This commentary originally appeared in The New York Times.

For a half-century, America has avoided war with China over Taiwan largely through a delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance.

That equilibrium has been upset. China is building up and flexing its military power; hostile rhetoric emanates from both Beijing and Washington. War seems likelier each day.

It’s not too late to restore the kind of balance that helped to keep the peace for decades, but it will require taking steps to ease China’s concerns. This will be difficult because of Chinese intransigence and the overheated atmosphere prevailing in Washington. But it is worth the political risk if it prevents war.

Deterrence came in the form of the implied use of U.S. military force to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Reassurance was provided by the understanding that the United States would not intrude on decisions regarding Taiwan’s eventual political status.

The United States and its regional allies must continue to create a robust military deterrence. But U.S. leaders and politicians also need to keep in mind the power of reassurance, try to understand China’s deep sensitivities about Taiwan and should recommit — clearly and unequivocally — to the idea that only China and Taiwan can work out their political differences, a stance that remains official U.S. policy.

During the Cold War, Beijing and Washington signed a series of communiqués related to Taiwan. One of them said the United States “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” This and other wording was deliberately ambiguous, but it was accepted by all sides as a commitment to avoid rocking the boat. China still views this arrangement as binding.

To be clear, it was China that began rocking the boat first.

Since 2016, when Tsai Ing-wen of the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party was elected president of Taiwan (succeeding a more China-friendly administration), Xi Jinping has repeatedly brandished China’s military power with large-scale military exercises and other pressure tactics apparently meant to discourage independence sentiment on Taiwan.

U.S. political figures have rightly responded with rhetorical support for democratic Taiwan, by supplying it with weapons and by strengthening the U.S. military presence in the region. But the American reaction is also pouring fuel on the fire.

I have worked on U.S. defense strategy in various military roles for more than a decade. I recently traveled to Beijing, where I met with Chinese government and military officials, leading academics and experts from Communist Party-affiliated think tanks. During these talks it was clear that Beijing is far less concerned with U.S. efforts to enhance its military posture in the region — the deterrence side of the equation — than with the political rhetoric, which is seen in China as proof that the United States is moving away from past ambiguity and toward supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence.

They have plenty of evidence to point to.

In December 2016, Donald Trump became the first U.S. president or president-elect since the normalization of China-U.S. relations in 1979 to speak directly with a Taiwanese leader, when Ms. Tsai called to congratulate him on his election victory. President Biden has, on four occasions, contradicted the U.S. policy of ambiguity by saying we would support Taiwan militarily if China attacked. The number of U.S. Congress members visiting Taiwan — which China views as overt support for the island’s independence — reached a decade high last year, including an August 2022 trip by Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the House at the time and the highest-ranking U.S. official travel to Taiwan since the 1990s. That has continued this year: In June a nine-member congressional delegation, the largest in years, arrived in Taipei.

Provocative legislation has not helped. Last year the Taiwan Policy Act, which articulated support for Taiwan’s role in international organizations, was introduced in the Senate, and in July of this year the House passed a similar act. House Republicans introduced a motion in January to recognize Taiwan as an independent country.

Actions like these put great pressure on Mr. Xi, who won’t tolerate going down in history as the Chinese leader to have lost Taiwan. That would be seen in Beijing as an existential threat, potentially fueling separatist sentiment in restive regions like Tibet and Xinjiang.

For now, lingering doubts over Chinese military capabilities and the specter of U.S. and allied retaliation are enough to restrain Mr. Xi. But if he concludes that the United States has broken, once and for all, from its previous position on Taiwan and is bent on thwarting unification, he may feel that he must act militarily. The United States might be able to build the necessary military power in the region to deter a Chinese war of choice. But the level of dominance needed to stop Mr. Xi from launching a war he sees as necessary might be impossible to achieve.

Reassuring China would require Mr. Biden to reiterate that the United States does not support Taiwanese independence or oppose the island’s peaceful unification with China and that, ultimately, Taiwan’s fate is up to Taipei and Beijing. It would mean moving away from attempts to create international space for Taiwan and chastising Beijing when it pulls away Taipei’s diplomatic partners. The White House would also need to use what leverage it has to discourage members of Congress from visiting Taiwan and threaten to veto provocative legislation.

There would doubtless be blowback in Washington and Taipei, and Mr. Xi may already have made up his mind to seize Taiwan, regardless of the U.S. stance. But a politically neutral position on Taiwan is what the United States has followed for decades. Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama and George H.W. and George W. Bush advocated peaceful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing to resolve their differences.

