For most of the postwar period, Japan has been a paragon of political stability among industrial democracies. Since the formation of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955, Japan has enjoyed remarkable political continuity. With the exception of less than a year of opposition government in the early 1990s, the LDP has ruled Japan for more than half a century.

This past summer, following the July elections for the Upper House of Japan's parliament (the Diet), Japan entered a new era of political uncertainty. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won control of the Upper House in a stunning defeat for the LDP. For the first time, control of the Diet is split--the ruling coalition of the LDP and the Komeito Party still control the lower house that determines the formation of the government. Passage of basic legislation now gives rise to intense political battles. There is widespread anticipation that the LDP will be forced to carry out early elections for the lower house next spring, opening the door to the possibility that the opposition could come to power in Japan.

The election results surprised many observers, who were blinded by the LDP's massive victory in the 2005 lower house elections, under the leadership of then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi had called a snap election around the issue of reforming the postal savings system, but that success was an aberration from a long-term trend of declining support for the LDP that grew during the 1990s. Increasingly, Japanese saw the party as a hostage to special interests and their allies in the bureaucracy who have used the budget to fund wasteful pork barrel projects--Japan's own "bridges to nowhere"--particularly in rural areas. Younger urban and suburban voters who favor deregulation and reform had come to see the LDP as an obstacle to needed change.

Koizumi, who came to power as prime minister in 2001, single-handedly reversed this downward trend of support. He developed a strong personal following, an appeal that came in large part from positioning himself as a maverick reformer who ran against his own party and against the opposition in equal measure. His five years in office were a testament to his charisma and ability to rise above the system that brought him to power.

Unfortunately for the LDP, this appeal does not seem to extend beyond Koizumi. After leaving office in 2006, he was replaced by Shinzo Abe, an LDP conservative who typified the party's long history of rule, in that he is the grandson of a former prime minister and the son of a former cabinet minister. Abe's policy agenda largely ignored the concerns of Japanese voters about the failing social welfare system and the impact of global competition, and instead favored conservative themes such as "patriotic" education and the revision of the postwar American-imposed constitution.

Voters decisively repudiated Abe, his agenda, and his party in the Upper House vote. The opposition DPJ, led by the wily former LDP leader Ichiro Ozawa, emphasized economic reform, as well as relief for those in rural and urban Japan who are falling behind. The DPJ's election manifesto focused on pension reforms--bolstered by a scandal of tens of millions of lost pension records--price supports for farmers, subsidies for families with children, and a crackdown on wasteful government spending.

The election result triggered Abe's resignation and in September 2007, he was replaced by his LDP rival Yasuo Fukuda. The new premier has managed, temporarily, to halt the massive slide in the government's support. Ozawa's mistakes have helped in this task. The DPJ, mainly for reasons of the legislative calendar, chose a foreign and security policy issue--the reauthorization of Japan's naval mission in the Indian Ocean in support of the U.S.-led "war on terrorism"--as the first test of strength. The DPJ has opposed this mission, arguing that Japan should not deploy forces overseas except in support of United Nations authorized operations.

This water was further muddied when Ozawa emerged from a series of meetings with Fukuda to announce his support for a deal on the maritime mission, tied to the formation of a "grand coalition" to govern Japan. The coalition proposal was reportedly offered by Fukuda and seemed to acknowledge the LDP's weakness. Ozawa's willingness to embrace this deal puzzled most observers and his own party repudiated him. Over the span of a few days, Ozawa resigned his party leadership and then agreed to come back to the post after issuing a public apology for his actions. Polls show that Ozawa suffered a significant loss of support from a public that is increasingly eager for change. But Fukuda is also very vulnerable. Among other things, the LDP is now stung with a growing scandal over questionable deals with defense contractors.

The Japanese Diet and political scene are now poised for months of battles over a range of policy issues, most of them related to domestic policy and the budget, rather than foreign policy. The DPJ, with a chastened Ozawa back at the helm, is apparently ready to use its control of the Upper House to challenge the ruling party coalition. Political uncertainty is now likely to be a dominant feature of Japanese life for months, if not years, to come.

We are pleased to announce the first article of the new academic year in our series of Shorenstein APARC Dispatches. This month's piece comes from Dr. John D. Ciorciari, one of this year's Shorenstein Fellows. Dr. Ciorciari's current research centers on the alignment policies of small states and middle powers in the Asia-Pacific region. He also has interests in international human rights law and international finance. In this piece, Dr. Ciorciari shares some comments on "Myanmar After the Saffron Revolution."

