Shorenstein APARC has received a grant from the Academy of Korean Studies in Seoul which enables the center to publish a series of books on Korea's democratization and social change, under the series title: Korean Democracy: From Birth to Maturity.

Under this three-year grant, the center will publish a series of studies which focus on: 1) the role of social movements in Korean democratization, 2) comparative relevance of the Korean experiences, and 3) impact of democratization on social and political changes.

For the first study the center will build upon its on-going research projects, particularly the Stanford Korean Democracy Project. This project seeks to understand the emergence and evolution of social movements and their role in Korean democratization. During the authoritarian years, when former military generals ruled Korea, various social groups participated in the movement to restore democracy and ensure human rights. Their activism was instrumental to democratic reforms that took place in the summer of 1987 and they continued to play an important role even after democratic transition.

The Stanford University Korea Democracy Project traces the dynamic of this social movement from 1970 to 1993. Based on sourcebooks obtained from the Korea Democracy Foundation, project researchers led by Dr. Gi-Wook Shin have created novel quantitative data sets. Specifically, they have coded the main features of nearly five thousand protest and repression events from 1970 to 1993, using a comprehensive coding scheme developed expressly for this purpose. In addition, researchers have coded an organizational directory that includes characteristics associated with 387 social movement organizations active during this same period. While there are many informative studies of particular movements - such as the Kwangju uprising - in Korea's democracy movement, the Stanford Korea Democracy Project aims to provide a systematic overview of the movement as it developed through the most authoritarian period (1972-84), democratic transition (1987), and the democratic period (post-1987). Two books are expected from this project.

The second study will address the comparative relevance of Korean experiences. The comparison between Korea and other non-Western societies raises many questions about the conditions necessary for democratic transformation, including the role of culture, national identity, social organization, labor politics, and economic modernization. There is also a need to understand how Korea's particular example provides lessons regarding effective democracy promotion. The center plans to host a conference on labor politics in Korean democracy that is designed to develop a theoretical challenge to the Euro-centric theoretical paradigm in labor studies and draw implications for other non-Western societies. In advancing comparative perspectives, the researchers will work closely with Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). The coordinator of their Democracy Program, Larry Diamond, has already published two books that looked at Korea's experience in this comparative framework.

Finally, the third study will assess the impact of democratization on broader social and political changes in South Korea. This will include not only domestic issues but also Korea's relations with other nations. The latter is particularly relevant since Korean democratization took place in the post-cold war era. As such, democratization has provoked Koreans to rethink their views of the North, US-ROK relations and Korea's role in the world. Clearly democratic change has significantly altered the environment in which Korean government policy is made, broadening the public policy dialogue to include non-governmental actors, new media, and politicians who are sensitive to the shifts of public opinion. Researchers at the center will explore this dynamic in supporting the research and publication of a new book on South Korea's democratization and the anti-American wave of 1999-2002, authored by a former senior American official, David Straub, currently a 2007-2008 Pantech Research Fellow at the Center. 

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Center, a research center within the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), seeks a full time researcher to assist the director of the Korean Studies Program (KSP) with scholarly work related to the program. The incumbent will manage KSP's projects that concern Korea and the East Asia region.

Responsibilities include, but are not limited to, conducting research related to the program and the director's own research. The incumbent will provide program support to the director in developing new research projects; preparing grant proposals and reports; and assisting the director in preparing for research meetings and conferences. The incumbent may be called upon to accompany the director or to represent program at related research meetings.

QUALIFICATIONS: The incumbent must have BA (or equivalent) in international relations or political science (or related subject) with two to three years of work experience with strong writing and editing skills. A graduate degree in social sciences is desirable, but not required. Must have knowledge of international relations in North East Asia, specifically of Korean affairs and of the policy making process in Washington D.C. The incumbent will work in a fast-paced and dynamic intellectual environment.

Applicants must submit a cover letter and CV.

