Stanford experts discuss Sino-American relations in wake of North Korea provocations
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Stanford experts from the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) spoke with media in Asia and the United States about the dynamics on the Korean Peninsula following recent provocations by North Korea; a roundup of those citations is below.
The United Nations imposed a new set of sanctions against North Korea on March 2 in response to the country’s fourth nuclear test in January and subsequent rocket launch in February of this year. Shorenstein APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin offered his view in an interview with Dong-a Ilbo:
“The new sanctions are unprecedentedly strong and comprehensive, but the dominant view is pessimistic,” he said, emphasizing that the sanctions’ effectiveness stands largely on the shoulders of China, which is North Korea’s largest trading partner.
“Only if China doesn't fizzle out after a few months – but continuously enforces the sanctions – will we see any meaningful effect,” he said.
Shin also called upon South Korea to play a leadership role in dealing with North Korea because the United States has only limited interest in solving the nuclear problem, and China, will not change its approach and continue to move according to its own interests.
Shin relayed a similar message in an interview with Maeil Shinmun last December. South Korea must break from its own perception that it is the “balancer” between China and the United States. South Korea, often described as a “shrimp among whales,” should instead strive to play a larger role as a “dolphin,” he said.
Furthermore, Shin told Maeil that the U.S.-Korea relationship and the U.S.-China relationship are very different from each other, and should be viewed as they are. He pointed out that the U.S.-Korea relationship is an alliance where the two countries act accordingly as one body, whereas the China-Korea relationship is a strategic partnership insofar as the two countries cooperate on selective issues of mutual interest.
In a separate interview with the Associated Press, David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program, was asked about the possibility of peace talks with North Korea as an alternative to or parallel with the U.N. sanctions. Straub said “it would not make sense” and that “there is no support for such an approach in Washington” because of the strategic partnership between China and North Korea. He also told Voice of America that the new sanctions will significantly increase the political, diplomatic, and psychological pressures on North Korea's leaders to rethink their pursuit of nuclear weapons.
"China Daily" features Stanford research efforts in Zouping
China Daily has featured a longstanding Stanford research project described as instrumental towards the normalization of U.S. relations with China during the Carter administration.
Led by late professor Michel Oksenberg, a China expert who also served on the U.S. National Security Council, the project sought to examine the workings of the local government, economy and social structure of Zouping, a county in northern China. Between 1987 and 1991, the project brought more than eighty U.S. academics to that area.
According to the Daily, it was “one of the most important academic exchanges of the 1980s,” which offered a symbol of reform and “helped the world gain greater and deeper understanding of China’s growing role on the global stage.”
Jean Oi, director of the China Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, was part of the cohort that traveled with Oksenberg, and has since revisited the area with her students to continue research efforts.
The full article can be accessed below.
APARC Event: 2018 Oksenberg Conference on Zouping County Research
Publication: Zouping Revisited: Adaptive Governance in a Chinese County
China and North Korea have ulterior motives, Straub says
David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program, tells AP that China and North Korea have ulterior motives in demanding the replacement of the Korean peninsula armistice agreement with a peace treaty.
Globalization, Innovation, and Culture in Korea
The 8th Annual Koret Workshop
South Korea has become an economic powerhouse, but faces multiple challenges. The conference will focus on four areas that South Korea needs to turn its attention to: 1) the higher education and development; 2) entrepreneurship and innovation; 3) global competitiveness; and 4) demographic changes and immigration policy.
During the conference, a keynote speech is open to the public. Please click here for more information about the public keynote.
The Koret Workshop is made possible through the generous support of the Koret Foundation.
Responding to North Korea's fourth nuclear test
In a recent interview with Yonhap News, David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program, says "Although the United States and the PRC certainly have differences [in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue], they pale in copmarison to U.S.-Soviet differences."
Yonhap News article in English (February 12, 2016)
Straub also offers, in an extended interview with South Korea's Segye Ilbo newspaper, his thoughts on Pyongyang's motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons. He argues that the appropriate policy response is to continue to increase pressure on the regime to convince it that nuclear weapons will bring more costs than benefits, while holding open the door to good-faith negotiations to resolve peninsular issues.
Segye Ilbo article in Korean (January 8, 2016)
Divided Lenses: Screen Memories of War in East Asia
Divided Lenses: Screen Memories of War in East Asia is the first attempt to explore how the tumultuous years between 1931 and 1953 have been recreated and renegotiated in cinema. This period saw traumatic conflicts such as the Sino-Japanese War, the Pacific War, and the Korean War, and pivotal events such as the Rape of Nanjing, Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Iwo Jima, and the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all of which left a lasting imprint on East Asia and the world. By bringing together a variety of specialists in the cinemas of East Asia and offering divergent yet complementary perspectives, the book explores how the legacies of war have been reimagined through the lens of film.
