FSI scholars produce research aimed at creating a safer world and examing the consequences of security policies on institutions and society. They look at longstanding issues including nuclear nonproliferation and the conflicts between countries like North and South Korea. But their research also examines new and emerging areas that transcend traditional borders – the drug war in Mexico and expanding terrorism networks. FSI researchers look at the changing methods of warfare with a focus on biosecurity and nuclear risk. They tackle cybersecurity with an eye toward privacy concerns and explore the implications of new actors like hackers.
Along with the changing face of conflict, terrorism and crime, FSI researchers study food security. They tackle the global problems of hunger, poverty and environmental degradation by generating knowledge and policy-relevant solutions.
Stanford scholars talk APEC 2014
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Asia-Pacific leaders recently met in Beijing at the annual APEC summit, and after two days of discussion, concluded with some significant pledges and remarkable moments. President Xi Jinping of China and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan held a landmark meeting, and the United States and China discussed two agreements that are both symbolic, and lay groundwork for regional progress, say Stanford scholars.
High-level intergovernmental meetings are often more theatre than substance, but this year the 21-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the oldest trans-Pacific regional organization, delivered important messages and may spur actions by member governments.
“Any summit is a ‘hurry up, get this done’ motivator,” says Thomas Fingar, the Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. “The head of state goes to the meeting – and generally speaking – he doesn’t want to arrive and say ‘my guys were asleep for the last year.’”
Fingar says the APEC summit prodded countries to work on “deliverables,” particularly the goals and projects on the agenda from previous meetings. He recently returned from Beijing, and shared his perspectives with students in the Asia-Pacific Scholars Program.
Writing for the East Asia Forum, Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, said many of the commitments declared at the APEC summit, and at the subsequent meetings of the G20 in Australia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Myanmar, will have implications for global governance, particularly as China holds a more influential role in the region.
APEC countries account for over 40 percent of the world’s population and nearly half of global trade – and true to form, the grand vision of the summit is to advance regional economic integration.
Yet, “the ancillary things – things that went on in the margins – are in many ways more important,” Fingar says, referring to areas outside of the summit’s obvious focus, and what’s discussed on the sidelines of the public talks.
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Key outcomes from the 2014 gathering include:
- The leaders of Japan and China met for the first time since coming into office, afterward acknowledging that the two countries have “disagreements” in their official statements. Of the Xi-Abe meeting, Fingar says, “it helps clear the way for lower level bureaucrats to go to work on real issues."
- The United States and China announced a proposal to extend visas for students and businesspeople on both sides. While the immediate effects would be helpful, the change is symbolically superior. “You don’t give 5-10 year visas to adversaries,” he says, it shows that “‘we’re in [the relationship] for the long-term.’”
- China proposed the development of a new “Silk Road,” pledging $40 billion in resources toward infrastructure projects shared with South and Central Asian neighbors. “It’s tying the region together and creating economy-of-scale possibilities for other countries,” he says. “A real win-win situation.”
- The United States and China, the world’s two largest energy consumers, announced bilateral plans to cut carbon emissions over the next two decades. “It’s significant because those two countries must be the ones to lead the world in this area. Unless we are seen to be in basic agreement, others will hold back.”
- China codified the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a global financial institution intended as an alternative to institutions like the World Bank. “China has been frustrated with its role in existing international institutions,” Fingar says, explaining a likely motivation behind the AIIB’s creation.
Emmerson said the outcomes of the APEC summit from the U.S.-China standpoint were better than expected, speaking to McClatchy News. The visa and climate deals, as well as their commitment to lowering global tariffs on IT products, will lessen chances of conflict between the two countries.
However, the summit did leave some areas unsolved. One of the most important is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade pact proposed by the United States that includes 11 others countries in the region, but does not yet include China.
Leaders “made positive noises” coming out of the TPP discussions, Fingar says, but nothing was passed. The gravity and complexity of trade-related issues, especially agriculture and intellectual property, is likely to blame for slow action.
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Leaders pose for a group photo at the 22nd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Beijing, China.
APEC/(Xinhua/Yao Dawei)
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Why North Korea released its American prisoners
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Recently, North Korea suddenly released the two remaining Americans it was holding – Kennth Bae and Matthew Todd Miller. The news made headlines internationally, and the drama of it was heightened because the United States’ top spy flew into Pyongyang and secured their release. Not surprisingly, the event raised many questions and is prompting a great deal speculation. Why did North Korea release the Americans? Why choose the U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper to receive the handover? And, especially, what are the implications for the troubling situation on the Korean Peninsula?
David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program at Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, has had direct experience with similar situations. In 2009, he accompanied former U.S. President Bill Clinton on a mission to Pyongyang to bring home two incarcerated American journalists, Laura Ling and Euna Lee. As the State Department’s Korean affairs deputy director (1996-98) and director (2002-04), he was involved in efforts to obtain the release of a number of other Americans held in North Korea. Here, Straub offers his analysis of the recent event.
