China’s remarkable aggregation of national power over the past 35 years has been a source of wonderment: to economists, who have been surprised by that country’s consistently high rate of growth; to political scientists, who are at a loss to explain the persistence of authoritarian Communist Party rule despite its more open market order; and to historians, who describe China’s meteoric rise as unprecedented. But to the U.S. national security community, China’s swift climb up the international power ladder has been a source less of wonderment than of increasing concern.

How should America evaluate the risks that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) poses to its current and future interests? It is a crucial question, since sound strategy depends on an accurate assessment of the capabilities and intentions of potential rivals. Significantly underestimating China’s ambitions and its future means to advance them could render the United States strategically vulnerable. Exaggerating those same factors risks an inefficient use of America’s diplomatic, military, and economic resources, while counterproductively stimulating more vigorous PRC investments in hard power than would otherwise be the case.

Much literature has appeared in recent years speculating on future Sino-American cooperation, competition, or conflict. While there is no shortage of theories of international relations to inform conjecture on likely future scenarios, two in particular highlight the sharp contrasts in approach and perspectives that characterize this debate. The first is realism, which assumes an evolving international environment in which fierce competition between leaders and challengers is the norm. The realist dynamic is sometimes called the “Thucydides Trap”, a term inspired by Thucydides’ famous account of the seemingly inevitable conflict between the rising city-state of Athens and the status quo power Sparta as they struggled for dominance of Ancient Greece in the fifth century BCE. Realists who embrace the Thucydides Trap metaphor argue that the risks of hegemonic wars between rising states (such as China) and status quo states (such as the United States) are high. A second and contrasting theory framing this discussion is neoliberalism, which assumes that open-access political systems (which China is not) and market-based economic exchange create opportunities for the realization of positive sum gains between competing powers. Deepening socio-economic interdependence, encouraged and sustained by skillfully designed international institutions, can ensure stability and growing prosperity.

These two perspectives promote very distinct U.S. approaches for dealing with the challenges posed by a rising China. Realists, who believe that states operate in an unsentimental and unforgiving environment, would advise current U.S. leaders to keep ample powder dry, to leverage existing and acquire new allies, and to occasionally accommodate when relevant U.S. interests are much less than those of China. Persuaded that the China locomotive will keep speeding down the tracks in the years ahead, a realist would point to growing U.S.-China friction in the East and South China Seas as the shape of things to come.

Neoliberals would advise the status quo power to maintain the vibrancy and appeal of liberal political-economic norms and institutions in the belief that the contender will find it more advantageous to be a member of a successful club than to start one of its own. More importantly, neoliberals argue that long-term club membership leads to co-option and to an evolutionary change in the contender’s values. Of course, the neoliberal predictions of co-option and an evolutionary change in values are sharply at odds with those of China’s Communist Party, whose leaders envision no evolution concerning its monopoly on political power.

Both Thucydidean realists and neoliberals warn against the adoption of the other’s viewpoint. Realists point out that overly-optimistic predictions of China’s power trajectory could result in a less robust U.S. foreign policy that might encourage PRC aggression, undermine America’s reputation, discourage the commitment of allies, and set conditions for the possibility of a significant strategic setback. Neoliberals counter that too muscular a policy could undercut cooperative efforts at securing optimal agreements between the United States and China that might help improve long-term relations. Moreover, while either side could be correct, both could prove irrelevant if China’s growth slows significantly, seriously weakening its prospects to become a truly formidable challenger.

No matter what the perspectives or underlying assumptions, any useful analysis of this vexing and serious policy dilemma requires a deep understanding of China’s current standing in both regional and global affairs, as well as comprehensive knowledge of the internal and external constraints it faces in trying to realize its long-term ambitions. An effective China policy for the United States is best built on a foundation that is grounded in sober, thorough assessments of the context in which Sino-American relations exist and operate. [...]

The first paragraphs of the article "China's Place in U.S. Foreign Policy" (The American Interest, vol. 10, no. 6) have been reproduced here with permission; access to the full article is available on The American Interest website. 

