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Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping recently visited the United States to meet with top officials and tour various cities. China experts followed the trip closely because Xi is anticipated to become China’s next president. Thomas Fingar spoke with the Shanghai Oriental Morning Post about the visit, and about the Obama administration’s Asia policy.

How will the Obama administration’s strategic adjustments towards the Asia-Pacific shape or influence Xi’s visit? Given the fast-changing environment and shift of power towards Asia, will there be any changes or differences in the United States’s treatment of China’s anticipated future leader?

The primary impact is likely to be on the discussions between Xi and his American interlocutors. I assume that U.S. officials will want to explain the announced strategic adjustments and that Xi will seek authoritative answers to questions that he and other Chinese leaders have about the objectives and implications of the adjustments.

Contrary to your question, I do not believe the environment is changing rapidly—shifts in the global system and the shift in dynamism and wealth toward Asia have been under way for decades. The United States has been and will remain a part of that transition. The U.S. goal is to ensure that the changes result in increased security and prosperity for all—a win-win situation not unlike what happened when first Japan and then the other “Asian tigers” preceded China on the path toward greater wealth and power. 

What interests Washington most about Vice President Xi? What expectations does the United States have for his visit?

Washington expects Xi to succeed Hu Jintao and understands that he will be first among equals in a collective leadership that constrains Xi’s ability to act independently. But U.S. officials also understand that Xi, like all leaders, brings personal preferences and agendas to the job and that dealing with him will be influenced by his personality, understanding of American culture, and goals for the relationship. Simply stated, the Americans Xi meets will want to get to know him and what he is like.

U.S. officials understand that he is here as China’s vice president and therefore is unlikely to be bringing new initiatives. They do expect him to have questions about U.S. and Obama administration positions on a wide range of global issues and to have questions about U.S. intentions in Asia.

Is the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy aimed at containing or encircling China? Almost all U.S. official statements try to clarify that the United States is not trying to contain China, but its policy focus and military deployments in the Asia-Pacific have made many Chinese scholars doubtful of U.S. intentions. What are your observations? Is U.S. rhetoric consistent with its actions?

I do not like the term “pivot to Asia” and am pleased that U.S. officials seem to have stopped using that term. The United States is not returning to Asia; we never left. I think the basic point of recent statements is that with the end of the U.S. role in the conflict in Iraq and plans to draw down in Afghanistan, the United States will be able to focus more attention on other parts of the world. Asia is, and has been, the most dynamic, fastest changing, and in many ways most-challenging region of the world for many years. The region is also very important to the United States and deserves more attention than it has received. The Asia-Pacific is a region of superlatives—biggest economies, largest militaries, most nuclear powers, largest military budgets, largest foreign exchange reserves, etc. It would be unwise and impossible not to pay attention to developments in and affecting the region and its relations with other parts of the global system.

I have been working on China for more than 45 years and working with Chinese counterparts for 40 years. I must say that I have just about abandoned efforts to persuade important groups in China that the United States is not attempting to surround, contain, or thwart China’s rise. They seem determined to believe that it is the case no matter what we say or do. It is impossible for me to look at the policies and actions of the last eight administrations and come to any conclusion except that the United States means what its leaders have said: that it is in the interest of the United States for China to be strong, secure, and prosperous. The record shows quite clearly that the United States has assisted China’s rise. It also shows that China’s rise has been beneficial to the United States. We are not poorer or weaker or more insecure because China’s people live better and China plays an increasingly important role on the world stage. 

Do you think the Obama administration has changed the direction of U.S. strategy toward China or Asia compared with the Bush administration?

The short answer is, “no. ” The Bush administration was preoccupied by terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan and devoted less time and attention to Asia. Obama is redressing the balance and better aligning attention with current interests. Arguably what has changed is the perception of China held by others in the region. A series of foreign policy blunders in 2010 undercut the success of China’s diplomacy and increased regional concern about China’s intentions. That prompted requests for reassurance that the United States would remain engaged in the region and that the Bush administration’s “neglect” of certain regional meetings was not a harbinger of a retreat from Asia. The Obama administration seeks to provide that assurance and to make clear that we are engaged in Asia because we are a Pacific power with great interests in the region. We are not there to contain or block anybody.

The United States is struggling with its economy and also cutting its defense budget. Do you think this strategy comes at the right time?

Downturns in the economy never come at a good time. The great recession has taken a heavy toll but we are recovering and will recover. We have been spending too much for too long and need to cut back. In my opinion, we also need to tax ourselves more to pay for modernization of infrastructure, better schools, and other requisites of continued prosperity. We are winding down two long and expensive wars and should reduce our defense budget. It will take time to replace worn out equipment and to reduce the large role that defense expenditures played in the U.S. economy during the Cold War, but we will get there eventually. More importantly, now is a good time to reduce defense expenditures and reorganize our military because we do not have any enemies and are not bent on conquering other nations.