Two year fixed-term appointment with possibility of renewal.

To ensure your application information is captured in our official files and that the hiring department has immediate access to your resume, you must apply to Jobs at Stanford
requisition # 28868 (keyword search: 28868).

Stanford University is an affirmative action, equal opportunity employer.

In December 2007, for the first time ever, South Koreans, anxious about the economy, elected a businessman as their president. Pro-growth conservative Lee Myung-bak won a resounding victory, with 49 percent of the vote, over left-center candidate Chung Dong-young, who won only 26 percent. Lee's margin would have been even greater had it not been for the late entry into the race by another conservative, Lee Hoi-chang, who finished third with 15 percent.

Korean voters had become tired of ten years of rule by the left-center, and they saw incumbent President Roh Moo-hyun as confrontational and ineffective. By contrast, Lee, a former Hyundai Engineering and Construction CEO, has a reputation for being a pragmatic, can-do leader. As mayor of Seoul (2002-2006), he beautified the city and reformed its mass transit system.

Lee is scheduled to be inaugurated on February 25 for a single five-year term, but he faces two early challenges. First, just before the election, the left-center camp passed a bill establishing a special prosecutor to investigate allegations that Lee had been involved in business fraud and other corruption. The special prosecutor is supposed to announce his findings before the inauguration. A regular prosecutor earlier found the charges to be unfounded, and most observers think that the special prosecutor will not turn up significant new information.

Second, President-elect Lee must counter centrifugal forces in the conservative party ahead of parliamentary elections on April 5. Lee Hoi-chang's defection has already split the conservative camp, and now President-elect Lee and former conservative party leader Park Geun-hye (daughter of the late President Park Chung Hee) are feuding over how much say each should have in choosing candidates for the parliamentary election.

If President-elect Lee is cleared by the special prosecutor and if he successfully manages relations with Park, Lee's party will likely win a very large majority in the parliamentary election, offering him the opportunity to be a strong and effective executive.

As president, Lee will face two long-term challenges. First, as Lee has promised Korean voters, he must strengthen the economy. While the Korean economy has been growing at a rate of about 5 percent in recent years, the average Korean has felt hard-pressed by large increases in housing and education costs. Lee plans to focus on deregulation and attracting foreign investment. He has, however, already been forced to scale back his promise of 7 percent annual growth to 6 percent at least for his first year in office.

Second, although North Korea was not a major issue in the election campaign, due to the apparent progress in Six-Party talks to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program, many experts are skeptical that North Korea will fully abandon its nuclear ambitions. Lee supports engagement of North Korea and continued humanitarian aid, but he has said he will not provide major economic aid to North Korea until it ends its nuclear weapons program. This marks a significant departure from the policy of his predecessors Roh Moo-hyun and Kim Dae-jung. A renewal of tensions with North Korea could threaten South Korean economic growth and Lee's popularity.

Lee strongly supports South Korea's alliance with the United States. He may seek talks with the United States to adjust or delay implementation of agreements reached in recent years to reduce the United States' role in South Korea's defense. Lee also supports early ratification of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the largest U.S. free trade agreement since NAFTA. (The U.S. Congress has not yet approved the U.S.-Korea FTA.)

Many experts believe that the near coincidence of Lee's election and the inauguration of a new U.S. administration in January 2009 offers a major opportunity to strengthen U.S.-South Korean relations. Shorenstein APARC and the New York-based Korea Society recently announced the formation of a study group of senior former U.S. officials and experts to issue a report and recommendations on how the next U.S. administration can work with President Lee. The study group will travel to Seoul in early February for meetings with President-elect Lee and his economic, foreign policy, and security advisors.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the election of Lee was that Koreans did not think it remarkable. They simply took it for granted that the election would be free, fair, and peaceful. Yet it has only been twenty years since South Koreans literally forced a military-backed government to allow them to vote democratically for their chief executive. In those two decades, there have been five presidential elections, with Lee's victory making the second full-fledged transfer of power between political camps. Moreover, this election was conducted at very low cost, using public funds; companies were not "squeezed" for campaign contributions as in the past. South Korea has demonstrated itself to be, along with Australia and New Zealand, the most democratic country in East Asia and a model of political development for the entire international community.

