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Masayo Fujimoto
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In recent years, Japan’s traditional employment structure has begun to shift. Historically in Japan, employees expected to work for the same organization throughout their professional lives, gaining experience and garnering respect as they grew in seniority. Known as “lifetime employment,” this occupational approach typified the Japanese professional experience. Today, though lifetime employment still persists in many companies in Japan, more and more workers, many of them recent graduates, are changing jobs in search of better prospects. The companies that hire this new breed of employee are looking for recruits who have the requisite experience, but lack the expectation of respect and promotion simply by virtue of their years of service. In the Tokyo metropolitan area in particular, a number of companies have embraced this short-term employment system.

What are the differences between Japanese who change jobs and those who work in the same place all their lives? In 2005, the Social Stratification and Mobility Study (SSM Study) provided new perspective on the changing face of Japanese job mobility. A large-scale survey, social survey professionals have conducted the SSM Study every ten years since 1955. This article is based on the fourth release data (November 2007 version), which was prepared by the 2005 Social Stratification and Mobility Study Group.

Several patterns emerge in the SSM Study data. First, much depends on when an employee first began working. Those (male) workers who started their first job after 1950—especially during Japan’s post–World War II rebuilding phase or the economic bubble of the early 1990s—are much more likely to change jobs than those who started their first job before that year. In particular, those employed during the rebuilding era have tended to change jobs multiple times.

Second, Japanese employees behave differently depending on the size of the enterprise at which they work. At governmental organizations or large enterprises with more than one thousand employees, for example, workers who started their first job there tend to stay there. As the organizations diminish in size, this tendency likewise decreases. At mid- or small-size organizations with fewer than three hundred employees, workers who started their first job there tend to change their job earlier than their counterparts at bigger employers.

Third, with respect to job type, white collar professionals tend to keep their first job, whereas blue collar workers change job more often. More specifically, there is little job movement, for example, among those employed in educational or research services. However, in mining, transportation, manufacturing, sales or wholesale businesses, legal and accounting services, communications, and advertising, workers regularly change job due to long hours coupled with low income.

Fourth, in terms of educational background, workers who have attended college, university, or graduate school often stick with their first job. Workers with high school or junior high school levels of educations are more likely to move on from their first job within first few years.

Why do Japanese workers change jobs? The SSM Study indicates that, among those moving from their first to their second job, 33 percent did so for a “better” position. Ten percent made the switch because they were dissatisfied and wanted a change, or because they were either laid off or the company went bankrupt. The Study also shows that the 33 percent who sought better work also tended, in making such a change, to increase both their income and job prestige, and to affiliate with larger organizations. Many workers who secured better jobs were more educated; the 10 percent who cited job dissatisfaction as the reason for their move tended to be less so. More detailed analysis of the SSM Study reveals that more than 50 percent of those who moved on to a second, better job not only felt that they were better off, but also that they actually joined a smaller organization. This data point shows that a “better” job in Japan does not always mean working for a big, famous company.

The SSM Study considered other important elements of the job-changing experience, including the patterns of change as they relate to job prestige and autonomy. People who moved from large companies tended to be forced into smaller companies, whereas workers from mid- or small-size companies (fewer than three hundred employees) often remain in that size bracket. Most workers experience increased job prestige when they change jobs; this is especially true of educated workers who change job after building up ten or more years of experience at their first job. The exception to this pattern is white collar employees, whose prestige is high from the very first job they take and therefore less likely to rise significantly higher.

The SSM Study showed that white collar workers—and, interestingly, particularly those working in sales—enjoy enhanced autonomy after their job change. Generally, job changes result in “better,” more autonomous employment and higher prestige, if at a smaller organization. People who change their job, therefore, tend to be more motivated by job prestige and increased professional autonomy than by the size of the employer, or even the income level.

Job mobility in Japan is still in an early phase. In the country’s large companies, educated white collar workers—those who theoretically possess the greatest potential for upward job mobility—still tend to stay with the same organization for most of their professional lives. Those relative few who do move report increased satisfaction with their autonomy and/or their job prestige, even in cases where they join a smaller company or take a pay cut. In an effort to move beyond traditional lifetime employment, the Japanese government now encourages the job mobility, but workers have yet to embrace the system on a large scale.