Is the “pivot to Asia” strategy concrete or more of a “paper tiger” given the fact that other challenges, including Iran, are still occupying the United States?

As previously noted, the term “pivot to Asia” exaggerates the amount of change. The United States never left or lost interest in Asia, but is now able to devote more attention to the most dynamic, and in some respects most dangerous place in the world. Building a new security architecture that is inclusive—including China—and addresses concerns in and about North Korea is and should be a priority. Forging institutions to ensure continued stability and prosperity in the region despite paralysis at the global level and adjusting to changes in production and supply chains are among the long list of specific issues that need attention. The United States has a stake in the way these issues are addressed and must be engaged in the search for solutions.

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Japan's experience with China's rise thus far suggests an increasingly tumultuous Northeast Asia. For a decade or more, the Sino-Japanese relationship has been punctuated with a series of political crises, and while the two governments in Beijing and Tokyo have sought to define a new forward looking agenda for their nations, it is the management of these crises that have shaped Japanese attitudes towards a rising China. Sheila Smith will present her analysis of Japan's domestic response to China's rise, and how it has affected the constellations of interests that shape Japan's policy response. She argues that these various moments of contention in Japan's relations with China, from Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visits, to resource development in the East China Sea, to the Gyoza "war," and the Senkaku "shock," could have provided the opportunity for building cooperative more effective conflict resolution mechanisms in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Yet within Japan, these various issues of contention have hardened Japanese attitudes rather than produced support for greater diplomatic compromise. As Chinese influence grows, Japan's postwar institutions and policy preferences are being sorely tested not only in the diplomatic realm, but from deeply within Japan's own society. Postwar beliefs about Japan's past, its security and its ability to cope with an increasingly volatile Northeast Asia are all being challenged.

Sheila A. Smith, an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy, is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Smith directed the Council on Foreign Relation’s New Regional Security Architecture for Asia Program and currently leads a project on China and India as Emerging Powers: Challenge or Opportunity for the United States and Japan? She joined CFR from the East-West Center in 2007, where she directed a multinational research team in a cross-national study of the domestic politics of the U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Smith was on the faculty of the Department of International Relations at Boston University (1994–2000), and on the staff of the Social Science Research Council (1992–1993). She has been a visiting researcher at two leading Japanese foreign and security policy think tanks, the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, and at the University of Tokyo and the University of the Ryukyus. Smith earned her PhD and MA degrees from the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. She regularly contributes to CFR’s Asia Unbound blog.

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Sheila Smith Senior Fellow for Japan Studies Speaker Council on Foreign Relations
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Nearly a year has passed since an earthquake triggered a tsunami that swept away entire communities on Japan’s northeastern coast, leading to a series of accidents at the Fukushima nuclear complex. Since the March 11 disaster, Japan is experiencing a growing sense of community, and it faces a potential opportunity for innovation in the energy industry and economy. Masahiko Aoki and Kenji E. Kushida discuss post-March 11 developments, and a related conference at Stanford scheduled for February 27.

Aoki is the Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor Emeritus of Japanese Studies, and director of the Japan Studies Program at the Shorenstein-Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

Kushida is the Takahashi Research Associate in Japanese Studies at Shorenstein APARC, and a Stanford graduate (BA ’01, and MA ’03).

One Year After Japan's 3/11 Disaster will bring together experts from Stanford, Japan, and Europe for a discussion of the major economic, political, energy, and societal challenges and growth in post-Fukushima Japan.   

Looking back a year later, what do you think are important lessons we can learn from March 11?

Masahiko Aoki: Japan has often faced disasters leading to the complete destruction of cities and enormous losses of life. In the last century alone, there was the great Tokyo earthquake of 1923; wartime damage in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and other metropolitan areas; the Kobe earthquake of 1995; and so on. Each time, Japan rebuilt its life and infrastructure anew. Accepting the reality of a disaster and making efforts to rebuild is in a sense deeply embedded in Japan’s collective DNA. However, the March 11 disaster was not only just a natural disaster. People are now well aware that there were lots of elements of human and institutional error in terms of preparing for and coping with natural disasters. Recent geographical studies and historical documents reveal that large-scale earthquake-tsunami disasters comparable to March 11 have occurred four times in the last 4,000 years. It provides Japan with a good opportunity for thinking about how to build sustainable societies and cities.  