We are pleased to bring you the third article of the academic year in our series of Shorenstein APARC Dispatches. This month's piece comes from Dr. Phillip Lipscy, FSI Center Fellow and Assistant Professor, Political Science. Lipscy joined Shorenstein APARC in fall 2007 and his research interests focus on international relations and political economy, particularly as they relate to Japan and East Asia. He has been a Shorenstein APARC affiliate since his undergraduate years, when he studied under Professor Emeritus Danial Okimoto. He attended Harvard University for his doctoral studies.

Since the end of World War II, East Asia has often been characterized as a region with weak international organizations. There has been no regional integration project comparable to the European Union (EU). Cooperation on a wide variety of issues has tended to be ad hoc rather than institutionalized. Regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), have generally been weak or limited in scope, with some notable exceptions such as the Asian Development Bank.

However, in recent years, there are indications that the pattern of institutionalization in Asia is shifting. Since the end of the Cold War, regional cooperative arrangements have emerged and grown. With the addition of China, Japan, and South Korea, a revitalized ASEAN+3 is becoming a locus of economic cooperation. Many observers believe the Six Party Talks could be institutionalized to manage a broader set of security issues beyond North Korea. The Chiang Mai Initiative, a multilateral currency swap arrangement, might eventually develop into a monetary fund. Bilateral trade agreements are proliferating and could ultimately produce a regional free trade zone.

Under the right circumstances, regionalism can complement the broader global order. However, to a significant extent, recent regional initiatives reflect an underlying dissatisfaction with the global institutional architecture. The Chiang Mai Initiative emerged after the Asian financial crisis, from a widespread sense that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) underrepresented Asian interests and therefore imposed overly harsh conditionality on the affected states. Paralysis at the Doha Round negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has facilitated the rapid expansion of bilateral trade initiatives. The North Korean nuclear problem is precisely the sort of collective security issue the United Nations (UN) Security Council was envisioned to deal with, but the rigidity of both Security Council membership and its decision-making procedures has rendered this impractical.

Historically, international organizations have often exhibited path dependence, or a resistance to change. For example, the permanent members of the UN Security Council still remain the victorious powers of World War II. The distribution of voting shares in the IMF and World Bank has consistently overrepresented inception members such as Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, at the expense of both the defeated powers of World War II and newly independent and developing states. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) remains a predominantly European institution despite the rapid growth of Asia. Across a wide range of international organizations, Asian nationals continue to be underrepresented among employees, and in some cases leading positions are allocated to Western nationals by convention, as in the IMF and World Bank.

However, as Asia continues its rapid growth, the active involvement of Asian states in the global order will become paramount. Including India, broader East Asia encompasses more than half of the world's population. The region already accounts for about one-third of global oil consumption and CO2 emissions, and this is only likely to grow in the future. By 2020, in purchasing power parity terms, regional GDP will likely exceed that of the United States and the EU combined. Over the course of the twenty-first century, Asia's economic and geopolitical weight in the world will, in all likelihood, come to rival that of Europe in the nineteenth century. With Asia's dramatic rise, Asian problems will become increasingly indistinguishable from global problems.

