This op-ed originally appeared in Nikkei Asia 

If his recent diplomatic contacts are any indication, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga is off to an auspicious start in managing Japan's two most important relationships: the U.S. and China.

Last month, Suga got a pleasant surprise when he spoke to Joe Biden, with the President-elect explicitly stating that the Senkaku Islands, which China claims as the Diaoyu, fall under the protection of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. A few weeks later, Suga received China's foreign minister Wang Yi, who was there largely to consolidate the warm economic relationships between the two countries -- except for a prickly comment about the Senkakus at the end. Clearly, the U.S. and China both see Japan as a critically important player in their competition for Asia-Pacific hegemony.

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This is a far cry from the precarious position Japan found itself in at the beginning of Shinzo Abe's first and second terms. In 2007, the young Prime Minister Abe elevated a spontaneous joint response by the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami into a quadrilateral working-level group involving regular meetings and maritime exercises. Dubbed the Quad, Abe sought to make the group a counter to China's increasingly expansionist threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

When Abe's first term was cut short, he was succeeded by the more China-friendly Yasuo Fukuda, who prioritized relations with China and stepped back from the Quad. Combined with a leadership change in Australia that saw the pro-China Kevin Rudd become Prime Minister, the Quad fizzled out.

After Abe returned to the prime ministership in 2012, lingering suspicion over his hawkish nationalism and anti-China sentiment was exacerbated by his 2013 visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. That provoked rebuke not only from Japan's East Asian neighbors but from then U.S. Vice President Biden.

With U.S. policymakers still hoping that China's surging middle-class wealth would transform the country into a peace-loving democracy, the Quad seemed like a misguided attempt by Japan's China-hawks best left forgotten. Some in Tokyo were even starting to worry about a "grand bargain" between the U.S. and China that would relegate Japan to a small supporting role in the Asia-Pacific.

How times have changed. Few in Washington believe China will ever metamorphose into a moderate democracy, while in 2017, Abe harnessed Donald Trump's anti-China agenda to revive the Quad, as all four countries realized the need for a viable strategy to contain China. The new Quad has quickly gathered momentum, with India allowing Australia to join the Malabar naval exercises in November for the first time in 13 years so that all Quad members could participate.

As the Quad's main architect, Abe played a central role in bringing the group to this point, pairing it with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, another influential framework for the region for which he can claim authorship. By Abe's side throughout these developments, and now in charge of Japan's foreign policy, how will Suga handle the Quad, and what are its pros and cons?

The highest aspiration for the Quad is that it becomes an Asian version of NATO that can contain China. The combined military capabilities of the four countries are formidable, with the U.S. obviously leading the way and India possibly needing some catching up. The geostrategic impact of a formal alliance to pressure China would be tremendous.

Such an alliance would be even more effective if it included other countries in the region. Some, such as South Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam, have begun to participate in multilateral forums headlined by the Quad, possibly foreshadowing the development of a Quad Plus grouping that could exert significant pressure on China to moderate its expansionist approaches.

While Suga will likely tread carefully in expanding the Quad's activities to avoid damaging important economic relations with China, he has a clear understanding that China will only respond to power, and the game-changing power of the Quad alliance would surely appeal to him.

For all its potential, the Quad is not there yet. Fundamentally, it remains a coalition of like-minded countries discussing their concerns about China. At their most recent meeting in Tokyo in October, the four countries could not even muster a joint statement -- instead releasing separate readouts in each country's capital. Becoming an alliance with reciprocal obligations is clearly much further down the line.

Unless greater institutionalization becomes reality, China's divide and conquer approach will remain a threat, as it will try to target one or another country to break the Quad. China has already successfully done so before, pushing Australia to break from the Quad in 2008.

Today, the Quad's greatest utility for Suga is the threat it poses to China. The potential for this loose coalition to coalesce into a formidable alliance would increase if China continues to engage in provocative actions and further alienate the four countries. This threat could be effective in deterring China's aggressive behavior in the Indo-Pacific.

At this point, Suga will likely use the Quad as a card, gradually deepening its engagements but also preparing to develop it into a stronger alliance if China keeps poking at the Senkakus. The fact that Suga has that leverage today speaks to Japan's improved position relative to the early days of the first Abe administration.

