On the centennial of the March First Independence Movement of Korea, APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin and Rennie Moon, associate professor at Yonsei University’s Underwood International College and former Koret fellow in Korean studies at APARC, discuss the origins of the movement and its impact and legacy for anti-imperialist movements in Asia and beyond.

The year 2019 is the centennial of several anti-colonialist movements that emerged in Asia, including the March First Movement of Korea. On that day a century ago, protesters shouting “Mansei!” (“Long live Korean independence!”) gathered in Seoul and formed what would become the first nationwide political protest in Korea under Japanese colonial rule. Although the movement failed to achieve national sovereignty, it left important legacies for Korea and other parts of Asia under foreign dominance.

In a new essay for The Journal of Asian Studies, “1919 in Korea: National Resistance and Contending Legacies,” APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin and Rennie Moon, associate professor at Yonsei University’s Underwood International College and former Koret fellow in Korean studies at APARC, discuss the origins of the March First Movement, its impact on colonial Korea and other parts of Asia that fought against imperialist dominance, and its implications for postcolonial and contemporary Korea, North and South. Their essay is part of the journal’s special forum entitled “Anti-colonialism in Asia: The Centenary of 1919,” which explains why 1919 was not only a single year of important events in Asia, but also a center point for the larger movements of anti-colonialism that emerged globally in the early decades of the twentieth century.

Korea became Japan's protectorate in 1905 and was “annexed” to Imperial Japan five years later. Soon after, Koreans experienced a decade of severe suppression and minimal rights under a brutal military colonial regime. In the aftermath of World War I, however, Shin and Moon write, the international geopolitical climate began to shift. Inspired by the Russian revolution of 1917 and by Wilsonian ideals of national self-determination, Korean intellectuals and leaders began secretly collaborating both inside Korea and abroad, with support from religious leaders and their nationwide mobilizing networks.

On March 1, 1919, twenty-nine leaders gathered in downtown Seoul and read aloud a declaration for Korean independence, sparking a movement that spread quickly from Seoul and Pyongyang throughout the country, with more than one million people protesting. The Japanese, who were caught by surprise, responded with brutal crackdown on protestors.

The March First Movement eventually did not achieve national independence from Japanese rule, but it forced Japan to shift from the earlier military rule to a colonial policy known as bunka seiji (cultural rule), which selectively accommodated Korean demands in nonpolitical spheres and gave rise to many cultural, educational, and media organizations and activities.

It also left Korean leaders divided over what to do next, leading to a schism between moderates, who were willing to work with the new cultural policy in preparation for future national independence, and the socialist radicals, who rejected compromise and went on to establish the Korean Communist Party in 1925. This bifurcation, note Shin and Moon, is seen by many scholars “as the primary origin of the postcolonial national division that would incite a civil war in 1950.”

South Korea recognizes the March First Movement as the basis of the founding of the republic, though conservatives and progressives still disagree about its founding date. When the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established in the North, however, it downgraded and rewrote the movement in various ways to fit it into its own version of history that traces the legitimacy of the regime to an anti-imperialist, democratic revolution spearheaded by Kim Il-Sung, who became the leader of the DPRK after 1945.

Beyond Korea, explain Shin and Moon, the March First Movement influenced the rise of the anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement in China two months later, inspired the 1919 anti-imperialist resistance that took place in the Philippines and Egypt, and was an impetus that can be seen in the Satyagraha, or nonviolent resistance in India. “By considering the March First and other political movements of 1919 in other Asian countries from a comparative, transnational perspective,” Shin and Moon say, “we can recognize interrelationships and diffusion processes traditionally ignored in historical writings prior to the ‘historiographic revolution’ in the 1990s.”

Read the full article in The Journal of Asian Studies >>

27 April 2019 marked the first anniversary of the historic Panmunjom summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean leader Moon Jae-in.

The meeting jumpstarted the whirlwind of North Korea’s summit diplomacy and prompted a new wave of hope that diplomacy could be effective after years of confrontation and tensions.

But the anniversary was marked with mixed messages and dissonant attitudes — it was celebrated by the South Koreans alone. North Korea remained unresponsive to the South’s invitation to the anniversary ceremony, and North Korea’s Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Country openly demanded that the South explore ‘more active measures’ to improve inter-Korean ties. The inter-Korean rapprochement efforts borne out of Panmunjom are stranded by the stalemate on the nuclear track...

Read the full article on East Asia Forum

On the heels of the abrupt ending of the Hanoi summit between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with the future of the diplomacy of denuclearization in question, the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC convened the 11th Koret Workshop, appropriately titled this year “North Korea and the World in Flux.”

The workshop, an annual gathering made possible through generous funding from the Koret Foundation, brought together international experts in Korean affairs for a full day of panel discussions. Participants assessed the U.S.-DPRK summit diplomacy, examined the challenges and opportunities in media coverage related to the negotiations between the two countries, and considered the prospects and pitfalls for summitry with North Korea in the near term. A report on the workshop proceedings is forthcoming.

