The 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is scheduled to begin on October 16, 2022. Its outcomes will determine the country’s trajectory for years to come. Join APARC’s China Program for an expert panel covering the Congresses’ context, coverage, and policy implications for the future. This panel discussion will provide expert analyses of what was expected, what was unexpected, how the policies announced may play out over the coming years, and some lesser-covered policy changes that may herald implications for China and the world.
Speakers
Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Previously, he was engagement director at The Conference Board’s China Center for Economics and Business in Beijing, where he researched China’s political environment with a focus on the workings of the Communist Party of China and its impact on foreign companies and investors. Prior to working at The Conference Board, Blanchette was the assistant director of the 21st Century China Center at the University of California, San Diego.
Emily Feng is NPR’s Beijing correspondent. Feng joined NPR in 2019. She roves around China, through its big cities and small villages, reporting on social trends as well as economic and political news coming out of Beijing. Feng contributes to NPR’s news magazines, newscasts, podcasts, and digital platforms. Emily is the recipient of the 2022 Shorenstein Journalism Award for excellence in coverage of the Asia-Pacific region.
Qingguo Jia is professor of the School of International Studies of Peking University. Currently, he is a Payne Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University in 1988. He is a member of the Standing Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. He is vice president of the China American Studies Association，vice president of the China Association for International Studies, and vice president of the China Japanese Studies Association. He has published extensively on US-China relations, relations between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan and Chinese foreign policy.
Alice L. Miller is a historian and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution. From 2001 to 2018, she was editor and contributor to Hoover’sChina Leadership Monitor.
Listen to a conversation with Marciel on the Insight Myanmar podcast, below. You can also read a Mizzima News article featuring the conversation.
About the book
Scot Marciel is widely considered the State Department’s top Southeast Asia hand, the result of decades of experience working in and on the region and the key role he has played in shaping and implementing U.S. policy. He was on the ground in the Philippines during the historic People Power revolt in the 1980s, became the first U.S. diplomat to serve in Hanoi in the early 1990s, was appointed the first U.S. ambassador to ASEAN in the 2000s, and spent the last 15 years twice serving as the State Department’s point person on Southeast Asia policy, and as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia and then to Myanmar during that country’s democratic experiment and its horrific ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya.
Imperfect Partners encapsulates Marciel’s experiences, providing the perspective of an American diplomat who has dealt with the dual challenges of working with foreign governments and also within the U.S. government. Noting that the United States “has a history of not quite knowing how to engage with Southeast Asia,” he highlights the ups and downs of critical U.S. relationships in the region. Marciel explores not only diplomatic successes, but challenges faced, missteps made, and opportunities missed in U.S. diplomacy with Southeast Asia. His on-the-ground witness account of the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations is essential reading, as is his passionate analysis of the gains and the failures of Myanmar’s decade-long opening.
While China’s rise has re-injected a long-absent strategic element into U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia, Marciel warns against making China the focus of that policy. He argues that the United States can best advance its own interests—and support the freedom of maneuver of Southeast Asia—through a strategy of consistent engagement based on a positive agenda and by focusing on the region’s dynamic younger generation.
