Capital Market Regulation in Japan after the Global Financial Crisis
This paper is examines the evolution of Japan’s capital markets and the related regulatory reforms after the Global Financial Crisis. We start by looking at the importance of capital markets in the Japanese financial system. We study how the size of financial flows through capital markets relative to those through the banking sector changed since the 1980s in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we look at how Japan’s financial system responded to the Global Financial Crisis. We find that the disruption of the financial system in Japan was small. Section 4 then surveys the financial regulatory changes in Japan since the Global Financial Crisis. While the Japanese regulators tightened the regulation to improve the financial stability as the regulators in the U.S. and Europe did, they also continued the efforts to develop capital markets in Japan. The efforts continue and receive strong endorsement from Abenomics, which put an emphasis on economic structural reform to restore growth in Japan. We examine the capital market policies in Abenomics in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Looking at US policy toward North Korea after Iran and Cuba
In an NK News' series of interviews with a panel of U.S. experts on North Korea policy, David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program and former State Department Korea director, analyzes the U.S. approach toward Pyongyang. With NK News' permission, downloadable PDF versions of the interviews are available below.
Masahiko Aoki Memorial Conference
The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) Japan Program with the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies (FSI) as well as the Stanford Graduate School of Business, the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), and the Stanford Department of Economics will be hosting a memorial conference and service on December 4th and 5th in honor of the late Masahiko Aoki. December 4th will be a full day conference featuring topics within Masa's extensive field of study and research including theoretical and applied economics, theory of institutions, corporate architecture and governance, and the Japanese and Chinese economies. The day will culminate with a cocktail reception. The Celebration of Life on December 5th will be a gathering for family and friends in remembrance of Masa with a light lunch reception to follow.
December 4, 2015
Memorial Conference
Agenda
8:30am - 8:50am Breakfast & Registration
8:50am - 9:00am Welcome Remarks: Takeo Hoshi (Stanford University)
9:00am - 9:30am Kenneth Arrow (Stanford University), “The Role of Organizational Structure in the Economy”
9:30am - 10:00am Paul Milgrom (Stanford University), "Designing the US Incentive Auction"
10:00am - 10:30am Break
10:30am - 11:00am Koichi Hamada, Yale University, “Masahiko Aoki: A Social Scientist"
11:00am - 11:30am Kotaro Suzumura (Hitotsubashi University), “Masahiko Aoki (1938-2015): Recollections of his Pilgrimage and Legacy in Japan”
11:30am - 12:00pm Yingyi Qian (Tsinghua University), "Masahiko Aoki and China"
12:00pm - 1:15pm Lunch
1:15pm - 1:45pm Jiahua Che (Chinese University of Hong Kong) presenting Masahiko Aoki's
"Three-person game of institutional resilience vc transition: A model and
China-Japan comparative history"
1:45pm - 2:15pm Miguel Angel Garcia Cestona (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona), "Corporate Governance and Employee Participation: some lessons from Mondragon"
2:15pm - 2:45pm Herbert Gintis (Santa Fe Institute), "General Social Equilibrium and its Dynamics"
2:45pm - 3:15pm Break
3:15pm - 3:45pm Dale Jorgenson (Harvard University), "
3:45pm - 4:15pm Avner Greif (Stanford University), "Comparative Institutional Analysis: China and Europe Compared"
4:15pm - 4:45pm Francis Fukuyama (Stanford University), "Asian Kinship, Industrial Structure, and Trust in Government"
4:45pm - 5:00pm Closing, Takeo Hoshi (Stanford University)
5:00pm - 6:00pm Cocktail Reception
*Agenda is subject to change and will be updated as speakers are confirmed
December 5, 2015
Celebration of Life
Agenda
10:30am - 11:00am Registration
11:00am - 12:00pm Celebration of Life
12:00pm - 1:30pm Lunch Reception
Huijun Gu
Huijun Gu joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) for the 2015-16 year as a visiting scholar from Jiangsu Administration Institute, where he serves as an associate professor.
His research interests include Planning (规划) and Governance, industrial upgrading and government behavior.
Huijun Gu obtained his Ph.D. at Nanjing University in 2013, focusing on organizational behavior.