This op-ed by Oriana Skylar Mastro and Zack Cooper originally appeared in Australian Financial Review.

Australia’s trials are not the first time Beijing has used economic coercion against another country.

It has become so common that we are becoming desensitised to it. Some notable examples include Beijing’s limitations on rare earth exports to Japan in 2010, Norwegian fish exports in 2010, Philippine tropic fruit exports in 2012, Vietnam’s tourist industry in 2014, Mongolian commodities trade in 2016, and South Korean businesses in 2017. In each case, Beijing sought to achieve a political objective by imposing economic penalties.

This case is different. Beijing has typically been ambiguous about the purpose or nature of its coercive economic statecraft. Despite evidence otherwise, it blamed the Japanese ban on meeting a yearly quota, the Philippine ban on pesticide exposure, the tourism drop to Vietnam on changing Chinese preferences, and the closure of South Korean stores on fire code violations. In Australia’s case, though, Beijing is doing away with these pretenses.

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China has not been shy this time about connecting its punitive actions to its unhappiness with Australian policies. The Chinese foreign ministry has listed a “series of wrong moves” by Australia for the disruption in relations. Beijing’s embassy in Canberra then gave a list of 14 “mistakes” to the Australian press.

These grievances include Australia’s foreign interference legislation, foreign investment reviews, funding for Australian think tanks, and unfriendly media reporting. Some of these criticisms are particularly ironic coming from Beijing, which often objects to foreign interference in other countries’ domestic affairs.

A core component of China’s strategy is a disinformation and propaganda effort designed to paint its moves as merely defensive, a proportionate and legitimate response to actions taken by the other side.

Australia has done nothing ‘wrong’

Let’s be clear: Australia has done nothing “wrong” in promoting and protecting its democratic institutions at home. It should not censor its media, obstruct analysis by outside experts, or shy away from safeguarding its democratic processes.

This time, the current trade restrictions are about more than making an example of Australia or showing smaller powers that they’ll pay if they have something to say about how the Chinese Communist Party governs at home. Beijing’s aims have taken on new proportions. Party leaders are now willing to punish democracies simply for upholding basic democratic principles within their own countries.

The message is clear: curtail some of your democratic principles or pay the price.

The US needs to work with like-minded states around the world to address this new threat. Free countries need to speak out together in Australia’s defence. If democracies do not hang together, they will hang separately. We should articulate that China’s actions are more than a violation of international law; they threaten the health of our democracies at home. Such a reframing would show Beijing that economic coercion will no longer be treated as a low-stakes tactic.

But words are not enough. We need coordinated action. US alliances are designed primarily to deter and defend against military attacks. Chinese actions make clear, however, that there are alternative methods for undermining peace, prosperity and freedom that our alliances do not adequately address. New alliance consultations to protect against economic attack would enhance our deterrence against China.

Washington should also launch a series of discussions with its allies to determine what new institutional mechanisms, commitments, and structures are needed to defend against economic attacks, not just military ones.

We should ensure the ability to take joint reciprocal action against Beijing in the economic realm, particularly to defend smaller countries. China engages in economic coercion because it is effective and relatively risk-free. But if instead like-minded countries responded together when one was attacked economically, this would go a long way in discouraging Beijing from employing such tactics.

Using all the tools of power

A critical first step is mapping dependencies on China and investigating how to limit over-dependence that open democracies to unacceptable economic vulnerability. As in the military realm, we need to enhance our resiliency against attack by avoiding over-dependence on any single import, export, or supply chain decency. This is a task that the so-called D10 (G7 plus Australia, India, and South Korea) should take up early next year.

The good news is a collective response to Chinese economic coercion will be more feasible under a Biden administration. President-elect Joe Biden and his senior advisers have articulated a preference for multilateral responses to Chinese aggression.

And while President Donald Trump relied mainly on military moves to warn and punish Beijing, Biden’s team prefers to make use of all tools of power. For these reasons, there has even been talk of rejuvenating past efforts like TPP. US allies and partners are also likely to see Biden as more reliable, making them more willing to undertake the risky venture of joining forces against Beijing.

The United States, Australia, and other allies and partners tried to welcome China into the international community. This was the right move. It has been good economically for many advanced economies, including Australia and the United States. But there is a flip side to every coin.