"What we have in this very readable book are the reflections of an eminent American diplomat on issues of particular significance for Australia as it continues to ponder how it should be responding to China’s rise, and how those responses are likely to affect its alliance with the US." — Dr. Allan Patience
"A new book by longtime U.S. diplomat Scot Marciel, Imperfect Partners, argues that if the United States wants to transcend its “imperfect partnership” with Southeast Asia, it will need to step up its efforts in the region viewing the region as significant for its own sake, as opposed to its relevance to other threats and challenges [...]. The book’s blend of memoir and foreign policy analysis succeeds in providing a rich and nuanced take on U.S. policy in the region. Marciel provides some details on key policy inflection points that will be of interest to Southeast Asia practitioners, experts and watchers, be it being closely scrutinized by Vietnam’s internal security apparatus while setting up the initial U.S. diplomatic presence in the country amid the normalization process in the 1990s, or what he characterizes as puzzling disinterest in communications and messaging by democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi as hopes faded for reform in Myanmar in the late 2010s, which coincided with his time as ambassador there. Readers who are less familiar with Marciel’s diplomatic finesse also get a sense of how he helped advance ties in important ways, with a case in point being his literal elevator pitch that eventually saw then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pay a historic visit to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta in 2009." — Prashanth Parameswaran
Read the complete review at ASEAN Wonk >
"Some of the most fascinating parts of the book are when Marciel shares the lessons he learned about US foreign policy and makes key recommendations of strategies policymakers should consider when confronted with future diplomatic challenges. He is not reserved about criticizing US mistakes and is a full-throated advocate for stronger US engagement with Southeast Asia as Washington’s ties with Beijing deteriorate." — Murray Hiebert
"It is rare that a diplomat or scholar can be so well-versed in a region as diverse and expansive as Southeast Asia, but Scot Marciel’s new book offers an authoritative account of this critical region’s complexities while also being an entertaining memoir of his career in the United States’ government [...] The book makes a compelling case for American policymakers to engage more seriously with Southeast Asia and provides clear guidelines for the best way to do it." — Hunter Marston
"Marciel has created a masterful overview of the diplomatic history of the US and Southeast Asia. Recognizing that US policy has not been unified since the region itself is not a cohesive unit, he argues that neither the US nor the countries of Southeast Asia were perfect partners, engaging one another based on various external and internal stimuli as they collaborated. The author relates personal experiences from his 35 years of diplomatic service in the region to illuminate the ebb and flow of US policy, making this tome part autobiography and part history. Rather than thoroughly reviewing every event, he highlights each relationship with the different countries through interweaving stories. Marciel then examines the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and how the US has worked with this weaker but still important regional organization. He finishes by discussing China's rising influence in Southeast Asia and provides thoughts on how the US can better engage with the region. Even though the book is rich with insight and thoroughly documented, readers should find it a quick and easy read because of its personal narrative style."—David Bath
"Imperfect Partners is a major addition to our understanding of the complicated relationship between the US and Southeast Asia over several decades. Part memoir and multiple parts deft analysis of the delicate art of diplomacy in a highly diverse region of 10 countries, 600 million people, the world’s fifth-largest economy, a key strategic region for global trade in China’s backyard [...], this book’s scope makes it hard to fathom why there isn’t more interest in Southeast Asia in Washington D.C." — David Scott Mathieson
"As a career diplomat, [Scot Marciel] had a distinctive vantage point as an expert on Southeast Asia within the US government regardless of the political stripes of the president in the White House. In Imperfect Partners, he brings readers through the evolution of US involvement and interest in Southeast Asia from Reagan through Trump." — Chong Ja Ian
"The former diplomat says the US needs to keep showing up and boost relations in Southeast Asia. In an area 'long skeptical of US staying power in the region, showing up consistently at the highest levels is essential,' he writes, adding that Washington needs to be a 'consistent, reliable and good partner.' Marciel is extremely qualified to write about the US and Southeast Asia. Over 35 years, he held senior Asia posts in Washington, and was ambassador to ASEAN, to Indonesia, and to Myanmar — before the calamitous February 2021 coup. His book is part-memoir and part-primer, with a background that would be helpful to potential investors or people new to Southeast Asia." — Richard Borsuk
"U.S. policymakers, including me, have struggled for years to figure out how best to work with Southeast Asia as a region. This reflects both the lack of expertise (in academia and government) about the region and the inherent difficulty of dealing with a highly diverse group of countries that has neither a powerful central institution nor a dominant member that can speak on behalf of the members."—Scot Marciel