In late September, tens of thousands of Buddhist monks took to the streets of Myanmar, leading the largest uprising against the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) since 1988. A sharp and sudden hike in fuel prices sparked the protests, but to the regime's many critics, the revolt displayed the depth of popular discontent with economic mismanagement, corruption, and political repression in Myanmar. Images of unarmed monks confronting the feared tatmadaw (armed forces) won the protesters considerable moral support from abroad, as did a public appearance by Aung San Suu Kyi. Some observers anticipated that the "saffron revolution" would lead to the overthrow of the regime, as occurred during the "rose," "orange," and "tulip" revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

The tatmadaw responded swiftly and brutally, however. Troops imposed tight curfews, raided pagodas, and used clubs and tear gas to disperse protesters. In a matter of days, the armed forces killed numerous demonstrators, arrested or detained thousands more, and re-imposed control. The saffron revolution thus appears to have subsided, and the outlook is not promising for advocates of regime change or dramatic policy shifts in Myanmar.

The episode did reveal some minor cracks in the SPDC edifice. Colonel Hla Win, a longtime senior member of the junta, reportedly defected into an ethnic Karen rebel-controlled area and is seeking political asylum after defying an order to massacre a group of monks. At least one senior army official has leaked incriminating evidence to the press, and a foreign ministry official resigned at the government's "appalling" response to the protests. Prime Minister Soe Win has been hospitalized with leukemia for months. Rumors even swirled of a coup. Nevertheless, SPDC chairman Than Shwe, his deputy Maung Aye, and other cabinet members appear to have closed ranks, and the SPDC looks quite firmly entrenched.

International responses to the uprising and military response have been mixed. Western governments and activist groups quickly condemned the SPDC and pushed the regime to open dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi's opposition National League for Democracy. U.S. President George W. Bush announced tighter sanctions shortly after the crackdown began. Japan--which has favored engagement in the past--is now considering sanctions and has demanded an explanation and an apology for the shooting of a Japanese journalist.

To dampen international pressure, the SPDC allowed Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari to enter the country as a UN special envoy. Gambari has met with both Than Shwe and Aung San Suu Kyi to convey the UN's concerns about the crackdown. The SPDC has also appointed retired general U Aung Kyi as an official interlocutor with Aung San Suu Kyi and has made gestures of conciliation to the clergy. However, the Myanmar leadership has rebuffed demands for more serious political dialogue or far-reaching policy reforms.

A degree of Chinese and Russian protection has helped shield the SPDC from international pressure. China and Russia vetoed a U.S.-sponsored UN Security Council resolution demanding that the SPDC free all political prisoners. Officials in Beijing and Moscow argued that the unrest was an "internal matter" unsuited for Security Council action. Their defense of a strong norm of sovereignty--rooted largely in their fear of similar Western attacks--provides political cover for the SPDC. Their objection to isolating Myanmar economically also makes it unlikely that a program of enhanced U.S. and European sanctions will bring the junta to its knees. As long as Myanmar's neighbors do business with the SPDC, it will probably survive.

To date, divergent foreign policy priorities have conspired against a genuinely multilateral policy to drive reform in Myanmar. For China, Myanmar is a strategic gateway to the East Indian Ocean and a source of prized raw materials, as well as a political ally on issues of state sovereignty. India and Thailand have also been loath to cut off or alienate their troublesome neighbor. India has little ideological affection for the SPDC but rejects sanctions and has responded quietly to recent events in Myanmar. Indian officials view Myanmar as an important regional pivot with China and a source of natural resources. Thai policymakers, worried about refugees and instability in ethnic minority enclaves along the border, have tended to prioritize stability over reform in relations with the SPDC. Both India and Thailand derive considerable economic benefits--both legal and illicit--from an open border. In addition, they fear that using their limited leverage to attack the junta will drive it further into China's embrace.

The governments of other member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have split on the issue. Indochinese states defend Myanmar's sovereignty, while the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have been more openly critical. With a bit of diplomatic legerdemain, Singapore expressed ASEAN's grave concern to Myanmar, speaking as the Association's chair. Discourse in regional think tanks suggests that a growing number of Southeast Asian officials advocate Myanmar's suspension from ASEAN. Although suspension would push Myanmar even further into the margins of international society, it would be unlikely to unseat the SPDC. Isolation also bears obvious risks; cloning North Korea is not in any ASEAN government's interest.

