Beyond his childhood ties to Hawai'i and Indonesia and his self-styled designation as "America's first Pacific President," President Barack Obama has demonstrated significant and genuine interest in Asia and in developing trans-Pacific ties. He embarked on November 5 for the second presidential visit to Asia during his term, and while there he will visit India, Indonesia, South Korea to attend the summit of the Group of 20 (G20), and finally to Japan to attend the annual heads of state meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will travel a week ahead of Obama to attend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) gathering and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Vietnam, followed by visits to Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and Australia. Her trip will include an added-in stop to China's Hainan Island. To address major issues surrounding the President's trip to Asia--including the "China question" and historic U.S. bilateral alliances--four scholars from the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) gathered for a public panel discussion on October 27.

Thomas Fingar, Oksenberg/Rohlen Distinguished Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, spoke about the symbolic aspects of Obama's visit, noting the importance of a presidential visit for showing a sense of real commitment to the region and an acknowledgement of the "rise" of countries like China and India. On a more pragmatic side, he also suggested that meeting in person with other leaders is crucial in order to "bring about deliverables." The omission of a visit to China should not be weighed too heavily, Fingar said, pointing out that the President visited China last year. The stops in Japan and South Korea are tied to important multilateral meetings, though they will also reaffirm longstanding ties with those allies, while the visit to India is an indication of growing relations between the two countries. Of particular importance is Obama's participation in the G20 Summit in South Korea and the APEC meeting in Japan because, Fingar stated, a major purpose of the visit is about the "United States having a role in building new multilateral institutions." Finally, while much of the success of the Asia trip rests on how well Obama conducts himself, Fingar expressed confidence that the President would skillfully manage the visit.

During his visit to Indonesia, Obama will meet with Indonesia's President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for a bilateral discussion of such issues as economics, security, and higher education. Donald K. Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum, said that the postponement of earlier-planned visits to Indonesia has lessened some of the enthusiasm for Obama's "homecoming" to Jakarta. China's omission on the trip agenda is noteworthy, he suggested, and Clinton's addition of a stop in Hainan is due, in part, to help alleviate recent tension between the United States and China regarding China's claim of sovereignty over the South China Sea. Clinton's involvement in the EAS is an "important multilateral engagement" for the United States because of the presence of its ally Japan and the fact that the United States and China both have a voice there, unlike the ASEAN Plus Three meetings that do not include the United States. While in recent months the U.S.-China relationship has become more strained, Emmerson asserted that the "United States is not going to get into a cold war with China."

Obama will travel from Indonesia to South Korea for the G20 Summit, another major multilateral engagement during his travels. David Straub, associate director of the Korean Studies Program, described several significant aspects of this time in South Korea. While not technically an organization, Straub said, the Summit is an important forum for the discussion of economic stability and growth. Similar to Fingar, Straub noted the efficacy and significance of in-person meetings. The Summit provides an opportunity for world leaders to have face-to-face discussions on non-economic issues, such as North Korea's political situation. Straub suggested that President Lee Myung-bak's investment in the Summit is based, in part, on raising South Korea's global prestige, which is tied also to increasing the status of the G20 to become the premiere global financial organization. Finally, Straub stated that alongside the G20 meeting, Obama and Lee are expected discuss bilateral relations, which are at an all-time high, including the stalled U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement (Korus FTA). The FTA, which would be the most significant free trade agreement for the United States since NAFTA, has faced opposition and mixed support on both sides.

Obama's visit to India will be the third U.S. presidential visit there in the past decade, which is indicative of changing U.S. perceptions of India brought about through the IT boom and growing economic ties, suggested Daniel C. Sneider, associate director of research for Shorenstein APARC. Sneider pointed to a broader shared agenda despite a lack of clarity on some issues, such as Pakistan, and a focus on India as Asia's "other" growing economy. He stated that he would be watching for the United States and India to work together to emphasize India's role in East Asia, highlighted by India's participation in the EAS. India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has championed a "look east" policy and expressed stronger interest in East Asia, especially China. In terms of Obama's visit to the APEC heads of state conference in Japan, Sneider noted the importance of this trip also for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The newly formed government of Prime Minister Naoto Kan has worked to ease tensions in the alliance and both countries hope to use the visit to bolster a more positive image of the alliance. Certain points of contention, like the move of the U.S. military base on Okinawa, have been put aside for the time being. Sneider stated that recent China-Japan tensions have also served to reinforce the importance of the relationship.

