At the annual Oksenberg Lecture, Max Baucus, former U.S. ambassador to China, says the U.S.-China relationship is steady, highlights need for greater U.S. engagement on areas of trade and the South China Sea

Despite talk of potential conflict between China and the United States, Max Baucus, who served as U.S. ambassador to the People's Republic of China from 2014 until 2017, said the bilateral relationship is stable and that its long-term management will determine the future quality of life in both countries.

“Essentially, it’s sound,” Baucus said of the relationship. “China and the United States both need each other.”

As the world’s largest economies, China and the United States are vital to each other’s success, and that makes the Thucydides Trap far from inevitable, said Baucus, who spoke at the annual Oksenberg Lecture hosted by the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) as part of the China Program’s 10th Anniversary celebration last week.

The Thucydides Trap, a term used to describe a pattern in history where conflict resulted from tension between a rising power and a ruling power, has been applied in theory to the U.S.-China relationship by experts, but Baucus expressed doubt that the two countries would fall into it.

Baucus’ remarks at the annual event, named in honor of the late Michel Oksenberg, were followed by comments from Michael Armacost, Shorenstein APARC Fellow; Daniel Russel, senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute; and Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow at Shorenstein APARC; moderated by Jean C. Oi, political science professor and director of the China Program.

Baucus said that, despite the draw to succumb to the idea of the Thucydides Trap, what reassured him of the contrary were the many examples of Chinese and American leaders working together on areas of collaboration that he witnessed throughout his term as ambassador.

Russel, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, also cautioned about the dangers of applying the comparison of the Thucydides Trap to the U.S.-China relationship, and emphasized that the role of human agency - both positive and negative - can shape the course of events.

“As important as it is to learn from history, it can be a bit treacherous if we apply it as a law of physics,” said Russel. “In 2017, we see that, on the one hand, there are structural factors that drive a strategic rivalry, and on the other hand, there are modern factors like globalization that drive tremendous interdependence.”

One challenge that flared during Baucus’ tenure was the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, and he said he believes that, had the United States been more forward, it could have accomplished more of its strategic objectives on the issue.

Only after a summit was held between President Obama and President Xi Jinping in September 2015, where the U.S. government delivered a clear message that land reclamation and construction are unacceptable under international law, did Baucus see signs that the Chinese government took notice.

“Frankly, I believe we should have acted sooner,” Baucus said, suggesting that freedom of navigation operations by the United States in the South China Sea should be conducted more often and in concert with other countries.

Another challenge that Baucus encountered was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade pact led by the United States and put forth under the Obama administration, which he described as an “economic compliment” to the U.S. military presence in the region.

Baucus, a former senator from Montana who spent time on Capitol Hill speaking about the merits of the TPP as ambassador, said the pact’s eventual abandonment by President Trump was a “huge mistake.”

On the future of the U.S.-China relationship, Baucus called for greater engagement, including additional summits between policymakers and with a more candid format that would allow participants to ask questions in addition to reading prepared statements.

“We need constant, repetitive and comprehensive engagement,” Baucus said.

The United States needs to take more thoughtful risks in its engagement with China and to build a vision and strategy that it could “stick with,” he said.

The United States must also find “that delicate balance” between its relationships with China as well as Japan and South Korea, according to Armacost, who served for two decades in the U.S. government.

Armacost noted that every U.S. administration weighs its strategic interests against the geopolitical context and that the Trump administration has yet to make clear how it intends to approach such a balance.

Stephens, a former U.S. ambassador to South Korea, agreed that long-term strategic planning would be constructive, and that the Chinese and U.S. governments would benefit from taking a step back to think about where each sees their own role in the world.

“As the world has flattened, I think our understanding and appreciation for the depth of differences that exist at the high policy levels and at a cultural level has dimmed a bit,” she said.

More emphasis on learning historical, cultural and political factors could serve to enhance understanding between people in China and the United States and help address bilateral challenges, Stephens said.

“It’s going to take a little more focus and more resources,” said Baucus. “But I do think that American resilience is going to find an answer to these challenges.”

