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The nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is one of the greatest challenges facing the global non-proliferation system. Yet the very root of that issue reaches far beyond the non-proliferation system. The Six-Party Talks, involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, Russia, Japan, and China, bring hope for a peaceful solution between these nations. However, the continued strategic mistrust between the United States and North Korea casts an uncertain light on the struggling negotiations. Yang Xiyu will speak about the challenges of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, the profound mutual mistrust between the US and North Korea, and China's role in the Six-Party Talks. He will also discuss a possible solution.

Before coming to Shorenstein APARC as a visiting scholar, Yang Xiyu was Director of the Office for the Korean Peninsula Issues in Chinese Foreign Ministry. The office was set up in January 2004, when Dr. Yang was its first director to deal with the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, as well as, affairs relating to the Six-Party Talks. He began his involvement in issues related to the Korean Peninsula in 1994, when he worked in the Chinese Embassy in the United States. During the following years, he took part in the launch of the Four-Party Talks, and was the representative for the Chinese side in the working level meeting of the talks, as well as, a member of the Chinese Delegation in the Four-Party Talks that were held in New York and Geneva.

He was awarded the National Award for Outstanding Contribution to Social Science Studies by the State Council of China, and the Honorable Allowance for National Distinguished Experts.

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Xiyu YANG Visiting Scholar Speaker Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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The Chen administration has attempted to deal with the growing economic and technological links across the Taiwan Straits through confrontation with and coercion against Taiwanese businesses with investments in the People's Republic of China. These attempts have done little to stop the flow of capital and knowledge from Taiwan to China, but this failure is not necessarily bad for Taiwan even as it is a boon for China. This talk will address in which sectors and in what ways the flow of Taiwanese business activities to China have been beneficial or detrimental to each economy. Looking forward, the talk will also attempt to answer how further integration will benefit each side.

Douglas Fuller has spent over ten years researching technological development in East Asia. Most recently, he completed a doctorate at MIT in political economy. The topic of his thesis was technological development in China's IT industry. For this and previous research, he has interviewed IT firms in Malaysia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the People's Republic of China and the US. He has published articles in Industry and Innovation and other peer-reviewed journals.

A wine and cheese reception will follow the seminar.

This is the inaugural seminar of the CDDRL Taiwan Democracy Program and it is co-sponsored by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center.

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Doug Fuller SPRIE Postdoctoral Fellow Speaker
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Diplomatic maneuvering in response to the North Korean nuclear crisis has presented the United States, South Korea, and China each with strategic dilemmas that go beyond the issue of how to address the prospect of a nuclear North Korea. In response to the immediate question of how to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, a complicated triangular relationship between China, South Korea, and the United States has emerged that reflects longer-term strategic anxieties about the future of a revamped security order in Northeast Asia following the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis.

Increasingly, these three countries perceive that how the crisis is resolved, and the policies that each member of the triangle is likely to pursue as steps toward resolving the crisis, may influence their relative positions and regional influence after the immediate issue of North Korea's denuclearization--or North Korea's future--has been resolved. Strategic anxieties about the future of Northeast Asia may be emerging as an obstacle that is as serious as apparent North Korean intransigence in explaining the lack of progress in diplomatic efforts thus far. Based on interviews with foreign policy analysts representing each actor in the triangle, the presentation will attempt to explain how each country in the triangle perceives its respective foreign policy choices and how those choices might influence the interests of its neighbors in Northeast Asia.

Scott Snyder is a Pantech Fellow at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center during 2005-2006 and is concurrently a senior associate in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS. He spent four years in Seoul as Korea Representative of The Asia Foundation during 2000-2004. Previously, he has served as a program officer in the Research and Studies Program of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and as acting director of The Asia Society's Contemporary Affairs Program. Past publications include Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (2003), (co-editor with L. Gordon Flake) and Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (1999). Mr. Snyder received his B.A. from Rice University

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Encina Hall, Room E301
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Scott Snyder is a senior associate in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS, and is based in Washington, DC. He spent four years in Seoul as Korea Representative of The Asia Foundation between 2000 and 2004. Previously, he served as a program officer in the Research and Studies Program of the U.S. Institute of Peace, and as acting director of the Asia Society's Contemporary Affairs Program. He has recently edited, with L. Gordon Flake, a study titled Paved With Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (2003), and is author of Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (1999).