"For the United States, Southeast Asia is one of the most important and least understood parts of the world. Scot Marciel draws on his vast diplomatic experience to bring a wealth of illuminating stories, hard-earned insights, and wise analysis to bear on a region that will help determine our capacity to deal with the most pressing issues of the 21st century. . . . Imperfect Partners is an indispensable resource for anyone seeking to understand Southeast Asia and America’s relationship with its countries and people." —Ben Rhodes, former deputy national security advisor and author of After the Fall
"Drawing on his 35 years of diplomatic experience, Scot Marciel has written an illuminating survey of the United States' relations with Southeast Asia. . . . This is an excellent primer on a part of the world whose significance has grown substantially in recent years with the rise of neighboring China." —John Negroponte, career diplomat, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the first director of national intelligence
"Ambassador Scot Marciel has written a gem of a book. His thoughtfully researched account is brought to life with fascinating insights and captivating, on-the-scene anecdotes. . . . Imperfect Partners is a must-read for U.S. policymakers, business leaders, academics, humanitarians, and everyday Americans engaging with the nations of Southeast Asia." —Kristie Kenney, former State Department counselor and U.S. ambassador to Thailand, the Philippines, and Ecuador
"A master practitioner has provided us with a ring-side view of how our diplomats pursue American interests in Southeast Asia. This is must reading for aspiring Southeast Asia hands who want to familiarize themselves with American regional diplomacy. It’s also indispensable reading for American strategists, who will ignore Ambassador Marciel’s policy prescriptions at their peril." —Dave Shear, former assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs and U.S. ambassador to Vietnam
Established in 1980 and presented by the Ishibashi Tanzan Memorial Foundation, the annual award recognizes excellence in the fields of politics, economics, international relations, society, and culture. It honors individuals who have contributed to advancing the legacy of former Japanese Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan and his ideas on liberalism, democracy, and international peace. Tsutsui’s book explores the paradox underlying the global expansion of human rights, examines Japan’s engagement with human rights ideas and instruments, and assesses their impacts on domestic politics around the world.
“I’m deeply honored to receive this prestigious award, especially in this historical moment in which commitment to the international liberal order is ever more critical,” says Tsutsui, who is also director of APARC’s Japan Program, APARC’s deputy director, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the co-director of the Center for Human Rights and International Justice. “Among all the Japanese Prime Ministers in history, no one demonstrated a more unwavering commitment to liberalism than Ishibashi Tanzan, and I’m especially pleased that my book on global human rights has received this recognition bearing his name. There’s also a personal connection for me, as my father is the author of the first social science book on Ishibashi Tanzan and I helped with his research as a middle school student, making copies of relevant newspapers.”
In an APARC interview about the book, Tsutsui explains the tension inherent in the diffusion of global human rights, which is rooted in states’ embracing these universal rights although they are grounded in principles that constrain their sovereignty. “The end of the Cold War enabled the United Nations to engage in human rights activities free from Cold War constraints, and now those states that committed to human rights without thinking about the consequences have to face a world in which their violations can become a real liability for them,” he notes.
Tsutsui believes that Japan has an opportunity to become a global leader in human rights. “The more inwardly oriented United States is creating a vacuum in promotion and protection of liberal values, especially with China’s influence surging, and Japan should carry the torch taking the mantle of human rights, democracy, and rule of law,” he argues.
Tsutsui’s research interests lie in political and comparative sociology, social movements, globalization, human rights, and Japanese society. His current projects examine issues including changing conceptions of nationhood and minority rights in national constitutions and in practice, populism and the future of democracy, the global expansion of corporate social responsibility, and Japan’s public diplomacy and perceptions of Japan in the world.
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Q&As
New Book by Stanford Sociologist Kiyoteru Tsutsui Probes the Decoupling of Policy and Practice in Global Human Rights
In his new book, Shorenstein APARC’s Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui explores the paradox underlying the global expansion of human rights and Japan’s engagement with human rights ideas and instruments. Japan, he says, has an opportunity to become a leader in human rights in Asia and in the world.
Reflections on the Assassination of Former Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe
Abe was one of the most transformative political leaders in modern Japanese history, and his passing will change Japanese politics in a number of ways, most immediately shaking up internal politics within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. To honor Abe’s legacy, we all need to reassert our resolve to protect our democracy in Japan, the United States, and all over the world.
APARC Invites Fall 2023 Asia Studies Fellowship Applications
The Center offers a suite of fellowships for Asia researchers to begin fall quarter 2023. These include postdoctoral fellowships on contemporary Japan and the Asia-Pacific region, inaugural postdoctoral fellowships and visiting scholar positions with the newly launched Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, and fellowships for experts on Southeast Asia.