Kenneth Bae was sentenced to 15 years in prison and had already been held nearly two years when he was released on Saturday, while Matthew Todd Miller was arrested in April of this year and subsequently sentenced to six years in prison. Why did you think North Korea suddenly returned them?
The surprise is not that they were released. The North Koreans have returned every American they have held during the past few decades. While some Americans have been arrested for reasons that the North Koreans themselves might have thought valid, such as the charge that Bae was seeking to bring down the regime by his Christian proselytization, in every case the North Koreans treated the Americans as pawns. In fact, in the case of these two Americans and of Jeffrey Fowle, the third incarcerated American who was released last month, the U.S. government actually publicly used the word “pawns” for the first time to describe the way Pyongyang was using them. While that risked angering the North Koreans and delaying the releases, it reflected increasing American frustration at the North Korean practice of holding American citizens hostage to force the U.S. government to send senior figures to be seen as pleading for their release. North Korea intended to release Bae all along—after it got as much as it could of what it wanted.
But why did Pyongyang release the Americans at this particular time?
The reasons for that remain unclear. Many observers have speculated that the North Koreans wanted to ease U.S. and U.N. criticism of their human rights situation. The U.N. General Assembly will soon consider a measure, based on a damning U.N. investigative report, to hold top North Korean officials accountable for crimes against humanity due to the way they treat their own people. Others have speculated that the North Koreans wanted to release the Americans before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit this week in Beijing, to make it easier for Chinese President Xi Jinping to press President Obama to agree to return to the Chinese-led Six Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. Both of these are plausible but they are speculation –only North Korean leaders really know.
But there is also an American angle to the timing. All along, the North Koreans have been demanding that the United States send a very senior current U.S. official to receive the release of incarcerated Americans. In the past, these roles have been performed by both very senior former U.S. officials, such as Presidents Carter and Clinton, and current but relatively low-ranking American officials, such as Ambassador Robert King, the United States’ special envoy for North Korean human rights issues. Almost from the start in this case, the U.S. was prepared to send Ambassador King but the North Koreans rejected him as being too junior. Instead, the North Koreans demanded a very senior sitting U.S. official come; they stuck with that demand and ultimately were successful. After a long process of negotiations and signaling, the two sides very recently agreed that National Intelligence Director Clapper would be appropriate. U.S. officials have publicly suggested that they were the ones who nominated Clapper. They say that the choice of this non-diplomat was intended to underline to all concerned that the sole purpose was to obtain the release of the remaining Americans. I am convinced that that was in fact the case. The U.S. government is naturally loath to talk substance with the North Koreans in a situation such as this when it is in fact acting under duress.
Then why didn’t the United States send Director Clapper sooner?
The United States does not want to encourage the North Korean leaders to think that they can coerce the United States by taking American citizens hostages. That might only result in more such hostage-taking. U.S. officials thus held firm for a long time and decided to send Mr. Clapper only when they concluded there was no better way to obtain the release of our citizens. U.S. officials have suggested that the North Koreans sent a signal a few weeks ago that triggered this particular decision, but exactly what was behind this exact timing remains to be disclosed.
Does the dispatch of someone as senior as Clapper increase the likelihood of more hostage-taking?
Unfortunately, it may. From a North Korean perspective, they got their basic demand—for a very senior sitting official—and it was the Americans who blinked. They also got a letter from President Obama to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, even if it was only “brief” and just certified that Clapper was his envoy for the purpose of retrieving the Americans. The North Koreans claim that President Obama “earnestly apologized”; the U.S. government has flatly denied making any apology. I’m sure U.S. officials weighed the concern about encouraging the North Koreans in further misbehavior against their desire to return Bae and Miller. Bae in particular had been held longer than any other American so far and he has a number of health issues. In response to the recent spate of hostage-taking, last year the State Department, for the first time, strongly warned Americans against all travel to North Korea. After the release of Bae and Miller, U.S. officials reiterated that warning.
You said that the North Koreans do this to force senior Americans to be seen as pleading for the release of incarcerated Americans. Do the North Koreans really go to so much trouble only for that?
Some observers say that the North Koreans do this because the United States refuses to talk and negotiate with them and that this is their desperate effort to try to negotiate and seek better relations with the United States. I’m afraid that is very much wishful thinking. The United States and North Korea actually communicate directly through North Korean diplomats assigned to U.N. headquarters in New York, as a North Korean ambassador there recently confirmed in an interview with Voice of America. The United States is also prepared to negotiate with North Korea, but only if it credibly signals that it is willing to negotiate an end to its nuclear weapons program. North Korea’s current stated position is that it is ready to return “unconditionally” to the Six Party Talks, but that is transparently cynical. The North Koreans have already created conditions, by using the Six Party Talks as a cover to achieve a nuclear weapons breakthrough. The North Korean now seriously say that they will not give up nuclear weapons until the United States gives up its own. Under such conditions, it would be a farce for the United States to agree to a resumption of Six Party Talks.