There also are longer-term repercussions to consider: If the combination of deterrence and reassurance fails and China attacks Taiwan, it will set a precedent in which Chinese leaders kill and destroy to achieve their goals. But if a pathway remains for China to eventually convince Taiwan’s people — through inducements or pressure — that it is in their interest to peacefully unify, then that may be a China that we can live with.

In the best-case scenario, the United States and China would reach a high-level agreement, a new communiqué, in which Washington reiterates its longstanding political neutrality and China commits to dialing back its military threats. This would avert war while giving China political space to work toward peaceful unification. That might mean using its clout to isolate Taiwan and eventually convince the island’s people that it should strike a deal with Beijing. But it isn’t Washington’s place to prevent the unification of the two sides — only to ensure that doesn’t happen through military force or coercion.

A war between the United States and China over Taiwan could be the most brutal since World War II. As politically difficult as it may be, U.S. leaders have a duty to try to prevent conflict, and that means speaking more softly but carrying a big stick.

Amidst evolving geopolitical shifts, the foundation of U.S. nuclear deterrence, forged in the crucible of the Cold War, faces a new set of challenges. The principle of mutually assured destruction (MAD), once the bedrock of deterrence, is now being tested by Russia's aggressive posturing and China's strategic advancements. In the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and signals of a willingness to employ tactical nuclear weapons, questions arise about the efficacy of traditional deterrence strategies. Concurrently, China's expanding nuclear arsenal adds complexity to the equation. Do these developments mean America needs to rethink its deterrence strategy? 

In a new paper, “China’s Nuclear Enterprise: Trends, Developments, and Implications for the United States and Its Allies,” FSI Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro focuses on the Chinese perspective of the equation and examines recent trends in Chinese military doctrine and their implications for U.S. deterrence strategy. Mastro’s contribution is part of a new report, Project Atom 2023: A Competitive Strategies Approach for U.S. Nuclear Posture through 2035, produced by the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues.

A fundamental premise underlying Mastro’s analysis is that China merits distinct scrutiny differently from Russia, and that the two countries should not be considered  “nuclear peers.” Although China is indeed engaging in nuclear force modernization, Mastro contends that the nation is still adhering to its fundamental nuclear policy: minimal retaliation capability and a no-use-first pledge.

While some have been troubled by China’s turn to regional nuclear options like the DF-26, an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads, Mastro asserts that this is because “they are regional weapons lower on the escalation ladder.” Rather than trying to achieve parity with the United States, she contends that Beijing’s objective is to preserve a credible second-strike capability, which is essential to the concept of deterrence.

Instead of prescribing specific alterations to U.S. force posture or nuclear modernization, Mastro suggests that any changes in U.S. defense strategies carefully consider the impact on Chinese nuclear strategy. The key is to preserve China’s minimal retaliation capability and its pledge to refrain from initiating nuclear warfare: “the most important goal for U.S. deterrence policy should be to ensure it does not encourage a change in China’s nuclear policy and in posture.”

Other steps the United States should take, according to Castro, include preventing the “co-mingling” of nuclear and conventional weapons on vessels apart from ballistic missile submarines. This precaution aims to eliminate ambiguity and mitigate the risk of possible conflict escalation. She also believes that there may be “more costs than benefits” in the proliferation of nuclear weapons among Asian allies — South Korea, Japan, and Australia. These threaten the non-proliferation regime and increase the possibility of accidents. The answer, Mastro holds, is not deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on foreign soil, but rather increased consultations and joint planning with allies. Such collaborative efforts could reassure allies and partners of U.S. intentions even as they have minimal impact on Chinese contingency planning. 
 

This commentary first appeared as part of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Interpret:China series. 

Tensions at the Taiwan Strait are at an all-time high. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit marked the highest level of exchange between U.S. and Taiwanese officials since 1997. China used the visit as a pretext to conduct large-scale military exercises encircling the island, coupled with rhetoric about how it could successfully use force to unify if it decided to do so.

The dynamics between China and the United States over Taiwan are eerily like those laid out in Zuo Xiying’s balanced, informative article. Zuo accurately captures the U.S. deterrence strategy toward Russia before its invasion of Ukraine—highlighting key components such as threatening economic sanctions and international isolation, as well as providing training and equipment to Ukraine to enhance its ability to defend itself. But deterrence failed, the reasons (according to Zuo) being that the United States did not do more to reassure Russia of its peaceful intentions and that ultimately costs are difficult to calculate ahead of time. Once war broke out, as Zuo also points out, the United States escalated its involvement by providing military aid to Ukraine, which increased the costs of the war to Russia.