Of Paradigms, Politics and Principles: The 2016 Taiwan Elections and Implications for China’s Security Strategy and Cross-Strait Relations
Sponsored by the Taiwan Democracy Project and the U.S. Asia Security Initiative at the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC)
Abstract
During the recent meeting between PRC President Xi Jinping and Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, the “1992 One China Consensus” served as a mutually acceptable paradigm for maintaining “peaceful and stable” conditions across the Taiwan Strait. For Xi Jinping, the warmth of the visit thinly veiled a message to Taiwan’s leaders and electorate, as well as to onlookers in Washington. Chinese officials and media clearly link the talks and confirmation of the 1992 Consensus to “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—a concept that is increasingly unpalatable to many in Taiwan. Xi hopes to keep DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen (and perhaps even future KMT leaders) in the 1992 Consensus “box” and to co-opt the U.S. in this effort, but perhaps underestimates the political transformation underway on Taiwan.
The Xi administration has also hardened its position regarding “core interests” such as Taiwan, embodied in a “bottom line principle” policy directive that eschews compromise. Although many commentators and most officials across the region have shied away from stating that the PRC and Taiwan are at the crossroads of crisis, the collision of political transformation on Taiwan and the PRC’s “bottom line principle” will challenge the fragile foundations of peaceful cross-Strait co-existence. Changes in the regional balance of military power brought about by a more muscular People’s Liberation Army compounds the potential for increased friction, providing Beijing with more credible options for coercion and deterrence.
This talk will consider the politics and principles involved in cross-Taiwan Strait relations in light of the upcoming 2016 Taiwan elections and the policies of the Xi Jinping administration; and will discuss some of the possible implications for China’s national security policy, regional stability, and the future of cross-Strait relations.
Bio
Nico Ravanilla
Nico Ravanilla joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center as Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow for the 2015-16 year. His research interests are political economy and governance, comparative politics and Southeast Asia. While at Shorenstein APARC, Ravanilla will research how political selection impacts governance, and evaluate possible routes for incentivizing capable and virtuous citizens to run for public office.
His project titled “Nudging Good Politicians” looks at the case of the Sangguniang Kabataan, a governing body in the Philippines comprised of elected youth leaders. Ravanilla aims to apply his research to develop and scale up programs for politicians, especially those at the onset of their careers, which would include specialized leadership training and merit-based endorsement.
Ravanilla is also a Southeast Asia Research Group (SEAREG) Young Southeast Asia Fellow for 2015-16. He received his Ph.D. in political science and public policy from the University of Michigan in summer 2015.
Pavin Chachavalpongpun
Pavin Chachavalpongpun joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) during the 2015-2016 academic year from the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University, where he serves as associate professor.
His research interests include Thailand's domestic political and international relations, particularly the role of the Thai monarchy in the political domain in the past decades; politics of Myanmar and Indochinese states; politics of ASEAN; and the concept of nationalism and its relevance to domestic and foreign policy. During his time at Shorenstein APARC, Pavin will work on the concept of neo-royalism and the future of the Thai monarchy--an issue which is important at this critical juncture of the royal succession in Thailand. Pavin is the author of two books: "A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations" and "Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy". He is also a chief editor of the online journal Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. After the coup of 2014, Pavin was twice summoned by the Thai military for his critical comments on its political intervention. Denying the legitimacy of the coup, Pavin rejected the summons. Shortly afterwards, a warrant was issued for his arrest and his passport was revoked. This situation forced him to apply for a refugee status with Japan. Pavin received his PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He earned his BA from the Department of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand.
Straub explains context of North-South Korea artillery fire
North Korea today threatened military action against South Korea if it did not end its propaganda broadcasts along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) within 48 hours. The broadcasts against the North are being systematically blared by loudspeakers over the border.
South Korea resumed the broadcasts earlier this week after an 11-year hiatus, in retaliation for North Korea’s planting landmines just outside a South Korean DMZ guard post that crippled two South Korean soldiers on Aug. 4.
David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and a former Korean affairs director at the U.S. Department of State, offers insights on the situation. Straub also spoke on PRI's "The World" radioshow on Aug. 20, the audioclip and summary can be accessed by clicking here.