The Ishibashi Tanzan Memorial Foundation recognizes Tsutsui, the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, for his book 'Human Rights and the State.'
Since Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has advocated “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” Vision in 2016, various scholars have analyzed policy formulation process of FOIP. Most of them refer to the rise of China as an influential power in the Indo-Pacific region with its own initiative, namely, the Belt and Road Initiative as a major factor which prompted the Second Abe Administration to launch FOIP.
It is the contention of this presentation that the current configuration of the Japanese political institutions has made it possible for the Second Abe administration to launch and pursue such a comprehensive strategy while an international factor is important. It demonstrates that a series of political reforms since 1990s have strengthened the power of the prime minister as an institution to initiate key cabinet policies and coordinate policy formulation among different ministries. The strong institutional foundation of the Japanese prime ministerial power has made it possible for the Abe administration to effectively pursue such a broad vision, engaging various ministries and organizations.
The existing research on Japan's diplomacy often evaluates Japan as a passive state. It considers that in the past Japan only responded to foreign pressure while it did not proactively push forward its own policies. The presentation suggests that Japan has changed and become more eloquent as a result of changes in domestic political institutions.
Speaker
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Harukata Takenaka is a professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo. He holds a PhD from Stanford University and a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Tokyo.
His key research areas are the role the prime minister in Japanese politics, changes in Japanese external policy, and democratization in Pre-war Japan.
Prof. Takenaka’s recent publications include: “Kyokoku Chugoku” to Taijisuru Indo-Taiheiyo Shokoku [Indo-Pacific Nations facing China aspiring to be a “Great Country”](edited) (Tokyo: Chikura Shobo, 2022), “Evolution of Japanese security policy and the House of Councilors,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, 22:2, (June 2021), 96-115, Korona Kiki no Seiji [Politics of Covid 19 Crisis](Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2020), “Expansion of the Japanese prime minister’s power in the Japanese parliamentary system: Transformation of Japanese politics and the institutional reforms,”Asian Survey,59:5:844-869 (September 2019); Futatsu no Seiken Kotai [Two Changes of Government] (edited) (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2017); Failed Democratization in Prewar Japan (Stanford University Press 2014),
How is India posturing to manage strategic competition in the Indian Ocean? Thus far US-China security competition has been most acute in the western Pacific, but Chinese capability growth and strategic policies suggest that it also seeks a leading role in the northern Indian Ocean, in the not-too-distant future. India has traditionally considered itself the natural dominant power in the Indian Ocean region, but it has never faced the scale and types of competition that China will present. Does India have the wherewithal to maintain its leadership in the region? How will India work with the United States, bilaterally and through groupings such as the Quad, as they seek to maintain the status quo in the face of Chinese challenges? Is the Indian Ocean bound for militarized competition, or can India, the US, and China find a pathway to strategic coexistence?
Panelist
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Dr. Sinderpal Singh is Senior Fellow and Assistant Director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, and concurrently Coordinator of the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. In the fall of 2022, he has been appointed as the McCain Fulbright Scholar in Residence at the United States Naval Academy. His research interests include the international relations of South Asia with a special focus on Indian foreign policy, the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region, and India-Southeast Asia relations. He is currently writing a book on India’s role in the Indian Ocean since 1992 and is the author of India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy from Nehru to the BJP (Routledge 2013). He received his Ph.D. from the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, his MA from the Australian National University, and his BA from the National University of Singapore.
Moderator
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Dr. Arzan Tarapore is the South Asia research scholar at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, where he leads the newly-restarted South Asia Initiative. His research focuses on military strategy, Indian defense policy, and contemporary Indo-Pacific security issues. Prior to his scholarly career, he served as an analyst in the Australian Defence Department. Arzan holds a Ph.D. in war studies from King’s College London.
Sinderpal Singh
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, and South Asia Programme
Senior Fellow, Assistant Director
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
Following the launch of his new book, America's Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing U.S. Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition, Wyne joins the China Program’s Author Series to discuss how the United States must avoid complacency and consternation in appraising China and Russia. Rather than attempting the unfeasible—countering their current and future initiatives and forestalling subsequent provocations—Wyne argues that Washington should formulate a more practical, creative, and sustainable foreign policy that can advance U.S. national interests regardless of what steps Beijing and Moscow take, and that recent competitive missteps give the U.S. space to undertake this task.