Most analysts agree that China holds the key to improving the prospects for reform, development, and democracy in Myanmar. Indeed, a change in Chinese policy would increase the likelihood of tougher Indian and ASEAN stances, since a fear of encouraging close Sino-Myanmar ties helps justify their existing approaches. The possibility of embarrassment at the upcoming Olympic games provides a short-term incentive for China to press the SPDC for better governance. A longer-term incentive will be to secure the countries' shared border, which is plagued by narco-trafficking, illegal migration, and ethnic conflict. Finally, China has an incentive to build its credibility as a constructive force in Southeast Asia and beyond. Chinese officials have led a well-documented "charm offensive" in the region, both bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, to build influence. To the extent that ASEAN governments make reform in Myanmar a priority, China can show itself to be a responsible stakeholder in Southeast Asia's future.

In the near term, a coalescence of the policies of regional powers is unlikely. Moreover, strong regional pressure does not guarantee seismic policy shifts in Myanmar. The SPDC's harsh response to the protests--like its 2006 decision to move the national capital to a remote area--testifies to considerable paranoia. Still, the outside world has economic, security, and moral reasons to hold Myanmar to higher standards of governance. The pace and direction of change will depend only marginally on the severity of Western sanctions, which bite but do not cripple the regime. Western governments' ability to identify common objectives and forge cooperation with Asian partners will be more determinative. Ultimately, the development of concerted action by relevant Asian states is likely to be the rate-limiting step in the equation. The saffron revolution suggests that many domestic actors are prepared to assume risks to promote reform if Myanmar's neighbors take a tougher stand and help provide the enabling conditions for change.

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Shorenstein APARC Dispatches are regular bulletins designed exclusively for our friends and supporters. Written by center faculty and scholars, Shorenstein APARC Dispatches deliver timely, succinct analysis on current events and trends in Asia, often discussing their potential implications for business.

The Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco would like to announce that Michael Armacost has been chosen at a recipient of the 2007 Autumn Conferment of Decoration in recognition of the following contributions:

1) Contributions to the progress of bilateral relations as United States Ambassador to Japan

As the United States ambassador to Japan from 1989 to 1993, Dr. Michael Armacost contributed to the resolution of major issues such as the Gulf War and economic tensions between Japan and the United States. In addition to his dedicated efforts to address these concerns, he arranged for President Bush's visit to Japan in January of 1992. Dr. Armacost's extensive work has contributed to the further development of bilateral relations and excellent friendship between Japan and the United States.

2) Contributions to the further development of Japan-U.S. relations through accomplishments at research institutions, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense

After teaching at the International Christian University in the 1960s, Dr. Armacost served as a special assistant to Robert Ingersoll, then United States ambassador to Japan. He also held positions involving Asian affairs with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. As under secretary of state for political affairs, he participated in the planning of policies towards Asian countries including Japan. With considerable experience in Japan-U.S. relations and through exchanges with people from various fields in Japan, Dr. Armacost has helped bring mutual benefit to the two countries.

3) Contributions to promote the Japan-U.S. relationship through achievements following his work as a diplomat.

Since leaving his position as a diplomat, Dr. Armacost has continued his efforts at think tanks and research institutions of universities. Through his academic publications and lectures on such topics as Japan-U.S. relations and international security in Northeast Asia, he has promoted further understanding of Japanese foreign policy. Dr. Armacost has brought deeper knowledge about Japan to a wide audience of American politicians, business leaders, and scholars of Japan.

Ambassador Armacost will travel to Japan to receive this decoration from Emperor Akihito on November 6 in the Imperial Palace.

Within weeks of 9/11, Japan dispatched ships to the Indian Ocean to provide fuel and other support to the Western forces waging the war in Afghanistan.

It was the first time since World War II that Japan sent forces abroad to support an overseas military conflict, although in a noncombat role. American policymakers hailed Japan as a loyal ally, willing to put "boots on the ground."

Come Nov. 1, however, the Japanese ships will be heading home.

American officials worry that, after taking steps to shed its postwar pacifism, Japan will now shirk its role as an ally in international security.

But these concerns are alarmist. The Japanese government, even its liberal opposition party, has shown a desire and commitment to contribute to global security.

A renewal of the law authorizing the mission in Afghanistan is now increasingly unlikely, since the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which opposes the measure, won a shocking victory in last summer's elections for the upper house of parliament. While the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is still determined to reauthorize the military role, it faces significant public opposition and a tough road in the parliament.

Some American officials and experts have issued bellicose warnings that not renewing the mission would signal a dangerous retreat from Japan's responsibilities in the world and undermine the security alliance. Others accused DPJ leader Ozawa Ichiro of being irresponsible, even "anti-American."