Related links:

Photo gallery from the 2017 Oksenberg Lecture

China Program's 10th Anniversary Conference: Panelists exchange views on China's future

Brochure: Celebrating the First 10 Years of the China Program

Researchers urge Moon Jae-in to form a close working relationship with Donald Trump and to establish a new special envoy role for North Korea policy emulating the “Perry Process”

Researchers from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) said they are optimistic about the election of South Korean president Moon Jae-in who assumed office last week following waves of protest across the country.

Now that the vacancy left in the wake of former President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment has been filled, the South Korean government needs to work to strengthen bilateral relations with the United States amid escalating tensions in Northeast Asia, they said.

The Moon administration should immediately engage U.S. President Donald Trump and his senior staff at the White House and government agencies, said Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow at Shorenstein APARC.

“Moon would do well to establish a personal relationship with Trump,” said Stephens, who was U.S. ambassador to South Korea from 2008 to 2011. “The new administration must set up a meeting as early as possible and be ready to engage on a range of issues.”

“In a sense, Moon has to play catch-up,” said Shorenstein APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin, who noted that Trump already held in-person meetings with other Asian heads of state in the United States, including summits with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Shin added that a coherent U.S. strategy toward Asia and senior staff appointments in the State and Defense Departments would also aid in supporting the foundation upon which the South Korean and American governments work together on policy challenges, especially North Korea.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities have become more and more advanced over the past few months, and provocations have continued to ratchet up, including its firing of a ballistic missile that landed in the sea near Russia on Sunday and repeat threats to conduct a sixth nuclear test.

The Moon administration must focus on establishing trust and cooperation with the Trump administration because it is the only pathway to finding a resolution to North Korea’s program, said Siegfried Hecker, a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, an additional center in the Freeman Spogli Institute.

“Any solution must be compatible with the interests of Seoul, but it has to be done in concert with Washington to get Pyongyang’s attention,” said Hecker, who served as director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and has traveled to North Korea seven times since 2004 to survey its nuclear facilities.

During the campaign, Moon repeatedly spoke of his proposals to reengage the North Korean regime, such as holding talks with its leader Kim Jong-un and re-opening Kaesong Industrial Complex, a joint economic zone on the North Korean side of the border.

Stephens and Shin said Moon’s proposals for North Korean engagement would be a step in the right direction if pursued in due time and led under the direction of a special envoy from South Korea emulating the American “Perry Process.”

The Perry Process, proposed by former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and implemented in the late 1990s under the Clinton administration, entails the appointment of a senior-level, bipartisan representative to pursue a two-track approach of engagement through joint projects and of continued dialogue on denuclearization with North Korea.

Appointing one person in South Korea to lead North Korea policy would help centralize and streamline its organization, which currently, requires coordination of activities across dozens of government agencies, the two researchers noted.

“We recognize that establishing such a position and filling the position would be far from easy,” said Shin, co-author of the study Tailored Engagement. “But the magnitude of the nuclear crisis requires restructuring the way in which the South Korean government deals with North Korea, achieving domestic consensus, and shoring up international support for its efforts.”

The United States, China, Japan and Russia are the key international countries concerned with the peace and stability of Northeast Asia, yet South Korea has both an acute need and the potential to assume greater leadership of North Korea policy, said Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar.

China, as North Korea’s largest trade partner, exercises influence over North Korea by maintaining a commercial relationship in the hope of avoiding a collapse of the regime, however its leverage only goes so far, he added.

The Moon administration should consider the limits of Chinese influence before making policy decisions regarding North Korea, Fingar said, for example, whether to freeze or remove the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system, Thermal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), deployed last April in South Korea, which the Chinese government strongly opposed.

“There is little that Beijing can or will do that would persuade Pyongyang to be more receptive to initiatives from Seoul than it would otherwise be,” said Fingar, a China specialist who served as chairman of the U.S. National Intelligence Council. “Seoul should not ‘pay’ much to obtain Chinese assistance because China already supports reengagement and would not do more no matter what Seoul offered as an inducement.”