For more information about America's Great-Power Opportunity or to purchase a copy, please click here.
Speaker
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Ali Wyne is a Senior Analyst at the Eurasia Group’s Global Macro Geopolitics practice and Author of the brand-new book America’s Great Power Opportunity: Revitalizing U.S. Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition.
Xiao Ren joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as visiting scholar for the 2022-2023 fall quarter. He serves as Professor at Fudan University, Institute of International Studies, as well as Director for the university's Center for the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy. While at APARC, he conducted research exploring ideas and ways for China and the U.S. to better manage their competition during the Biden administration and Xi Jinping's leadership.
Laura M. Stone joined the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as Visiting Scholar and China Policy Fellow for the 2022-2023 and 2023-2024 academic years. She currently serves the U.S. Department of State, recently as Deputy Coordinator for the Secretary's Office for COVID Response and Health Security. While at APARC, she conducted research with the China Program and Professor Jean Oi regarding contemporary China affairs and U.S.-China policy.
Professor Jia Qingguo joined the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) as Visiting Scholar and Payne Distinguished Fellow for the 2022 fall quarter. He currently serves as Professor at the School of International Studies at Peking University. While at APARC, he conducted research on the state and future development of U.S.-China policy.
One often hears that China is “winning” the competition with the United States in Southeast Asia. This strategically important region is home to 650 million people, and collectively is the world’s fifth-largest economy and the US’s fourth-largest export market.
While serious competition is indeed a reality, it is not particularly useful to think of it in terms of one side “winning,” as if it were a sporting match. Southeast Asia is not a prize to be won. Countries there want to have good relations with both China and the US, but do not want to be dominated by either. They are strongly committed to their own independence and sovereignty. The American goal should not be to “win” but rather to maintain sufficiently strong relationships and influence to advance its many goals. The US should also provide the gravitational pull needed to help Southeast Asians maintain maximum independence and freedom of maneuver in the face of a rising China that sees the region as its sphere of influence.
To achieve this goal, Washington needs to engage consistently at all levels—starting with the president—and with that engagement, the US should bring a positive agenda that is not all about China. Even that, however, will not be enough should the US fail to bolster its economic game. In an area of the world that prioritizes economics, the US has steadily lost ground to China, especially on trade and infrastructure. This trend has reached the point that it is common to hear Southeast Asians say they view the US as their security partner and China as their economic partner. The harsh reality is that, even with still-strong security partnerships, it is hard to imagine the US being able to sustain its overall influence in the region if it continues to lose ground economically.
Southeast Asia is not a prize to be won. Countries there want to have good relations with both China and the US, but do not want to be dominated by either.
The numbers tell part of the story. While US merchandise trade with the Southeast Asian region grew by a respectable 62.4% from 2010 to 2019 (the last pre-pandemic year), China’s trade increased by an impressive 115% during the same period, according to the statistics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Over a longer period, the US share of the region’s total merchandise trade fell from 16.1% in 2000 to 11.6% in 2020, while China’s share rose from 4.3% to 19.4%. Although infrastructure investment numbers are harder to come by, there is no question that China is playing a much more significant role in Southeast Asian infrastructure development than the US.
Some of the relative decline in the US economic role in the region is the inevitable result of China’s dramatic economic growth and the resulting increased trade and investment. That trend, however, only partly explains the US predicament. Over the past 10–20 years, Beijing has been much more aggressive in its economic statecraft than Washington. Beijing signed a Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN, then joined a new multilateral trade agreement—the Regional Cooperation and Economic Partnership (RCEP)—and more recently asked to join the high-standard Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) free trade accord. On infrastructure, China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the high-profile Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to funnel billions of dollars into infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
The BRI initiative generally has been welcomed in the region for one simple reason: Southeast Asia has huge and urgent infrastructure needs—estimated by the Asian Development Bank to be $210 billion per year through 2030—that it cannot meet by mobilizing domestic resources. Through BRI, Beijing is offering to meet a portion of those needs with greater speed and fewer conditions than other would-be partners. Southeast Asian governments have lined up for BRI projects, with outgoing Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, Indonesian President Joko Widodo, and former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razaq having signed on for more than $20 billion of BRI-funded infrastructure projects in the 2015–2018 period. Although the BRI has been the subject of substantial criticism for overpromising, project delays, quality problems, employing Chinese rather than local labor, and raising the host government’s debt obligations, the initiative still dominates the discussion of infrastructure in the region.
