While Shanghai and Hong
Kong are often viewed as the financial centers of China, Beijing, the capital,
is in reality where all financial decisions are made-decisions that affect the
country's banking system and overall financial structure, which has
implications on a global level. Carl Walter, a managing director of JPMorgan
China, spoke at a Stanford China Program seminar on November 1 about the
frequent changes in China's banking system since 1949 and the cost of these
reforms within and outside of China.
China's banking system is currently controlled by the Ministry of Finance
(MOF), which has competed at several points with the People's Bank of China
(PBOC) for influence within the state bureacracy. During the Cultural
Revolution period, MOF first moved to the fore of China's banking system,
merging together the until-then separate PBOC and Bank of China (BOC) and
eliminating all other banks. With China's "Open Door" economic reforms of 1978,
the banks were again separated, with PBOC having oversight for three commercial
banks and MOF for two, including BOC. In 1994, authority for all commercial
banks, such as BOC and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), moved to PBOC and
MOF took control of three newly established policy banks, such as China
Development Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank. Premier Zhu Rongji
drove these and all other banking reforms until 2003.
Major bank restructuring has taken place since 1998, the big four banks were
re-capitalized, problem loans spun off into four "bad" banks and the
international accounting system adopted in preparation for international share
offering on both domestic and international markets. All four banks
successfully raised capital internationally and domestically over the past five
years. Two large sovereign wealth fund-like entities came into being-Huijin,
controlled by PBOC, and China Investment Corporation (CIC), operated under MOF-
that were used to hold the Chinese state ownership of these banks. The year that it was established in
2007, CIC acquired Huijin and MOF thereby indirectly gained control of all of
the banks under PBOC.
The greatly increased
level of bank capital achieved through restructuring and recapitalization was
eroded, however, due to the enormous growth of loans in 2009 so that China now
is faced with raising virtually the same amount of capital again, stated Walter.
Everyone is paying the price, including international and domestic equity
investors, who are being diluted, and China's own government, which to avoid
dilution, must buy new shares at high market prices. The values of these shares,
moreover, may be inflated due to the techniques used earlier to remove bad
loans from their balance sheets. This has left banks exposed to these now
worthless portfolios. To that extent, international accounting firms and market
regulators put their reputations on the line when they support capital raising
by the banks internationally. In short, the politics and economics of China's
bank reforms and the struggles to control the banks have been
internationalized.
Walter suggested that
China is trapped with a banking system that is suited to the country's political
system, but not to its economy. His forthcoming book, Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundations of China's
Extraordinary Rise, co-authored with Fraser J.T. Howie, examines this issue
and the recent history of China's financial system in depth.