Karl Eikenberry is a distinguished fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, announced earlier this month.

Weeks away from a final international accord on Iran’s nuclear program, Stanford scholars are focusing on the technical, political and practical aspects of the pending deal intended to loosen sanctions while restricting Tehran’s ability to build a nuclear weapon.

“In two to three weeks we will have what some pundits are already calling the most revolutionary positive change in Iranian-American relations and others are saying a disastrous policy of appeasement to the Iranian regime,” said Scott Sagan, a senior fellow at the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Sagan moderated a discussion at the FSI's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) on Tuesday that included FSI’s Siegfried Hecker and Thomas Fingar, as well as Abbas Milani, director of Stanford’s Iranian Studies.

Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, said Iran has developed its civilian nuclear capabilities to concurrently have a nuclear weapon option. However, at this point, they do not yet have nuclear weapons, nor have they produced the fissile materials, plutonium or highly enriched uranium, that would fuel such weapons.

“They’ve demonstrated they can enrich uranium to the levels allowed for civilian applications, but that gives them the capability to produce highly enriched uranium for bombs should they choose to do so,” Hecker said. “If they complete the Arak reactor, they will have the potential for plutonium production, although they have not developed a facility to extract the plutonium. If you look in terms of timelines for making fissile materials, they were somewhere between weeks to a month or two away for making enough fissile material for one bomb at the start of the negotiations in November 2013. The nuclear deal would move that timeline, called the ‘breakout’ time to one year, giving the international community more time to respond.”

Hecker said the technical issues are “secondary to whether Iran actually wants to go ahead and decide to build the bomb.”

He met with Iranian negotiators – including Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif – in 2013, and said the officials were anxious to reach a deal.

“Zarif told me that the cost of acquiring strategic capabilities will make Iran less safe rather than more safe,” Hecker said.

Fingar, who chaired the National Intelligence Council while also serving as the U.S. deputy director of national intelligence for analysis between 2005 and 2008, stressed the need for strong verification mechanisms if any deal with Iran is going to work.

“Verification can establish some facts but what it means is fundamentally a contextual and political judgment. What is most important? Catching somebody in a technical violation or preserving the overall purpose for which you are conducting verification. Verification requirements are an integral part of the negotiating process,” Fingar said.

That is especially true for Iran, which has proven that it is not trustworthy, he said.

“It did have a military program, it was seeking the bomb. It continues to lie about it. It lied to the European negotiators, to the UN, to the IAEA,” Fingar said. "This history mandates having a rigorous verification capability."

Monitoring is done in three bins, he said. The first, and most important, is the IAEA on-site inspections. The second is that done by other countries’ intelligence services, including those of the other P5 plus 1 countries and Israel. The third bin is the U.S. intelligence community.

“We will learn far more about what Iran is doing from the IAEA inspections than from any other mechanism,” Fingar said.

Milani focused on the politics of the deal inside Iran. Discussion of this political dimension, he said, cannot be understood unless we take into account two critical issues: Recent concerns with the health of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the heated battle on who might succeed him; and secondly the rise of ISIS and the fact that they are near Iran’s borders and have repeatedly threatened the country’s Shiites.

The debate in Iran is heated, he said, with many in favor of the agreement and a few opposed to it.

“Part of what is being fought over is what happens after the deal,” he said. “Who can claim victory for the deal? Who can take blame for it? These are profoundly political issues and they are being fought over.”

Milani said that he has never seen any policy issue, in the entire 35-year history of the Islamic Republic, being discussed with as much detail, and with as much ferocity as the nuclear deal.

There are occasional, detailed debates happening in Tehran University and other places Milani said. One side –typically pro-regime hard-liner – argues that this is the worst deal in Iran’s history. Reformists and scholars supporting President Rouhani’s government defend the agreement.

But he said these conservative opponents of the agreement are in the minority. He estimates that they have no more than 7 to 10 million supporters in a country with a population of 75 million. The vast majority of the population wants a deal, he said. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which wields more power than any other group, is not all in favor of the deal and has made threats against the government in recent weeks.