Kenji Kushida: Big shocks always cause big changes, and the type of change depends on the kind of shock. With March 11, there was the human tragedy of people literally getting washed away. It also raised the question of how to restructure energy markets, which is an area where outcomes in Japan can affect worldwide restructuring. This particular shock then is triggering a whole set of fairly slow moving, but very transformative changes that could take place over the next few years.

What trends are we seeing in Japan’s energy industry now, and what are the implications for Japan’s future energy policy?

Aoki: When I flew into Tokyo the day after the great earthquake, the city was quite dark. But by the summertime, it was not only lit up, but there was a blue hue to the light—this was due to the wide adoption of energy-efficient LED lighting. Even with the nuclear plants down and 25 percent of the electric capacity gone, there were no major blackouts thanks to energy-saving measures. This kind of incident motivates people to explore ways to innovate the energy industry. For example, Japan’s energy-efficient auto industry took off in the late 1970s in reaction to the Oil Shock.

Japan’s energy industry is currently run by regional monopolies. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), for example, monopolizes everything from power generation to retail distribution. In the past, there had been an attempt to break up the different parts of the power monopolies into separate entities. But only a bit of reform was made because of very strong resistance from TEPCO. Now TEPCO is on the verge of insolvency, so Japan has a very good chance to restructure its power industry. People are again starting to think about breaking up the regional monopolies and about innovation, which several experts will discuss during our conference.

Kushida: We will also draw on Stanford’s being in California to think about how to prevent Enron-style market manipulation and rolling blackouts from happening in Japan. A lot of it has to do with the rules and regulations that create an energy market. In the tsunami-devastated areas of Japan, there is also a tremendous opportunity for ground-up investment in new forms of energy. Silicon Valley technologies and companies can help design the next generation of renewable, sustainable energy systems in those areas.
In Japan, there is a sense that people have rediscovered their ties to one another after the disaster.

-Masahiko Aoki, Director, Japan Studies Program


During the recovery, many Japanese citizens demonstrated a remarkable strength and collaborative spirit. Has this changed?

Aoki: Annually on New Year’s Day in Japan, a high-level Buddhist priest writes the calligraphy for a word representing the spirit of the people. This year he wrote “絆”—“bond” (kizuna)—signifying the ties both among Japan’s citizens, and between Japanese and the generous help and aid that poured in after March 11.

In Japan, there is a sense that people have rediscovered their ties to one another after the disaster. Before March 11, there was some worry that young people were not so concerned about others and about tradition. Many young people now want to become volunteers, and there is also a better sense of community.

What has the impact been on Japan’s economy, and what are the prospects for recovery?

Aoki: There is an increasing awareness that Japan cannot sustain the same kinds of export-oriented, manufacturing-based industrial structures it has over the past decades.

Since 2007, Japan’s net foreign exchange receipts from royalties, investments, and the like have exceeded those from trade. The economic structure is becoming less export oriented, so the March 11 disaster might trigger the acceleration of a more domestic-oriented economy. It might also lead to an increase in foreign direct investment, prompted in part by population aging and partly by appreciation of the yen. Japan will become more domestic market oriented, while at the same time more internationally active. A lot next year depends on what will happen with Europe’s economy, but otherwise the prospect for Japan’s GDP is not bad because of reconstruction demand.

Kushida: Recovering from March 11 presents a potentially more productive experience than the 2008 global financial crisis. In 2008, Japan’s exports dropped dramatically for a few months and then there was a sharp recession that recovered quickly. There was not a whole lot that people or companies could do, other than adjust to the potential decline. March 11 provides more opportunities for innovation at the company and individual level. 

As it is finding growth in the domestic market, Japan has been criticized lately for being “inward-looking.” But two things from this latest crisis are contributing to looking outward a little more. One is the sense of vulnerability and transience, so strengthening Japan’s economic base becomes a much more urgent matter. The second is that in the aftermath of the euro crisis, the very strong yen has also led to a huge move toward outward acquisitions that are becoming integrated with the domestic economy.

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Walter H. Shorenstein
Asia-Pacific Research Center
616 Serra St., Encina Hall C302-23
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-3368 (650) 723-6530
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Visiting Professor
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Research Interests

Asia-Pacific and global competitiveness; national innovation and technology policies; foreign R&D investment; strategy and organization design for transnational firms.

Professional Biography

Joseph L. C. Cheng joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) in 2012 from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign where he is currently professor of international business and director of the CIC Center for Advanced Study in International Competitiveness. CIC (Committee on Institutional Cooperation) is the nation’s primer consortium of top-tier research universities in the Midwest, including the Big Ten Conference members and the University of Chicago. 

