Reforming Japan's Energy Sector, Governance, and Economy
Advance Reading Recommended:Speakers will not give prepared remarks.They ask that attendees read the Q&A with Siegfried Hecker and David Straub on the recent agreement.Additional reading materials are linked at the end of this event announcement. |
About the event: The speakers will take questions regarding the February 29 agreement between the United States and North Korea that provided for the delivery of U.S. food aid, a moratorium on North Korean nuclear and missile tests, and the entrance of international inspectors into facilities at Yongbyon.
About the speakers:
Siegfried S. Hecker is co-director of the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, Senior Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Professor (Research) in the Department of Management Science and Engineering. He is also director emeritus at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, where he served as director from 1986-1997 and senior fellow until July 2005. He received his B.S., M.S., and PhD degrees in metallurgy from Case Western Reserve University. His current professional interests include plutonium research, cooperative nuclear threat reduction with the Russian nuclear complex, and global nonproliferation and counter terrorism. He is a fellow of numerous professional societies and received the Presidential Enrico Fermi Award.
John Lewis is the William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, emeritus, and an FSI senior fellow by courtesy. He is an expert on Chinese politics, U.S.-China relations, China's nuclear weapons program, U.S. policy toward Korea and health security issues in northeast Asia. He founded and directed the Center for East Asian Studies, in 1969-1970; the Center for International Security and Arms Control (now the Center for International Security and Cooperation, or CISAC) from 1983 to 1991; and the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now APARC), from 1983 to 1990. He currently directs CISAC's Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region.
David Straub was named associate director of the Korean Studies Program (KSP) at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) on July 1, 2008. Prior to that he was a 2007–08 Pantech Fellow at the Center. Straub is currently writing a book on recent U.S.-South Korean relations. He is also a member of the New Beginnings policy research group on U.S.-South Korean relations, which is co-sponsored by Shorenstein APARC and the New York-based Korea Society. An educator and commentator on current Northeast Asian affairs, Straub retired in 2006 from his role as a U.S. Department of State senior foreign service officer after a 30-year career focused on Northeast Asian affairs. He worked over 12 years on Korean affairs, first arriving in Seoul in 1979.
Note: This event will follow a shortened science seminar by Dr. Len Weiss titled "The Mysterious Flash of 9/22/1979: The Case for an Israeli Nuclear Test"
CISAC Conference Room
No longer in residence.
David Straub was named associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) on July 1, 2008. Prior to that he was a 2007–08 Pantech Fellow at the Center. Straub is the author of the book, Anti-Americanism in Democratizing South Korea, published in 2015.
An educator and commentator on current Northeast Asian affairs, Straub retired in 2006 from his role as a U.S. Department of State senior foreign service officer after a 30-year career focused on Northeast Asian affairs. He worked over 12 years on Korean affairs, first arriving in Seoul in 1979.
Straub served as head of the political section at the U.S. embassy in Seoul from 1999 to 2002 during popular protests against the United States, and he played a key working-level role in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program as the State Department's Korea country desk director from 2002 to 2004. He also served eight years at the U.S. embassy in Japan. His final assignment was as the State Department's Japan country desk director from 2004 to 2006, when he was co-leader of the U.S. delegation to talks with Japan on the realignment of the U.S.-Japan alliance and of U.S. military bases in Japan.
After leaving the Department of State, Straub taught U.S.-Korean relations at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in the fall of 2006 and at the Graduate School of International Studies of Seoul National University in spring 2007. He has published a number of papers on U.S.-Korean relations. His foreign languages are Korean, Japanese, and German.
China's defense budget has grown over the past two decades to become the second largest in the world, though still far below that of the United States. The steady growth of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) capabilities and effectiveness influence not only Beijing's security policies, but the behavior of states within, and increasingly beyond, East Asia, including the United States. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, whose experience with the Chinese military includes assignments as the U.S. defense attaché and assistant army attaché to the People's Republic of China (PRC), will discuss the PLA's modernization efforts and address the evolving role of the military in the PRC's comprehensive national security strategy.
Karl Eikenberry is the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University (FSI). Within FSI he is an affiliated faculty member with the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. He is also and an affiliated researcher with the Europe Center. Prior to his arrival at Stanford, he served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from May 2009 until July 2011, where he led the civilian surge directed by President Obama to reverse insurgent momentum and set the conditions for a transition to full Afghan sovereignty.