Still, the ultimate political obstacle is that the deal must contain language that all actors can sell to their respective constituencies as a victory. And finding a language that passes this political hurdle is every bit as hard as the problems discussed by Hecker and Fingar.

Joshua Alvarez is a freelance writer.

Kathleen Stephens, a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea, will join Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as the William J. Perry Distinguished Fellow in the Korea Program.

Her fellowship, made possible through the generous support of Jeong and Cynthia Kim, is effective Sept. 1, 2015.

Ambassador Stephens will be housed at Shorenstein APARC, the center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies working on policy-relevant interdisciplinary research related to the Asia-Pacific.

“Kathy Stephens brings exceptional diplomatic experience on a global scale to Shorenstein APARC. Equally impressive, she has four decades of experience in Korean affairs, first as a Peace Corps volunteer in rural Korea in the 1970s, and in ensuing decades as a diplomat and as U.S. ambassador in Seoul,” said Shorenstein APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin.

"She is often cited as one of the most popular American envoys ever to South Korea. Her ability to deal with tough issues like North Korea and the U.S.-South Korean free trade agreement -- and to connect with everyday Koreans -- speaks to her deep expertise.”

Stephens came to Stanford previously as the 2013-14 Koret Fellow after 35 years as a foreign service officer in the U.S. Department of State. At Stanford, she taught a course on U.S.-Korea relations and contributed extensively to center activities, including a Koret Workshop focused on inter-Korean relations and the biannual Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum. Her time at Stanford, though, was cut short when she was recalled to the diplomatic service to lead the U.S. mission in India as charge d'affaires during the first seven months of the new administration led by Narendra Modi.

Stephens' diplomatic career included serving as acting under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs in 2012; U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 2008 to 2011; principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 2005 to 2007; and deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs from 2003 to 2005.

She also served in numerous positions in Asia, Europe and Washington D.C., including as U.S. consul general in Belfast, Northern Ireland from 1995 to 1998, during the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement, and as director for European affairs at the White House during the Clinton Administration.

“I am delighted and honored to return to Stanford,” Stephens said. “Shorenstein APARC is an incredibly stimulating place – an opportunity to be immersed in one of the world’s leading community of scholars working on U.S.-Asia-Pacific affairs.”

Stephens holds a bachelor’s degree in East Asian studies from Prescott College and a master’s of public administration from Harvard University, in addition to honorary degrees from Chungnam National University and the University of Maryland. As an undergraduate, she studied at the University of Hong Kong and was an Outward Bound instructor in Hong Kong. She was previously a senior fellow at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.

Stephens' awards include the Presidential Meritorious Service Award (2009), the Sejong Cultural Award, and Korea-America Friendship Association Award (2013). She is a trustee at The Asia Foundation, and on the boards of The Korea Society and Pacific Century Institute.

She tweets at @AmbStephens.

Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is launching a U.S.-Asia Security Initiative spearheaded by a former top American diplomat to deepen dialogue on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues and to further bridge American and Asian academics, government officials and industry leaders.

A new and uncertain multipolar system is emerging in Asia. The United States is and will remain a global power, but it is evident the post-Cold War international order is increasingly under strain. There is a pressing need for research about how developments in the Asia-Pacific region impact U.S. interests, and what the optimal strategies are to respond. Led by Karl Eikenberry, who served as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011, the initiative will look beyond simplistic notions of nations engaging harmoniously or competing against each other and explore a range of policy options.

Combining expertise from across Stanford University, the initiative will gather faculty and researchers from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and take place under the auspices of Shorenstein APARC, a center focused on interdisciplinary research on contemporary issues of international cooperation, governance and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Eikenberry, an Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow at Shorenstein APARC, retired from the U.S. Army as a lieutenant general after 35 years of service before taking the role as ambassador. At Stanford, he has returned to an early and longstanding interest in Asia, contributing to an urgent discussion about how the United States should respond regionally and globally to an increasingly strong China. The initiative is founded on the premise that there is a role for an institution that not only fosters groundbreaking research, but also serves to convene academic and governmental expertise from across the Asia-Pacific region in a dialogue aiming to inform policy and strategy.