The US, meanwhile, has underperformed in terms of its economic diplomacy. Most importantly, in 2017 it summarily withdrew from its primary economic initiative in the region, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement. President Trump’s decision to pull out of that accord was a severe geostrategic and economic blunder, as TPP would have bound the US into the broader region for a generation or more, as well as facilitated greater US trade with a number of fast-growing economies. With the US out of the TPP and China joining RCEP, the prospects are for a growing percentage of ASEAN trade to be with China (and other RCEP partners) and for the US and American businesses to lose further ground.
The US does not need to match Chinese numbers. It does, however, need to find a way to become a more significant player in Southeast Asian infrastructure.
The US also has struggled to compete on infrastructure. The US is not going to match China, particularly in areas such as road, rail, and port development, but it could do more. The Trump administration launched several initiatives—including the Blue Dot Network, Clean EDGE Asia, and the establishment of the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a larger, more ambitious version of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a federal entity that helps insure US ventures abroad—all of which sought to leverage private sector funding to offer high-quality projects. The Biden administration has followed up with the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, announced in June in coordination with G-7 partners, and promised via the Quad $50 billion in infrastructure funding. To date, however, these initiatives generally have not significantly changed the overall infrastructure picture in the region.
The US failure to engage in the region’s burgeoning free trade networks—combined with the big splash that China’s BRI initiative is making and the lack of a countervailing American initiative—is fueling the perception in the region that the US is a declining economic player. In an ASEAN 2021 survey of regional opinion leaders, 76% believed China was the most influential economic partner in the region, compared to less than 10% who felt that way about the US. Even more telling, I recall asking a senior Myanmar economic minister in 2017 why he had led private-sector roadshows to China, Japan, and South Korea but not the US, and he replied: “We didn’t even think of the US.”
Thus, the US faces a problem of both reality and perception. To address this, the US does not need to match Chinese numbers. It does, however, need to find a way to re-energize its trade engagement and to become a more significant player in Southeast Asian infrastructure, and to do so in ways that change the narrative in the region.
Recognizing this reality, the Biden administration recently launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which is expected to result in negotiations on trade, supply chains, clean energy, and decarbonization, as well as on tax and corruption issues. The administration touted this initiative as reflecting the needs and realities of the 21st-century global economy. The good news is that seven of the ten ASEAN member nations signed onto IPEF, presumably reflecting their interest in greater US economic engagement and their hope that IPEF can produce just that. Skeptics say the initiative does not offer the promise of greater access to the US market via tariff reductions, which normally would be the carrot to entice other governments into adopting the high standards Washington wants. Also, as Matthew Goodman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has pointed out, the fact that the administration is unwilling to take any negotiated agreement to Congress for ratification is likely to raise doubts in the minds of Asian partners about the IPEF’s durability, since a future administration can easily toss it aside.
Despite or maybe because of these doubts, the US needs to do all it can to turn the IPEF into something that is economically meaningful. Can it produce a digital trade agreement, real substance on strengthening supply chains, or can it possibly even use trade facilitation tools to enhance market access as former senior US trade official Wendy Cutler has suggested in a recent podcast hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies? It is too early to say, but the bottom line is that many in the region—and indeed even in the US—will remain privately doubtful until and unless the IPEF shows that it can result in tangible business and economic benefits.
The US will have to make it easier for Southeast Asian governments to say “yes” to deals. That means offering the full project package, including financing, and accelerating the project preparation and approval timeline to come closer to matching that of the Chinese.