It is of vital importance the Moon administration seeks to strengthen trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan and the United States, and to consider holding a summit to address areas of collaboration, all of which would function alongside the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral structure toward creating stability in the region, according to Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC.

“Such cooperation is essential to the security of the region – without it, the United States cannot fulfill its obligation to defend South Korea against the threat posed by North Korea,” said Sneider, who leads the Divided Memories and Reconciliation research project. “Moreover, it’s in the interest of all three countries to tighten such cooperation to balance the rise of China.”

The Moon administration should, above all else, take time to consider its first steps despite pressures to perform early, said Michael Armacost, a fellow at Shorenstein APARC who held a 24-year career in the U.S. government.

“Getting things right is more important than making a quick splash,” said Armacost, a former U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs. “I would advise any new president to proceed at a deliberate pace, focusing particularly on the key personal issues first, and consulting widely before enunciating major policy departures.”

Related links:

South Korea's election: Shorenstein APARC scholars offer insight

Yonhap News: 미 한반도 전문가 그룹 "한국형 페리 프로세스 필요" (May 16, 2017)

VOA: 미 전문가들 "한국 정부, 미국과 북 핵 협력 중요...대북특사도 임명해야" (May 17, 2017)

Moon Jae-in was elected South Korea’s president on a pledge to address domestic inequality and to renew dialogue with North Korea. In the midst of Tuesday’s vote, Shorenstein APARC scholars offered insight to local and international media outlets.

Gi-Wook Shin, professor of sociology and director of Shorenstein APARC’s Korea Program, provided comment to The Economist about the challenges facing an administration led by Moon, a progressive candidate who is assuming power when an active conservative camp remains. He is also cited in an article in the New York Times focused on Moon's economic agenda and featured in a video from a Korea Society event that examines next steps for the new president.

Rennie Moon, the Koret Fellow in the Korea Program, co-authored an analysis piece on the East Asia Forum with Shin analyzing recent polls and the Moon administration's economic and security agenda.

Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, wrote an analysis piece for The National Bureau of Asian Research. In the piece, he explores how the election could impact the U.S.-Republic of Korea alliance amid escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow at Shorenstein APARC, appeared in a live interview on CNBC. In the taping, she discusses the significance of the vote and the new administration’s priorities as Moon swiftly takes office following the removal of his predecessor.

Northeast Asia relations are increasingly under strain as South Korea and China await shifts in political leadership and the threat of a sixth nuclear test by North Korea looms large. Scholars from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) have offered comment and analysis to media outlets about the evolving environment.

Gi-Wook Shin, director of Shorenstein APARC’s Korea Program, recognized in an interview with the Christian Science Monitor that, while threats posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile program aren’t new, it is best practice to always be prepared for the possibility of conflict.

“I’m someone who believes that you have to get ready for the worst-case scenario. If something does happen, the consequences will be huge,” said Shin, who recalled the air-raid drills of his youth in the Seoul metropolitan area, which is centered 35 miles from the border of North Korea.

Shin also spoke with Yonhap News about positions held by the Trump administration, which, he said, includes the view that the policy of “strategic patience” has failed and that tensions in Northeast Asia have led the administration to consider – with greater plausibility – the option of a preemptive military strike.

Addressing China’s relationship with North Korea, Shorenstein APARC Associate Director for Research Daniel Sneider wrote an analysis piece for Tokyo Business Today. He argued that, despite President Trump’s tense rhetoric, U.S. policy toward North Korea could so far be described as “‘let China do it.’”

“The ‘let China let do it’ policy is hardly new,” Sneider wrote in the piece, available in English and Japanese.

“Why does the Trump administration believe this will work now? In part, the answer is the same as under the two previous administration – there are no better options available.”

Last month, Kathleen Stephens, the William J. Perry Fellow at Shorenstein APARC, spoke at length about North Korea policy on PBS NewsHour following Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s remarks in Seoul, where he acknowledged, “all options are on the table.”