At a midday public keynote, General Vincent Brooks, U.S. Army (Ret.), spoke before a packed audience about the challenges and opportunities in Korea. Brooks, who recently retired from active duty as the four-star general in command of all U.S. Forces in Korea, provided his unique and very-timely assessment of the situation on the Korean peninsula, and offered his insights on where the diplomacy of denuclearization may go next.

Gen. Brooks’ public address was followed by a conversation with Karl Eikenberry, director of APARC’s U.S.-Asia Security Initative.

Watch the video recording of Gen. Brooks’ remarks:

An air of uncertainty remains prevalent in the Indo-Pacific region. The South China Sea continues to be in contention, with six governments exerting claims on overlapping areas. The threat of a full-blown trade war between China and the United States puts the stability of the regional (and global) economy in question. Meanwhile, the Korean peninsula appears to swing between the brink of conflict to the possibility of dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs. It was in the midst of this precarious period for the region that the third annual gathering of the U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Dialogue Series took place in Tokyo from January 30 to February 1.

The 2019 meeting was co-sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and APARC’s U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI). For the past three years, the series has convened senior Japanese and American policymakers, military leaders, scholars, and regional experts to discuss Japan's security strategy and the alliance between Japan and the United States. Support for the workshop came from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Since its inception in 2016, the dialogue series has provided a venue for in-depth discourse on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues, and has helped build bridges between American and Asian academics, government and military officials, and other defense and security policy specialists. “We have continued to expand the range of attendees from the Japanese and U.S. government and military,” said USASI Director Karl Eikenberry. “This has ensured for our dialogue even greater policy relevance with each iteration.”

“The U.S.-Japan security dialogue is unique because it combines civilians and military officers, both retired and serving, which simply does not take place elsewhere,” observed Stanford Lecturer in International Policy Daniel Sneider, a regular participant. “It also avoids the sometimes-empty rhetoric about our alliance in favor of an operational, but strategically informed, approach that gets at not only what is being accomplished, but where the gaps exist in our alliance.”

Threats, Challenges, and the Appropriate Responses

L to R: Amb. Karl Eikenberry and Lt. General Noboru Yamaguchi (Workshop Co-Chairs)

The 2019 dialogue opened with a day of discussions on many of the challenges facing the U.S.-Japan security alliance, including an assessment of the latest security trends in the Indo-Pacific, as well as Japan’s new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). Passed by the Japanese Cabinet only a month earlier, the NDPG was the focus of two sessions on day one, including a discussion of its implications for Indo-Pacific security, as well as a session on the guideline’s ramifications for concepts of Integrated Air and Missile Defense and Archipelagic Defense

“Unsurprisingly, the global rise of China—along with the U.S. and Japan’s separate and combined responses to PRC strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region—helped shape both our agenda and the selection of participants,” observed Eikenberry. “We were specifically interested in the implications for the maritime domain and certain operational aspects of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.”

The day one closing ceremony featured remarks from the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the Honorable William Hagerty.

Developing Policy Recommendations, Meeting with Policymakers

L to R: Major Rodger Welding and Colonel Daniel Munter (United States Pacific Air Forces), and Lt. Colonel Yuka Nakazato, (Japan Air Self-Defense Force)

Days two and three were designed for small group sessions. Referred to as “Core Group”, its U.S. and Japanese members met the morning of January 31 to review the preceding day’s workshop and develop corresponding policy recommendations. The quality and depth of the conversations underscored just how great an impact the expanded range of participants had on the resulting policy.

“Participants weren't afraid to address sensitive, big-picture questions,” said Phillip Lipscy, a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford, “like the slow growth of Japanese military spending in the face of increasing regional threats and the challenges posed by unpredictable US administration policies.”

“Even as an expert of Japanese politics, I found the dialogue extremely informative and stimulating,” shared Lipscy.

Sneider agreed as well. “One thing that stood out this year, in contrast to the previous years, was a greater willingness on the part of our Japanese colleagues to air their sense of unease about and even opposition to the direction of American foreign and security policy under the Trump administration,” he said. “In the past, the American participants were much more open about their criticism of their own government, the Japanese tended to be polite—not so much this year, which made for a lively exchange on many issues.”

In the afternoon, core U.S. participants again met with the US Ambassador, along with his embassy team, as well as with senior Cabinet Office officials from the government of Japan.

Field Testing Ideas

During the second annual gathering in 2018, the dialogue began including a visit by the core workshop participants to a combined U.S. military—Japanese Self Defense facility. As part of the 2019 dialogue, the Core Group spent their third and final day visiting Yokota Air Base, the headquarters of both United States Forces Japan and Japan Air Self Defense Force Air Defense Command.

“ “These visits allow us to better understand Alliance operational challenges in the field,” noted Eikenberry. “Just as importantly, it affords us an immediate opportunity to test out some of the very ideas discussed during the preceding days.”

Yokota Air Base, Japan

Chatham House Rules applied to the dialogue, but a workshop report is forthcoming.

