A central focus for the research efforts of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center is an ongoing exploration of simultaneous trends toward regional integration and rising nationalism in Northeast Asia.
At a SPRIE seminar on September 20, Autodesk's Jack Gao and Array Networks' Michael Zhao spoke on the challenges of creating leaders in China's high tech firms.
Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Xueguang Zhou is the Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development, a professor of sociology, and a Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies senior fellow. His main area of research is on institutional changes in contemporary Chinese society, focusing on Chinese organizations and management, social inequality, and state-society relationships.
One of Zhou's current research projects is a study of the rise of the bureaucratic state in China. He works with students and colleagues to conduct participatory observations of government behaviors in the areas of environmental regulation enforcement, in policy implementation, in bureaucratic bargaining, and in incentive designs. He also studies patterns of career mobility and personnel flow among different government offices to understand intra-organizational relationships in the Chinese bureaucracy.
Another ongoing project is an ethnographic study of rural governance in China. Zhou adopts a microscopic approach to understand how peasants, village cadres, and local governments encounter and search for solutions to emerging problems and challenges in their everyday lives, and how institutions are created, reinforced, altered, and recombined in response to these problems. Research topics are related to the making of markets, village elections, and local government behaviors.
His recent publications examine the role of bureaucracy in public goods provision in rural China (Modern China, 2011); interactions among peasants, markets, and capital (China Quarterly, 2011); access to financial resources in Chinese enterprises (Chinese Sociological Review, 2011, with Lulu Li); multiple logics in village elections (Social Sciences in China, 2010, with Ai Yun); and collusion among local governments in policy implementation (Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 2011, with Ai Yun and Lian Hong; and Modern China, 2010).
Before joining Stanford in 2006, Zhou taught at Cornell University, Duke University, and Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He is a guest professor at Peking University, Tsinghua University, and the People's University of China. Zhou received his Ph.D. in sociology from Stanford University in 1991.
North Korea's announcement this week of plans to test a nuclear weapon is hardly surprising. The six-party talks to negotiate an end to its nuclear program are dead, and the North faces escalating financial and economic sanctions by the United States and its allies.
Experts have long debated the real motivations of the North in developing nuclear weapons. Some contend that the nuclear program, even the latest pronouncement, is simply a bargaining chip to gain security guarantees and economic aid. Others see a long determination to become a nuclear state.
The North Korean leaders may have begun the nuclear program as leverage. But the U.S. invasion of Iraq seems to have hardened their conviction that the only way to protect their nation and their regime is to join the nuclear club. The North Koreans want to become a Pakistan rather than an Iraq.
Still, officials in Pyongyang hesitated to cross the provocative line of visibly demonstrating their capability. Pressure is being mounted to get them to back down from their pledge. But for a variety of reasons, they apparently believe the timing for a test is now optimal.
First of all, they hope to blame the Bush administration for their decision. In the statement issued this week, the North Korean government argued that alleged American war plans justify a nuclear test, a position that reflects the views of the North Korean military.
Second, the North anticipates the test will be successful. Although a plutonium weapon is more complicated than a uranium bomb, it is quite likely that the North now has sufficient confidence in a Nagasaki-style primitive bomb. This success would be an object of pride for an otherwise failing state, and bolster its claim to the status of a world-class military power.
Third, the North Koreans see their potential enemies tied down and unable to respond effectively. The Bush administration is locked into a disastrous war in Iraq, and about to be weakened even more if the Republicans lose the upcoming midterm elections. In South Korea, the government of President Roh Moo Hyun is already a lame duck and politically paralyzed.
Fourth, Pyongyang may bet that China and South Korea, the two principal sources of trade and economic aid, would not join the United States and Japan in any real sanctions against the North. The July missile tests by North Korea provoked international uproar and led to a U.N. resolution. But the real impact has been minimal.
Finally, the North may calculate that testing will facilitate Japan's efforts to become a "normal'' nation with a broader military role in the region. That prospect could increase tensions in Northeast Asia, especially between Japan and China, and that, the North may believe, is not necessarily bad for it.
The United States, South Korea and China must act together to show that these calculations are misguided and that the North will pay a painful price if it goes ahead. Certainly this severely tests the troubled American alliance with South Korea and the emergent partnership with China. But Pyongyang's miscalculations also offer an opportunity to repair the strained alliance and create a new structure of security cooperation in Northeast Asia.
It is no secret that Seoul and Washington have been at odds over how to deal with North Korea. But the test announcement has already accelerated a shift in South Korean opinion. Rather than holding the United States responsible for the current impasse, most Koreans now see North Korea as the instigator of crisis.
South Korean officials understand that without reinforcing the alliance now, no policy toward the North can be effective. The United States and South Korea should urgently agree on common action plans -- including a shutdown of investment and economic assistance from the South to the North -- and make those consequences clear to Pyongyang.