Snyder received his BA from Rice University and an MA from the Regional Studies East Asia Program at Harvard University. He was the recipient of an Abe Fellowship, administered by the Social Sciences Research Council, in 1998-99, and was a Thomas G. Watson Fellow at Yonsei University in South Korea in 1987-88.

Scott Snyder Speaker
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Ambassador Hubbard served from 2001 to 2004 as U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea, completing a 39-year career in the Foreign Service in which he focused primarily on economic, political and military relations with key nations of East Asia. Immediately prior to his appointment to Korea he was principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, a position he also held from 1993 to 1996. Ambassador Hubbard previously served concurrently as U.S. ambassador to the Philippines and to the Republic of Palau from August 1996 to August 2000.

After entering the Foreign Service in 1965, Ambassador Hubbard was assigned as a political-economic officer in the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. He subsequently embarked upon intensive Japanese language study, which prepared him for two assignments to Japan totaling seven years and several assignments dealing with Japanese affairs in Washington. His other overseas assignments included the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris, where he advised U.S. representatives to the International Energy Agency, and the U.S. embassies in Kuala Lumpur and Manila, where he was deputy chief of mission. Ambassador Hubbard also spent one year (1981-82) as legislative assistant to Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa.

Occupying senior State Department positions beginning in the mid-1980s, Ambassador Hubbard played a leading role in policies toward Japan, the Korean Peninsula and the ASEAN nations of Southeast Asia. As Philippines desk officer, country director for Japan and deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, he helped manage security ties with leading allies and addressed issues arising from trade with some of the world's most successful economies. Increasingly involved in Korean Peninsula affairs in the 1990s, Ambassador Hubbard was a principal negotiator of the 1994 Agreed Framework aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program. He became the first senior official to lead a U.S. government delegation to North Korea in 1994 when he was dispatched by President Clinton to secure the release of a U.S. Army pilot captured after his helicopter was shot down over North Korea. In addition to this successful trouble-shooting mission, Ambassador Hubbard was tapped the same year as presidential envoy to promote human rights and democracy in Burma.

Born in Kentucky in 1943, Ambassador Hubbard was raised in Tennessee and South Carolina. He received his B.A. in political science in 1965 from the University of Alabama, where he was selected for Phi Beta Kappa. He has been awarded honorary doctorates by the University of Maryland and the University of Alabama. Ambassador Hubbard's professional awards include the State Department's Superior Honor Award and the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service.

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Thomas Hubbard former US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Speaker
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About the series: The year 2005 marks the 60th anniversary of the end of Pacific War and Japan's unconditional surrender. Post-war Japan has embraced a new constitution that renounced war as a right of the nation and for the past six decades pursued economic growth under democratic government. Ironically, the years leading to this anniversary were filled with various disputes over territorial and historical issues with China and Korea and questions from neighboring countries whether Japanese society is shifting towards the right. Triggered by Prime Minister Koizumi's official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines "A" class war criminals, anti-Japan sentiment is widely spreading among its neighboring countries, accompanied by strong nationalism, and is posing a potential threat to the political stability of the region.

This colloquium series will focus on Japan's relationship with China and Korea and the historical controversies that are central to their deteriorating political relationship. The series speakers will address the following questions: What are the historical roots of these controversies? How did post-war Japanese foreign policy effect and was effected by Japan's handling of its militaristic past? What is the nature of domestic politics of these three countries that politicizes these historical issues and influences their responses to one another?

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Ryosei Kokubun Director, Institute of East Asian Studies and Professor of Law and Politics Speaker Keio University, Japan
Peter Duus Discussant: Professor Peter Duus, William H. Bonsall History Professor, Emeritus Commentator Stanford University
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Writing from Seoul, Pantech Fellow and San Jose Mercury News foreign affairs correspondent Daniel C. Sneider considers China's deepening economic ties to North Korea, and their potential impact on South Korea and the United States.

SEOUL, Korea - The visit last month of North Korea's diminutive dictator Kim Jong Il to China is still making waves here in the South Korean capital.

The Chinese rolled Kim through showcases of their market reforms. The North Korean leader, who once denounced the Chinese for retreating from socialism, responded with dutiful words of praise for the Chinese model.

South Koreans applaud any evidence that Kim may be headed down a Chinese-style path. Like the Chinese, most South Koreans believe this may be the only way to ultimately persuade the North to abandon its nuclear weapons program.

But in conversations here with senior South Korean officials and others closely involved with North Korea, I detected unease, even alarm, at the growth of China's influence and presence in the North. Some talked darkly about a Chinese "takeover'' of the North.