Asked about the significance of Tillerson’s remarks, Stephens said his speech would be "closely listened to and heard throughout the region, as well as [in the United States]."

“One thing that did strike me about Secretary Tillerson’s remarks was that he was quite specific and categorical in saying now is not the time for talks,” Stephens said in the interview. “I actually would have liked to have seen him keep the door a little bit ajar on that, because I think, when you do have a new administration in Washington…that's a good argument for trying to climb that mountain one more time and seeing what’s possible diplomatically.”

Uncertainty about U.S. intentions in Northeast Asia has increased fear that events could spin out of control in the region due to American disengagement. That engagement cannot be taken for granted, Shorenstein Fellow Thomas Fingar writes on the Stanford University Press blog, and it remains to be seen just how well regional political leaders adjust to the Trump administration’s evolving foreign policy.

The blog post highlights themes from his book Uneasy Partnerships: China’s Engagement with Japan, the Koreas, and Russia in the Era of Reform (Stanford, April 2017).

Stanford scholars are encouraging the new administration to consider steps to alleviate the uncertainty and anxiety felt by countries in East Asia about U.S. intentions toward the region.

President Donald Trump’s anti-China rhetoric during his campaign and his recent withdrawal of the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership have contributed to the unease in the region, which is drifting in ways that are unfavorable for American interests, they said.

Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) recently published a 27-page report with recommendations on topics of trade and defense that would improve relations between the U.S. and Asian countries. The report, co-authored by eight Stanford scholars, is aimed to help shape U.S. policies in the region.

“The advent of any new administration provides an opportunity to reassess policy approaches,” wrote Gi-Wook Shin, director of the Shorenstein center. “A new mandate exists, and it is our hope that that mandate will be used wisely by the new administration.”

Trade and defense

The biggest trade concern for experts in the region is President Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and his intention to focus on bilateral agreements instead of multinational pacts.

The agreement, which bound 12 countries in the region by a set of international trade and investment rules, had problems, Stanford scholars said. For example, some have criticized the treaty for not requiring full compliance with international labor standards for all the participating countries. Also, the rules of origin, which were supposed to give preferential treatment to countries in the TPP, were deemed to be weak by many, allowing goods produced outside the TPP to receive benefits.

But it would not be wise or efficient for the U.S. to start negotiations from scratch in the region because the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement, which was touted as a model for the 21st century, already has hurt its credibility with other Asian countries, said Takeo Hoshi, director of the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Center. In addition, Asian countries view the idea of bilateral agreements as an attempt to force trade deals on them that disproportionately benefit the U.S., he said.

“The TPP was not perfect and many problems remain, but they are not removed by abandoning the TPP,” Hoshi wrote in the report. “Completely abandoning the TPP could hurt not only the U.S. economy but also erode U.S. leadership in Asia.”

Hoshi said the U.S. should rely on aspects of TPP that are consistent with the current U.S. trade policy when creating new bilateral agreements, while maintaining and improving existing free trade agreements with other Asian countries.

Another immediate concern for scholars is the maintenance of security and stability in the region.

“The region is unsettled because of uncertainty about us,” said Thomas Fingar, a Shorenstein APARC fellow. “The U.S. has long served as the guarantor of prosperity and security in the region but Asians are no longer convinced that we have the will or ability to do so. This has real consequences … It’s not simply because they are already beginning to act as if we intend to play a less active or positive role.”

If China’s national power and economy continue to expand, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain stability in the region if the U.S. does not continue to play a constructive role. Possible dangers include escalation of tensions between China and the U.S. or its allies following accidents or tactical encounters near areas over which China claims sovereignty.

In the report, scholars recommend a comprehensive review of security in the region to make sure military plans are in place that prioritize management of a possible collapse of North Korea or a sudden military strike coming from the country. Other priorities should include peaceful resolution of China-Taiwan differences and ensuring military access in the South China Sea and East China Sea, wrote Karl Eikenberry, director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative at the Shorenstein Center.