After accompanying President Clinton to North Korea in 2009, including sitting in on his meeting with its previous ruler, Kim Jong Il, I was even more puzzled as to why the North Koreans would go to so much trouble to force senior Americans to come to retrieve incarcerated American citizens. After much reflection, my working hypothesis is that the North Koreans must get great psychological satisfaction from forcing the U.S. government to bend to their will, even if they get nothing substantive in return—even if, in fact, they only increase the American disinclination to deal with them otherwise. In some cases, such as President Clinton’s visit, they also propagandize the event to their own people. So far, they have not yet reported to their people on Clapper’s visit. It will be interesting to see if they do.
A couple of quick final questions: do you think, as some media have suggested, that the Chinese government or private citizens played a role as intermediaries in the release of the Americans? And do you give any credence to some South Korean commentators’ belief that the timing of the release was related to the American mid-term elections?
It’s amazing to see all the people who come out of the woodwork after such an event, claiming to have played a role. Even Dennis Rodman is now saying he helped by sending a letter to Kim Jong Un. I know that many private citizens talked with North Korea officials about these cases and I would imagine that the Chinese government also urged Pyongyang to do the right thing, but I am confident that it was talks American and North Korean officials held that resulted in the release. As for speculation about the timing being connected to the American elections, that’s a common misperception in South Korea and probably North Korea as well. As any American knows, the idea that obtaining the release of these Americans from North Korea would somehow help the Democrats in the election is of course ludicrous.
David Straub also spoke with Radio Free Asia about the release of the American prisoners from North Korea. He says the release has nothing to do with North Korea's nuclear initiative, saying that issue must be addressed on its own merits. The article is in the Korean language and can be accessed by clicking here.
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U.S. citizen Kenneth Bae (2nd L), who was held in North Korea since Nov. 2012, shakes hands with U.S. Air Force Colonel David Kumashiro (R) after Bae landed aboard a U.S. Air Force jet at McChord Field at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington Nov. 8, 2014.
Reuters/Anthony Bolante
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Meeting the challenge of China’s rise in Asia
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On 10 Nov. 2014 a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum will convene in Beijing, followed in rapid succession by the East Asia Summit in Naypyidaw and the G20 in Brisbane.
Much of what will be said and done at these events will implicate the tectonics of nascent global governance set in motion by China’s campaign for greater influence in Asia.
At the APEC summit, Chinese president Xi Jinping will stress the need for massive spending on infrastructure in Asia. He will tout China’s sponsorship of a Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) that would operate outside of, and potentially compete with, the American-led World Bank and the Japanese-led Asian Development Bank (ABD).
Many will welcome the AIIB as evidence of China’s willingness to assume responsibility for public goods in a rebalanced post-Cold War world whose needs exceed the resources of existing global institutions. But will ‘public’ goods benefit the public if their terms are not made public? In 2014 China ranked 68th of 68 donors in the Aid Transparency Index compared with the 5th-place ADB and the 7th-place World Bank. Given the commercial importance of cyberspace, it is also concerning that China is the worst violator of the rights of internet users in the latest Freedom House ranking of 60 countries on that variable.
In the ADB as of 2013, Tokyo held respective 16 and 13 per cent shares of subscribed capital and voting power. Understandably, at the AIIB’s inception, Beijing’s shares will be far larger. But how soon and by how much will China allow its initial dominance to be diluted by other contributing members? Concerns over Beijing’s intentions may already underlie the wait-and-see attitudes of Tokyo, Seoul, and Canberra as to whether to join the new bank.
Another alternative to international lending by traditional sources is the New Development Bank (NDB) recently innovated by the BRICS. Headquartered in Shanghai, it will be led first by an Indian.
In the formal sessions of APEC, lip service will be paid to its hopes for free and open trade and investment worldwide by 2020. But in the corridors delegates will debate whether China’s AIIB and the BRICS’s NDB will further ‘responsible stakeholding’ and shared governance by emerging states in a global economy no longer centred on the West. Some may fear that Xi wants to use these new institutions to tie Asia more tightly and deferentially to Beijing in a web of ‘Silk Roads’ that will disproportionally serve Chinese interests.
China’s ambitions will also be questioned at the East Asia Summit in Myanmar, especially regarding the South China Sea (SCS). China will again be asked to clarify its generously self-serving U-shaped line: Does Beijing really want to possess or control nearly all of that body of water? Southeast Asians will again urge China to implement the Document on Conduct (DOC) in the South China Sea that it signed with all ten members of ASEAN in 2002. China will again be implored to accept a future Code of Conduct (COC) regulating state behaviour in the SCS. But Beijing will likely continue to delay and demur, while ASEAN’s historic centrality to Asian region-formation continues to diminish.