Philippines Conference Room
North Korea’s agreement to curb its nuclear and weapons programs is welcome diplomatic news. But it stops far short of addressing the world’s concerns about the isolated and unstable dictatorship.
Stanford experts David Straub and Siegfried S. Hecker discuss Pyongyang’s deal with Washington that will allow nuclear inspectors into North Korea and deliver much-needed nutritional assistance to the impoverished country.
Straub is the associate director of the Korean Studies Program at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He is a former State Department senior foreign service officer who worked for more than 12 years on Korean affairs. He travelled to North Korea in 2009 with former President Bill Clinton as part of a delegation to secure the release of two journalists from Current TV.
Hecker is co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation and a senior fellow at FSI. Hecker has visited North Korea four times since 2004. During his last trip in 2010, he was shown a new light-water reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear center and a uranium enrichment facility.
What are some of the key factors that led North Korea to agree to this deal?
Straub: This year marks the 100th anniversary of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung’s birth, which the entire country will be celebrating April 15. The government has also said that this is the target year for North Korea to become a “strong and prosperous country.” Kim Jong Un is a brand-new leader, and presumably he and his advisors want to show that he is capable of feeding his people and at least managing the relationship with the United States.
How do you assess the agreement? Where does the moratorium put relations between the U.S. and North Korea?
Hecker: The moratorium demonstrates that North Korea is once again interested in diplomacy with the United States. The fact that they are willing to halt the nuclear operations at Yongbyon, especially the uranium enrichment activities, is a big step in the right direction. I believe the U.S. now wants to achieve a permanent halt to all nuclear weapons activities in North Korea, then roll them back, and eventually achieve complete, verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Straub: There is no perfect deal when it comes to North Korea, but overall I think it is worth giving this one a chance. It will probably slow down the pace of nuclear and missile development in North Korea. In addition, it will give us time to explore whether there is any prospect that the new leadership in North Korea may be willing to take a different, more positive approach toward the United States and South Korea than its predecessors. If history is a guide, the likeliest outcome is that after a period of several months to a few years the six-party talks will again break down, after which North Korea will create a new crisis.
How hopeful are you that this will lead to the capping of North Korea's nuclear capabilities and perhaps even its ultimate denuclearization?
Hecker: My advice to our government since November 2010, when I was shown the Yongbyon centrifuge facility, was to take immediate action so that the nuclear situation does not get worse. I advocated three no’s: no more bombs, no better bombs and no exports. The current agreement will limit the number of bombs because the Yongbyon nuclear facilities will observe a moratorium. We are still not certain of what they can produce at an undisclosed site, but I believe it is limited. The nuclear testing and missile launch moratorium will constrain the sophistication of their nuclear weapons. Denuclearization is important, but it remains a more distant goal.
Why does the United States call this “important, but limited progress”?
Straub: It is significant, in part, because since North Korea threw out international nuclear inspectors in 2009 there has been no outside monitoring of what is going on at the Yongbyon facility. But most of the things North Korea has agreed to could be reversed at will. Apart from the nuclear tests, the suspension of North Korean nuclear activities applies only to Yongbyon. Dr. Hecker and other experts have concluded there is no way North Korea could have constructed its uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon so soon after the departure of international inspectors if had not already had another facility elsewhere. The agreement also does not address a number of non-nuclear issues, such as North Korea’s military attacks on South Korea in 2010. For there eventually to be lasting progress on the Korean Peninsula—including a resolution of the nuclear issue—there will have to be great improvement in relations between North and South Korea.
Based on what your 2010 visit to the Yongbyon nuclear facility, how much progress could they have made in terms of uranium enrichment?
Hecker: They told me they just brought up the centrifuge facility a week before we arrived in November 2010. They may have perfected the operations and produced some low enriched uranium feed material for the light-water reactor they are constructing (which is still at least a couple of years away from completion). It is also possible that they are still struggling to make the centrifuge facility work smoothly. It is very important to have the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors get into the facility to see what progress has been made and to get a measure of how sophisticated their operations are. The North, in my opinion, still has only four to eight primitive plutonium bombs. I don’t believe they have the confidence to put a warhead small enough to fit on one of their missiles. We have little information on whether they have made highly enriched uranium or have tried to build a bomb fueled with highly enriched uranium.