During his time at Shorenstein APARC, Cheng will conduct research on the international competitiveness of multinational firms from the Asia-Pacific, with a focus on the JACKS countries (Japan, Australia, China, Korea, and Singapore). The project has two main objectives:  (1) to identify the key competitive advantages of the JACKS countries both individually and collectively as a cluster of economies; and (2) to investigate how indigenous firms from the JACKS countries internationalize and leverage home-based advantages to enhance their competitiveness overseas. The research findings will be reported in a forthcoming book that Cheng is currently writing: Asia-Pacific and the JACKS Multinationals: Economics, Culture, and International Competitiveness.

Cheng is a consulting editor for the Journal of International Business Studies and senior editorial consultant to the European Journal of International Management. He is also a guest editor for an upcoming special issue of Long Range Planning on “China Business and International Competitiveness: Economics, Politics, and Technology.” Additionally, he currently serves or has served on the editorial boards of several other journals, including Management International Review, Journal of World Business, Organizational Dynamics, and Journal of Engineering and Technology Management.

Cheng holds a PhD in business administration from the University of Michigan and a BS (with honors) in industrial engineering from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Walter H. Shorenstein
Asia-Pacific Research Center
616 Serra St., Encina Hall E301
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-2507 (650) 723-6530
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Heeyoung Kwon is a visiting scholar with the Korean Studies Program, and she is also currently a program officer in the Public Diplomacy Department at the Korea Foundation. She has been responsible for organizing bilateral forums such as the Seoul-Washington Forum and the Korea-Japan Forum, as well as KF Global Seminars at the Korea Foundation.

Her recent interests are South Korea-U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, including the possible resumption of the Six Party Talks.  

Kwon received a BA in history from Hanyang University in Seoul, and an MA in Korean studies from the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. The topic of her MA thesis was about the South Korea-U.S. relationship, focusing on the dispatch of Korean soldiers to the Vietnam War.

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For the past two decades China has been a poster child of successful globalization. But its integration into the world economy and global trends drive and constrain Beijing's ability to manage growing social, economic and political challenges. In a YaleGlobal Online series article, Thomas Fingar looks at the global implications of China’s development challenges.
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For the past two decades China has been a poster child of successful globalization, integrating with the world and in the process lifting millions of citizens out of poverty. But China’s integration into the world economy and global trends drive and constrain Beijing’s ability to manage growing social, economic and political challenges. 

Global trends affect all nations, but China may be uniquely vulnerable to developments beyond its borders and beyond its control. Chinese leaders recognize the diversity and complexity of the challenges they face but appear determined to confront them individually and incrementally. How – and how well – they respond to those challenges will have significant consequences of China and the world. 

Many of these challenges center on rising expectations in the face of increasing competition.

Thanks to a fortuitous combination of wise decisions and good timing, China has made phenomenal progress in the three decades since Deng Xiaoping launched the policy of reform and opening to the outside world in 1978. More Chinese citizens live better today than ever before and many more expect to join the privileged ranks of the middle class. Aspirations and expectations have never been higher. That’s a very good situation to be in, but it also entails enormous challenges for China’s leaders because several trends indicate that meeting expectations could become increasingly difficult.

Chinese aspirations have never been higher, but meeting expectations could get increasingly difficult.

Specifically, China will find it increasingly difficult to sustain past rates of growth and improvements in living standards.

One visible trend results from the strategic decision to take on the easiest tasks first in order to produce an “early harvest” of tangible benefits that build experience and confidence to tackle the next set of challenges. By design, each successive set of challenges is more difficult than the ones that preceded it. There are many different manifestations of this phenomenon, including the decision to focus on the more developed coastal areas and move inward to less-developed regions characterized by less infrastructure, poorer nutrition and less education. Other manifestations include the consequences of joining international production chains as low-cost assemblers of goods that are designed, manufactured and marketed elsewhere. Sustained success requires moving up technical and managerial ladders to perform more demanding and better paying tasks. Other daunting challenges result from policies that have deliberately constrained domestic demand with predictable consequences that include increasing inflationary pressures and a nationwide property bubble.

A second category of challenges results from the fact that China now has, and will continue to have, more competition than in the past. When Deng announced the decision to pursue the longstanding goal of self-strengthening by following the model of Japan, Taiwan and other rapid modernizers, he was responding to a de facto invitation from the Carter administration for China to take advantage of “free world” economic opportunities without becoming an ally or having to change its political system. This gave China a 10-year head start with virtually no competition until the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended. China made good use of this opportunity and has since taken advantage of experience and ties forged with foreign partners before Central European states and the states of the former Soviet Union joined the game. 

