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On February 25, 2005 a panel of researchers presented preliminary findings from surveys of 176 CASPA members (171 valid responses). The discussion included the interpretation of study findings, key issues and trends, and implications for professionals, corporate managers, and policymakers in the semiconductor industry. Panelists included Hsing-Hsiung (Hubert) Chen (pictured above left), SPRIE visiting scholar and director of Integrated Research Division, ITRI; Jian Hung Chen (pictured above center), SPRIE visiting scholar and ITRI researcher; and Mr. David Wang (pictured above right), vice president, Fibera Inc., CASPA President 2003-2004.

The Rise of Greater China in the Global Semiconductor Industry

Dr. Hsing-Hsiung Chen shared with the participants some striking statistics that clearly highlighted the rise of Asia and Greater China in the semiconductor industry. While in 1985 Asia accounted for only one percent of worldwide semiconductor production and 7 percent of worldwide semiconductor consumption, the numbers are expected to reach 21 percent and 42 percent respectively in 2005. The story for Greater China is particularly salient. Take the year of 2004 as an example. In IC design, the top thirty firms in this sector commanded 86 percent of the worldwide market share and half of them were founded or co-founded by Chinese professionals. In fabrication, eight of the top ten foundry companies were Chinese and together they covered 88 percent of the market. A similar story can be told about packaging and testing companies, with eight of the top ten companies located in Taiwan and mainland China and accounting for half of the global market share.

The Connection of Silicon Valley Professionals to Greater China

Mr. David Wang pointed out the role of the Silicon Valley as a hotbed for entrepreneurs, managers, and engineers that found or join semiconductor companies in Greater China. For example, CASPA, a leading semiconductor professional organization for Chinese Americans, has over 3,500 members in the United States and Asia, with the majority residing in the Silicon Valley. Among 171 CASPA survey respondents, half had worked in the United States and Greater China. Fifteen percent had worked at more than one place in Greater China.

Many aforementioned top Chinese semiconductor companies have strong ties to the Silicon Valley. Companies such as SST and ISSI were founded by Chinese in the Silicon Valley but have strong presence in the Greater China region in production and sales. Other Greater China-based companies like UMC, SMIC, ASMC, HuaHong NEC, and Winbond have drawn an impressive list of senior managers from Silicon Valley companies.

Job Movement Trends

Dr. Jian-Hung Chen presented some preliminary findings of the surveys and identified some interesting trends in job movement. When being asked "Will you consider working permanently in a region different from your current location?" 7 percent of the respondents revealed that they were already considering moving, while 52 percent said they would consider moving within 1-3 years. Young professionals (with fewer than ten years of work experience) were somewhat more likely to move within three years (65 percent) than more experienced professionals (~57 percent). In terms of geographic destinations, only 10 percent favored moving to or relocating to elsewhere in the United States. The rest all preferred relocations within or to Greater China. Shanghai was the most popular site, voted by 50 percent of the respondents as their preferred destination. Taiwan and Beijing followed with 13 percent and 14 percent of the votes. Breaking down the data according to the origin of the respondents into Mainland China, Taiwan and the United States (indicated by the location of undergraduate education), Shanghai remains the topic choice for all three populations. Interestingly, professionals originally from Taiwan were more likely to move to Shanghai (39 percent) than return to Taiwan (33 percent) and none of the professionals originally from mainland China regarded Taiwan as an option.

An examination of key influential factors on movement decisions may shed some light on the observed trends. Growth potential, family matters, and quality of Life were ranked the three most important factors in one's movement decision. others' success/failure examples and company decision received the lowest scores. Senior professionals were more likely to be influenced by company decision (compared to junior professionals), while junior professionals more by others' success/failure examples (compared to senior professionals). Host company size did not seem to be a noteworthy differentiator.

Finally, in terms of the type of company one hopes to work for after relocation -- the choices being startup, multinational, local company and company decision (i.e. internal transfer) -- professionals moving to Taiwan strongly favored local company and internal transfer, while professionals moving to Beijing and Shanghai preferred startup much more than the other three modes.

Greater China's Regional Advantage

Several participants chipped in their insights on the mainland's labor cost advantage. For semiconductor professionals moving from the Silicon Valley to Shanghai, "The rule of thumb is a 1/3 to 1/2 pay cut, although they may be awarded with [the realization of] the growth potential through other forms, such as stock options" observed Mr. Wang. Such expatriate compensation packages are still substantially higher than those for local hires, whose salary level is usually 20-25 percent of that of the Silicon Valley. Overall local income increase is estimated to be about 5-10 percent a year, although most of it is due to the move up the semiconductor industry value chain. Salary increase for the same position is probably less than 5 percent a year. Entry-level salary has also been heavily affected by the recent surge in the local supply of engineers, thanks to a substantial increase in college engineering graduates. Hence, taking into account differences in cost and experience, "for now, the common and effective practice seems to be hiring one expatriate for every 25 local hires," said Dr. Jian-Hung Chen.