“The United States also should engage in a more long-range, exploratory strategic dialogue, first with allies and partners, and then with Beijing, to identify potential areas of mutual interest that can help prevent the unintended escalation of conflicts and reduce already dangerous levels of misperception and mistrust on both sides,” Eikenberry wrote.

China is key

Maintaining a peaceful, productive relationship with China should be of the utmost importance for the U.S., according to the Stanford scholars.

“Managing America’s multifaceted relationship with China is arguably the most consequential foreign policy challenge facing the new administration,” Fingar said.

Although President Trump’s anti-China rhetoric during his campaign made Asian countries anxious about the future, China has been criticized by many American leaders before. Ten previous U.S. presidents were critical of China during their campaigns, but once they assumed office, their tone changed and they adopted a more pragmatic view of U.S. interests in the area, Fingar wrote.

However, while in the past China’s political moves have been predictable for the most part, now that its economy is slowing, the country is increasingly relying on social control and nationalism to reinforce regime legitimacy. This makes China less predictable, according to Fingar.

But the scholars say that there are several opportunities to approach the relationship with China in a way that is beneficial for the U.S. and the rest of the region.

One such opportunity would be for the U.S. to declare its willingness to join China’s newly created Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was formed in early 2016 to support construction projects in the Asia-Pacific region. This would be an “any outcome we win” opportunity that would showcase the U.S. desire to cooperate with China and help establish the region’s confidence in the U.S., Fingar said.

The new administration should also consider pushing for a quick completion of a Bilateral Investment Treaty with China – something that two previous U.S. administrations were not able to achieve. Creating this agreement would help protect things that are important to the U.S. businesses and reassure the willingness of the U.S. to deepen its relationship with China, according to Fingar.

“In my view, how we’re going to establish or reestablish relations with China is key,” Shin said. “Will there be more tension? That’s really important. This affects not only the U.S., but also our allies in the region.”

Alex Shashkevich is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

Scholars at Stanford's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies assess the strategic situation in East Asia to be unsettled, unstable, and drifting in ways unfavorable for American interests. These developments are worrisome to countries in the region, most of which want the United States to reduce uncertainty about American intentions by taking early and effective steps to clarify and solidify U.S. engagement. In the absence of such steps, they will seek to reduce uncertainty and protect their own interests in ways that reduce U.S. influence and ability to shape regional institutions. The recommendations summarized below, and elaborated in a 23-page report entitled “President Trump’s Asia Inbox,” suggest specific steps to achieve American economic and security interests.

» Key Recommendations

» Full Report with Preface from Director Gi-Wook Shin and Introduction by Amb. Michael H. Armacost

» About the Contributors

» Information for Press

» Press Coverage

Key Recommendations. 

Trade and Economic Relations

The dynamic economies of East Asian countries are increasingly integrated and interdependent. The United States is an important market and source of investment and technology, but this is no longer sufficient to ensure that future arrangements and rules will protect American interests. The region is moving toward more formal, rule-based arrangements and the United States must be an active shaper of those institutions.

Most in the region want the United States to play a leading role in the establishment and enforcement of free and fair international economic transactions, and want the rules and mechanisms governing trade to be multilateral ones. If we do not play such a role, China, and possibly others, will seek arrangements that disadvantage American firms.

• The replacement for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) should build on what was achieved in those negotiations, especially those that would assure market access for U.S. firms and protect intellectual property rights, enforce labor standards, and ensure environmental protection. A single multilateral agreement would be best, but much could be achieved through interlocking and consistent bilateral agreements.
• The administration should adopt policy measures to increase employability and create jobs for the Americans who have been disadvantaged by globalization.

Defense and Security

China’s military buildup and North Korea’s growing arsenal of missiles and nuclear weapons have fueled concerns about U.S. will and ability to honor its security commitments in the region. No one wants a regional arms race or tit-for-tat moves that increase the danger of accidental conflict or escalation, but many believe concrete steps are needed to check perceptions that the United States is becoming less willing to maintain the peace and stability that undergirds regional prosperity.