India, Brazil, Indonesia and other “non-aligned” states stayed out of the game for a few years longer, thereby increasing China’s advantages. Now there are more players and potential competitors climbing the learning curve more rapidly than they otherwise might have done because they can learn from China’s experience. Foreign investors and international production chains now have far more options than they did when China was essentially the only large developing country in the game.

China now has, and will continue to have, more competition than in the past from other emerging economies.

A third set of challenges centers on demographic trends and implications. One is the oft-cited but nonetheless extraordinary challenge of being the first country in history to have a population that becomes old before it becomes rich. Many countries have graying populations – Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia and most of Western Europe – but the others are much more highly developed than China and have extensive social safety nets to meet the needs of their senior citizens. China’s one-child-per-couple-policy has accelerated a demographic shift that normally occurs in response to higher standards of living, greater educational and employment opportunities for women, and the independent choices of millions of people. 

China must put in place an extensive and costly system to support its elderly – reducing the amount of money and other resources available for other goals – or live with the consequences of making individuals and couples responsible for the wellbeing of parents and grandparents. This challenge is compounded by the broader consequences of becoming a society in which there are few siblings, cousins, aunts, uncles or other relatives beyond the nuclear family.

A fourth challenge derives from the highly centralized character of China’s political system. For three decades, China arguably has been able to develop as quickly as it has because it is a unitary state – not a federal system in which the provinces have significant independent authority – with a single-party regime. This facilitates timely and decisive action in response to perceived needs and opportunities and makes it easier to coordinate multiple components of an increasingly complex system. There are advantages to this type of system, but also risks and costs. One set of risks results from the fact that “all” key decisions must be made at the apex of the system by a relatively small number of officials who have only finite time, attention and knowledge. As China has become more modern and prosperous, it has also become more diverse. Different locales, sectors of the economy, interest groups and other constituencies have diverse expectations of the political system. Keeping the many concerns and requirements straight, and successfully juggling and balancing competing demands, will continue to become more complex and difficult.

Looming challenges are under study, increasing the likelihood of avoiding the most negative consequences.

As this happens, it will intensify another challenge, namely, the challenge of being “right” most of the time with little to no cushion for error. Systems with distributed authority are more cumbersome, but they avoid single points of failure. The danger of single-point failure increases as the complexity of issues, number of competing viewpoints and volume of information increases. Logically, the chance of mistakes increases as decisions become more demanding. Theoretically, there exists a point in any system at which the system can be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task. The eurozone crisis may be a cautionary example.

Recognizing these challenges should not be read as a pessimistic prediction of inevitable failure. Indeed, the fact that looming but not yet imminent challenges are already the subject of study, deliberation and debate around the world increases the likelihood of avoiding the most negative or disruptive consequences; mitigating those that cannot be avoided entirely; and capitalizing on the many positive trends toward greater cooperation, acceptance of interdependencies and ability to learn from others’ experiences. 

Clearly discernible trends point to common interests and opportunities for cooperation as well as to challenges of unprecedented complexity. Whether China continues to eschew active engagement to address challenges at the global level in order to concentrate on domestic problems will shape possibilities for international cooperation. So, too, will actions of other nations that help or hinder China’s ability to solve its problems.

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In the year following Japan’s 3/11 triple disaster of the Tohoku earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima nuclear incident, fundamental issues in Japan’s political economy are being debated. Potentially major restructuring of Japan’s corporate and political institutional landscape are on the horizon.

Japan’s electricity industry is on the brink of sweeping reform. Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), one of the country’s largest firms, faces potential insolvency from the decommissioning of nuclear reactors and reparations. The deregulation and creation of a new regulatory framework for Japan’s electricity markets can potentially stimulate innovation, economic growth, and entrepreneurship. Investment into smart-grids and rebuilding of the Tohoku region provide opportunities as well as risks.

Political institutions are also being reexamined. On the government side, the clear failure of governance structures is fueling a debate for restructuring administration of the power industry. The ineffective political leadership during the crisis is causing a re-examination of how politicians, bureaucrats, and firms deal with contingencies. More broadly, the 3/11 crisis has influenced political dynamics, as criticism of Prime Minister Kan’s government fueled its downfall, and the specter of this disaster will loom over political debates.

This conference brings together leading scholars, influential experts, many of whom hold key positions in the reform process, and highly informed observers of Japan’s post-3/11 adjustments.