What does this agreement say, if anything, about the new North Korean leadership?
Hecker: From what I know, this was pretty much the deal worked out the week before Kim Jong Il’s death. I think it’s a good sign; Kim Jong Un appears to be in control as indicated by the fact that he is able to offer up a similar deal even with his father gone.
Straub: This deal suggests that there is a great deal of continuity in North Korea’s leadership. The substance of this agreement is actually quite consistent with North Korean policies and priorities over the last 20 years. While there is no evidence to suggest that Kim Jong Un will adopt major new policies, there is always at least the possibility he might eventually.
The deal includes the provision of 240,000 metric tons of “nutritional assistance” to North Korea. What does the country’s food situation look like right now?
Straub: There is no doubt that many ordinary North Koreans are going hungry. The United States has termed this “nutritional assistance” to distinguish it from “food aid,” because officials are concerned that the provisions of bulk grain – especially rice – might be siphoned off by the North Korean elite. The U.S. government had said earlier that nutritional assistance would not involve bulk grain, and that it would be targeted toward especially vulnerable groups, such as lactating mothers, children, and the elderly.
As the U.S. presidential election campaign moves into full bore, what role will foreign policy play in the national debate and the presidential election? Does foreign policy matter to voters or do international issues take a back seat to domestic concerns? How does the election affect the conduct of foreign policy?
Here to shed light on the presidential election and U.S. foreign policy are three prominent commentators, with moderator Coit Blacker.
Michael H. Armacost is the Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow at FSI’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, a position he has held since 2002. He is the former president of the Brookings Institution, former under secretary of state for political affairs and former U.S. ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.
David Brady is deputy director and Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the Bowen and Janice Arthur McCoy Professor of Political Science and Leadership Values in Stanford's Graduate School of Business, a professor of political science in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute and the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. He is a specialist on U.S. national elections.
David M. Kennedy is the Donald J. McLachlan Professor of History, Emeritus at Stanford and Faculty Co-Director of the Bill Lane Center for the American West. Most famously, Professor Kennedy won the 2000 Pulitzer Prize for History for his book Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (1999).
Moderator: Coit D. Blacker is director and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies in the School of Humanities and Sciences, and the Olivier Nomellini Family University Fellow in Undergraduate Education. During the first Clinton administration, Blacker served as special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and senior director for Russian, Ukrainian, and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC).
Bechtel Conference Center
Michael Armacost (April 15, 1937 – March 8, 2025) was a Shorenstein APARC Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) from 2002 through 2021. In the interval between 1995 and 2002, Armacost served as president of Washington, D.C.'s Brookings Institution, the nation's oldest think tank and a leader in research on politics, government, international affairs, economics, and public policy. Previously, during his twenty-four-year government career, Armacost served, among other positions, as undersecretary of state for political affairs and as ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.
Armacost began his career in academia, as a professor of government at Pomona College. In 1969, he was awarded a White House Fellowship and was assigned to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State. Following a stint on the State Department's policy planning and coordination staff, he became a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo from 1972 to 74, his first foreign diplomatic post. Thereafter, he held senior Asian affairs and international security posts in the State Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security Council. From 1982 to 1984, he served as U.S. ambassador to the Philippines and was a key force in helping the country undergo a nonviolent transition to democracy. In 1989, President George Bush tapped him to become ambassador to Japan, considered one of the most important and sensitive U.S. diplomatic posts abroad.
Armacost authored four books, including, Friends or Rivals? The Insider's Account of U.S.–Japan Relations (1996), which draws on his tenure as ambassador, and Ballots, Bullets, and Bargains: American Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections (2015). He also co-edited, with Daniel Okimoto, the Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia, published in 2004 by Shorenstein APARC. Armacost served on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards, including TRW, AFLAC, Applied Materials, USEC, Inc., Cargill, Inc., and Carleton College, and he currently chairs the board of The Asia Foundation.
A native of Ohio, Armacost graduated from Carleton College and earned his master's and doctorate degrees in public law and government from Columbia University. He received the President's Distinguished Service Award, the Defense Department's Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Secretary of State's Distinguished Services Award, and the Japanese government’s Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.