View the reports from the first and second annual workshops.

The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative is part of Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). Led by former U.S. Ambassador and Lieutenant General (Retired) Karl Eikenberry, USASI seeks to further research, education, and policy relevant dialogues at Stanford University on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues.

(L to R: Karl Eikenberry, Michael McFaul, Major Marcus Morgan (U.S. Army LNO to Japan Ground Self Defense Force Northern Army and Stanford University Center for East Asian Studies MA ’18), Phillip Lipscy, Daniel Sneider)

Following the abrupt ending of the highly anticipated second bilateral summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Hanoi, APARC and CISAC scholars evaluate the result of the summit, its implications for regional relations in Northeast Asia, and the opportunities moving forward towards the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

This Q&A with Noa Ronkin features Andray Abrahamian, the 2018-19 Koret Fellow in Korean Studies at APARC, whose work with the nonprofit Choson Exchange has taken him to the DPRK nearly 30 times; Siegfried S. Hecker, top nuclear security expert, former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Research Professor of Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus, and Senior Fellow at CISAC/FSI, Emeritus; and Gi-Wook Shin, Professor of Sociology, William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, Director of APARC, and founding Director of the Korea Program.

Prices for Denuclearization of North Korea

• During the Agreed Framework from 1994-2002, the international community provided approximately 1.5 billion U.S. dollars and the U.S. government provided 400 million U.S. dollars in heavy fuel oil (HFO).
• During the Six-Party Talks from 2003-2009, the United States provided approximately 200 million dollars for the cost of HFO and dismantling a part of Yongbyon.
• We even released over 20 million U.S. dollars back to North Korea, an amount that was blocked by a Banco Delta Asia investigation.
• We also removed North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

• The Secretary of State rolled up his sleeves and proactively engaged the North Korean leadership by visiting Pyongyang four times within one year. This level of commitment is unprecedented and a remarkable demonstration of active problem solving from our country’s top diplomat. This was the first positive response from the United States to North Korea since the 2017 Missile crisis. 
• President Trump provided a world stage for Kim Jong Un to debut and got him the global attention that he wanted.
• The United States and South Korea also agreed to suspend joint military exercises. I recall how, during a meeting with Chairman Kim, the Chairman noted that he understood both the U.S. and South Korea claim that the joint military exercises were defensive in nature, but that the North Korean public feels these exercises are offensive. 

• It suspended missile and nuclear testing. 
• Pyongyang released detainees without protracted negotiations.
• The North returned the remains of U.S. servicemen killed in action during the Korean War.
• It partially dismantled Yunsong missiles engine testing site and dismantled Punggeri nuclear weapon testing site.
• It once again tabled Yongbyon nuclear research facilities.

• The North is to halt the testing of Nuclear weapons and launches of ballistic missiles.
• North Korea is to permit U.S. and international technical experts access to key WMD-related sites throughout the process.
• Pyongyang is to declare and shut down all nuclear facilities.
• The North is to completely dismantle and remove its nuclear weapons, delivery systems, facilities, and associated material from the Korean peninsula with an agreed timeline.
• North Korea is to provide a comprehensive declaration of its nuclear and ballistic missiles, as well as chemical and biological programs.
• North Korea is to rejoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

• Pyongyang wants the removal all U.N. designated sanctions.
• The North wants resumption of inter-Korea economic projects, including Kaesong industrial Park and Kumkang mountain tourism project.
• The North wants to obtain an End-of-War declaration.
• It wants to be recognized as a nuclear state, if possible.
• It wants to improve its relationship with the United States, with an eye towards establishing a diplomatic relationship.
• It wants to place a long-lasting peace mechanism in the Korean peninsula that reassures continued Kim family rule in the North.

• The United States would be able to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea;
• It could ease restrictions on North Korean banking transactions;
• It could modify or ease existing import and export gaps;
• It could provide exemptions for joint ventures to be implemented in economic zones.

• The United States could lift its travel ban;
• It could establish a liaison office;
• It could start promoting cultural exchanges;
• It could lift the U.S. sanctions on Kim family members and senior officials;
• It could delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.

• The United States could sign an End-of-War declaration;
• It could begin military-to-military engagement;
• It could sign a Peace treaty;
• It could establish a diplomatic relationship.

• The United States could lift U.N. sanctions.

• The North needs to completely shut down all nuclear facilities;
• It needs to eventually hand over a comprehensive declaration of its nuclear and ballistic missiles, as well as its chemical and biological programs;
• It needs to accept U.S. and international experts and provide access to its WMD facilities; 
• It needs to agree to set a timeline and work with the United States and international experts to dismantle and remove its nuclear weapons, missiles, facilities and associated material from Korea;
• It needs to agree to rejoin the NPT; 
• It should reform its foreign investment rules and regulation to make investment a friendly environment for the international community;
• It should improve its human rights record. And, perhaps, they should start with ease on freedom of religion. (There was a rich history of Christianity in Pyongyang 100 years ago.)