Why Poor Countries Are Becoming Richer, Democratic, Increasingly Peaceable, and Sometimes More Dangerous

It is easy to be confused about the world’s prospect. On the one hand, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, many millions of people have been freed from economic and political shackles that had long kept them under authoritarian rule and in poverty—or at least far poorer than they should be. On the other hand, several parts of the world are beset by political turmoil and conflicts, rapid population increases, and falling incomes.

The American security alliances with Japan and South Korea have been a major concern of
China’s foreign and defense policies. China’s position toward the alliances is determined by
its foreign policy and security theories, doctrines, and principles; by its approach to a re-
gional security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region; by its bilateral relations with countries
in Northeast Asia; and by incidental issues such as territorial disputes in Asia in which it is
involved.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

The currency crisis that started in Thailand in the summer of 1997 was followed by repercussions on the currencies of neighboring countries, culminating in a crisis infecting most countries in East Asia. Japan and China, which have developed strong ties with the rest of Asia through trade and investment, have not been exempted from this contagion. This paper looks at the latest currency crisis in Asia from the perspectives of these two regional giants.

This collection of papers stems from a recent World Bank project focused upon the contentious issue of whether government has played any positive role in the success of the so-called "high-performing" Asian economies. It goes beyond the influential World Bank volume The East Asian Miracle to chart a middle ground that recognizes diversity among the different East Asian economies, as well as the evolutionary nature of government intervention.

China’s attitude toward the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances, particularly the former, has drawn a lot of attention in the post–Cold War era. How China views the utility and function of these two security alliances and reacts to them could well shape the dynamics of the alliances. From a historical perspective, however, this is not a new issue. China has lived with these alliances for almost half a century. To better understand China’s current concerns about the alliances and to predict its future posture, we might look for clues in what China has done in the past. This paper attempts to provide a broad survey of Chinese perceptions of the two security alliances in the Cold War period to elucidate Beijing’s post–Cold War policy orientation. By tracing the evolution of the Chinese calculus of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.- Korea alliances, it hopes to find answers to the following questions. What are some of the important variables or conditions that defined China’s attitudes and approaches to dealing with these two alliances? How do these variables or conditions interact with each other? Have they been constant or changing over time? Are they still relevant in the post–Cold War era, and to what extent?

The paper draws its findings mainly from the Chinese official media. While this may not be an ideal source, it nevertheless provides a systematic data basis for a historical analysis of continuity and change. There is no question that the official Chinese media, particularly before the 1980s, was full of rhetoric and propaganda. There has always been a gap between rhetoric and behavior in Chinese foreign policy, as in other countries. Nevertheless it is equally true that behind rhetoric always lie perceptions, self-serving or not, that provide “diagnostic propensities” and “choice propensities” of the Chinese leaders and elites, and thus have policy implications.

The findings of the paper suggest that China’s perceptions of the targets, internal structures, and functions of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean alliances have changed remark- ably over time, from extreme hostility to high tolerance. These changes resulted from the interactions of such factors as China’s assessment of the world balance of power, the well- being of its relationship with both indigenous and outside powers, and the priority of its national policy. The evolution of Chinese perceptions also illustrates that China need not view the two security alliances as inherently hostile to its interests. Under some circum- stances they can be considered useful or at least harmless. Beijing’s attitudes are often determined not by the two alliances per se but rather by its perception of the sources of threat to its security and whether these security alliances can alleviate or aggravate the threat. On the other hand, given the nature of China’s foreign policy, Beijing does not have intrinsic love for these alliances. Since the 1980s, China has not particularly endorsed any bilateral or multilateral military alliance in the region. Normatively China is also uneasy with the reality of the American military presence in the region and tends to see it as a short-term arrange- ment rather than a long-term phenomenon. During the Cold War, the Chinese perceived the two security alliances as either against China or with China. In the post–Cold War period, they have yet to be convinced that the function of the two alliances could be neither.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

By almost any criterion of success—be it cost-effectiveness, risk-reward ratio, multiplier
effects, or sheer longevity, the Japan America Security Alliance (JASA) stands out as one of
the most successful alliances in twentieth century history. For the United States, chief
architect of a global network of military relationships, JASA is arguably the most important
of its many bilateral alliances. In terms of historic impact, JASA is comparable to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a multilateral alliance that restructured the European
security landscape in 1949. For nearly a half-century, JASA and NATO have functioned
as the bedrock on which the Cold War security systems of Asia and Europe have been
constructed.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

Reprint from Journal of Far Eastern Business originally printed Autumn, 1994.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.

This APARC discussion series clearly recognizes that the international and regional condi- tions of the post–Cold War era raise new and vexing questions about the future of the United States and its alliance relations in Northeast Asia. Today I would like to raise and begin to analyze a specific subset of questions related to proliferation, which I believe have a direct bearing on the future security situation in the region—and, more importantly for us, the U.S. alliances there. I do not think that this subject receives sustained analysis, so I would like to try to initiate that process. I am at the outset of putting this research together and welcome the opportunity to hear your thoughts and criticisms as the study evolves.

In this presentation, I take a preliminary look at how issues of proliferation affect the present and future disposition of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia. In particular, I hope to answer three questions. First, how do issues of proliferation either weaken or strengthen U.S. relations with its allies in Northeast Asia? Second, how do issues of proliferation affect the overall security situation there? And third, how does the security situation, in turn, shape the rationale or justification for continued U.S. alliance presence in the region? For this presenta- tion, when I speak of proliferation I generally refer to the spread of nuclear, missile, and advanced conventional weapon capabilities. I will not address issues related to chemical and biological weapons, although I do believe that these are a concern. Such a definition obviously casts a rather wide net, and in a presentation such as this at a relatively early stage of the research, I want to keep my focus relatively narrow. Thus, I will not address what I consider global issues of nonproliferation, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Rather, I want to focus more narrowly on issues of specific relevance to Northeast Asia.

In trying to keep this focus narrow, then, I will proceed in four steps. First, I wish to briefly consider the contemporary trends of proliferation, around the globe and regionally, which have a bearing on the security situation in Northeast Asia. Second, I want to discuss three types of proliferation concerns and show how they intersect and interact with U.S. alliance relations. The first is nuclear proliferation, and here I would like to look at alliance relations in the context of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO. On the issue of the proliferation of theater missile defenses (TMD), I want to look specifically at the development of these capabilities by South Korea and Japan. And third, on the issue of ballistic missile proliferation, I would like to consider the efforts by South Korea to develop a more powerful ballistic missile force. In the third part of the talk, I would like to address how these and other proliferation issues affect relations with China, because future U.S. alliance relations will be shaped in no small measure by Chinese reactions to them. In the fourth and concluding section of the talk, I will try to look ahead and assess how these several developments affect relations between the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia; how they influence security in the region; and how U.S. alliance relations in Northeast Asia might be readjusted in the future so that cooperation and nonproliferation can help justify a continued U.S. presence in the region, simultaneously contributing to long-term regional confidence and stability.

Published as part of the "America's Alliances with Japan and Korea in a Changing Northeast Asia" Research Project.