South Korean mixed feelings about China are not new. But the Kim visit comes on top of a rapid broadening of Chinese economic ties to North Korea, described in detail in a new report issued by the International Crisis Group. Chinese trade and investment in North Korea has reached $2 billion annually. Bridges and highways in and out of North Korea are being built, making it easier to ship iron ore and other raw materials out.

Hundreds of Chinese firms are investing into North Korea, in some cases grabbing deals away from South Korean companies.

Is China willing to use this expanded influence to compel Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons? Some in the Bush administration still cling to that hope. But the report argues strongly against that happening.

China may again drag Pyongyang back to the stalled six-party talks that it hosts. And it will move quickly to curb any North Korea provocation, such as a nuclear test, that could lead to war.

But China has an overriding interest in stability as well, opposing any attempt to destabilize the Kim government. The Chinese will cooperate to curb Pyongyang's laundering of counterfeit money through their banks, the report says, but will not shut down the North's banking operations in China.

South Koreans don't differ with China on the need to engage the North. Their own economic ties with the North are deepening. And Seoul too is consumed with the danger of triggering a war by trying to cut off the North's economic lifeline.

But South Koreans now also worry that China's deepening stake in the North will only perpetuate the division of the Korean Peninsula.

A South Korean businessman who is deeply engaged in dealings with the North argued to me privately that the North Koreans are unhappy with their dependence on Beijing and eager for an alliance with the United States. By refusing to deal directly with Kim Il Jong, he argued, "the Bush administration is pushing North Korea into the camp of China.''

We should explore such claims with a healthy dose of skepticism. The North Koreans are masters at playing the Chinese and South Koreans against each other, as they did with the Russians and Chinese during the Cold War.

More important, South Korean nervousness about China comes together with renewed interest in shoring up the strained alliance with the United States. This is partly behind a decision to negotiate a free-trade agreement (FTA) with the United States this year.

A free-trade agreement between the United States and Korea, one of the largest economies in the world, would be good for both economies. It should open more markets in Korea, removing a host of barriers such as restrictions on foreign investment. Korean officials, led by a young and ambitious American-trained trade minister, believe an FTA will spur a new round of needed internal reform and a jump in growth.

Anti-FTA protests were already taking place as I was discussing this with Korean officials. More are sure to come from those, such as farmers, most threatened by more open markets. But officials say the president and his government are committed to pushing this through.

Privately, Korean officials hope the FTA will also remind Koreans and Americans of the value of their alliance. It gives both sides something to talk about other than to dwell on their differences over North Korea. We should push hard from both sides to quickly finish an FTA deal -- and continue to talk quietly about our shared interests in maintaining a strategic balance in Northeast Asia.

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In this Q&A session from the Council on Foreign Relations (reprinted in the New York Times), Shorenstein APARC visiting professor David Kang -- together with other experts on the region -- comments on South Korea's increasing independence from the United States, and other issues related to the "North Korea problem."

What is South Korea's strategic posture in East Asia?

After the Korean War ended in 1953, South Korea and the United States established a political and security alliance that has lasted more than half a century. "For a number of decades, South Korea primarily defined itself as a U.S. ally, with the enemy to the north," says Donald Gregg, president of the Korea Society and a former U.S. ambassador to Korea. However, South Korea is now trying to create a new role for itself in Asia. Seoul is exploring a growing economic relationship with China--which passed the United States in 2003 to become South Korea's largest trading partner--and its policy of engagement and growing cooperation with North Korea is pulling it away from the United States. "All we know for sure is that South Korea's role is no longer junior partner to the U.S.," says David Kang, a visiting professor of Asian studies at Stanford University. "The days when they would just unquestioningly follow the U.S. are over."

Kang and other experts say Seoul is beginning to shift its focus towards increasing regional ties with its Asian neighbors. The U.S.-South Korea relationship, while still strong, is not as exclusive as it has been in the past. "South Korea is still an ally of the United States ... nevertheless, it has been the most active country in promoting East Asian cooperation and integration, and will probably continue to do so," says Charles Armstrong, professor of history and director of the Center for Korean Studies at Columbia University.

What are South Korea's biggest foreign policy challenges?