Brief Agenda

 

Welcome: Gi-Wook Shin, Stanford University

Session I: Reforming Japan's Energy Industry: In Search of Institutional Change to Promote Innovation

Chair: Masahiko Aoki, Stanford University

Kazuhiko Toyama, Industrial Growth Platform, Inc.
Innovation of the Electric Power Industry in Japan's Post-Fukushima Era

Koichiro Ito, Stanford University
Reforming Japan's Power Industry

Discussant: Frank Wolak, Stanford University
Reforming the Japanese Power Sector: Lessons From Around the World

Lunch

Session II: Political Agendas of Japan's Energy Policy: Opportunities and Constraints

Chair: Daniel Sneider, Stanford University

Keita Nishiyama, Innovation Network of Japan
An Insider's View on Policy Processes and Policy Recommendations for the Japanese Electricity Industry

Steven Vogel, University of California, Berkeley
Japanese Politics After March 2011

Discussants:
Daniel Aldrich
, Purdue University
Phillip Lipscy, Stanford University

Session III: The Disaster's Societal Impacts and Visions Moving Forward

Chair: Michael Armacost, Stanford University

Florian Coulmas, German Institute for Japanese Studies
Japan's Societal Reaction to the Disaster

Masahiko Aoki, Stanford University
Prospects for Japan's Industrial Restructuring in the Global Perspective

Discussants:
Takeo Hoshi
, University of California, San Diego
Kenji Kushida, Stanford University

Bechtel Conference Center

Shorenstein APARC
Encina Hall E301
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
(650) 724-8480 (650) 723-6530
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Sociology
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Professor, by Courtesy, of East Asian Languages & Cultures
Gi-Wook Shin_0.jpg PhD

Gi-Wook Shin is the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea in the Department of Sociology, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the founding director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) since 2001, all at Stanford University. In May 2024, Shin also launched the Taiwan Program at APARC. He served as director of APARC for two decades (2005-2025). As a historical-comparative and political sociologist, his research has concentrated on social movements, nationalism, development, democracy, migration, and international relations.

In Summer 2023, Shin launched the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), which is a new research initiative committed to addressing emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges in Asia. Across four research themes– “Talent Flows and Development,” “Nationalism and Racism,” “U.S.-Asia Relations,” and “Democratic Crisis and Reform”–the lab brings scholars and students to produce interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, policy-relevant, and comparative studies and publications. Shin’s latest book, The Four Talent Giants, a comparative study of talent strategies of Japan, Australia, China, and India to be published by Stanford University Press in the summer of 2025, is an outcome of SNAPL.

Shin is also the author/editor of twenty-seven books and numerous articles. His books include The Four Talent Giants: National Strategies for Human Resource Development Across Japan, Australia, China, and India (2025); Korean Democracy in Crisis: The Threat of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization (2022); The North Korean Conundrum: Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security (2021); Superficial Korea (2017); Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War (2016); Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea (2015); Criminality, Collaboration, and Reconciliation: Europe and Asia Confronts the Memory of World War II (2014); New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan (2014); History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories (2011); South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society (2011); One Alliance, Two Lenses: U.S.-Korea Relations in a New Era (2010); Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia (2007);  and Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (2006). Due to the wide popularity of his publications, many have been translated and distributed to Korean audiences. His articles have appeared in academic and policy journals, including American Journal of Sociology, World Development, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Political Science Quarterly, Journal of Asian Studies, Comparative Education, International Sociology, Nations and Nationalism, Pacific Affairs, Asian Survey, Journal of Democracy, and Foreign Affairs.

Shin is not only the recipient of numerous grants and fellowships, but also continues to actively raise funds for Korean/Asian studies at Stanford. He gives frequent lectures and seminars on topics ranging from Korean nationalism and politics to Korea's foreign relations, historical reconciliation in Northeast Asia, and talent strategies. He serves on councils and advisory boards in the United States and South Korea and promotes policy dialogue between the two allies. He regularly writes op-eds and gives interviews to the media in both Korean and English.

Before joining Stanford in 2001, Shin taught at the University of Iowa (1991-94) and the University of California, Los Angeles (1994-2001). After receiving his BA from Yonsei University in Korea, he was awarded his MA and PhD from the University of Washington in 1991.

Director, Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC)
Director, Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab at APARC
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Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor of Japanese Studies, Department of Economics, Emeritus
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Emeritus
Senior Fellow at Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
2011_MasaAoki2_Web.jpg PhD

Masahiko Aoki was the Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Professor Emeritus of Japanese Studies in the Department of Economics, and a senior fellow of the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

Aoki was a theoretical and applied economist with a strong interest in institutional and comparative issues. He specialized in the theory of institutions, corporate architecture and governance, and the Japanese and Chinese economies.