What does all this mean for U.S. deterrence strategy with respect to Taiwan? Zuo recognizes that “for China, the Russia-Ukraine conflict acts as a mirror. . . . China needs to not only study in depth how the United States deters and how it punishes Russia, but also to carefully analyze how Russia perceives the United States’ threats and to derive experience and lessons from therein.” But he leaves the reader wondering what those lessons are. He hints in his discussion on Ukraine that a U.S. strategy to build up Taiwan’s defenses is unlikely to deter China; however, he also indirectly suggests that China may be underestimating the costs of war. Successful deterrence, Zuo notes, “requires not only that the United States itself has powerful forces and strong resolve but that it can make the other side accurately feel the threat and have an accurate calculation of the costs and benefits. But the real world is complicated, and it is difficult to have both conditions present at once.” In other words, he thinks there is an intermediate step needed in a deterrence strategy. The United States has to not only issue a credible threat, but also make the other side accurately assess the costs and benefits of certain actions.

Zuo does not seem optimistic. He implies the United States needs to increase efforts to paint a more specific picture of what it would do if war broke out—but that, even if it did, the message still might not get through. The reader is left with an acute understanding that if there is war over Taiwan, failures in both Beijing and Washington will be to blame.

This commentary originally appeared in Nikkei Asia.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is due to hold its first joint naval exercise as a bloc next month.

This will be an important milestone at a time the group is facing daunting challenges to its interests and its diplomatic centrality in the Asia-Pacific region, including intensifying U.S.-China rivalry; an ongoing crisis in Myanmar that has divided ASEAN and left it looking feeble; the proliferation of alternative forums including AUKUS and the Quad; talk of a NATO office in Japan; and, of course, China's continued assertiveness in the South China Sea.

The upcoming drill, though, could have been a bolder, more assertive statement.

Indonesia, as ASEAN chair, initially proposed holding the exercise within the South China Sea. Unfortunately, due to Cambodian opposition, the exercise has been shifted to an area outside of China's expansive South China Sea claim. The Cambodians are said to have argued that the initial location of the drill, in the North Natuna Sea, would have unnecessarily upset China.

The decision to shift the exercise is a minor blow to ASEAN ambitions to bolster security cooperation but should not deter Indonesia and other member nations from making another run at a collective Southeast Asian naval drill in waters that fall within China's infamous "nine-dash line."

Such a drill would not only make sense from a policy and international law perspective but arguably reinforce one of the original intentions behind the founding of ASEAN in 1967, and address its current need to reaffirm the bloc's centrality.

ASEAN was established as a bulwark against communist expansionism and also to manage conflict and mistrust among neighboring Southeast Asian nations. The intention was to discourage great-power intervention and interference in the region.

The past 10 to 15 years, however, have seen significant intervention in the South China Sea, most notably by China, which continues to assert its expansive claim vigorously despite a ruling by a U.N.-backed tribunal that its nine-dash line claim has no basis in international law.

China's aggressiveness has prompted the U.S. and others to increase naval activity in the region to assert the right of navigation through what they maintain is an international waterway. Many ASEAN nations have complained about or felt uncomfortable with these activities, particularly those of China, but the bloc has struggled to back up its position with tangible action.

That is the beauty of an ASEAN naval exercise in the South China Sea. Properly designed and implemented, it would assert ASEAN centrality on a critical issue and put China on the back foot, without bringing in great power competition.

China would probably protest, but it is hard to imagine Beijing retaliating against a substantial group of Southeast Asian nations -- countries it is actively wooing -- acting together. The U.S. probably would welcome ASEAN's action, which would advance the cause of treating the area as international waters without its own involvement.

To be successful, the exercise would need to include only ASEAN members, as any outside participation would undermine the whole point. As Indonesia originally proposed, it should also be run as a humanitarian relief exercise rather than anything more overtly "military."

Such an exercise would not resolve South China Sea territorial claims nor prevent China from continuing to assert its claims. Nor would it end the bloc's divisions over Myanmar or other matters. It would, however, boost ASEAN's diminished credibility, while pushing back on unjustified Chinese claims in a manner that Beijing would not easily be able to counter or blame on the U.S.

If the initial exercise were carried off successfully, it could lead to regular drills, potentially reducing the perceived need in Washington and other capitals to assert freedom of navigation rights in the South China Sea themselves. In that sense, it could reduce great-power tension and "interference" in the region.