This turbulent era opened with the Mukden Incident of 1931, which signaled a new page in Japanese militaristic aggression in East Asia, and culminated with the Korean War (1950–1953), a protracted conflict that broke out in the wake of Japan's post–World War II withdrawal from Korea. Divided Lenses explores how the intervening decades have continued to shape politics and popular culture throughout East Asia and the world. Essays in part I examine historical trends at work in various "national" cinemas, including China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and the United States. Those in part 2 focus on specific themes such as comfort women in Chinese film, the Nanjing Massacre, or nationalism, and how they have been depicted or renegotiated in contemporary films. Of particular interest are contributions drawing from other forms of screen culture, such as television and video games.
This book is an outcome of the conference, Divided Lenses: Film and War Memory in Asia, that the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center hosted in December 2008, part of the Divided Memories and Reconciliation research project.
15th Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum
In this fifteenth session of the Strategic Forum, former senior American and South Korean government officials and other leading experts will discuss current developments in the Korean Peninsula and North Korea policy, the future of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, and a strategic vision for Northeast Asia. The session is hosted by the Korea Program in association with The Sejong Institute, a top South Korean think tank.
Seoul, Republic of Korea
North Korean Nuclear Test Destabilizing for Region
Stanford nuclear experts said they were skeptical of North Korea’s claim that it had detonated a hydrogen bomb this week.
However, they said the test was an important step forward for North Korea’s nuclear program and would have a destabilizing effect on the entire region.
“I don’t believe it was a real hydrogen bomb, but my greatest concern is not so much whether or not they actually tested a hydrogen bomb, but rather that they tested at all,” said Siegfried Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and senior fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has “a track record of exaggerated statements, hyperbole and outright lies,” according to Scott Sagan, Caroline S.G. Munro professor of Political Science.
“The propaganda machine in North Korea has made all sorts of claims about Kim Jong-un’s personal prowess and his history, and it is totally unsurprising that he might make exaggerated claims about North Korea’s military prowess,” Sagan said.
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry said he also doubted that North Korea had detonated a two-stage hydrogen bomb.
“Whether it’s a hydrogen bomb or not, it’s very dangerous, destabilizing development,” said Perry.
“It’s obvious they’re working to increase the capability and size of their nuclear arsenal and that represents a huge danger to the region and creates major instability and major concerns on the part of South Korea and Japan.”
Many North Korea watchers had been anticipating another nuclear test.
“We’ve thought that the North Koreans could test at any time – that the tunnels were ready, that they could do this at any time – so it would be a political decision, not a technical decision,” said Thomas Fingar, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
Hecker said North Korea’s latest nuclear test would move the country closer to being able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and mount it on a missile, extending the reach of their nuclear weapons.
“They will have achieved greater sophistication in their bomb design – that is the most worrisome aspect,” Hecker said.
“At this point, what makes their nuclear arsenal more dangerous is not so much explosive power of the bomb, but its size, weight and the ability to deliver it with missiles.”
On the diplomatic agenda, the U.S. and its allies will likely push for stronger sanctions in the wake of the tests, according to Kathleen Stephens, a former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and William J. Perry fellow at Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).
“In the UN the U.S., Japan and South Korea will likely look for another, and stronger, UN Security Council resolution, presumably with some efforts to attach to it some teeth and strengthen sanctions,” Stephens said.
The U.S. Congress is currently considering financial sanctions that would cut of all access to U.S. banks for any banks dealing with the North Koreans.
But financial sanctions would likely be less effective in dealing with North Korea than they had been with Iran, according to Fingar.
“It’s like hitting a masochist,” said Fingar.
“North Korea is relatively insulated from the external economy, where Iran wasn’t. Iran had a middle class, you could make sanctions hurt, they could have a real effect. You could make it hard for the North Koreans to buy luxury goods, but at the end of the day, is that going to bring down the regime?”
Financial sanctions against North Korea could have the unintended consequence of also hurting China, said David Straub, associate director of the Korea program at APARC.
“This could be problematic for China because many of the transactions that North Korea conducts would be going thorough Chinese banks, and the Chinese, understandably might not be happy about the US financial sanctions on them, in effect,” Straub said.
Perry recommended that the U.S. reinvigorate diplomatic talks with North Korea in collaboration with China, South Korea, Japan and Russia.
“I would not give up on negotiations with North Korea yet,” Perry said.
“What could have been done many years ago was following through on negotiations with North Korea at the turn of the Century, which were proceeding robustly in the last years of Clinton’s second term, but were abandoned by the Bush Administration...That was a geo-strategic error.”
But Hecker said those negotiations would be harder now.
“I have previously argued that we should focus on three “No’s” for three “Yes’s” – that is no more bombs, no better bombs (meaning no testing) and no export – in return for addressing the North’s security concerns, its energy shortage and its economic woes,” said Hecker.
“This could have worked when I first proposed it 2008 after one of my seven visits to North Korea. It will be more difficult now."