His most recent book, Corporations in Evolving Diversity: Cognition, Governance, and Institutions, based on his 2008 Clarendon Lectures, was published in 2010 by Oxford University Press. It identifies a variety of corporate architecture as diverse associational cognitive systems, and discusses their implications to corporate governance, as well their modes of interactions with society, polity, and financial markets within a unified game-theoretic perspective. His previous book, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, was published in 2001 by MIT Press. This work developed a conceptual and analytical framework for integrating comparative studies of institutions in economics and other social science disciplines using game-theoretic language. Aoki's research has been also published in the leading journals in economics, including the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of Economic Literature, Industrial and Corporate Change, and the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizations.

Aoki was the president of the International Economic Association from 2008 to 2011, and is also a former president of the Japanese Economic Association. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and the founding editor of the Journal of Japanese and International Economies. He was awarded the Japan Academy Prize in 1990, and the sixth International Schumpeter Prize in 1998. Between 2001 and 2004, Aoki served as the president and chief research officer of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry, an independent administrative institution specializing in public policy research in Japan.

Aoki graduated from the University of Tokyo with a B.A. and an M.A. in economics, and earned a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Minnesota in 1967. He was formerly an assistant professor at Stanford University and Harvard University and served as both an associate and full professor at the University of Kyoto before rejoining the Stanford faculty in 1984.

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Masahiko Aoki Speaker Stanford University
Kazuhiko Toyama Speaker Industrial Growth Platform, Inc.
Koichiro Ito Speaker Stanford University
Frank Wolak Speaker Stanford University
Daniel C. Sneider Speaker Stanford University
Keita Nishiyama Speaker Innovation Network of Japan
Steven Vogel Speaker University of California, Berkeley
Daniel Aldrich Speaker Purdue University
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Former Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Former Assistant Professor of Political Science
phillip_lipscy_2018.jpg PhD

Phillip Y. Lipscy was the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University until August 2019. His fields of research include international and comparative political economy, international security, and the politics of East Asia, particularly Japan.

Lipscy’s book from Cambridge University Press, Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations, examines how countries seek greater international influence by reforming or creating international organizations. His research addresses a wide range of substantive topics such as international cooperation, the politics of energy, the politics of financial crises, the use of secrecy in international policy making, and the effect of domestic politics on trade. He has also published extensively on Japanese politics and foreign policy.

Lipscy obtained his PhD in political science at Harvard University. He received his MA in international policy studies and BA in economics and political science at Stanford University. Lipscy has been affiliated with the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo, the Institute for Global and International Studies at George Washington University, the RAND Corporation, and the Institute for International Policy Studies.

For additional information such as C.V., publications, and working papers, please visit Phillip Lipscy's homepage.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Phillip Lipscy Speaker Stanford University
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Former Shorenstein APARC Fellow
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Michael Armacost (April 15, 1937 – March 8, 2025) was a Shorenstein APARC Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) from 2002 through 2021. In the interval between 1995 and 2002, Armacost served as president of Washington, D.C.'s Brookings Institution, the nation's oldest think tank and a leader in research on politics, government, international affairs, economics, and public policy. Previously, during his twenty-four-year government career, Armacost served, among other positions, as undersecretary of state for political affairs and as ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.

Armacost began his career in academia, as a professor of government at Pomona College. In 1969, he was awarded a White House Fellowship and was assigned to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State. Following a stint on the State Department's policy planning and coordination staff, he became a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo from 1972 to 74, his first foreign diplomatic post. Thereafter, he held senior Asian affairs and international security posts in the State Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security Council. From 1982 to 1984, he served as U.S. ambassador to the Philippines and was a key force in helping the country undergo a nonviolent transition to democracy. In 1989, President George Bush tapped him to become ambassador to Japan, considered one of the most important and sensitive U.S. diplomatic posts abroad.

Armacost authored four books, including, Friends or Rivals? The Insider's Account of U.S.–Japan Relations (1996), which draws on his tenure as ambassador, and Ballots, Bullets, and Bargains: American Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections (2015). He also co-edited, with Daniel Okimoto, the Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia, published in 2004 by Shorenstein APARC. Armacost served on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards, including TRW, AFLAC, Applied Materials, USEC, Inc., Cargill, Inc., and Carleton College, and he currently chairs the board of The Asia Foundation.  

A native of Ohio, Armacost graduated from Carleton College and earned his master's and doctorate degrees in public law and government from Columbia University. He received the President's Distinguished Service Award, the Defense Department's Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Secretary of State's Distinguished Services Award, and the Japanese government’s Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.