China’s “rise” has elicited envy, admiration, and fear among its neighbors and more distant countries. Much of what has been written about the modalities and impact of China’s increased activism on the world stage comes close to depicting what has happened (and what presumably will happen in the future) as determined almost entirely by goals, approaches, and instruments conceived in Beijing and implemented as designed by their Chinese authors. Such descriptions and explanations minimize or ignore the other side of the equation, namely, what individuals, corporate actors, and governments in other countries do to attract, shape, exploit, or deflect Chinese involvement. The "China and the World" project will redress the imbalance by examining the actions of China’s partners and ways in which initiatives and reactions from partners have shaped Chinese policy and the outcome of engagements with other countries.
The ultimate objective of this study is to understand and anticipate China’s behavior on the world stage. But China’s objectives, methods, and impacts vary from one region to another, and differences between regions are as interesting and as important as are practices and patterns common to all parts of the globe. Describing and explaining regional differences (as well as differences among countries in the same region) is therefore a useful, if not necessary, prerequisite for examining behavior and interactions at the global level.
North America, to be sure, is arguably the most important partner and shaper of China’s international behavior in the decades since Deng Xiaoping launched the policy of “reform and opening” that has transformed China. The reason for not focusing specifically on the United States in this study is that U.S.-China relations have been studied more extensively than any other Chinese relationship. However, the extent and nature of U.S. relations with countries in all regions make it imperative to consider U.S.-China relations in each region and their role, if any, in shaping China’s relationships with other countries.
The “China and the World” project will focus initially on Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. China has a long history and deeply varied relationship with these two regions. At the next stage, the project will examine China’s relationship with South Asia. Additional regions, such as Central Asia, may be added.
The project will begin with a one-and-a-half day workshop on March 19–20, 2012, convened in Beijing at the new Stanford Center at Peking University. It will focus on China’s relationships with Japan, Korea, and Russia in Northeast Asia. The participation of scholars from Southeast Asia and North America will help ensure that the core questions developed at the workshop are broadly applicable to other regions as well.
Stanford Center at Peking University
Newly printed “no smoking” signs went up across China when the government rolled out a nationwide public indoor smoking ban in May 2011. A sticky gray layer of smoke residue now coats many signs, representing the challenges China’s growing tobacco-control movement faces against a multibillion-dollar government-run industry and deeply embedded social practices.
How has the cigarette become so integrated into the fabric of everyday life across the People’s Republic of China (PRC)?
To get to the heart of this question, historians, health policy specialists, sociologists, anthropologists, business scholars, and other experts met Mar. 26 and 27 in Beijing for a conference organized by Stanford’s Asia Health Policy Program. They examined connections intricately woven over the past 60 years between marketing and cigarette gifting, production and consumer demand, government policy and economic profit, and many other dimensions of China’s cigarette culture.
Anthropologist Matthew Kohrman, a specialist on tobacco in China, led the conference, which was held at the new Stanford Center at Peking University. In an interview, he spoke about the history of China’s cigarette industry, cigarettes and society, and the tobacco-control movement.
The early years
Tobacco first entered China through missionary contact in the 1600s, says Kohrman, but it was not until the early 20th century when cigarettes began gaining popularity. The first cigarette advertising was a “confused tapestry” of messages as marketers figured out what spoke to the public. “There were just as many images of neo-Confucian filial piety as there were of cosmopolitan ‘modern women,’” says Kohrman.
Through improved marketing and aggressive factory building, British American Tobacco and Nanyang Brothers, China’s two largest pre-war firms, helped increase the demand for cigarettes. The Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) disrupted the cigarette supply, but their popularity had taken hold. Some cigarette firms shifted during the war to the relative safety of southwest China, where tobacco production has remained concentrated ever since.
Post-1949
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the tobacco industry was nationalized and strong relationships between the central government and cigarette manufacturers in the provinces were formed. Cigarettes also began to be viewed as a part of everyday life. “Ration coupons for cigarettes were issued alongside grain, sugar, and bicycle coupons,” says Kohman. “The Maoist regime legitimized cigarettes as the right of every citizen."
During the Deng Xiaoping era (1978–1997), China’s cigarette industry really took off as manufacturers competed with one another for foreign currency to purchase cutting-edge European equipment and newer varieties of tobacco seed stock. Increased production and the return of full-scale advertising fueled greater consumer demand, and manufacturers began producing more and more varieties of cigarette. Vendors displayed glass cases filled with a colorful patchwork of cigarette packs bearing names like Panda, Double Happiness, and Red Pagoda.