Going beyond cost considerations, discussions centered around a provocative question raised by a member of the audience: "Is it just a question of time or is there any other fundamental piece that needs to get in place before Chinese firms can penetrate high value-added nodes in the semiconductor industry value chain [i.e. design]?" SPRIE Director, Professor Henry Rowen responded by pointing out that although to this day, probably only a handful of the 400-500 design companies in Mainland China have real technologies and products, let alone profits, Chinese fabless design companies are growing rapidly and can find lots of applications in the domestic market, especially in telecommunication. Dr. Wang concurred that it is probably more of a matter of time. "If a foundry moves to the next-generation technology, firms up- and down-chain will follow suit and build complementary capacities as well. It's a clustering effect. It just takes time."

Other Issues

Panelists and the audience also engaged in lively discussions about corporate strategy for semiconductor multinational companies in Greater China, family, social and cultural factors affecting the flow of talents, and inter-regional collaboration. Networks and flows of managerial and technical leaders -- particularly their connection to the Silicon Valley and their worldwide reach -- are new priority areas of research for SPRIE.

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Waishengren (or mainlanders) make up about 12% of the current population in Taiwan. This is an artificial category referring to the Chinese people and their descendants who were originally from mainland China and who have been settling in Taiwan since 1945. The term can be literally translated to mean people from outside the (Taiwan) province.

Despite the diversity of social and economic backgrounds, the Waishengren have shown a strong and almost uniform tendency in opposing Taiwanese nationalism or Taiwan independence. They have shown a strong inclination in supporting a unified and strong China, though the Republic of China, not the People's Republic, is still the country that embodies their collective identity.

Dr. Chang will address the following questions: (1) why do the Waishengren act, or are perceived to act, as one "ethnic group" in Taiwan, given the differences?; (2) what were the main historical reasons for their nationalistic feelings?; (3) what are the features of Chinese diaspora nationalism in Taiwan?; (4) how does Waishengren nationalism differ from the Taiwanese and Chinese nationalism that is found in Southeast Asia?; (5) what is the general and theoretical meaning of diaspora nationalism?

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Mau-kuei Chang Institute of Sociology, Academica Sinica, Taiwan
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The Anti-Secession Law recently passed by China's National People's Congress has generated a hostile response in Taiwan and sharp criticism by the U.S. government. It has been described by some as a war-authorization law. Does this signal that Beijing is on a path that reduces its scope for rational choices? Dr. Zhao's talk will analyze this development in light of the recent rise of Chinese nationalism.

A recipient of the 1999-2000 Campbell National Fellowship at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Dr. Zhao currently sits on the board of directors of the US Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (USCSCAP). He is the founder and editor of the Journal of Contemporary China, a member of the National Committee on US-China Relations, and a Research Associate at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research in Harvard University.

Zhao is the author and editor of six books. His most recent A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism, was published by the Stanford University Press in 2004. He has also written articles for Political Science Quarterly, The China Quarterly, World Affairs, Asian Survey, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Journal of Democracy, and many others.

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Suisheng Zhao Executive Director, Center for China-US Cooperation and Associate Professor, Graduate School for International Studies University of Denver, Colorado
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Greater China is the most rapidly growing region in both production and market share in the semiconductor industry, and Chinese professionals play increasingly important roles for the development in the region. SPRIE/ITRI cooperated with CASPA in conducting a study to assess the perspectives of Chinese professionals on the rise of the IC industry in Greater China, and exploring the factors influencing their movement decisions. This panel will present a preview of data from the 2005 web-based survey and interviews--preliminary results, insights from the interviews, and potential implications for professionals, corporate managers, and policymakers.

CASPA: Chinese American Semiconductor Professional Association. With more than 3500 members and 10 chapters distributed across US and Asia, CASPA is the largest Chinese American semiconductor professional organization worldwide.

ITRI: Industrial Technology Research Institute. ITRI is a major industrial technology research institute in Taiwan, with more than 6,000 employees and annual budget around $US 5 billion. Many major Taiwanese semiconductor companies, such as TSMC and UMC, are ITRI spin-offs.

