Despite all of
the rhetoric, it is clear from the numbers that China's ascendency has not been
at the expense of the United States.
-Thomas Fingar
China unquestionably
occupies a significant place in the world's U.S.-led economic and political
system. Will it continue to participate in the system that it has benefited
from and contributed to, adapting its policies and practices in order to do so?
Or, will it attempt to overturn the current system at some point in an effort
to gain global dominance? Thomas Fingar, the Oksenberg/Rohlen Distinguished
Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International
Studies, will address these core questions in a new research project, arguing
that the situation is neither so polarized, nor so simplistic. Former chairman
of the National Intelligence Council, Fingar takes an empirical approach to his
research, examining whether there have been recurring patterns to China's
involvement in the global order; what drives, shapes, and constrains Chinese
initiatives; and how others have responded to Chinese actions.
Fingar asserts that there have been patterns to China's participation in
international economics and politics over the past 30 years, including a
pendular quality to the U.S.-China relationship. According to him, relations
between the two countries were largely instrumental during the Cold War era
when the United States was at odds with the Soviet Union and China was
undergoing a period of self strengthening. U.S.-China relations cooled
following the Tiananmen Square incident, the timing of which coincided roughly
with the fall of the Soviet Union. Trust between the two countries deteriorated
as China displayed its more authoritarian side, and the United States responded
with sanctions that did not significantly impede China's economic growth, but
did change the relationship in ways that still shape perceptions of one
another.
Economics are now the primary focal point of discussions about U.S.-China
relations, with a negative light frequently cast on China. "Despite all of
the rhetoric, it is clear from the numbers that China's ascendency has not been
at the expense of the United States," states Fingar. Trade with China, in
fact, creates jobs in the United States, but trade-related jobs are dispersed
and therefore not clearly visible. "They are not concentrated in a place where
a factory closed, often for reasons that that have nothing to do with China,"
says Fingar, "but the pain and the political impact is local. I would
predict that when our economy turns around, the pendulum will swing further
back in a less-worried, less-critical direction."
While China has a legal system and has adopted many international standards,
Fingar asserts that "it is still not a society governed by law," and
that it in fact does not always measure up to global or even to its own
standards. He cites China's record of undesirable practices and issues, such as
currency manipulation, government corruption, and intellectual property
violation, which complicate and confuse understanding of its involvement in the
global system.
Fingar does not believe that the U.S.-China relationship will ever return to
the "honeymoon" era of the Cold War, but he says, "The swings of the
pendulum and the perturbations in the relationship are less intense and of
shorter duration; that is the pattern." Quoting Anne-Marie Slaughter, director
of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State, Fingar suggests that the
best vision for the global order is "a world in which there are more
partnerships and fewer alliances." He cautions against disregarding important,
long-time alliances, such as the U.S.-Korea relationship. He notes, however,
the crucial fact that alliances assume that there is an adversary, which can
marginalize and threaten regional neighbors, such as China, or put allies in
the uncomfortable position of having to choose between siding with a neighbor
or a distant ally. "We must find a way so that no one has to choose," says
Fingar.
On January 6, Fingar outlined the primary points of his new research
project at a public lecture co-sponsored by the Stanford China Program and the
Center for East Asian Studies, part of the China
in the World series. He will also lead Stanford students through an
examination of related key issues and questions in "China on the World
Stage" (IPS 246), a course
that he is teaching during the current winter quarter.