It is symbolic of ASEAN’s plight that the group has been too divided to express more than ‘serious concern’ over ‘developments’ in the SCS — untethered abstractions that leave China happily uncharged. In ASEAN’s field of vision, the COC has become an entrenched mirage. Calls for a code are repetitively embedded in ASEAN’s communiqués because it is one of the few things the members can agree should happen. Thanks to Chinese foot-dragging, however, the goal keeps receding and Beijing keeps doing whatever it wants to in the SCS.
Chinese activity now includes a unilateral land-reclaiming and construction work at the specks that China already controls — actions that violate the spirit if not the letter of the DOC.
Some US$5.3 trillion in goods are shipped annually across the SCS, including US$1.2 trillion to or from the United States. China has unilaterally declared and begun to enforce a monopoly on fishing in more than half of the SCS. If multilaterally negotiated limitations are being flouted or forestalled in this key regional instance, how much confidence can one have that Xi will cooperate in Asia on behalf of a rules-based order at the global level?
None of this means denying the overdue need to restructure existing institutions to accommodate the voices and priorities of rising powers. But time is running out. Convincingly dire warnings in the just-released UN report on climate change render existential the need for concerted global action. Nationalism and nationalistic regionalism — by Beijing, Moscow or Washington — must not derail progress toward the constructive rebalancing and sharing of global governance. Shifting power to emerging actors should facilitate not frustrate that process. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of one wall in Berlin should not be spent building another in Asia.
This article was originally carried by the East Asia Forum on Nov. 7 and reposted with permission.
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Leaders meet at the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial meeting in Beijing on Nov. 7, 2014.
Flickr/U.S. Department of State
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India's Relations with its Northeast Asian Neighbors
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This past May, India, a country of over 1.2 billion people, elected Narendra Modi, the leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the new prime minister, shifting leadership away from an incumbent party that held power for the past few decades. This new government, set in the context of shifting political and security dynamics, brings new challenges for dialogue in a region that sees unresolved border disputes and historical tensions, particularly between China and India.
What impact will India’s new leadership have in Northeast Asia? How do historical relationships continue to shape the present? What is the outlook for policy priorities between India and countries in Northeast Asia?
Scholars from the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University and the Brookings Institution’s India Center will offer perspectives in a panel discussion. This event is Shorenstein APARC’s inaugural event in New Delhi.
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Agenda and Participant Bios
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Taj Palace
Sardar Patel Marg
Diplomatic Enclave
New Delhi - 110 021, India
Vikram S. Mehta
<i>Moderator</i>; Chairman, Brookings India Center
Michael H. Armacost
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Former Shorenstein APARC Fellow
Michael Armacost (April 15, 1937 – March 8, 2025) was a Shorenstein APARC Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) from 2002 through 2021. In the interval between 1995 and 2002, Armacost served as president of Washington, D.C.'s Brookings Institution, the nation's oldest think tank and a leader in research on politics, government, international affairs, economics, and public policy. Previously, during his twenty-four-year government career, Armacost served, among other positions, as undersecretary of state for political affairs and as ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.
Armacost began his career in academia, as a professor of government at Pomona College. In 1969, he was awarded a White House Fellowship and was assigned to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State. Following a stint on the State Department's policy planning and coordination staff, he became a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo from 1972 to 74, his first foreign diplomatic post. Thereafter, he held senior Asian affairs and international security posts in the State Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security Council. From 1982 to 1984, he served as U.S. ambassador to the Philippines and was a key force in helping the country undergo a nonviolent transition to democracy. In 1989, President George Bush tapped him to become ambassador to Japan, considered one of the most important and sensitive U.S. diplomatic posts abroad.
Armacost authored four books, including, Friends or Rivals? The Insider's Account of U.S.–Japan Relations (1996), which draws on his tenure as ambassador, and Ballots, Bullets, and Bargains: American Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections (2015). He also co-edited, with Daniel Okimoto, the Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia, published in 2004 by Shorenstein APARC. Armacost served on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards, including TRW, AFLAC, Applied Materials, USEC, Inc., Cargill, Inc., and Carleton College, and he currently chairs the board of The Asia Foundation.
A native of Ohio, Armacost graduated from Carleton College and earned his master's and doctorate degrees in public law and government from Columbia University. He received the President's Distinguished Service Award, the Defense Department's Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Secretary of State's Distinguished Services Award, and the Japanese government’s Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.