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Hsing-Hsiung Chen Visiting Scholar of SPRIE and Director of Integrated Research Division Industrial Technology Research Institute
Jian-hung Chen Visiting scholar of SPRIE and researcher Industrial Technology Research Institute
David Wang Vice President, Fibra Inc. and President of CASPA 2003-2004
Seminars

This two-day research workshop at Stanford University aims to bring together experts to explore the nature of the connections between universities/research institutes and industry in the United States , Taiwan , and Mainland China . Within this national and international context, the workshop will focus on several leading cases, including Stanford University , Tsinghua University in Beijing , and the Industrial Technology Research Institute in Hsinchu Science-based Park. The workshop will facilitate exchange of data and ideas among leading scholars and practitioners from several disciplines, institutions, and countries. Workshop proceedings will be published and distributed by SPRIE as part of its Greater China Networks program.

In recent years, the rise of the Knowledge Economy has underscored the essential role technological innovation has played in economic development. As key institutions in the innovation process, universities and public research institutes have become the center of many theoretical and empirical studies, most of which have focused on the various roles of academia in national innovation systems and their linkages with industry in fulfilling these roles.

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What might we expect of the Bush administration in its second term? APARC's Michael Armacost considers the road ahead.

President Bush has claimed a renewed mandate, and has begun to reshuffle his national security team. Condi Rice will move to State; Steve Hadley will move up at the NSC. Rich Armitage and Jim Kelly, who have borne much of the day-to-day responsibility for U.S. policy in Asia, are leaving along with Colin Powell. What might we expect of the Bush administration in its second term?

Generally speaking, continuity rather than change is likely to be the watchword in foreign policy. Above all, the Middle East and South Asia are likely to remain the principal preoccupations of American concerns. In Iraq, Washington will seek to acquit its commitments - to hold elections, train Iraqi security forces, and accelerate reconstruction projects - with whatever measure of dignity and honor it can muster in the face of excruciatingly difficult choices. With Yassar Arafat's death, American engagement in Israeli-Palestinian issues is destined to increase. And Iran's bid for nuclear weapons will continue to challenge the United States and Europe.

Thus Asia will not have pride of place on the Bush agenda. Yet it will continue to command Washington's attention. Why? Because it is in Asia that the interests of the great powers intersect most directly. Asia is the world's most dynamic economic area, and it is becoming more tightly integrated. Washington cannot afford to neglect South and Southeast Asia, for in these areas Islam presents a relatively moderate face. And North Korea, of course, poses a direct and growing challenge to the administration's nonproliferation policy.

Fortuitously, the United States is better positioned in Asia than in most other regions. Our military presence remains sizable and retains mobility and flexibility. Our economy continues to generate solid demand for Asian exports and is a robust source of direct investment. While criticism of American policy is widespread in the region, it is not expressed with the virulence that is seen in Europe and the Middle East. Above all, Washington has cultivated the Asian great powers assiduously, and has managed to improve relations with Tokyo, Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi - a substantial accomplishment. It remains to be seen whether it can work in concert with others to ameliorate the sources of discord on the Korean Peninsula and over the Taiwan Straits.

The United States, to be sure, confronts some daunting challenges in Asia. If the U.S.-Japan alliance is in excellent condition, defense cooperation with Seoul remains troubled by the sharp divergence in U.S. and Korean perspectives on North Korean aims and strategy. Nor have we found a solid basis for pursuing with Pyeongyang's neighbors a coordinated approach to the six-nation talks. Regional economic cooperation is taking shape along pan-Asian rather than trans-Pacific lines. Developments in the Middle East threaten to "Arabize Islam" in Southeast Asia. And the "Johnny One Note" quality of American diplomacy - i.e. its preoccupation with international terrorism - often plays poorly against Beijing's more broadly based effort to provide regional leadership.

Nor is America unconstrained in its policy efforts in the region. Our military forces are stretched thin globally, impelling some downsizing of deployments in Asia. Huge fiscal deficits loom, and with growing bills falling due in both Iraq and Afghanistan, resources available for policy initiatives elsewhere are likely to be tight. The president has succeeded in pushing negotiations with North Korea into a multilateral framework, yet Washington is being pressed by its negotiating partners to adopt a more conciliatory posture. The democratization of Asian nations, while welcome, does not automatically facilitate U.S. diplomatic objectives. Recent elections in South Korea and Taiwan were decisively shaped by a new generation of voters. Governments in Seoul and Taipei are increasingly accountable, yet viewed from the United States, they are not extraordinarily sensitive to Washington's views, let alone deferential to its lead.