The tobacco industry remained under government control as other industries privatized in the 1980s and 1990s. Party-state management of the cigarette became even more centralized in the early 1980s with the creation of the China Tobacco Monopoly Administration and its parallel external counterpart, the China Tobacco Corporation.
Since 1949, provincial protectionism has marked the cigarette market. It is now possible to purchase Beijing cigarettes in Kunming, Chengdu brands in Shanghai, and so on, but to distribute cigarettes in another province, a manufacturer must cut a deal with provincial government officials. Provincial administrations are loath to cut such deals because central government policy dictates that the portion of cigarette sales tax which does not go to the central government always is channeled to the finance bureau of the province of original production. China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization opened the market ever so slightly to international brands like Marlboro and Kent, but domestic brands continue to dominate because of fierce protectionism.
...If it chooses to do so, China is in a position to lead and change the landscape in a very profound way.
-Matthew Kohrman, Professor of Anthropology, Stanford
A new era
In 2003, the World Health Organization established the first global health treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Although the United States still has not yet ratified the FCTC, China signed the treaty in 2003 and ratified it in 2005. Kohrman says China’s tobacco industry giants fear competition from international cigarette brands more than they worry about tobacco-control measures related to the FCTC.
Nonetheless, the FCTC ushered in a new era of public health research about tobacco and has helped increase public awareness about the dangers of smoking. New restrictions have been imposed on print and television advertising for cigarettes, and international organizations, such as the Bloomberg Family Foundation, have begun funding anti-tobacco work in China.
A big challenge to tobacco-control campaigns, says Kohrman, is the sheer amount of money that tobacco companies have available for marketing. “In 2010, China’s tobacco industry posted profits in excess of U.S. $90 billion—that’s huge. Tobacco control research and advocacy now annually receive a few million dollars, and much of that is coming through outside funders, which have very specific projects in mind.”
China’s tobacco advertisers have adapted to the new restrictions that prevent them from openly promoting cigarettes in the media. They have instead moved to point-of-sale and soft-marketing tactics, including misinformation campaigns about the “dangers” of quitting smoking. “The actual expenditure on marketing probably hasn’t dropped very much,” says Kohrman.
Cigarettes and society
Strong marketing and the legitimization of cigarettes as a part of everyday life have led to the deep integration of cigarettes into Chinese society. While only 3 to 4 percent of women in China smoke, cigarettes are an important part of male identity and social mobility. The wide range of cigarette brands has led to the growth of high-end varieties favored by businessmen and politicians, with some brands costing as much as $50 a pack. The custom of cigarette gifting has existed in China for decades, and it is difficult for a young man to turn down a package of cigarettes from a senior colleague or supervisor.
There is also the fact that nicotine is highly addictive, and quitting is difficult in an environment where smoking cigarettes is socially sanctioned. Kohrman says, “When you take an incredibly addictive substance like nicotine and throw it into the mix of all of these norms and customs, it creates a pretty toxic brew.”
The future?
Tobacco control presents a formidable challenge in China, one that requires understanding the historical context and complex dimensions of the cigarette industry. “Cigarettes have been insinuated into so many aspects of daily life across China, and the market for this product has now become so closely enmeshed with matters of government finance and operations,” says Kohrman.
What happens in China could have implications for the entire world. “There’s a tobacco-induced human annihilation unfolding right now in almost every country and questions about how society and Big Tobacco are enmeshed, and how cigarette culture and government finance have become mutually supportive are pivotal,” says Kohrman. “Every country except Bhutan has legalized cigarette sales and is subject to many of the same general issues as China—only in China they’re on a much larger scale. But if it chooses to do so, China is in a position to lead and change the landscape in a very profound way.”
Japanese rule in Korea was harsh but the country witnessed significant social and economic transformation. In the process, Koreans were not simply victims or passive bystanders but active participants in the formation of colonial modernity, said Gi-Wook Shin during his keynote presentation at a conference held Feb. 16 and 17 at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa (UH Mānoa).
Shin's works on Japanese colonialism in Korea were published in many journals and books including Colonial Modernity in Korea (1999) and Ethnic Nationalism in Korea (2006).
The conference was held to commemorate the 40th anniversary of UH Mānoa’s Center for Korean Studies, the oldest Korean studies institution in the United States.