“As China rises and Japan seeks a greater defense role in Asia, a number of questions are raised over the United States’ role in the region. This creates a great impetus for stakeholders to gather and develop an understanding of today’s perplexing security issues,” Eikenberry said.

“It’s an honor to lead this Stanford initiative and make possible opportunities for students, scholars, peers and leaders across the world.”

Before arriving at Stanford, Eikenberry’s Asia-related postings included assistant army, and later, defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy Beijing, operational assignments in the Republic of Korea and Hawaii, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy at U.S. Pacific Command, Senior Country Director for China at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and two senior command tours in Afghanistan. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, holds master’s degrees from Harvard University and Stanford University, and has an advanced degree in Chinese history from Nanjing University.

The three-year initiative will build synergies with existing activities at Stanford, drawing scholars, government officials and industry leaders to engage at conferences and public seminars on important U.S.-Asia security themes. Understanding that inquiry is enlivened through interdisciplinary dialogue, participants will share best practices across multiple fields including diplomacy, military strategy and environmental risk.

“I can’t think of a better person to drive this initiative – Karl has a profound understanding of the economic, diplomatic and military complexities in the region. I have every confidence that it will develop into a robust, established project under his leadership,” said Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC.

Launching July 1, 2015, the initiative aims to bolster local, national and global networks through several foundational components, including a core working group of experts from Stanford and peer institutions to provide new perspectives on U.S. policies in Asia; educational opportunities for Stanford students; and public programs that will bring intellectual and strategic leaders to Stanford to enrich the conversation on Asia-Pacific security.

The initiative seeks to operate as a focal point for academic scholarship on the west coast of the United States and offer practical steps that stakeholders can take to strengthen the security architecture and U.S. alliance commitments in the region. Outcomes from the initiative’s activities will include publications and policy reports, many of which will be offered open access online.

“As the Asia-Pacific region continues to rise, we see new threats but also greater opportunity to work together,” said Michael McFaul, director of FSI. “Stanford and FSI excel in offering practical solutions to policy challenges and can play a role in identifying strategies aimed at maintaining peace and stability in the region.”

Initiative inquires: Charlotte Lee, Shorenstein APARC, cplee@stanford.edu, (650) 725-6445

Media inquires: Lisa Griswold, Communications and Outreach Coordinator, Shorenstein APARC, lisagris@stanford.edu, (650) 736-0656

As people around the world look to support earthquake relief efforts in Nepal, scholars from Stanford and the London School of Economics and Political Science offer new research that can help donors make better decisions about where and how to contribute their money.

“NGO reports tend to focus on quantity in delivery, such as numbers of homes and people served—but not on quality,” write Yong Suk Lee (Stanford) and J. Vernon Henderson (LSE).

In a forthcoming paper, the coauthors evaluate reconstruction efforts in Indonesia following the 2004 earthquake and tsunami, and find two trends: aid agencies that directly execute their services—point-to-point—perform the highest quality work. And, when agencies contract their services, higher quality work is performed when a global, not domestic, implementer completes the work.

Knowing this reality, and with improved disclosure of outcomes, the coauthors hope that donors would be able to make more informed choices.

Fishing village survey 

Figure 1. A map details the survival rate of the population and flood damage within northern Indonesia in 2004. Darker shaded areas show a higher survival rate, lighter shaded areas show a lower survival rate. Striped areas denote flooding, largely on the northeastern border. Boundaries marked with thicker lines are ‘kabupaten,’ or county divisions, and lightly colored lines are ‘kecamatan,’ or sub-county units larger than a village alone. (Courtesy of Yong Lee).

Through fieldwork and three rounds of surveys – in 2005, 2007 and 2009 – Henderson and Lee investigated aid work in Aceh, an area of coastal villages in northern Indonesia (Figure 1).