• While reaffirming the need for a forward presence in the region, reconfigure it along the lines of an “active denial” strategy. “Active denial” means maintaining a forward presence in East Asia that is designed to deny an opponent the benefits of military aggression, especially the prospect of a quick victory. The first component of such a strategy is a resilient force posture, which can be achieved by exploiting the size and depth of the region to distribute units in more locations. The second component is an emphasis on planning to conduct military operations against an adversary’s offensive strike or maneuver forces, not targets deep inside an adversary’s homeland territory and not by carrying out preemptive strikes.
• Strengthen U.S. military capabilities by developing and fielding stealthier air and maritime platforms, increase submarine and anti-submarine assets, and provide forward deployed forces with better active defenses, such as rail guns and lasers. At the same time, the United States should assist those neighbors of the PRC who feel threatened by Chinese assertiveness to develop asymmetric coercive capabilities that can put at risk forward-deployed PLA forces. The United States can use elements of such assistance programs as points of negotiating leverage in our attempts to limit militarization on both sides.
• Continue to promote U.S.-China military relations, emphasizing accident avoidance and crisis management, sustained dialogues on national strategies and doctrines, and cooperative endeavors, such as training exercises and combined operations, where and when feasible and mutually beneficial.

China

People in the region worry about China’s actions and intentions but they worry more about the prospect of confrontation and conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic. They look to the United States as a counterbalance to China but fear that Washington will overreact or underreact to actions by Beijing, or take provocative actions that jeopardize their own interests. The U.S. should:

• Respond to Chinese actions inimical to American interests in ways that protect our interests, achieve U.S. goals shared by others in the region, and avoid both the reality and the appearance of being “anti-China.”
• Reaffirm American commitments to allies and partners including China and Taiwan.
• Tighten enforcement of import restrictions on products produced by firms that have stolen intellectual property from U.S. companies.

Korean Peninsula

North Korea is threatening an ICBM test in 2017, possibly in the next few weeks or months. There is a political vacuum in South Korea, and Seoul is being pressured and punished by Beijing to reverse its decision to accept the deployment of a U.S. THAAD missile defense in South Korea. Under these circumstances, these are our priority recommendations for the administration

• It should work to dissuade North Korea from an ICBM test. Publicly, the new administration should reaffirm that the U.S. would use military means against an ICBM that appeared to threaten the U.S. or one of our allies. Regular spring ROK-U.S. joint military exercises should be held, but calibrated and conducted to avoid giving Pyongyang extra pretext for a test. The Trump administration should appoint a senior envoy empowered to go to Pyongyang to convey openness to renewed diplomacy, while at the same time being clear about the consequences of an ICBM test. China will share this goal, and the new Trump administration should establish a dialogue with China on North Korea based on this shared interest rather than linked to other issues in the U.S.-China relationship, such as bilateral trade. The Trump administration should not negotiate the THAAD issue with Beijing but rather stick to the principle that this is a Seoul-Washington issue.
• The U.S.-ROK relationship will need early and special attention in 2017. Secretary of Defense Mattis’ early visit to the ROK was a wise move. With names already announced for Beijing and Tokyo, a new American ambassador for Seoul should be nominated soon. Despite the political leadership vacuum in Seoul, the Trump administration should strive for the closest possible diplomatic, political, and military coordination on North Korea with our South Korean allies. Trade and burden-sharing issues should not be front-burner issues during South Korea’s political transition. U.S. neutrality in the South Korean election, along with demonstrated respect for South Korea’s democracy, will be carefully monitored, and is essential, as is strengthening U.S. contacts and outreach across the political spectrum in South Korea.

Japan

The Abe administration is the most stable government Japan has had for many years. The prime minister wants to work with Washington, is prepared to deepen defense cooperation with the United States and others in the region, and is eager to lock in the commitments and arrangements negotiated in the TPP. There is a real opportunity to secure access for U.S. firms greater than achieved by any previous administration.