Events during Obama's Asia visit in the next two weeks will help to solidify or possibly call into question his image as the "Pacific President," and undoubtedly influence the role of the United States in Asia for the future.

On Monday, an undersea earthquake shook Indonesia's remote Mentawai Islands and triggered a 10-foot tsunami: It has killed at least 272 people, and left 412 missing. The first cargo plane with humanitarian supplies arrived today. Hundreds of miles away in eastern Java, the volcanic Mount Merapi erupted Tuesday and killed at least 30 people.

That's two disasters in less than 24 hours.

 Indonesia is no stranger to catastrophe. It is located along the Pacific Ring of Fire, which is one of the most seismically and volcanically volatile areas in the world. Its last sizeable earthquake and tsunami duo struck in December of 2004, killing more than 225,000 people in 14 countries.

But despite the death and destruction of the last 48 hours, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said today that he doesn't yet see a need for foreign aid or rescue assistance.
So far, only the Philippines and the United States have offered to help Indonesia. But Natalegawa's behavior seems counter-intuitive. In the face of disaster, why would any country preemptively say no to aid?

A look into Indonesia's history reveals latent political sensitivities that may have influenced Natalegawa's decision. Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, an organization of countries who are not aligned with or against any major world power.

Indonesia prides itself on its "independent and active" foreign policy, which was first developed by then Vice President Mohammad Hatta on September 2, 1948 in Central Java. "Do we, Indonesians, in the struggle for the freedom of our people and our country, only have to choose between Russia and America?" he asked. "Is not there any other stand that we can take in the pursuit of our ideals?"

The "other stand" became known as "mendayung antara dua karang" or "rowing between two reefs."

Indonesia doesn't want to appear incompetent, or weak, to outside governments, and may also be wary to accept aid for fear of undermining its national legitimacy.
 
In 2004, Indonesia's acceptance of aid had an arguably negative effect on its citizens. "Though the post-tsunami reconstruction efforts in Aceh were generally successful, the amount of aid did engender some resentment in Jakarta over whether the national government had lost control of the reconstruction, and also potentially altered the economy in Aceh," explains Josh Kurlantzick a fellow for southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. "So people remember that."

Donald Emmerson, the director of the Southeast Asia Forum at Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, cites several reasons for Natalegawa's response. First, he says, if the Indonesian government solicited foreign aid, it would be inundated with offers. Coordinating offers of assistance right now would be a severe burden on the government.
 
Then there's the question of scale: so far, the destruction seems manageable in comparison to the 2004 disaster. Still, it's unclear whether Indonesia will be able to adequately respond on its own. "Indonesia is a large country, and its infrastructure is overstretched," Emmerson says. "Its capacity to respond effectively to domestic disasters is not as good as it might be."

In official and scholarly circles in the United States it has become almost a cliché to say that no country is both more important and less well known to Americans than Indonesia. Southeast Asia Forum director Donald K. Emmerson would like to change this by making Indonesia better known, among Americans generally and at Stanford especially. On September 19 he met in Jakarta with 18 locally resident Stanford alumni to discuss ideas for improving international awareness of, and expertise on, their country. Melinda Wiria (MS '98) coordinated the visit.

Following the resignation of Indonesia's authoritarian president Soeharto in 1998, the country underwent an extraordinary political transformation. Since 2006 Indonesia has been ranked by Freedom House as the only "free" country in Southeast Asia. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has proudly promoted his homeland's status as the third largest democracy, after India and the United States, and the largest Muslim-majority democracy as well.

In recognition of this achievement, the World Movement for Democracy chose to hold its Sixth Assembly in Indonesia. In April 2010, SEAF director Donald K. Emmerson traveled to Jakarta to attend the event and to arrange interviews with local political figures for a documentary film on democracy in developing countries. Also involved in the filming were Larry Diamond and Hicham Ben Abdallah, respectively the director of and a visiting scholar at Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

One of the Indonesian interviewees was SBY himself, pictured above at the presidential palace with his wife Kristiani Herawati and Prof. Emmerson on the day of the filming. The president took the occasion very seriously, carefully preparing his answers and conveying them clearly in fluent English. The film will also feature Malaysia's experience with democracy, including the travails of opposition politician Anwar Ibrahim. 

