed at least 30 people.
That's two disasters in less than 24 hours.
Indonesia is no stranger to catastrophe. It is located along the Pacific Ring of Fire, which is one of the most seismically and volcanically volatile areas in the world. Its last sizeable earthquake and tsunami duo struck in December of 2004, killing more than 225,000 people in 14 countries.
But despite the death and destruction of the last 48 hours, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said today that he doesn't yet see a need for foreign aid or rescue assistance.
So far, only the Philippines and the United States have offered to help Indonesia. But Natalegawa's behavior seems counter-intuitive. In the face of disaster, why would any country preemptively say no to aid?
A look into Indonesia's history reveals latent political sensitivities that may have influenced Natalegawa's decision. Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, an organization of countries who are not aligned with or against any major world power.
Indonesia prides itself on its "independent and active" foreign policy, which was first developed by then Vice President Mohammad Hatta on September 2, 1948 in Central Java. "Do we, Indonesians, in the struggle for the freedom of our people and our country, only have to choose between Russia and America?" he asked. "Is not there any other stand that we can take in the pursuit of our ideals?"
The "other stand" became known as "mendayung antara dua karang" or "rowing between two reefs."
Indonesia doesn't want to appear incompetent, or weak, to outside governments, and may also be wary to accept aid for fear of undermining its national legitimacy.
In 2004, Indonesia's acceptance of aid had an arguably negative effect on its citizens. "Though the post-tsunami reconstruction efforts in Aceh were generally successful, the amount of aid did engender some resentment in Jakarta over whether the national government had lost control of the reconstruction, and also potentially altered the economy in Aceh," explains Josh Kurlantzick a fellow for southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. "So people remember that."
Donald Emmerson, the director of the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, cites several reasons for Natalegawa's response. First, he says, if the Indonesian government solicited foreign aid, it would be inundated with offers. Coordinating offers of assistance right now would be a severe burden on the government.
Then there's the question of scale: so far, the destruction seems manageable in comparison to the 2004 disaster. Still, it's unclear whether Indonesia will be able to adequately respond on its own. "Indonesia is a large country, and its infrastructure is overstretched," Emmerson says. "Its capacity to respond effectively to domestic disasters is not as good as it might be."
Kim Jong-un will be like his father: ambitious, aggressive and ruthless
The North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his youngest son and presumed successor, Kim Jong-un, jointly attended military maneuvers on an unspecified date. This was the first official outing of the 27-year-old youngest son of the "Dear Leader." These maneuvers were held just before the Sunday celebration of the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea. David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program at Stanford University, discussed the informal transfer of power that took place last week.
What was learned last week about
the succession to Kim Jong-il in North Korea?
The maneuvers confirmed with near certainty the past few years of speculation
that the third son of Kim Jong-il has been informally designated as his
successor. This process is now public. This is the first time that the name of
Kim Jong-un has been published in North Korea. However, as long as his father
is alive and can govern, he will remain in power. But, clearly, his health is
not good. This official outing of the son seems in preparation for the
possibility that Kim Jong-il may die suddenly. Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in
2008, after which he disappeared for several months. Upon his return, he had
lost weight and appeared stiff and impaired on his left side.
Was Kim Jong-un touted as the successor?
There were no signs until a few years ago. First, it was Kim Jong-nam, the
eldest son, who was favored. Officially, he fell out of the race when he was
caught entering Japan with a forged passport. At the time, he told Japanese
officials he wanted to take his son to Tokyo Disneyland [the target of an attempted
contract killing by Kim Jong-un in 2008, the eldest now lives happily in Macao,
ed.]. It is then the second son, Kim Jong-chol, who was poised to be the
successor. But in Pyongyang, it was thought that he was not sufficiently
ambitious and aggressive. Then, all eyes turned to Kim Jong-un, who has the
personality of his father: ambitious, aggressive, and ruthless.
The main question then was how Kim Jong-un would be promoted. Most observers were betting on a gradual process. In this sense, it is not really surprising. He was appointed as a four-star general, which is a mostly symbolic distinction. He was also made vice-president of the Central Military Party. This underscores how strong the military is in North Korea. What surprised me most is that the younger sister of Kim Jong-il was also appointed as a four-star general. In line with the predictions of observers, Kim Jong-il has mobilized his immediate family to create a sort of regency capable of supporting his son in the event of his sudden death.