These remarks are clumsy and unfair. The possibility of Japan's return to a lesser security role is real enough, but its mission in Afghanistan is the wrong test of the country's reliability as an ally.

In reality, the maritime mission has become largely symbolic. As for Mr. Ozawa, if Americans would listen carefully to his arguments, they would find that he seeks to expand, not contract, Japan's global security role.

What the US sees as backtracking on global responsibility is actually something else --opposition, shared by Japan's liberal and conservative parties, to the American decision to invade Iraq. Once carefully buried behind the appearance of alliance solidarity, it is now surfacing.

Ozawa and his party have been unusually open in questioning the Iraq war, characterizing it as a war without clear international justification. According to reliable accounts, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Kazuo privately shares that view, as do others in the LDP.

US officials critical of the DPJ for avoiding a greater security role for Japan should remember that the party supported the antiterrorism law when it was passed in 2001. But they refused to support its renewal later after the Iraq war began. Over time, senior DPJ members say, the mission's original purpose got muddied with military operations in Iraq. Japanese and American officials deny that any diversion took place, but the Pentagon admits that ships engage in multiple missions and there is no way to segregate how fuel is used.

The new version of the law proposed by the LDP explicitly narrows the role of the Navy to supporting antiterrorist interdiction operations, a backhanded acknowledgment that there was no clear separation from the Iraq war.

Ozawa has long advocated a more visible security role for Japan outside its borders, calling on the government to send forces to aid the Gulf War in 1991 and pushing through legislation allowing Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

Japanese peacekeepers, however, are restricted to noncombat missions. Despite inching toward a larger security role, the government stands by an interpretation of Japan's American-authored antiwar clause in its Constitution that bars the use of force for anything other than to respond to an attack on themselves. But Ozawa has long contended that the constitutional bar should not extend to UN activities.

This month, Ozawa proposed that instead of the maritime force, Japan should send peacekeepers to Afghanistan under the auspices of the UN-authorized international security forces, and to Sudan as well.

Ironically, the ruling conservatives reject that as unconstitutional, arguing it would be an act of collective defense rather than self-defense.

"If Japan is to really be an ally of the US ..." Ozawa wrote, "it should hold its head up high and strive to give proper advice to the US." And in order to do that," he continued, "Japan had to be willing to put itself more on the line by sharing responsibility for peacekeeping, not just sending a few boats out of harm's way."

These are ideas that should be embraced, rather than denounced, by American officials.

Reprinted by permission by the Christian Science Monitor.

Please join us on Thursday, November 1 for the launch of the Stanford China Program, a new program of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC). With China at the forefront of so many contemporary issues, from economic growth to international security, scholars at Shorenstein APARC have developed the China Program in response to the increasing need to explore and explain dynamic changes taking place in China today. The Stanford China Program is composed of scholars who do their research on the ground, in the villages, company boardrooms and government institutions of China.

Our inaugural event, co-sponsored with the Center for East Asian Studies, illustrates the catalytic role that the Stanford China Program intends to play. The panel discussion "Growing Pains: Tensions and Opportunity in China's Transformation" will go beyond the headlines trumpeting China's spectacular growth. We will discuss the difficult questions facing China, about whether and how such a rapidly transforming nation will be able to manage the tensions that accompany growth at such a pace. Issues from growing income disparity to environmental damage and widening gaps between rural and urban China are forces that are tearing at the social fabric of China. Are these the signs of a system in crisis or, as the event title suggests, the necessary pains associated with growth?

These questions occupy not only scholars, but also policy makers and business leaders alike. The panelists will discuss a range of tensions and opportunities in contemporary China such as markets, governance, environment and social inequality. The panelists include:

• Melanie Manion, Professor of Public Affairs and Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a specialist on issues of political governance in China.
• Leonardo Ortolano, UPS Foundation Professor of Civil Engineering in Urban and Regional Planning at Stanford, who will speak on environmental issues.
• Scott Rozelle, FSI Helen F. Farnsworth Senior Fellow at Shorenstein APARC and a leading expert on rural China.
• Andrew G. Walder, Denise O'Leary and Kent Thiry Professor of Sociology at Stanford and Director Emeritus of Shorenstein APARC will moderate the panel discussion.

The event is scheduled to take place from 5:30 - 7:00 PM, Thursday November 1 in the Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall, 616 Serra Street. A light reception will follow the panel discussion. Full details can be found at the link below.

I look forward to welcoming you to this inaugural event and to future activities of the Stanford China Program at Shorenstein APARC.

Sincerely,

Jean C. Oi
William Haas Professor in Chinese Politics
Professor of Political Science
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Director, Stanford China Program