Humanitarian efforts there focused on “hard aid” such as construction of houses and fishing boats. Total aid delivered amounted to $7.7 billion and was implemented by international and domestic aid agencies—some directly and some as contractors—as well as the Indonesian government.

First, Henderson and Lee conducted a pilot survey, and then with a cohort of surveyors from the University of Indonesia, held interviews with village leaders and fishing families. Participants were asked to rate their housing accommodation, and if applicable, how their fishing activity compared to before the disaster.

“Mostly, we sat with villagers to see how willing they were to talk about aspects of aid,” Lee said. “Since it was several years after the tsunami hit, people were pretty open throughout the process.”

Data from those surveys was combined with information from the Recovery Aceh-Nias relief project database maintained by the government and the U.N., as well as demographic information provided by participants.

Delivering aid: Global v. local

Empirical analysis revealed that aid agencies such as the Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services reflected higher quality aid delivery (at a mean quality near 3.00), while agencies such as Save the Children and Concern Worldwide reflected lower quality (at a mean quality between 1.0-1.5).

“What’s surprising is that reputation didn’t really line up with what was expected,” Lee said, citing a few renowned agencies that didn’t receive high marks.

Lee said this could be explained by the fact that aid agencies that specialize in disaster recovery are better equipped, while a learning curve might exist for agencies with wider missions.

Global aid agencies are more likely to have logistical experience given their reach across multiple disaster situations. And while all NGOs face reputational costs for their results, global aid agencies are greater exposed to criticism because, by size, they’re more visible.

Yet, while global aid agencies and implementers may have the raw skills, local implementers have the cultural know-how.

“Local implementers might not have the most experience – like how to construct a house or manufacture a fishing boat – but they will likely know what’s actually desired,” Lee said. “So, there are obvious tradeoffs at play.”

For example, villagers reported bad ventilation in houses. This was because some aid agencies used small windows and concrete instead of wood material more traditionally used in Indonesia. Some boats were impossible to use because of improper design; they sank upon first use or fell apart after a few months.

Image

Collection of photos from fieldwork in Aceh, Indonesia, provided courtesy of Yong Lee. Upper left: A house built in an aid project village shows windows retrofitted after initial construction. Upper right: Boats constructed by aid agencies for fishing activity are refashioned to serve as water taxis for people and cars. Lower: Fishing boats sit unused on the side of the road many of them impossible to use, according to villagers surveyed.

Logistics and oversight

Aid delivery depends in many ways on the location and scale of the disaster. But, a few main aspects can determine if an aid agency doing its own work or operating as an implementer meets or exceeds expectations.

Henderson and Lee suggest that agencies that were highly supervisory had greater positive outcomes from their workers. In the case of Aceh, better monitoring and insistence on quality by leadership is a likely corollary between construction of better quality homes and boats.

“Rather than just give money, NGOs need to really oversee the projects. Organization and management are essential facets,” Lee said. “And that requires a lot of additional effort on their part.”

Oversight is especially relevant in disaster situations because of the often-overwhelming need for reconstruction. A flood of less-skilled workers enters the market to fill this gap, and on average the quality of work degrades.

“It’s much more difficult to impose quality control at this point,” Lee said. “So the implication that comes out of it is how does the implementer effectively utilize less-skilled workers.”

Getting to know the implementers and evaluating their work in-progress would help ensure quality on behalf of the aid agency. And, better dissemination of information about aid outcomes would help assure donors that their monies are being applied in the best possible way.

Future study

Most “hard aid” delivered to Aceh’s villages had finished by 2010, but “soft aid” such as democracy promotion and women’s empowerment stayed longer.

Henderson and Lee conducted one final survey in 2011. The data has been offered as open source material for researchers along with the larger data set.

Noting this, Lee said, “We’re thrilled that people are looking into the data further. It’s exactly what we wanted.”

Research projects applying the data include the impact of the tsunami on Aceh’s local economies and health effects on the population, among other areas.