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Heather Ahn
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The Koret Foundation of San Francisco has approved a $300,000 gift in support of the Korean Studies Program at Stanford University.

The two-year gift allows the Center to establish a Koret Fellowship and to bring leading professionals in Asia and the United States to Stanford to study United States–Korean relations. The fellows will conduct their own research on the bilateral relationship, with an emphasis on contemporary relations with the broad aim of fostering greater understanding and closer ties between the two countries.

“As a Korean American, I am pleased to support efforts to strengthen the bilateral relationship between Korea and the United States,” said Susan Koret, chairman of the board of the Koret Foundation. “The strength of Stanford’s program is a strong indicator that our foundation’s support will have a positive impact.”

“This is a very important and timely grant, as the two allies seek to repair the strains of the past and to strengthen their long standing relationship for the future,” said Professor Gi-Wook Shin, Center director. “Equally, we value our relationship with Koret, and we believe this is the beginning of a long-lasting relationship between the Foundation and our Center.”

The Korean Studies Program (KSP) focuses on multidisciplinary, social science-oriented, collaborative research on policy-relevant topics on Korea. KSP's mission is to be a research center in the truest sense, with its own research fellows and collaborative projects.

An entrepreneurial spirit guides Koret in addressing societal challenges and strengthening Bay Area life. Investing in strategic, local solutions, Koret helps to inspire a multiplier effect – encouraging collaborative funding and developing model initiatives.

In the San Francisco Bay Area, Koret adds to the region’s vitality by promoting educational opportunity, contributing to a diverse cultural landscape, and bolstering organizations that are innovative in their approaches to meeting community needs.

The Koret Fellowship is expected to commence with the 2008/2009 academic year.


About the Korean Studies Program at Shorenstein APARC

The Stanford Korea Program was formally established in 2001 at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center with the appointment of Professor Gi-Wook Shin, as the founding director. The Stanford KSP offers courses on Korea, hosts seminars related to the study of Korea, sponsors workshops and conferences, conducts research projects, supports fellowships, and collaborates with a broad range of visiting scholars.

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%people1%, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, gives a few cautionary lessons on U.S.-Korea relations.
Earlier this month I visited Seoul as a member of “New Beginnings,” a study group of former American policymakers and experts on Korea, co-organized by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford, and The Korea Society. We formed this group last year, anticipating that the upcoming Korean elections and the American presidential elections afterwards would offer an opportunity to embark upon a “new beginning” in our alliance.

After several days of meetings in Seoul, most importantly with President-elect Lee Myeong-bak and his senior advisors, we came away convinced that our hopes for a “new beginning” were more than justified. As President Lee takes office, it is clear that his administration is deeply committed to restoring the alliance to its previous place as the foundation of Korean foreign and security policy. Equally important, the new government is focused on the need to boost economic growth based on the free flow of trade and investment, and sees the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States as central to that goal.

For those of us who have long argued that a vibrant Korea is vital to America’s interests, these were welcome words. It is no secret that there was a perception in the United States that President Roh Moo-hyun, backed by a significant portion of the Korean people, no longer saw the alliance as a strategic imperative for Korea. Unfortunately, many Americans, particularly in Congress, had begun to share this view of the alliance, fueled by a mistaken belief that Koreans were “anti-American.”

This view of President Roh and of Korea was unfair and even distorted. President Roh deserves credit, particularly in the last two years, for taking important steps to improve alliance relations, not least his promotion of the negotiation of the FTA. He made unpopular decisions, such as the dispatch of troops to Iraq, in order to preserve a cooperative atmosphere. And as we saw demonstrated in the election, public opinion in Korea regarding the United States has shifted dramatically since the emotional days of 2002.

The Lee administration can anticipate a warm greeting in Washington, as is already clear in the preparations for his visit next month. The new President has sounded all the right notes – seeking closer cooperation on North Korea policy, restoring positive ties with Japan, America’s other vital ally in Northeast Asia, and building a broader strategic partnership with the U.S. beyond the Korean peninsula.