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W.P.S Sidhu
Senior Fellow
Brookings India Center
Gi-Wook Shin
Shorenstein APARC
Encina Hall E301
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
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gwshin@stanford.edu
Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Sociology
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Professor, by Courtesy, of East Asian Languages & Cultures
Gi-Wook Shin is the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea in the Department of Sociology, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the founding director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) since 2001, all at Stanford University. In May 2024, Shin also launched the Taiwan Program at APARC. He served as director of APARC for two decades (2005-2025). As a historical-comparative and political sociologist, his research has concentrated on social movements, nationalism, development, democracy, migration, and international relations.
In Summer 2023, Shin launched the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), which is a new research initiative committed to addressing emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges in Asia. Across four research themes– “Talent Flows and Development,” “Nationalism and Racism,” “U.S.-Asia Relations,” and “Democratic Crisis and Reform”–the lab brings scholars and students to produce interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, policy-relevant, and comparative studies and publications. Shin’s latest book, The Four Talent Giants, a comparative study of talent strategies of Japan, Australia, China, and India to be published by Stanford University Press in the summer of 2025, is an outcome of SNAPL.
Shin is also the author/editor of twenty-seven books and numerous articles. His books include The Four Talent Giants: National Strategies for Human Resource Development Across Japan, Australia, China, and India (2025); Korean Democracy in Crisis: The Threat of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization (2022); The North Korean Conundrum: Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security (2021); Superficial Korea (2017); Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War (2016); Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea (2015); Criminality, Collaboration, and Reconciliation: Europe and Asia Confronts the Memory of World War II (2014); New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan (2014); History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories (2011); South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society (2011); One Alliance, Two Lenses: U.S.-Korea Relations in a New Era (2010); Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia (2007); and Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (2006). Due to the wide popularity of his publications, many have been translated and distributed to Korean audiences. His articles have appeared in academic and policy journals, including American Journal of Sociology, World Development, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Political Science Quarterly, Journal of Asian Studies, Comparative Education, International Sociology, Nations and Nationalism, Pacific Affairs, Asian Survey, Journal of Democracy, and Foreign Affairs.
Shin is not only the recipient of numerous grants and fellowships, but also continues to actively raise funds for Korean/Asian studies at Stanford. He gives frequent lectures and seminars on topics ranging from Korean nationalism and politics to Korea's foreign relations, historical reconciliation in Northeast Asia, and talent strategies. He serves on councils and advisory boards in the United States and South Korea and promotes policy dialogue between the two allies. He regularly writes op-eds and gives interviews to the media in both Korean and English.
Before joining Stanford in 2001, Shin taught at the University of Iowa (1991-94) and the University of California, Los Angeles (1994-2001). After receiving his BA from Yonsei University in Korea, he was awarded his MA and PhD from the University of Washington in 1991.
Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL)
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Director of Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, APARC
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Former ambassador, political scientist McFaul to lead FSI
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Michael McFaul, a Stanford political scientist and former U.S. ambassador to Russia, has been selected as the next director of the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
The announcement was made Wednesday by Stanford Provost John Etchemendy and Ann Arvin, the university’s vice provost and dean of research. McFaul will succeed Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, who was nominated in July as an associate justice of the California Supreme Court and elected Tuesday.
McFaul takes the helm of FSI in January.
"Stanford has long been a home for scholars who connect academia to policy and public service, and Professor McFaul is the embodiment of that model," Etchemendy said. "We are grateful for Mike's service and confident he will be a strong leader for FSI."
Arvin said McFaul is a strong fit for the position.
“Professor McFaul’s background as an outstanding scholar and his service as an influential ambassador give him a vital perspective to lead FSI, which is Stanford’s hub for studying and understanding international policy issues,” she said. “His scholarship, experience and energy will keep FSI and Stanford at the forefront of international studies as well as some of the most pressing global policy debates."
McFaul has been a faculty member in the department of political science at Stanford since 1994. He joined the Obama administration in January 2009, serving for three years as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House. He then served as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation from 2012 to 2014.
McFaul already has a deep affiliation with FSI. Before joining the government, he served as FSI deputy director from 2006 to 2009. He also directed FSI’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) from 2005 to 2009.
During his four years leading CDDRL, McFaul launched the Draper Hills Summer Fellowship program for mid-career lawyers, politicians, advocates and business leaders working to shore up democratic institutions in their home countries. He also established CDDRL’s senior honors program. From 1992-1994, McFaul also worked as a Senior Research Fellow at FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).
“I am thrilled to be assuming a leadership role again at FSI,” McFaul said. “FSI has become one of the premier institutions in the country for policy-relevant research on international affairs. I look forward to using my recent government experience to deepen further FSI’s impact on policy debates in Washington and around the world.”
Arvin said McFaul’s previous positions at FSI and CDDRL will make for a smooth transition in the institute’s leadership.
“His familiarity with FSI’s history and infrastructure will allow him to start this new position with an immediate focus on the institute’s academic mission,” she said.