Australia has become too vulnerable to the whims of Beijing. And the US has few options to protect against such economic pressure. The incoming Biden administration needs to fundamentally rethink the nature of alliances so that countries like Australia have a third option the next time Beijing forces a choice between freedom and prosperity.

While much of the world has been occupied with the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active in promoting China’s claims in the South China Sea. Is it justified to argue that China is taking advantage of the global pandemic to make military gains?

In a new essay published in the Winter 2020 issue of the China Leadership Monitor, FSI Center Fellow at APARC Oriana Skylar Mastro sheds light on this question. Leveraging Chinese-language sources in addition to her own operational knowledge from over a decade of military experience, Mastro evaluates the PLA activities in the South China Sea over the eight-month period since March 2020. She includes in her analysis PLA statements, military exercises and operations, and deployment of relevant platforms and weapons in the region. Her conclusion is that the PLA has not significantly increased its operational role in the South China Sea but rather its signaling role. “Specifically, the Chinese military seems to be purposefully using, and perhaps even exaggerating, its capabilities and activities to enhance deterrence against the United States,” she argues.

Deployments of Weapons Systems and Military Exercises

After compiling a comprehensive picture of Chinese military activities in the South China Sea that includes both deployments of systems to the Paracels and Spratlys Islands and military exercises in the area, Mastro examines what these activities reveal about the PLA’s role in China’s South China Sea strategy.

PLA deployments in the area suggest it is trying to discourage the United States from countering its attempts to increase control over the South China Sea, she says. “China has been linking its deployments to U.S. activities for signaling purposes […] With new basing on the South China Sea islands and longer-range and more capable aircraft, China now has the option to move these platforms as a way to demonstrate to the United States its capability and resolve.” Over the past eight months, China has also conducted more robust military exercises to prepare for South China Sea contingencies. “But military readiness and preparedness are not the only reasons the PLA conducts exercises, notes Mastro. Instead, she argues that the PLA role has evolved beyond the operational to become a leader in a signaling strategy to bolster Chinese deterrence vis-à-vis the United States.

Chinese Discourse  

One of the strongest indicators that the Chinese military is attempting to leverage its role to signal capability to the United States is how the Chinese official media are capturing the ongoing competition. Having reviewed approximately 80 publications on the South China Sea, Mastro finds that the Chinese media are being used to amplify how capable the PLA has become in conducting complex operations in the South China Sea and to highlight that it is blameless for the current tensions in the region.

Mastro concludes that the PLA has taken a more active role in China’s South China Sea strategy, but not necessarily a more aggressive one. It is the need to enhance deterrence vis-à-vis the United States that has become a priority. “The PLA has become the main vehicle through which China is attempting to convince the United States to moderate its own South China Sea approach.” This sensitivity, and in some cases paranoia, about U.S. strategy, she claims, “suggests we are likely to hear tough talk and ostentatious military activity for some months to come.”

This analysis by Oriana Skylar Mastro originally appeared in The Interpreter, by the Lowy Institute.

China’s strategy in responding to concerns about its intentions in the South China Sea is to claim that none of the activities, statements or behaviours that concern other countries are actually happening.

China claims it has not militarised the South China Sea, but that the United States “is the real pusher of militarisation” in these waters. Its leaders often argue that China is a peace-loving country only interested in defending itself. As the China’s General Wei Fenghe stated at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, “China has never provoked a war or conflict, nor has it ever invaded another country or taken an inch of land from others. In the future, no matter how strong it becomes, China shall never threaten anyone.”

China has similarly brushed off concerns of other claimants, such as Vietnam, about its intensifying military exercises in the South China Sea and largely ignored Australia’s assertion at the United Nations that China’s claims have no legal backing.

So apparently it is all one big misunderstanding.

On 24 November, former Chinese ambassador Fu Ying criticised the United States in a New York Times op-ed for raising multiple issues that in her mind do not exist. Thus, the way to resolve the growing bilateral tensions is for the two countries “to have candid talks to better understand each other’s intentions and cultivate trust”.

So, in the Chinese communist spirit of 实事求是, or “seeking truth from facts”, I have charted the military capabilities China has deployed to the South China Sea, which are displayed with references on the map below. The Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands are under dispute; Hainan Island is a recognised part of China, but I include it because the military capabilities in situ have implications for Chinese military options in the South China Sea writ large.