Amidst the renewed embrace of the alliance, it is worth however keeping a few cautionary lessons from the past in mind:

1. Not everything will be Smooth Sailing

Despite the welcome official rhetoric, it is no secret that the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea has never been entirely smooth. From its earliest days, born out of Korea’s liberation and the trials of the Korean War, the alliance has been marked by both close cooperation and by clashes over key policy goals. While bound together by strategic necessity, the national interests of Korea and the United States have not always been identical.

There is nothing unusual about such differences among allies. Look for example at the tensions that plagued U.S.-European relations over the disastrous decision to invade Iraq. Even with the best of intentions, there will be moments of conflict between Seoul and Washington. What is important is how governments manage those differences to protect the underlying relationship. Both Koreans and Americans need to remember the virtues of quiet diplomacy, trying to avoid negotiating their differences through the media.

2. All politics is local

Alliance relations can no longer be managed solely by diplomats or by friends meeting behind closed doors. Those ties are crucial but both Korea and the United States are democracies in which the issues that are at the core of the relationship – from trade to the alignment of military forces – are matters of public discussion. Domestic politics shapes policy decisions but both Koreans and Americans sometimes forget the pressures operating on the other side.

This is particularly important in an election year. The Korean National Assembly election in April is already having an impact, delaying ratification of the FTA. The U.S. election will mean FTA ratification by the U.S. Congress this year may be impossible. Presidential candidates are taking positions that they may adjust after gaining power. On another level, the new government in Seoul needs to remember that the Bush administration is a lame duck affair and begin to prepare for a new government in Washington.

3. Expect the Unexpected, particularly with North Korea

The limited progress on the nuclear negotiations with North Korea has temporarily brought closer coordination between Korea and the US. But it would be foolish to assume that this trend will necessarily continue. The negotiations are already facing a slowdown as negotiators grapple with much tougher problems. If they break down, both Seoul and Washington, along with their other partners in the 6-party talks, will face some hard questions about how to respond. Any attempt to pressure Pyongyang is likely to bring an escalatory response, not least to test the new government in Seoul.

It is possible that Seoul and Washington will once again be somewhat out of synch. Ironically, the Bush administration – and whatever follows it -- may favor greater concessions than the new administration in Seoul would prefer to make.

These differences are manageable. The key is real policy coordination between the US and Korea – and the inclusion of Japan in a revived trilateral coordination mechanism. If both sides keep that commitment, we will indeed have made a “new beginning” in our alliance.

Daniel Sneider is the Associate Director for Research at Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. A former foreign correspondent, Sneider covered Korea for the Christian Science Monitor.
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The UN and the Cambodian government have finally established a “hybrid-style” tribunal in Phnom Penh to begin prosecuting senior leaders from the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime that caused the deaths of 1.7 million Cambodians more than thirty years ago. This tribunal is widely viewed as one of the most important experiments in transitional justice in a post-conflict society. Prof. Hall will show, however, that the hybrid structure mixing international and local lawyers, judges, and staff is deeply flawed. Cambodia’s legal system is notoriously corrupt, inefficient, and politically controlled. Predictably, the UN-sponsored tribunal has been plagued by accusations of corruption, opacity, distrust, and woeful human resource management. Against this backdrop, the international lawyers and judges at the tribunal continue their up-hill battle to forge a venue that meets minimum international legal standards.

John A. Hall specializes in international law and human rights. His controversial 21 September 2007 op ed in the Wall Street Journal (“Yet Another U.N. Scandal”) helped focus international attention on corruption and mismanagement at the Khmer Rouge tribunal. In addition to writing widely on Cambodia, he has worked for Legal Aid of Cambodia in Phnom Penh and the Public Interest Law Center in the Philippines. He holds a doctorate in Modern History from Oxford University, graduated from Stanford Law School in 2000, and before going to law school was a tenured professor of history.

John Ciorciari is Senior Legal Advisor to the Documentation Center of Cambodia, a leading NGO dedicated to accountability for the abuses of the Khmer Rouge regime. He holds a JD from Harvard Law School and a PhD from Oxford University.