McFaul is also the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and plans to build on his long affiliations with both Hoover and FSI to deepen cooperation between these two premier public policy institutions on campus.
He has written and co-authored dozens of books including Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should, How We Can; Transitions To Democracy: A Comparative Perspective (with Kathryn Stoner); Power and Purpose: American Policy toward Russia after the Cold War (with James Goldgeier); and Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin.
“In so many ways, Mike represents the best of FSI,” said Cuéllar, who has held leadership positions at FSI since 2004 and begins his term on the California Supreme Court in January. “He knows the worlds of academia and policy extremely well, and will bring unique experience and sound judgment to his new role at FSI.”
McFaul currently serves as a news analyst for NBC News, appearing frequently on NBC, MSNBC, and CNBC as a commentator on international affairs. He also appears frequently on The Charlie Rose Show and The Newshour, as well as PBS and BBC radio programs. He has recently published essays in Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, Politico, and Time.
McFaul was one of the first U.S. ambassadors to actively use social media for public diplomacy. He still maintains an active presence on Facebook at amb.mcfaul and on Twitter at @McFaul.
McFaul received his B.A. in International Relations and Slavic Languages and his M.A. in Russian and East European Studies from Stanford University in 1986. As a Rhodes Scholar, he completed his D. Phil. in International Relations at Oxford University in 1991.
“Since coming here in 1981 as 17-year-old kid from Montana, Stanford has provided me with tremendous opportunities to grow as a student, scholar, and policymaker,” McFaul said. “I now look forward to giving back to Stanford by contributing to the development of one of the most vital and innovative institutions on campus.”
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Fingar challenges geopolitical myths about East Asia, calls for greater cooperation
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Perception can often trump facts in politics, and the topic of security in East Asia isn’t exempt from this reality, exemplified by the dominance of China’s “rise” and Japan’s “ramped up” defense posture in current policy debates. Yet, those dynamics create a need as well as an opportunity for increased multilateral engagement, says Thomas Fingar, the Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
“Developments in China and Japan should be viewed as creating new opportunities and imperatives to deepen multilateral co-operation,” Fingar writes in a Global Asia essay.
“It would be a mistake to view them only as the cause of eroding confidence in the co-operative mechanisms that remain critical to peace and prosperity in the region.”
China’s rise has actually been a result of policies supported by the United States and other countries, despite prevailing commentary that they are intended to “contain” China, he says. In fact, Beijing’s rise was achieved by working within the rules-based international system, not outside of it.
China’s actions and growing power, especially military power, are compelling other regional actors, notably Japan, to reconsider their strategic situation. The reinterpretation of defense policy guidelines proposed by the Abe government is a long-delayed response to China’s military buildup, not an effort to remilitarize as a popular narrative holds. Fingar says the proposed relaxation of self-imposed policy constraints on Japan’s military forces could help pave the way for a future collective security arrangement in Northeast Asia.
So, where does this leave the U.S.-South Korea relationship?
He says the two countries can maintain their bilateral commitments while also deepening partnerships with, and between China and Japan. Both the United States and South Korea can help push for improved ties on trade and regional security issues.
“We need continued bilateral – and increased multilateral – co-operation,” he says, particularly, “to mange the challenges of a nuclear-armed North Korea.”
The full article can be viewed on the FSI website.
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Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force ships travel in formation with the U.S.S. George Washington during a regularly scheduled exercise in the East China Sea.
Flickr/U.S. Pacific Fleet
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China's Rise, Japan's Quest, and South Korea-US Co-operation
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Perceptions of security risks in Northeast Asia are increasingly being shaped by the rise of China and Japan's more recent efforts to become a more "normal" nation. The momentum behind both developments is being felt acutely in the relationship between the United States and South Korea. While many argue that the stage is being set for an inevitable conflict, Thomas Fingar, the Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, argues that what is happening in China and Japan provides an opportunity for greater multilateral cooperation.
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Global Asia
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At Stanford, Seoul’s Park Won Soon says “citizens are the mayor”
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Seoul faces challenges that are not very different from other global cities, said Mayor Park Won Soon, the public figure who leads the South Korean city of over 10 million people, concluding that the key to solving them is by better engaging and empowering citizens.
“We tore down the silos,” said Park, speaking to a Stanford audience about his efforts to improve Seoul’s bureaucracy and access for citizens.
At McCaw Hall, Park discussed his background as a scholar, civic activist and philanthropist, emphasizing how it provides him perspective as a leader, and the acumen to think differently to address a wide range of issues affecting Seoul, including poverty, climate change and an aging population.
Park’s visit to Stanford University was sponsored by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center (APARC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. The event was part of the Asia-Pacific Leaders Forum, a seminar series that brings Asian leaders to Stanford to share their experiences. In 2013, the series hosted Ban-Ki Moon, U.N. Secretary General, and in 2009, then-South Korean assembly member, now president, Park Geun-hye.