With these considerations in mind, one should expect President Bush and his foreign policy team to continue cultivating close ties with the Asian powers. Whether Washington can effectively utilize those relationships to roll back North Korea's nuclear program and avert crises in the Taiwan Straits will depend heavily on its relationships with the governments in Seoul and Taipei. And at the moment South Korea appears determined to expand economic ties with the North virtually without reference to Pyeongyang's nuclear activities. Taipei remains preoccupied with efforts to assert its own identity while counting on American protection.

In the end, of course, foreign policy rarely sees carefully laid plans bear fruit. Someone once asked a new British prime minister, Harold MacMillan, what would drive foreign policy in his government. He answered without hesitation, "Events, dear boy, events." I expect the same may be true for Mr. Bush.

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Michael H. Armacost
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With his second inauguration looming, President Bush has his hands full in the Middle East and with ambitious plans for domestic reform during his second term. In this context, Beijing's recently announced plans for anti-secession legislation is particularly unwelcome.

The content of the anticipated legislation remains uncertain, and its motivation and timing are puzzling. According to letters sent by the Chinese Embassy in Washington to key members of Congress, it is intended to "give full expression to the strong resolve of the Chinese people of never allowing the 'Taiwan independence' forces to cut off Taiwan from the rest of China under any name or by any means." Or as a pro-Beijing daily in Hong Kong put it, "It will leave 'Taiwan independence' forces with no room for ambiguity to exploit."

This suggests that the legislation's main aim will be further to deter President Chen Shui-bian's salami-slicing separatist tactics. An additional motivation may be to further energize U.S. efforts to restrain Chen in order to head off a future crisis. And, to be sure, the new legislative initiative may be attributable to internal political forces.

But why now, within weeks of President Chen's setback in the Dec. 11 legislative elections? One can only guess.

Perhaps Beijing chalked up the Democratic Progressive Party's difficulties in the elections to their own martial rhetoric, and decided to pile on new forms of political pressure. Perhaps it has concluded that despite the election results, Chen will still move aggressively on his stated intention to revise Taiwan's constitution -- thus moving a step closer to independence -- before the conclusion of his term in 2008. Perhaps it deduced from the pointed warnings directed at Chen by senior U.S. officials during the recent Taiwanese elections that Washington will now tolerate blunter threats to reinforce the People's Republic of China's "red lines."

Whatever the suppositions behind Beijing's plan for anti-secessionist legislation, they probably underestimate the substantial risks involved. Such legislation will doubtless alienate many Taiwanese voters, perhaps contributing inadvertently to the evolution of a growing sense of Taiwan's separate political identity, and producing wider legislative support in Taipei for major arms purchases from the United States.

It could also set off an action/reaction cycle with Taiwan that would undermine any possibility of reviving a serious cross-Straits dialogue. While Beijing's planned legislation may be its "response" to Chen's frequent references to constitutional referenda, it is as likely to encourage such referenda as obstruct them. It will upset many Americans, and it will galvanize the Taiwan lobby in America to stir up unhelpful resolutions in Congress when it reconvenes.

The greatest risk, perhaps, is that this could exacerbate the dangerous remilitarization of the Taiwan issue that has emerged since 1995, marked by explicit People's Liberation Army deployments and training aimed at Taiwan contingencies on the one hand, and escalating U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, combined with closer cooperation between the United States and Taiwan's defense establishment, on the other.

To a disturbing degree, this process seems driven less by policy considerations than by the parochial interests of the PLA for enhanced equipment and budgets, and by the attractiveness of the lucrative Taiwan arms market for U.S. military suppliers. Not surprisingly, this evolution is convincing pessimists on each side that confrontation is simply a question of time, despite the disaster it would represent for all parties.

Stabilizing this situation will demand the Bush administration's attention, despite other urgent preoccupations. Stability in the Straits, moreover, is an achievable goal if good sense prevails on all sides. Realistic leaders in Beijing recognize that there is no short-term solution.

With Taiwan in full control of its domestic circumstances, no country whose support is necessary for its independence to be meaningful views such independence as worth the cost of conflict with Beijing. The growing economic interdependence between China and Taiwan also raises the ante of any such conflict for them both.

To be viable, a stabilization arrangement cannot negate the "one China" principle, but it should leave open the parameters of an eventual settlement. Its goal should be an end to explicit PRC threats to use force against Taiwan and of overt preparations for military contingencies in the Strait, supplemented by reduced missile deployments opposite Taiwan; reduced U.S. military sales to Taipei consistent with the lowered threat level; more international "space" for Taiwan in exchange for an indefinite halt to actions aimed at enhancing Taiwan's international position; augmented links across the Taiwan Strait; and cross-strait talks aimed at addressing immediate problems and encouraging the growth of greater mutual confidence.

At a moment when we are entering a new year, let us hope that progress toward stabilization can be achieved.

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