Dealing with North Korea while preserving its relationship with the United States, maintaining relations with Japan, and addressing potential long-term military or economic threats from China, experts say. But "the major issue for Seoul is overwhelmingly North Korea, and everything else gets filtered through that lens," Kang says. South Korea looks to its northern neighbor with the goal of eventual reunification, and therefore seeks economic cooperation and political engagement to smooth relations and slowly move down that path. The United States, on the other hand, is primarily seeking to prevent North Korea from gaining nuclear weapons, and has refused to engage with Pyongyang until that issue is resolved.

Other experts see a disconnect between how South Korea views its role in the region and how other nations see it. South Korean officials talk of playing a "balancing" or mediating role in regional disputes, including tensions between China and Japan and the nuclear standoff between the United States and North Korea. But South Korea's "actual ability to mediate and balance is limited," says Armstrong. And while South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has expressed hopes of building Seoul into a logistics and business hub for the region, existing tensions on the peninsula--including international fears that North Korea is amassing a nuclear arsenal--cloud any long-term economic plans. As things stand, South Korea has the world's 11th largest economy, but not a corresponding level of political clout.

How is South Korea dealing with North Korea?

Through a policy of active engagement. In 1998, Former President Kim Dae-Jung introduced the "Sunshine Policy" aimed at improving ties with North Korea while assuring Pyongyang that Seoul is not trying to absorb it. Since then, "the degree of economic interaction between south and north has substantially increased," Armstrong says. Kim and North Korean President Kim Jung-Il met at a historic summit in 2000, and increasing progress has been made on a range of issues, from economic--increased rail links and joint projects like the Gaesung industrial complex--to social and symbolic, including cross-border family visits and Korean athletes marching together under a single flag at the Olympics. Trade between the two countries reached $697 million in 2004, and South Korea is now Pyongyang's second-largest trading partner after China.

South Korea sees engagement with North Korea as yielding far more benefits than confrontation. "South Korea is reorienting itself toward reconciliation and eventual reunification of the peninsula," Gregg says. South Korean officials say reunification would reduce the burden on each side of maintaining huge armies, help improve living standards, draw international investment, create employment, and help avert the worst possibility: open war on the Korean peninsula.

What is South Korea's relationship with China?

South Korea is developing increasingly warm relations with its giant western neighbor. "There is a real fascination with China in South Korea, and the flow of investment, exports, students, tourists, and businessmen going to China from South Korea has exploded in the last several years," Armstrong says. Bilateral trade between Seoul and Beijing reached $90 billion in 2004, a 42 percent increase from 2003. The two countries also agree politically on issues ranging from opposition to Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni war shrine, to accord on how to deal with North Korea's nuclear ambitions. China is also choosing the path of engagement with North Korea, and helping Pyongyang find a "Chinese way" to develop: that is, increasing economic openness without sacrificing political control. "On the whole, [South Korea and China] see pretty much eye to eye on the major geopolitical issues," Kang says.

Beijing, like Seoul, is investing in North Korea, which has ample natural resources--including coal, iron, and gold--and a low-cost labor force. In 2003, Chinese investment in North Korea was $1.1 million; in 2004, it ballooned to $50 million; and in 2005, it was expected to reach $85-90 million. The volume of trade between China and North Korea reached $1.5 billion in 2005, making Beijing Pyongyang's largest foreign trading partner. North Korean leader Kim Jung-Il, who rarely travels, emphasized Beijing's importance to his country by visiting China in January.

South Korea is positioning itself to be closer to an ascendant China, but trying to do it without jeopardizing existing ties with the United States. South Korea's biggest worry, experts say, is being pulled into a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan.

What's the relationship like between South Korea and Japan?

"Very bad at the moment in terms of public diplomacy and popular opinion," Columbia University's Armstrong says. South Korean wariness of Japan dates back at least to 1910, when imperial Japan invaded Korea and ruled it as a colony for thirty-five years. During the occupation, Japanese efforts to suppress Korean language and culture earned Korean enmity. During World War II, the Japanese practice of using "comfort women"--women from occupied countries, mostly Korea, who were forced to serve as prostitutes for the Japanese army--increased the anti-Japanese feeling.

South Koreans, and others across the region, are also infuriated by Koizumi's annual visit to the Yasukuni shrine. The site honors more than two million Japanese war dead, but includes the remains of more than a dozen convicted war criminals. South Korea also has disputes with Japan over territory. Both countries claim a group of islands--and the fishing and mineral rights around them--in the Sea of Japan that the Koreans call Dokdo and the Japanese call Takeshima. And many critics in South Korea and across Asia accuse Japan of whitewashing its wartime atrocities in its grade-school textbooks.