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John Hall Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Global Trade & Development Speaker Chapman University School of Law
John Ciorciari Discussant - 2007-2008 Shorenstein Fellow Commentator
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Teh-wei Hu is a Professor Emeritus of health economics at the University of California, Berkeley.  At Berkeley, he served as associate dean (1999-2002) and department chair (1990-1993) in the School of Public Health.  He received his PhD in Economics from the University of Wisconsin.  

During the past 40 years, Professor Hu has been teaching and conducting research in health economics, particularly in healthcare financing and the economics of tobacco control.  Hu was a Fulbright scholar in China. He has served as consultant or advisor to the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the National Institutes of Health, the Institute of Medicine, the Rand Corporation, the Ministry of Health in the People's Republic of China, Department of Health and Welfare in Hong Kong, Department of Health in the Republic of China (Taiwan), and many private research institutions and foundations. 

Professor Hu will speak to us immediately after an April trip to China, sharing his research and perspectives on the economics of tobacco control and the debate about healthcare system reforms in China (including a possible link between the two through financing expansions in coverage through increased tobacco taxation).

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Teh-wei Hu Professor Emeritus Speaker University of California, Berkeley, School of Public Health
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Karen Eggleston
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The Asia Health Policy Program of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center invites scholars from multiple disciplines to join the Asia-Pacific Health Policy Forum (APHPF) by creating your own account on our website.  Your information will be saved in our online database, searchable by name, country or region of focus, discipline, and topic.  

The mission of the Asia-Pacific Health Policy Forum (APHPF) is to serve as a resource for social science research, teaching, and evidence-based policymaking about health and healthcare in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Specifically, APHPF aims to

  • encourage collaboration among social scientists doing research on health policy in the Asia-Pacific region;
  • serve as a resource for teaching about health and healthcare in specific countries and regions within the Asia-Pacific;
  • provide analysis to inform policy, by offering a forum for rapid dissemination of policy-relevant research results, as well as by linking organizations, programs, conferences and white papers about specific health policy issues; and
  • raise awareness and foster dialogue among researchers, policymakers, and business about cross-cutting themes and global challenges of health and healthcare access, quality, and cost, within the specific historical and cultural contexts of the diverse nations of the Asia-Pacific. 

We encourage all researchers with an interest in health and healthcare in the Asia-Pacific to create an account and to submit information about upcoming conferences and sessions within larger disciplinary conferences that focus on any aspect of health policy in the Asia-Pacific to the Forum coordinator, Karen Eggleston

There are no membership dues, as the Forum is currently supported by the Asian Health Policy Program of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

The Asia-Pacific Health Policy Forum represents a multidisciplinary effort to build organizational linkages and work toward developing an Asia-Pacific parallel to the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policy.

With your help, the APHPF can develop into a vibrant resource and networking support for all of us seeking to understand and improve health and healthcare systems in the region.

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The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, with a generous grant from the Academy of Korean Studies, will host "From Democracy to Civil Society: The Evolution of Korean Social Movements," a conference on Korean democratization and social movements, on October 23-24, 2008.

This conference seeks to examine two paths through which Korean democratic movements have evolved: institutionalization and diffusion. Regarding institutionalization, we focus on the increasing legitimacy of the democracy movement’s ideals and organizations as well as a shift toward political institutions as a central locus for movement activity. Regarding diffusion, we explore how democratization has facilitated a variety of new social movements such as the environmentalist movement, women’s movement, and peace movement.

We encourage paper submission from interdisciplinary approaches and junior scholars including graduate students. The deadline for submitting proposals or papers (preferred) is May 15, 2008. We will pay all expenses for travel and accommodation and offer an honorarium for those who will present their papers at the conference. We will only accept electronic submissions.

» Apply via email

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This chapter is part of a yearly publication that compiles the edited and revised versions of papers presented at the Korea Economic Institute's (KEI) most recent Academic Symposium.

The chaper considers the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as the foundation for the architecture of strategic stability in Northeast Asia that has endured for more than a half century. Along with the U.S. alliance with Japan, this security architecture has maintained the balance of power despite vast geopolitical changes, not least the end of the global Cold War. It provided an environment that fostered spectacular economic growth and the institutionalization of democratic governance.