• Build upon arrangements negotiated in TPP to secure a U.S.-Japan free-trade agreement (FTA) that increases access for U.S. firms and locks in economic reforms initiated by the Abe government.
• Propose annual head of state level trilateral cooperation summits with Japan and South Korea and seek greater trilateral cooperation, particularly in the area of security cooperation. Caution Tokyo against steps backward on historical reconciliation.

Southeast Asia and the South China Sea

Southeast Asia is most vulnerable to and concerned about China’s actions and intentions. Countries in the region want the United States to counterbalance and constrain China but worry equally that the United States is unreliable and unequal to the challenge of protecting their interests while preserving American interests vis-à-vis China. Unless given a better option, they will lean toward China for economic and security reasons.

• The United States should anchor U.S. policy on the South China Sea (SCS) to an explicit commitment that no single country—not the US, not China, nor anyone else—should seek or enjoy a monopoly of ownership and control over that body of water. To underscore that commitment, the United States should execute freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in waters between and around the Spratly islands. These and other operations in the SCS should be conducted in conformity with the authoritative ruling on the status of its waters and land features issued in 2016 by the arbitral court convened for that purpose under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
• The United States should also try, in concert with its allies and partners, to bring the SCS under international protection and management by a combination of claimant and user states, including the United States and China, based on international law. The Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative should be enlarged and upgraded to serve this purpose. If China declines to join, a chair at the table should remain empty should Beijing change its mind.

The U.S. should remain engaged with the process of regional and trans-Pacific institution building, including but not limited to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) annual meetings, the East Asian Summit, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which will be hosted by Vietnam in 2017.

Full Report with Preface from Gi-Wook Shin and Introduction by Amb. Michael H. Armacost.

The policy recommendations published above are a summary included in the beginning of a 23-page report entitled “President Trump’s Asia Inbox.” You may view the full report here.

About the Contributors

Michael H. Armacost is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow and former U.S. ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.

Karl Eikenberry is the Oksenberg-Rohlen Fellow at Shorenstein APARC; director of the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative; former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, and Lieutenant General (Ret.), U.S. Army.

Donald K. Emmerson is a senior fellow emeritus at FSI; director of the Southeast Asia Program at Shorenstein APARC; and affiliated with FSI’s Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies.

Thomas Fingar is a Shorenstein APARC Fellow and has served as former first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and chairman of the National Intelligence Council, among other positions.

Takeo Hoshi is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies and director of the Japan Program.

Gi-Wook Shin is the director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center; senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; director of the Korea Program; and the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies, all at Stanford.

Daniel C. Sneider is the associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, co-director of the Divided Memories and Reconciliation project and a former foreign correspondent.

Kathleen Stephens is the William J. Perry Fellow in the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC and former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

Information for Press.

The contributors are open to comment, interview and provide background information on the contents of the report, “President Trump’s Asia Inbox.” To inquire about availability, please contact Lisa Griswold, Shorenstein APARC Communications and Outreach Coordinator, at lisagris@stanford.edu or (650) 736-0656.

Related Press Coverage

Stanford report offers policy insights for the Trump administration, Caixin Media (in Chinese), Feb. 13, 2017

"Trump, do not bring up KORUS FTA and US forces cost-sharing until S. Korea's next presidential election," Yonhap News and various other outlets (in Korean), Feb. 13, 2017

China looks to US to resolve N. Korea nuclear issue, The Straits Times (in English), Feb. 15, 2017

Stanford experts offer policy proposals, insights on US-Asia relations, Stanford News Service (in English), Feb. 15, 2017

Unsettled, unstable and drifting: Today's US-East Asia relationship, Medium (in English), Feb. 16, 2017

Why Japan will also be "convenient" for the Trump administration, Tokyo Business Today (in Japanese), Feb. 18, 2017

Study: Managing China relationship most consequential to US, China Daily USA (in English), Feb. 21, 2017

How the Trump administration should address China, Tokyo Business Today (in Japanese), Feb. 23, 2017

Fears of Trump giving China free reign in Asia misplaced, Asia Times (in English), Feb. 24, 2017