But much of the South Korean conflict with Japan may be for domestic political consumption, some experts say. "Under the surface, I would say the degree of interaction [between Seoul and Tokyo] remains high and, in the economic realm, is rather good," Armstrong says.

How is South Korea dealing with the United States?

While experts say most South Koreans still consider the U.S.-Korean alliance the backbone of their security relationship, time has passed and attitudes are shifting. A new generation of South Koreans, assertive and nationalistic, are less mindful of the Korean War--and less grateful for American intervention in the conflict that left nearly three million Koreans dead or wounded--and more resistant to what they see as a U.S. attempt to impose its values and Washington's singular focus on terrorism. The United States has opposed South Korean engagement efforts with North Korea, and has also moved to increase its ties with Japan. The Bush administration's foreign policy, including the war on terror, its punitive stance toward North Korean nuclear weapons, and particularly the invasion of Iraq, is highly unpopular in South Korea, according to opinion surveys there.

South Koreans are also increasingly demanding more control over their country's military and political affairs. In 2004, the United States returned several military bases to Korean control, and agreed to withdraw 12,500 of the 37,500 U.S. troops currently stationed in Korea by 2008. U.S. officials, including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, had been pushing for South Korea to take more of a role in the defense of the Korean peninsula, to free up U.S. forces for deployment elsewhere. But, all differences aside, Seoul is still eager to cooperate with the United States. South Korea, with some 3,000 troops in Iraq, is the third-largest member of the U.S.-led coalition there, behind the United States and Britain.

What is the recent history of the region?

Poised between China and Japan, fought over by the United States and Russia, the Korean peninsula long has played a central role in Asia's geopolitical affairs. After World War II, Japanese colonial rule gave way to U.S. and Soviet trusteeship over the southern and northern halves of Korea, respectively. The peninsula was divided at the 38th Parallel. In 1948, the southern Republic of Korea and the northern Democratic People's Republic of Korea, under Kim Il-Sung, were established.

In 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea, starting a conflict that brought in China on the North Korean side and a U.S.-led UN coalition on the South Korean side. While an armistice was agreed to in 1953, a formal peace treaty was never signed. In 1954, the United States agreed to help South Korea defend itself against external aggression in a mutual defense treaty. U.S. troops have been stationed in Korea since then. In addition to this important security relationship, shared interests in the last fifty years have included fighting communism and, since the 1980s, establishing a strong democracy and fostering economic development. However, in recent years strain has emerged on a range of issues, none more important than how to handle Pyongyang.

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The South Korean film industry has, in the past few years, achieved astonishing popularity domestically and internationally. This year, for the first time, we are pleased to provide a rare opportunity for the Stanford community and the bay area to enjoy a wide array of recent Korean films and to discuss the films with their directors. Three of these films will be shown here on campus. The details of the campus viewings are below. For more information about the entire festival, please visit http://www.mykima.org/.

Murder, Take One Thursday, Feb. 9, 7 - 9 p.m. Free and open to the public.

Duelist Friday, Feb. 10, 7 - 9 p.m. Free and open to the public.

Following the screening of the film, the director, Myung-Se Lee will be available for questions from the audience.

TaeGukGi: The Brotherhood of War Saturday, Feb. 11, 5 - 7:30 p.m. Free and open to the public.

Following the screening of the film, the director, Je-Gyu Kang will be available for questions from the audience.

Please join us for an academic symposium "Globalization & Contemporary Korean Cinema" on Friday, February 10 from 3 - 5 p.m. in the Okimoto Conference Room on the third floor of Encina Hall. Free and open to the public.

Panelists: Young-Lan Lee (Assoc. Prof. Kyung Hee University)

Hyangjin Lee (Senior Lecturer, Sheffield University)

Jenny Kwok Wah Lau (Assoc. Prof. San Francisco State University)

Aaron Magnan-Park (Asst. Prof. University of Notre Dame)

Kyu-Hyun Kim (University of California, Davis)

Moderator: Chul Heo and Aaron Kerner (San Francisco State University)

Korean films have emerged as a unique and influential player in international cinema. Current Korean cinema has combined Hollywood and more traditionally Asian aesthetics in ways that make it well suited for the global film market. This academic seminar will discuss the political, cultural, social, and economic implications of these recent developments for both Korea and international cultural sectors.