Thus, a critical question in the coming decades will be whether the contemporary international organizational architecture will be able to smoothly incorporate the rising states of broader East Asia. Sweeping geopolitical shifts have often created instability in the international system -- the waning of Pax Britannica in the early twentieth century precipitated two world wars and a global depression, as the world lacked a geopolitical and economic stabilizing force in times of crisis. If universalistic institutions such as the UN, IMF, and WTO are seen as unresponsive to Asian concerns, two potentially destabilizing outcomes are likely. First, Asian regional cooperation may further intensify. For example, a full-fledged Asian Monetary Fund that acts independently of the IMF could be formed, or an Asian Free Trade Area established. Such institutions have the potential to undermine existing international organizations such as the IMF and WTO. Eventually, Asian institutions may supersede existing global institutions, but only after contestation and needless replication. A second destabilizing outcome could be that Asian states disengage from the U.S.-backed international order without developing strong regional institutions. This might create a situation akin to U.S. nonparticipation in the League of Nations in the interwar years. Without active involvement of some of the most important players, international organizations will become less effective at facilitating cooperation and resolving major disputes. International relations will become more anarchic and cooperation more ad hoc.

The rise of Asia will likely provide the first major stress test for the global organizational architecture that the United States has constructed and underpinned since the end of World War II. Of course, there are also some grounds for optimism. Among other things, China and Vietnam have joined the WTO, ongoing IMF quota revisions have produced ad hoc increases to South Korea and China, and Asian nationals increasingly play important roles in major international organizations -- e.g. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata. It is paramount that concerns about Asian representation and interests in universalistic international organizations be addressed so that the rise of Asia contributes to -- rather than undermines -- the stability of the international order.

New York and Stanford, CA., Jan. 10, 2008 -- With South Koreans having elected a new president last month and Americans going to the polls in November to choose a new leader, Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the New York-based Korea Society today announced the formation of a non-partisan group of distinguished American former senior officials and experts to study ways to strengthen the alliance between the two countries.

The New Beginnings' study group will gather at the end of the month at Stanford University to discuss and analyze the implications of the Korean election for alliance relations. The group will then proceed to Seoul in early February for meetings with South Korean President-elect Lee Myung-bak and his top aides, as well as other leading figures in Korean business, academic, media and policy circles. Based on these meetings, the group will prepare a report in March on their findings and recommendations to present to American policymakers, including those from the leading U.S. presidential campaigns.

Korea Society President Evans J.R. Revere and Stanford University Professor Gi-Wook Shin said group members believe that U.S.-South Korean relations are critically important to the United States' role in East Asia and that the inauguration of new administrations in both the U.S. and South Korea offers a unique opportunity to create "new beginnings" in the alliance relationship.

They also noted that the two presidential elections coincide with a critical phase in multinational talks to end North Korea's nuclear weapons programs and that close U.S.-South Korean cooperation is essential to successful diplomacy in dealing with North Korea.

Shin and Revere said that the Bush and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, after initial policy differences over North Korea especially, had recently significantly improved their cooperation, but that the two countries could do much more to strengthen bilateral relations.

Shin and Revere said they regarded the study project as a continuing collaborative effort by their two institutions. After issuing the report in March, they intend to continue to meet with U.S. and South Korean policymakers and other leaders. They plan to update the report and recommendations after the U.S. presidential election.

Study group members are:

• Michael H. Armacost, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; currently the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow at Stanford University
• Stephen W. Bosworth, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University, and a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea
• Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a former State Department Northeast Asia intelligence chief
• Victor Cha, director of Asian Studies and D.S. Song Professor at Georgetown University, and former director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council and U.S. deputy head of delegation for the Six Party Talks in the George W. Bush administration
• Thomas C. Hubbard, Kissinger McLarty Associates, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea
• Don Oberdorfer, chairman of the U.S.-Korea Institute of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and former longtime Washington Post foreign correspondent
• Charles L. Pritchard, president of the Korea Economic Institute in Washington, D.C., and former U.S. ambassador and special envoy for negotiations with North Korea
• Evans J.R. Revere, president of the Korea Society, and former principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
• Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC; the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies; and professor of sociology at Stanford University
• Daniel C. Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, Stanford University, and formerly a foreign affairs correspondent and columnist
• David Straub, Pantech Research Fellow at Stanford's Shorenstein APARC, and a former State Department Korean affairs director