In March 2018 the Taiwan Democracy and Security Project, a part of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia- Pacific Research Center, convened a workshop that examined Taiwan’s place in the evolving security environment of East Asia. Participants from the United States, Taiwan, and elsewhere in Asia were experts on a wide array of economic, diplomatic, and security topics. The discussions at the workshop were intended to place Taiwan’s security challenges in a broader regional context, to consider possible obstacles to and opportunities for greater multilateral cooperation on security issues, and to devise a set of recommendations for steps that Taiwan and its friends and partners could take to enhance regional security relationships.

This workshop report provides an executive summary, policy recommendations for both the United States and Taiwan, and a summary of workshop sessions.

The future of ASEAN is necessarily unknown. Its futures, however, can be guessed with less risk of being wrong. The purpose of this article is not to predict with confidence but to "pandict" with reticence—not to choose one assured future but to scan several that could conceivably occur. Also, what follows is merely a range of possible futures, not the range. The five different ASEANs of the future all too briefly sketched below are meant to be suggestive, but they are neither fully exclusive nor jointly exhaustive. Potentiality outruns imagination. The author's hope is that by doing the easy thing—opening a few doors on paper—he may tempt analysts more knowledgeable than himself to do the hard thing. That truly difficult challenge is to pick the one doorway through which ASEAN is most likely to walk or be pushed through—and to warrant that choice with the comprehensive evidence and thorough reasoning that, for lack of space and expertise, are not found here. That said, this "pandiction" does start with a prediction, and thereafter as well the line between speculation and expectation—the possible and the probable—will occasionally be crossed. In addition, by way of self-critique, the author's postulations may overestimate the importance of China in ASEAN's futures

From 31 January through 1 February 2018, Stanford University’s U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI) and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), gathered in Tokyo representatives from the government, defense, and academic sectors of the United States and Japan for the second workshop of the U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Dialogue Series. The purpose of the workshop was to facilitate frank discussions between academic scholars, subject matter experts, government officials, and military leaders on the current strategic and operational security challenges to the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The goal of the dialogue was to establish a common understanding of the problems facing the U.S.-Japan security alliance and to develop actionable policy recommendations aimed at addressing these issues.

This conference report provides an executive summary, policy recommendations, and a summary of the workshop sessions and findings. More information about USASI is available here.