[[{"fid":"216091","view_mode":"crop_870xauto","fields":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin welcomes Mayor Park.","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin welcomes Mayor Park.","field_credit[und][0][value]":"Rod Searcey","field_caption[und][0][value]":"Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin welcomes Mayor Park.","field_related_image_aspect[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto","pp_lightbox":false,"pp_description":true},"type":"media","attributes":{"title":"Stanford professor Gi-Wook Shin welcomes Mayor Park.","height":948,"width":870,"style":"margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 15px; padding: 0px; float: left; width: 225px; height: 240px;","class":"media-element file-crop-870xauto"}}]]Mr. Park has long-had a connection to the university, though. He was a visiting professor at Shorenstein APARC in 2005, and continued to collaborate with researchers after leaving.
Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC, introduced Mr. Park, referencing their connection and past projects to a crowd of nearly 275 people, including Korean community members and media.
“We’ve known each other as colleagues and friends for a number of years," Shin said, "so it is a pleasure to host Mayor Park, and hold a public forum to hear [his] vision."
Shin and Park established a fellowship for Korean NGO leaders, and awarded it to 30 leaders over three years.
Fighting for equality
As a university student in 1975, Park protested against South Korea’s government led by President Park Chung-hee, a military leader who ruled under highly authoritarian law. Mr. Park was imprisoned for his activism and eventually expelled from school, but his enthusiasm for justice and democracy never waned, he said.
He said the political and social chaos during those years in South Korea motivated him to pursue justice through other channels, going on to become a human rights lawyer and into public office as mayor in 2011.
South Korea gradually transitioned into a democracy in the 1980s, influenced in large part by many sweeping civil movements. The country has since stabilized, and now enjoys cultural and economic success in the world today.
Park speaks to the audience about governance, emphasizing the importance of communication.
But, there is a “shadow behind the miracle,” said Park, referring to the myriad of societal problems that Seoul still faces, like many cities dealing with the effects of urbanization.
He said the only way to identify and address problems is through a highly participatory system of governance, and one that isn’t afraid to think of new solutions to old problems.
“A city that constantly collaborates and innovates to improve the quality of life for citizens,” he said, those are the efforts that create an environment “where people live in harmony and where people are happy.”
Park said listening to the voices of Seoul citizens is a cornerstone of his administration’s approach. And he has a motto that matches.
“Citizens are the mayor,” is the saying that Park administration attempts to fulfill through a variety of initiatives, including those led by the Seoul Innovation Bureau, a new administrative branch established to bring fresh ideas into the city’s paradigm.
Park’s administration holds town hall meetings and uses some of the latest technology to initiate dialogue with citizens, including SNS text messaging, social media and Wikiseoul, an online blog-style platform, to communicate policies and receive feedback.
[[{"fid":"216092","view_mode":"crop_870xauto","fields":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"Park meets community members and media following his talk.","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"Park meets community members and media following his talk.","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"Park meets community members and media following his talk.","field_credit[und][0][value]":"","field_caption[und][0][value]":"Park meets community members and media following his talk.","field_related_image_aspect[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto","pp_lightbox":false,"pp_description":true},"type":"media","attributes":{"alt":"Park meets community members and media following his talk.","title":"Park meets community members and media following his talk.","height":783,"width":870,"style":"margin-left: 0px; margin-right: 15px; padding: 0px; float: left; width: 230px; height: 200px;","class":"media-element file-crop-870xauto"}}]]He said he checks the city’s social media accounts personally because it allows him to keep a close eye on what issues are important to citizens, and often follows-up with constituents who write him “tweets,” messages received via Twitter.
Park says Seoul’s success is because of 10 million citizens and many institutions that have supported the city’s growth. He holds popular support in the city, and was recently reelected for a second mayoral term in June 2014, winning by a wide margin.
He said other countries are beginning to replicate his administration’s model, from e-governance activities to energy policy, calling it the “Seoul effect.”
Closing out the speech, Park said inclusiveness is the essence of good governance.
“If you want to travel fast go alone, but if you want to travel far, go together,” he said, citing a well-known proverb.
Below is the full video and transcript of his presentation.
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Park Won Soon, Mayor of Seoul, gives a speech at Stanford University.
Rod Searcey
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Stanford expert explains the story of Kim Jong Un rumors
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The 40-day disappearance from public view of North Korea's young leader Kim Jong Un and his sudden reappearance on Monday, walking with a cane but otherwise apparently well, made headlines around the world. International media ran countless reports that Kim was either seriously ill or had even been deposed. Why was this such a big story, and why did so many get it wrong?