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Michael H. Armacost Speaker Stanford University
Florian Coulmas Speaker German Institute for Japanese Studies
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Former Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Former Professor, by courtesy, of Finance at the Graduate School of Business
takeo_hoshi_2018.jpg PhD

Takeo Hoshi was Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), Professor of Finance (by courtesy) at the Graduate School of Business, and Director of the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), all at Stanford University. He served in these roles until August 2019.

Before he joined Stanford in 2012, he was Pacific Economic Cooperation Professor in International Economic Relations at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS) at University of California, San Diego (UCSD), where he conducted research and taught since 1988.

Hoshi is also Visiting Scholar at Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and at the Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER), and Senior Fellow at the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER). His main research interest includes corporate finance, banking, monetary policy and the Japanese economy.

He received 2015 Japanese Bankers Academic Research Promotion Foundation Award, 2011 Reischauer International Education Award of Japan Society of San Diego and Tijuana, 2006 Enjoji Jiro Memorial Prize of Nihon Keizai Shimbun-sha, and 2005 Japan Economic Association-Nakahara Prize.  His book titled Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the Future (MIT Press, 2001) co-authored with Anil Kashyap (Booth School of Business, University of Chicago) received the Nikkei Award for the Best Economics Books in 2002.  Other publications include “Will the U.S. and Europe Avoid a Lost Decade?  Lessons from Japan’s Post Crisis Experience” (Joint with Anil K Kashyap), IMF Economic Review, 2015, “Japan’s Financial Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis” (Joint with Kimie Harada, Masami Imai, Satoshi Koibuchi, and Ayako Yasuda), Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 2015, “Defying Gravity: Can Japanese sovereign debt continue to increase without a crisis?” (Joint with Takatoshi Ito) Economic Policy, 2014, “Will the U.S. Bank Recapitalization Succeed? Eight Lessons from Japan” (with Anil Kashyap), Journal of Financial Economics, 2010, and “Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan” (Joint with Ricardo Caballero and Anil Kashyap), American Economic Review, December 2008.

Hoshi received his B.A. in Social Sciences from the University of Tokyo in 1983, and a Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1988.

Former Director of the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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Takeo Hoshi Speaker University of California, San Diego
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Former Research Scholar, Japan Program
kenji_kushida_2.jpg MA, PhD
Kenji E. Kushida was a research scholar with the Japan Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center from 2014 through January 2022. Prior to that at APARC, he was a Takahashi Research Associate in Japanese Studies (2011-14) and a Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow (2010-11).
 
Kushida’s research and projects are focused on the following streams: 1) how politics and regulations shape the development and diffusion of Information Technology such as AI; 2) institutional underpinnings of the Silicon Valley ecosystem, 2) Japan's transforming political economy, 3) Japan's startup ecosystem, 4) the role of foreign multinational firms in Japan, 4) Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster. He spearheaded the Silicon Valley - New Japan project that brought together large Japanese firms and the Silicon Valley ecosystem.

He has published several books and numerous articles in each of these streams, including “The Politics of Commoditization in Global ICT Industries,” “Japan’s Startup Ecosystem,” "How Politics and Market Dynamics Trapped Innovations in Japan’s Domestic 'Galapagos' Telecommunications Sector," “Cloud Computing: From Scarcity to Abundance,” and others. His latest business book in Japanese is “The Algorithmic Revolution’s Disruption: a Silicon Valley Vantage on IoT, Fintech, Cloud, and AI” (Asahi Shimbun Shuppan 2016).

Kushida has appeared in media including The New York Times, Washington Post, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nikkei Business, Diamond Harvard Business Review, NHK, PBS NewsHour, and NPR. He is also a trustee of the Japan ICU Foundation, alumni of the Trilateral Commission David Rockefeller Fellows, and a member of the Mansfield Foundation Network for the Future. Kushida has written two general audience books in Japanese, entitled Biculturalism and the Japanese: Beyond English Linguistic Capabilities (Chuko Shinsho, 2006) and International Schools, an Introduction (Fusosha, 2008).

Kushida holds a PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. He received his MA in East Asian Studies and BAs in economics and East Asian Studies with Honors, all from Stanford University.
Kenji E. Kushida Speaker Stanford University
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Tobacco now kills 90 times more people each year than HIV/AIDS in China. China's tobacco industry is closely tied to the global industry, and the Asia Health Policy Program is working to establish a new field of research on its history, beginning with a Mar. 2012 conference at the new Stanford Center at Peking University. Robert Proctor, a Stanford historian and author of a groundbreaking new book on the global tobacco industry, will take part.
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Beauty and smoking are paired in this vintage-style cigarette poster in China, Nov. 2005. | Flickr/Yeap Ku
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