The joint Korean-American Film Festival "Korea Studies in Media Arts" is co-presented by Stanford University, San Francisco State University, University of Notre Dame, and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

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the Okimoto Conference Room
Encina Hall, third floor, east wing

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Since the mid-1990s, China, Japan, and Korea have come under severe pressure to restructure and reform their economic systems. Indeed, across East Asia, governments are attempting to address their structural problems with a variety of reform programs. It is still too early to declare the triumph of financial globalization, and East Asian financial and corporate systems continue to fall short of global standards in structure and performance. Yet now that the reform process has been under way for more than five years, old models have been discarded and new patterns are emerging.

This book identifies and accounts for empirical regularities across East Asian countries and sectors, which previous studies have left largely unexplained. In general, the distinguished contributors to this collection conclude that the interaction between financial globalization and domestic politics is the key to unlocking the reform process. In particular, the authors address issues important to the study of East Asian political economies—their receptivity to financial globalization, their financial integration, the convergence or divergence of their economic institutions, and the impact that their institutional transformations will have on national competitive advantage and the global economic system.

This title is out of print. Download PDFs below.

  1. Front matter/ Financial Globalization and East Asian Capitalism: An Overview (Jongryn Mo and Daniel I. Okimoto)
  2. The Politics of Reform in Japanese Finance: Assessing the Relative Influence of Foreign Investors (Jennifer Amyx)
  3. Policymaking in the Era of Financial Globalization: The Battle for Japanese Corporate Reforms, 1996–2002 (Yves Tiberghien)
  4. Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity: The Political Economy of Korea’s Financial Sector Reform (Wonhyuk Lim and Joon-Ho Hahm)
  5. East Asian Capital Flows: Political Networks, Liberalization, and Crises (A. Maria Toyoda)
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Financial Globalization and East Asian Capitalism

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Daniel I. Okimoto
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One of the few ways to get a taste of North Korea, short of leaping through numerous hoops to get a visa to visit the country, is to eat cold noodles (naengmyen). Most South Korean cities and even a few American ones offer several types of North Korean-style noodle restaurants. The version often prepared in Pyongyang, North Korea's capital, is mul naengmyen, or cold noodles in broth. It is served in a large metal bowl and looks like a flowering mountain rising up from the sea. Artfully balanced atop the mound of noodles made from buckwheat flour are julienned cucumbers, several slices of beef, half a hardboiled egg, and a few pieces of crisp Korean pear. When prepared Hamhung-style -- named after the industrial city on North Korea's east coast -- noodles are made from sweet potato flour and often topped with raw skate, which has a slightly ammoniac flavor.

The signs in the South advertising Northern-style cold noodles are a reminder of the Korean War and the division of the peninsula. After the Korean War, refugees from the conflict set up stalls in the markets of Seoul to sell the "taste of the north" to those who could no longer travel there. The recipes they brought with them to the south were sometimes the only valuables they carried. In the 1990s, a new wave of North Koreans came to the South and established naengmyen restaurants. Hailing from the North lends a certain authenticity to the preparation of the dish. Whether prepared by the refugees of the 1950s and their descendents, the defectors of the 1990s, or North Koreans themselves in Pyongyang or Hamhung, cold noodles are something that North Koreans are widely credited with doing better than South Koreans.

But the way naengmyen is "consumed" in the South reveals the great disparity between the two countries. There are many jokes in South Korea about the number of North Korean defectors who have only this one marketable skill. Since cooking in Korea is largely a woman's job, the close association of North Koreans with the production and sale of cold noodles subtly feminizes and, according to patriarchal Korean values, devalues them. North Koreans are thus second-class citizens, both those who are unemployed (the majority) and those who are employed only to provide service to the real "breadwinners" of the country. Anthropologist Roy Richard Grinker relates how South Korean textbooks and popular culture often depict North Korea as the younger brother of the more advanced South Korean older brother. Given the cultural associations of naengmyen, wife to husband might be the more appropriate analogy. A recent Joongang Ilbo Photoshop cartoon reinforces this sexist gloss on inter-Korean relations by depicting South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun dressed as a Choson-era husband with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il as his bride.

In a divided country, cold noodles serve as an important reminder of a common culture. They also represent a unique contribution that the economically weaker North Korea can bring to the reunification process. But however tasty Pyongyang-style mul naengmyen may be, cold noodles ensure neither a sustainable livelihood for every North Korean defector nor an equal place at the reunification table for North Korea.

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