What is known about Kim Jong-un?
He was probably born in 1983 or 1984. However, the regime may try to say he was
born in 1982. In Chinese culture-and also in North Korea-numbers are
significant. Kim Il-sung, his grandfather, was born in 1912. Kim Jong-il was
born in 1942. That would put Kim Jong-un in a kind of celestial lineage. It is
almost certain that he attended school in Switzerland, where he was a quiet
student. He had a false name, Pak-un, and one or two close friends. He also
liked basketball. He then returned to Pyongyang. Some unconfirmed reports say
he studied at a military university. A few years ago, it was said he had been
appointed to the office of the Workers Party and the office of National Defense
Committee, which is the highest organ of power in North Korea.
Who now heads North Korea? What is the
power structure like?
The general view is that Kim Jong-il is the supreme leader-an absolute
dictator-and he has tremendous latitude. He bases his legitimacy on the fact
that he is the son of the founder of the regime. But nobody can run a country
alone. He must therefore take into account various factors. In North Korea in
recent decades, the military has played a growing role and seems to occupy a
dominant place today.
A university professor based in South Korea believes that the regime in Pyongyang has greatly copied Japanese pre-war fascism, even though Korea fought against imperialism. The scheme is based on a totalitarian structure, relying in particular upon the military. Information is very strictly controlled and the population is monitored, as in East Germany. The structure remains very closed, and the leadership is afraid to open up to the outside world and receive investment or foreign aid. Finally, family occupies an important place. North Korea is part of China's cultural sphere, with a strong presence of Confucianism. The notion of the state is close to the family structure model. The king is seen as the head of the family.
Does a period of transition put the
regime in danger? What took place before?
It is inevitable that one day a regime that is so rigid and incapable of
transformation will suffer major changes. However, we cannot say when or what
form this will take. But it is clear that unusual things can happen during a
period of change like this. The last transition was very similar to the current
process. The difference is that Kim Jong-il had been clearly designated as the
successor by his father and he had decades to gradually gain experience and
consolidate his power within the system. Kim Jong-il managed most affairs of
state since 1980, when the last Workers Party meeting was held. He was the de facto leader for 14 years. When his
father died in 1994, however, he took three years to formally become established
as the leader. The difference today is that Kim Jong-il suffered a stroke in
2008. Some people in North Korea are afraid that his son had not had enough
time to prepare for power. Kim Jong-un must particularly ensure that the
military is loyal to him. That is why he was made a general.
What legacy does he leave his son Kim
Jong-un?
Although North Korea has said for decades that it follows the principles of juche or self-sufficiency, it largely
sustained itself during the Cold War by trade with the USSR and its satellite
states, and China. It received much help. Now that the USSR has collapsed and
China has turned to a market economy, the economic situation in North Korea has
become untenable. The country suffered a terrible famine in the mid-1990s.
Nobody knows for sure how many people died, but it was certainly several
hundred thousand. Some say that there were more than one million deaths, out of
a total population of 22-23 million people. The government then had to loosen
its grip on the system. This has helped the country recover. Today, access to
basic resources is much better in North Korea than it was fifteen years ago.
The country was also helped by foreign aid from Japan, South Korea, the United States, and China. Now, because of the crisis over its nuclear program, the only foreign aid that comes into Pyongyang is from China. The North Korean regime faces a dilemma: its only resource is its workers. It fears opening up to accept foreign capital and technology, which would expose the people to outside reports that fundamentally contradict the regime's decades-old claims. That is why the few commercial contacts are with ideologically similar countries, like Syria or Iran. As for the industrial project in Kaesong near the border between North and South, it is very closely monitored by the authorities.
What is the situation at the diplomatic level?
North Korea has no close allies in the world. It cooperates with Cuba, Syria, or Iran, but these countries are isolated. Their relationship is either rhetorical or in connection with the nuclear program. As for its neighbors, North Korea does not like them. The South is seen as an existential threat; it is another Korean state, comprising two-thirds of the Korean nation, and has been a phenomenal success. The situation is different with China. Officially, both countries are driven by an eternal friendship, but this is based primarily on strategic considerations. Nevertheless, China provides a lifeline to North Korea.