The planned visits of newly installed Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Beijing and Seoul next week offer a similar opening to turn threat into opportunity. Abe intends to repair tattered ties to those Asian neighbors. Now the three Northeast Asian powers can demonstrate that a nuclear test will not lead to increased tensions but to the complete isolation of the North.
The danger of escalating actions that could lead, again, to war on the Korean peninsula is grave. The North Koreans should be assured that the door to a diplomatic solution remains open to them. But they must also understand that by profoundly misreading this moment, the North Korean leadership now stands completely alone in Northeast Asia.
Reprinted by permission.
The supermarket revolution has arrived in China and is spreading as fast as or faster than anywhere in the world. As the demand for vegetables, fruit, nuts and other high valued products has risen, urban retailers are handling increasingly more of these high value commodities. The experience of many developing countries suggests that there could be serious distributional impacts of the emergence of supermarkets. And, in China, as elsewhere in the world, there is concern among policy makers and academics that poor, small farmers might be excluded from the market for horticulture commodities.
The main goal of our paper is to understand what types of farmers have been able to participate in the horticultural revolution, how they interact with markets and how supply chains affect their production decisions and incomes. We also want to understand if (and if so, then how) the rise of supermarkets have changed supply chains. Our analysis uses spatially sampled data from 200 communities and 500 households in the Greater Beijing area and supplemented by data collected in Shandong Province, China's fruit and vegetable basket. In contrast to fears of some researchers, we find small and poor farmers have actively participate in the emergence of China's horticulture economy. Moreover, there has been almost no penetration of modern wholesalers or retailers into rural communities. We also conducted surveys and interviews in wholesale markets and with procurement agents in Beijing supermarket chains and document the fact that supply chain shifts have only affected the downstream segments of food markets and China's wholesale markets (midstream in the food supply chain) are only being affected marginally.
The purpose of this paper is to present estimations of indicators of direct and indirect interventions of China's government in agriculture. In order to put these indicators in context, the paper reviews China's experience with policy reforms since the 1950s and the measures the effects of these reforms on the agriculture sector. Unfortunately, due to data constraints, we can only produce quantitative measures of distortions since the early 1980s, that is for the past 25 years. Due to the nature of China's agricultural experience over the last six decades, this review emphasizes the sectoral and macroeconomic policies and elements of the institutional framework that have influenced the incentive framework facing the sector and factor markets. The tradeand price/marketing-policy-related changes in incentives for different products are reflected in estimated rates of government assistance (Nominal Rates of Assistance, NRAs, Direct Rates of Assistances, DRAs and consumer subsidies).
China has been one of the leaders in agricultural biotechnology research and the adoption of transgenic plants. Despite this, critics argue that Chinese biotechnology policies could be improved to provide more benefits to farmers and more incentives to companies for greater research. The objective of the paper is to examine if policy changes could improve the welfare of producers and consumers and others in the cotton industry. The paper first reviews recent changes in laws and policies that affect China's plant biotechnology sector, IPR legislation, changes in bio-safety regulation and seed industry reforms. Next, using a primary data set collected from more than 1700 plots from a sample of farmers in northern China in 1999, 2000 and 2001, we econometrically estimate the effect of changes to intellectual property rights (IPR), bio-safety regulation and seed industry reform on farmer pesticide use and yields. The results are used as the basis of a simulation exercise designed to measure the size and distribution of the benefits (and costs) of reform. We find that improvements to the IPR environment, enhanced enforcement of China's bio-safety management regulation and greater commercialization of the seed industry positively affect the benefit of producers, consumers and technology providers.
Between 1979 and 1992, the Journal of Korean Studies became a leading academic forum for the publication of innovative in-depth research on Korea. Now under the editorial guidance of Gi-Wook Shin and John Duncan, this journal continues to be dedicated to quality articles, in all disciplines, on a broad range of topics concerning Korea, both historical and contemporary.
This edition's contents:
In Memoriam: James B. Palais
Special Section: Globalization and Korean Society
Articles
Book Reviews
This is a Special Seminar within the CDDRL Taiwan Democracy Program (co-sponsored with Shorenstein APARC).
Tang Fei was the first premier of Republic of China on Taiwan under the current Chen Shui-bian Government in 2000. Before he was appointed premier, Tang served as minister of national defense (1999-2000), chairman (1998) and vice chairman (1995-98) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commander-in-chief of the Air Force. He also served overseas as a deputy military attaché to the United States (1972-75) and as chief military attaché to South Africa (1979-82).
Premier Tang was a visiting scholar with the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in 2002.
In this special seminar, Premier Tang will address the internal conflicts and external challenges that Taiwan has faced since power transition in 2000.
Philippines Conference Room