The documentary's producer, Appleseed Entertainment, hopes to release it in 2011-12.

The United States and the ASEAN group of nations have further strengthened political, economic and security ties, after their second full-scale summit in New York.

President Barack Obama said the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which groups ten countries, had the potential for true world leadership. President Obama also made it clear that he saw Asia as a vital plank of US foreign policy.

DR EMMERSON: In the run-up to the summit, there was a big question. Would the partnership be declared as being strategic in nature? That was a key word in the discussion and what happened was the leaders basically finessed the issue. It's not hard to suspect that they worried that if they declared a strategic partnership with the United States, this would cause alarm in Beijing. Because let's remember in the run-up to this summit, we've had a lot of activity - the split between China and Japan over the disputed islands, one could continue with some evidence of a more muscular Chinese foreign policy, its commitment to its claim to possess basically the entire South China Sea, escalating that to the level of a core interest, presumably equivalent to their interest in recovering Taiwan. I could go on, but in many case, it was understandable that the subtext of the meeting was what will China think? So basically what the summit did was to finesse the issue. They decided to pass on the question of raising the partnership to quote - a strategic level - unquote, to the ASEAN US Eminent Persons Group, presumably expert advisors that would be convened and would make recommendations down the road.

And one of the most remarkable things about the statement was how much ground it covered. I mean, among the topics and issues that the leaders committed themselves to do something about, were 14 as I count them, 14 different subjects. Human rights, educational change, trade and investment, science, technology, climate change, interfaith dialogue, disaster management, illicit trafficking, international terrorism, I could go on. So it is clear to me that one of the tasks that ASEAN and the US will have to face in the coming months, is to try to insert some sense of priority.

LAM: On that issue of priority, the US President, Barack Obama, of course, postponed a couple of visits to Indonesia due to pressing domestic demands. Did he in anyway express American commitment to the ASEAN region?

DR EMMERSON: Yes, this was particularly kind of, I suppose you could say, evident in the fact that the meeting occurred at all, finally it was organized. It lasted two hours. He was apparently quite engaged and engaging during that period of time. And I think there is no question that the United States under his administration is committed to South East Asia as a region, indeed has agreed with the leaders of ASEAN, that ASEAN should play a central role in the process of building regional cooperation in East Asia.

LAM: And, of course, one of the topics that came up as well was the South China Sea, that entire region, given the competing maritime and territorial claims vis-à-vis the Spratley and Paracel Island groups. Do you think China is watching the US relationship with ASEAN, this growing relationship - do you think Beijing might be watching it with unease?

DR EMMERSON: Yes, absolutely. I am confident that they are watching it with considerable unease and I note that the statement that the leaders made, made no reference whatsoever to the South China Sea, presumably because of sensitivity with regard to Beijing's possible reaction. The topic was implicitly mentioned, but not explicitly.

LAM: And what about within ASEAN, the grouping itself? The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, on the weekend said that the ASEAN nations' credibility might suffer if they did not take a tougher line with Burma and this is in view of the upcoming elections in November. This is presumably directed at specifically China and India, but it could also be referenced to ASEAN could it not, because Burma is a member of ASEAN. Do you see that changing anytime soon with ASEAN, that ASEAN countries, leading members like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, that they might take a stronger stand with the military junta in Rangoon?

DR EMMERSON: The election in Myanmar, if I can call it an election, since it will be highly compromised and manipulated will take place, at least is scheduled to take place November 7th. Indonesia does not take over the chairmanship of ASEAN until the 1st January. So the question is, since Indonesia is a democratic country, arguably, the most democratic of any country in South East Asia, will it use its opportunity to try to put pressure on Burma in the year 2011? My own view is that ASEAN will probably not fulfill Ban Ki-moon's hope, will not exercise significant pressure on the junta. Instead, we could get the opposite situation in which so long as there is not major violence associated with the election, it will essentially be received by ASEAN as a kind of minimally-acceptable basis for assuring the Burmese junta that ASEAN still treats them as a full member. In other words, it's quite possible that the junta may get away with what I take to be a kind of facade effort to legitimate their rule.