Finally, I think in the last two decades, Pyongyang has toyed with the idea of a strategic alliance with the United States to counterbalance Chinese influence. But for domestic political reasons and because of the situation of human rights in North Korea, the Americans have never pushed this idea further. The North Koreans have realized that this strategic relationship was probably a dream.
The fundamental problem behind all of this is due to an accident of history. After the liberation of the peninsula from Japanese occupation in 1945, the division between the Soviets and Americans-for practical reasons-was not intended to be permanent. Today, there are two states, each of which thinks that it best represents the Korean nation and that it should be in charge of the affairs of the peninsula in its entirety. It is a zero-sum game. All issues about the current succession flow from this.
Institutions in Play: Who is Paying the Price of China's Bank Reforms?
In an emerging economy like China's, institutions are not yet institutions. They are often the playthings of politics and bureaucratic rivalries. China's banking system is a case in point. Since 1949, banks have bounced around China's institutional landscape as the government tried out first one then another banking model. This mattered little to the outside world until the last decade when reform brought banks to the international capital markets in search of massive amounts of new capital. This did not, however, stop institutional in-fighting. It spread so that today the domestic struggle over bank roles, responsibilities and ownership has expanded to involve international markets, investors, regulators and the reputations of market professionals at a growing cost to the Chinese government and to the banks themselves.
Carl Walter brings to JPMorgan over 20 years of professional experience in a number of senior banking positions across Asia and primarily in China. Currently Mr. Walter is Managing Director, JPMorgan China.
Prior to joining JPMorgan, Mr. Walter was a Managing Director and a member of the Management Committee at China International Capital Corporation ("CICC"), a joint venture of Morgan Stanley and China Construction Bank. He played a key role in the execution of CICC's international and domestic equity and fixed income transactions.
While at Credit Suisse First Boston Mr. Walter was responsible for organizing the firm's China investment banking team and established its Beijing Representative Office in 1993 serving as Chief Representative. During this time, he was involved in a number of significant equity and debt offerings.
A fluent Mandarin speaker, Mr. Walter received an MA in economics at Beijing University in 1979-80 supported by a grant from National Academy of Science. He received his PhD in Political Science from Stanford University in 1981 and earned his BA from Princeton University. He is also the author of "Privatizing China: Inside China's Stock Markets" which has been published in a Chinese edition "Minyinghua zai Zhongguo".
This event is part of the China and the World series.
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Carl Walter
Carl Walter joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as visiting scholar with the China Program for the 2021-2022 academic year. Prior to coming to APARC, he served as independent, non-executive Director at the China Construction Bank. He was also previously a visiting scholar with APARC during the winter and spring terms of the 2012–13 academic year after a career in banking spent largely in China.
His research interests focus on China's financial system and its impact on financial and political organizations. During his time at Shorenstein APARC Walter will continue his book project on how fiscal reforms in China have impacted the banking system, the overall economy and the prospect for financial reform going forward.
Walter has contributed articles to publications including Caijing, the Wall Street Journal and the China Quarterly. He is also the co-author of Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundations of China's Extraordinary Rise (2012) and Privatizing China: Inside China's Stock Markets (2005).
Walter lived and worked in Beijing from 1991 to 2011, first as an investment banker involved in the earliest SOE restructurings and overseas public listings, then as chief operation officer of China's first joint venture investment bank, China International Capital Corporation. Over the last ten years he was JPMorgan's China chief operating officer as well as chief executive officer of its China banking subsidiary.
Walter holds a PhD in political science from Stanford University, a certificate of advanced study from Peking University and a BA in Russian Studies from Princeton University.
Edwin O. Reischauer and the American Discovery of Japan
Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard Professor and U.S. Ambassador to Japan, was a seminal figure in both American education about and policy toward East Asia. In his detailed new biography, Dr. George Packard brings together his scholarship and his personal experience working for Reischauer in the early 1960s.
Re-centering the U.S.-Japan Alliance after the turmoil of the 1960 Security Treaty Riots, Ambassador Reischauer relied on his deep understanding of and sympathy for Japan, stabilizing the bilateral relationship for decades. Packard's insights on this history have bearing today as the United States and Japan seek to build a new partnership to cope with emerging challenges.
George R. Packard, president of the United States-Japan Foundation, is the former dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where he founded Johns Hopkins's Foreign Policy Institute, The SAIS Review, the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center in China. He has been a military intelligence officer, Foreign Service Officer, journalist, scholar, educator, and author.
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