The White House put the IPEF forward because it believes it lacks the political support either to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership or to launch another significant trade initiative. The domestic politics of trade might be tough right now, but that is not an excuse that is going to go very far in Southeast Asia. The region is not going to say “no problem, we understand.” Instead, it will go ahead without the US. If Washington wants to maintain influence, it needs to find a way to make the domestic politics on trade work. That almost certainly will entail appealing to bipartisan concern about Chinese geostrategic dominance, as trade alone probably will not sell.
On infrastructure, the various US initiatives to date have disappointed to some extent, although the Development Finance Corporation has been a step in the right direction. They do little other than offer the prospect of quality to give the US a competitive edge over Chinese-funded projects. The Chinese offer relatively speedy approval processes, low or zero conditionality deals, and complete project packages, including financing. Chinese state companies often are willing to undertake projects that do not appear to be commercially viable. Plus, Chinese political leaders weigh in personally to push the projects forward. I have seen this on the ground, in Indonesia and Myanmar, countless times. The Chinese pull out all of the stops, with intensive lobbying and full financing, and they often win.
Flags of ASEAN member states
Economic officials in the region complain that the multilateral development banks and Japan, which also offer substantial infrastructure deals, move much more slowly and laboriously than China. The design, discussion, and approval process often takes many years. With the US, it is almost always the private sector taking the lead, and private American companies have a hard time finding well-developed, “bankable” infrastructure projects in the region. Plus, US companies often come to the table without full financing or even all the pieces of the project. Government lobbying and financing usually lags, if it is there at all.
If the US is going to compete effectively for infrastructure projects in the region, it is going to have to change the way it does business. To begin with, the US will have to make it easier for Southeast Asian governments to say “yes” to deals. That means offering the full project package, including financing, and accelerating the project preparation and approval timeline to come closer to matching that of the Chinese. It also means more government funding for project development along with heavy US government lobbying, including by the president when appropriate, for major projects. The US is not going to engage in bribery or support projects that destroy communities or the environment, nor should it. But it needs to use just about all the other available tools to compete.
The US should consider establishing an overseas infrastructure czar in Washington who can lead and oversee government-business teams that identify potential projects where the US can compete, put together a full project package, including private and public financing, and then aggressively lobby the host government for approval. I often hear that the US does not work that way on overseas business. Perhaps, but if Washington wants to win some victories—and more significant projects—it needs to be willing to adopt new thinking.
Re-engaging on trade and winning more infrastructure deals are essential, but there is one more thing the US needs to do to reverse the perception that it is a declining economic player in Southeast Asia. It needs to do a much better job of telling its economic story. For example, the US remains the largest foreign investor in Southeast Asia, but I am willing to bet few people in the region know that. Similarly, America remains a huge market for Southeast Asian exports, just slightly smaller than China, but again that is not well known or much talked about in the region. The US should devote more resources and time to telling this story and to reminding the region of the incredible power of American private sector innovation and the US commitment to quality investment. Better communications alone will not solve the problem, but combined with trade and infrastructure initiatives it can help the US persuade the governments and people of Southeast Asia that it remains a major economic partner.
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News
Shining a Light on Myanmar’s Multidimensional Crises
As the devastating effects of the coup in Myanmar and post-coup conflicts have resulted in escalating humanitarian emergencies, APARC’s Southeast Asia Program and Asia Health Policy Program examine the shifting contours of war and the prospects for a better future for Myanmar’s people.
Rethinking China’s Influence in Southeast Asia: The Role of Non-State Actors and Unintended Consequences
Departing from international relations scholarship and popular media accounts that tend to portray China as a great power intent on establishing a sphere of influence in Southeast Asia, Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Fellow on Southeast Asia Enze Han argues for conceptualizing China as an unconventional great power whose diverse actors, particularly non-state ones, impact its influence in the region.
ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus ‘Not Appropriate’ for Myanmar: Ex-US Ambassador
The Irrawaddy spoke to Scot Marciel, former United States ambassador to Myanmar and currently a visiting scholar at APARC, about the current state of regional and international efforts to tackle the Myanmar crisis.
The harsh reality is that, even with still-strong security partnerships, it is hard to imagine the US being able to sustain its overall influence in the region if it continues to lose ground economically.