The stability created under this strategic architecture is now challenged by a unique combination of three developments—the rise of China, North Korea’s bid to become a nuclear power, and the weakening of the United States in the wake of the Iraq War. These events disturb the carefully crafted balance of power that was created during the Cold War era. China’s growth as an economic and military power, combined with its aspirations for regional leadership, creates an alternative pole of power to the United States. The defiant decision of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to test a nuclear device threatens the security of Korea and Japan and opens the door to further proliferation in the region.

These two developments have been widely discussed among policymakers and experts in the region and in the United States. But there has been little examination of the dangerous dynamic between these events and the Iraq War. The deteriorating military and political situation in Iraq and in the Middle East more broadly has significantly weakened the United States in East Asia. It has swung public opinion against the United States and, as collateral damage, undermined support for the alliances. The focus of U.S. attention and resources on the Middle East feeds a perception that U.S. interest in East Asia is declining. More profoundly, it encourages powers such as China and Russia to assert more frequently and more boldly their desire for a more multipolar power structure.

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Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies in "U.S. and Rok Policy Options"
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Some observers of Japan have pointed to a dangerous rise in Japanese nationalism. Advocates of that idea claim that this is evident in a number of events, such as, the visits of former Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine; former Prime Minister Abe's plan for constitutional reforms and his statements regarding the comfort women; the adoption of "revisionist" history textbooks; the territorial disputes with countries such as China and South Korea; and Japan's efforts to strengthen the Japan-U.S. security arrangements.

However, such observations invite the following questions:

  • If there are such signs in Japan, do they reflect Japanese society as a whole? Japan has been strongly pacifistic since the war, avoiding any entanglement in military conflict. This seems to be deeply rooted in the minds of the Japanese people. Just what is the relationship between the purported rise in nationalism and these pacifistic tendencies?
  • Most commentators who warn of rising nationalism in Japan fear a return of the extreme nationalism of prewar Japan. However, are not today's political regime, economic institutions and social conditions, all vastly different from those of prewar Japan?
  • Even though a trend toward nationalism can be witnessed in some quarters of Japan, it doesn't necessarily mean that Japan has become a country that would take dangerous actions. Nationalistic emotions and movements are not directly linked to the actions of a country. Rather, are there not some intervening factors between them?
Minister Kitano will address three points in answering these questions. First he will examine the current situation of Japan by discerning the ‘goals' of Japanese nationalism. Second, he will evaluate the strength of the nationalist movement in Japan by comparing the contemporary movement with the movement in prewar Japan. Last, he will analyze the function of nationalism in different stages of nation states. Through this process, Minister Kitano will reveal the 'myth and reality' of Japan's nationalism.

Mitsuru Kitano currently serves as minister for public affairs at the Embassy of Japan to the United States in Washington, D.C. where he is in charge of outreach to press/media, intellectual exchanges, art and cultural exchanges as well as support for Japanese language education. Kitano has written a number of op-ed articles, including ones analyzing U.S. opinions about Japan in such papers as the Washington Post, the Washington Times, and the International Herald Tribune.

Minister Kitano is a career diplomat and has been posted in Tokyo, France, Geneva, China and Vietnam since joining Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1980. He has been professionally engaged in Japan's bilateral relationship with the U.S., China and Southeast Asian countries, and Japan's policies regarding the United Nations and other international organizations. He was active also in such areas as economic cooperation and nuclear energy issues.

His academic achievements include being a lecturer at Sophia University (Tokyo) and a senior visiting fellow at RIETI (Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry) in Japan. In 2007, he co-authored a book, Paburikku Dipuromashi: Seron no Jidai no Gaiko Senryaku (Public Diplomacy: Diplomatic Strategy in the Age of Public Opinion) (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo).

Minister Kitano received a B.A. from the University of Tokyo in 1980 and a M.A. in international relations from the University of Geneva in 1996.

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Mitsuru Kitano Minister for Public Affairs Speaker Embassy of Japan in the United States
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