David Straub, a Korea expert at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center who formerly served as the State Department’s Korean affairs director, was one observer who consistently challenged that media narrative. In the following interview, he offers his analysis of both the North Korean situation and the way it was misinterpreted by a majority of the media.
Why didn’t you give credence to the reports that Kim Jong Un was seriously ill or had lost out in a power struggle?
I've been following North Korea professionally on and off since 1978. Looking at similar incidents, I've grown wary of poorly sourced reports about North Korea, and especially speculation, even when it comes from so-called “experts.” Because North Korea is a black box, mostly closed to outside view, almost anyone can get away with claiming that he or she is an expert. There are also many governments, groups and individuals that have axes to grind. Ignorance, wishful thinking and even disinformation are all too common when reporting on North Korea.
What was the evidence that led you to believe that Kim Jong Un wasn’t seriously ill, much less deposed?
There were only a few facts that we actually knew to be true during his absence. His last public appearance was on Sept. 3. In July and August, there was video of Kim Jong Un walking with a pronounced limp. Later in Sept., North Korean media reported that he was suffering an uncomfortable physical condition. Kim is now quite overweight, and there are also photographs of him wearing platform shoes. Therefore, the most likely explanation for his disappearance from public view was that he was receiving treatment for whatever caused the limp, and that he needed to stay off his feet until he was better. At age 31, it was unlikely that he was suffering from a more serious ailment. Moreover, just like his grandfather and father, Kim has previously dropped out of public view for many weeks at a time.
What about the reports that Kim was deposed?
There were zero credible sources that Kim had been deposed or that his leadership position had even been challenged. And, a great deal of speculation existed about the Oct. 4 visit of three top North Korean officials to South Korea, who attended the closing ceremony of the Asian Games there. But if there had actually been trouble in Pyongyang, the last thing one would have expected is for those officials to visit South Korea in such a manner. Meanwhile, one North Korean defector has been arguing for a long time that Kim has only been a figurehead and that real power in North Korea is wielded by officials in his party. The issue of just how much power Kim actually holds is an important one. The answer remains unclear to observers outside North Korea, and is a different issue from the stories about Kim's health and whether he had been overthrown.
Why did Kim suddenly reemerge?
The short answer is probably that his physical condition had improved enough. The photographs that North Korea media published on Monday show him walking with a cane but otherwise apparently in good health and in good spirits, and leading some of the same North Korean officials who recently visited South Korea, speculated by the media to be the ones who encouraged a coup.
Do you think that North Korea felt the need to show that Kim was still in charge after the media attention?
That too is speculation, but it is quite plausible. It is likely that Kim wanted to show not only the international community, but even more so, his own people that his physical condition is not serious. Ordinary North Koreans were of course not able to access international reports about Kim, but they knew that he was not appearing in their national media and presumably were wondering how he was.
But isn't it a problem for Kim to be seen in a weakened physical condition?
Kim's power and legitimacy in North Korea derive from the fact that his grandfather Kim Il Sung was the country's first leader, not from his physical condition or personal qualities. It’s no longer taboo in North Korea to show the top leader suffering from ailments. In fact, Kim's father Kim Jong Il was shown repeatedly looking extremely unwell after his stroke in 2008. Similarly, Kim Jong Un himself had already been shown in July and August on North Korean television suffering from the limp. In both cases, the North Korean media characterized the two Kims as hardworking leaders even when they were unwell. Moreover, as Yonsei University Professor John Delury has pointed out, actually showing Kim using a cane may be intentional because it makes him look a bit older and more mature.
What are we to make of the attention on Kim’s absence over the past several weeks?
I think it would be valuable if the international media would begin to apply better standards for its reporting on North Korea. North Korea poses important challenges to the international community, and citizens need to be informed about what's actually happening there, not what people imagine or those with ulterior motives would have us believe.
There is another, even more basic lesson to be drawn from this episode. With the rise of the Internet, information and misinformation have proliferated about North Korea, along with the ability to store and recall all of that information quickly. In addition, in popular imagination, the end of the Cold War transformed North Korea from an adjunct of the Soviet Union to an entity in itself, one that is both abhorrent and ridiculous. The result has been an exponential increase in the number of people throughout the world producing, circulating and consuming any information even remotely plausible about North Korea, and the established media in turn report on what those people are saying.
An increase in global attention to all things North Korea is important because it means North Korea can no longer hide itself from the international community. Already, this has contributed to the United Nation’s current consideration of legal action against the regime and its leaders over the human rights situation in the North. That is what North Korea’s leaders must have been worrying about over the past month as they watched the media reports—not Kim Jong Un’s bad leg.
Straub also spoke with Public Radio International (PRI) just before Kim’s reemergence, audio from “The World” radioshow is available on the PRI website.
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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un gives field guidance at the newly built Wisong Scientists Residential District in this undated photo released by the Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang on Oct. 14, 2014.
Reuters/KCNA
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