What’s behind the current tensions on the Korean Peninsula?
Fundamentally, the current situation is just another symptom of the underlying problem, which is the division of Korea into two competing states, with one of them—North Korea—having a Stalinist totalitarian system and a Maoist-style cult of personality. Since North Korea can’t compete with the South economically and diplomatically, it uses the threat of force or the actual use of it to try to intimidate South Korea. The North Koreans know that South Korea tends to “blink first” and step back because it is democratic and its leaders are concerned about civilian casualties.
The current situation is also related to the leadership transition in North Korea, with leader Kim Jong Un succeeding his father Kim Jong Il three years ago. Kim Jong Un still feels insecure, which is clearly evidenced by his execution of his powerful uncle Jang Seong-taek in 2013 and many other leaders there as well. To solidify support for his rule, he also manufactures a South Korean threat to rally his people behind him.
What does North Korea want?
North Korea’s immediate demand is that South Korea stop its propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. The South Korean broadcasts criticize the North Korean system and its leaders, which is something that the North, with its cult of personality, can’t accept. But the South resumed the broadcasts only because the North Koreans recently snuck into the South Korean side of the DMZ and viciously planted landmines just outside a South Korean guard post. These were clearly intended to maim South Korean soldiers. They did just that, blowing the legs off two young men.
The North Korean regime’s long-term aim is not just to survive but also to get the upper hand on South Korea, and eventually try again to reunify the peninsula on its own terms. That explains why North Korea behaves as it does, rather than reform its system and reconcile with the South.
The North also demands an end to all U.S. and South Korean military exercises on the peninsula—even though the North has a much larger military than the South and U.S. forces there combined and is developing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, the North wants to end the U.S.-South Korean alliance and see U.S. forces withdrawn from the peninsula, in the belief that it will open the way to eventual victory over the South.
Why did the South resume the broadcasts? Was it a good idea?
South Korea resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts in retaliation for the maiming of two of its soldiers on August 4th. Rather than retaliate by attacking militarily, the South resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts because the South Korean military knows that North Korean leaders hate them.
The South Korean military believes that North Korean leaders hate the broadcasts because they are effective in educating young North Korean soldiers and civilians in earshot about the nature of the regime and its leaders. The South Korean military seems to assume that the broadcasts are effective in that regard because they anger the North Korean leaders so much. But I think the reason the broadcasts anger the North Korean leaders is due to the cult of personality. The North Korean system can’t accept the idea of its leaders being criticized.
So I don’t think it was necessarily a wise step on the part of the South Korean military to resume the broadcasts. On the other hand, politically, by crippling two South Korean soldiers, the North Koreans had left South Korea with no option but to respond in some way. After the North Koreans killed fifty South Koreans in two separate sneak attacks five years ago, the South Korean government warned that it was not going to sit back the next time. The resumption of the broadcasts has further raised tensions but, frankly, given the danger of war on the peninsula, the South doesn’t have a lot of good ways to respond to North Korean provocations.
How serious is the situation?
North Korea has now threatened military action in 48 hours if South Korea doesn’t end the propaganda broadcasts. The North often makes threats. Usually, it doesn’t carry them out, but sometimes it does.
The United States and South Korea are conducting an annual military exercise together in the South until the end of August—something else that the North Koreans are demanding an end to. Most experts feel that the North is unlikely to launch a major provocation while the American presence is bolstered and the U.S. and South Korean militaries are paying full attention. The North Korean leaders know they are weaker than our side, so they usually avoid frontal assaults and instead engage in sneak attacks, at times and places and in ways of their own choosing.
There is more uncertainty in recent years because of the aggressive and threatening behavior thus far of Kim Jong Un, who is young and inexperienced. He seems anxious about his position in the North and prepared to take risks to bolster it, including rallying the people behind him by raising tensions with the South. We also don’t know if the North feels freer to engage in major provocations because it has developed at least a handful of nuclear devices since its first nuclear test in 2006.
So I myself wouldn’t be afraid to visit Seoul now but the situation bears even closer watching than usual.