The big question, of course, is how Indonesia and other proponents can overcome the objections of Cambodia, and possibly other member states.

Perhaps further discussions within the bloc could produce a plan that all members could accept. In the more likely case that divisions persist, then Indonesia, as ASEAN chair, could organize a naval exercise open to any bloc member willing to participate.

This presumably would include Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and ideally Thailand, at least.

Such a "minilateral" approach would be unusual but feasible, particularly if no external powers are involved. After all, Thailand recently broke with established ASEAN consensus to host a minilateral meeting on Myanmar that upset some of its fellow member states.

If need be, countries participating in a South China Sea drill could call it an "informal" ASEAN exercise to get around the lack of consensus. If the six mentioned countries all participated, it would still send a strong signal that ASEAN can, formally or informally, still act on critical issues.

ASEAN has a chance to take a significant step that would be in line with its original purpose and that would do much to bolster its standing, and possibly even reduce great power tension in the South China Sea. Indonesia and other like-minded ASEAN members should seize the chance and make it happen, especially since Indonesia is due to pass on the role of bloc chair to Laos, whose government is particularly susceptible to Chinese influence, later this year.

As the AI boom fuels an unprecedented surge in demand for chips and computing power, the global semiconductor supply chain has become critical in everything from smartphones and medical devices to cars and fighter jets. At the heart of this industry stands Taiwan, a leader in chip-making infrastructure, encompassing fabrication to cutting-edge research and development. With the People's Republic of China’s threat to Taiwan’s prosperity and stability becoming more acute, it is time for the United States and Taiwan to deepen their partnership in the semiconductor industry, argue Hoover Institution Research Fellow Kharis Templeman and FSI Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro.

In a chapter that is part of a new report, titled “The Silicon Triangle: The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Supply,” Templeman and Mastro show what the United States might learn from Taiwan’s successful experience in building a leading global role in the semiconductor supply chain and offer concrete opportunities for deeper collaboration given the two nations’ shared interests in chips.  The report is a product of the Working Group on Semiconductors and the Security of the United States and Taiwan, a joint project of the Hoover Institution and the Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations.

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Templeman and Mastro’s chapter, “Deepening US-Taiwan Cooperation through Semiconductors,” outlines the history of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry, accounts for its meteoric rise to prominence, and proposes that the United States and Taiwan should seek to use the semiconductor industry to “promote Taiwan’s prosperity and stability by creating an environment that fosters deeper business-to-business, research, academic, individual, and civil ties with Taiwan and other global partners in the semiconductor arena.”

To do so, the authors argue, the United States should actively promote Taiwan semiconductor firm activities, including manufacturing, design, and joint research and development in the United States; income tax abatement for cross-border workers; two-way semiconductor internship programs and academic exchange; semiconductor supply chain information sharing and resiliency planning; and defense industry co-production in Taiwan.

Deterring Invasion

According to Templeman and Mastro, further investment in Taiwan’s semiconductor industry would strengthen long-term U.S. interests there and represent an opportunity for the two nations to broaden their shared civil and business ties that will help to “deepen U.S. commitments to Taiwan’s democracy—and [deter] efforts to end it.”

The authors consider the PRC’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric of reunification and suggest that “leaders in the United States and Taiwan should be realistic about the real threat that the island faces, and their response to that should be to build the capabilities and the confidence of their people to weather coercion and deter attack.” As such, semiconductors represent a natural opportunity for the two nations to “grow substantive people-to-people, business, and even appropriate government ties at the working level […] we can use this momentum to break through long-standing bureaucratic frictions and improve interoperability in our economic and security relationships.”

The PRC threat to Taiwan’s autonomy will continue to grow as the island is increasingly isolated from the broader international community, the authors write. Reversing this trend, they say, “requires both symbolic and substantive assistance on the part of the United States and other countries.”

Deepening collaboration in the semiconductor industry represents a path for the United States to demonstrate its commitment to Taiwan, independent of the rhetorical debate over strategic clarity or ambiguity. The momentum gained through this collaboration would aid Taiwan’s resilience and incentivize other governments and opinion leaders in the region to deepen their commitments to the island, further enhancing cross-strait deterrence.

The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is delighted to share that Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro has been named an Air Force Individual Reservist of the Year 2022 in recognition of her outstanding scholarship and defense analysis in the Field Grade Officer (FGO) category. Mastro, whose career combines academic research and military service, is also a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she works as a strategic planner at INDOPACOM.

Awarded by the Air Force Headquarters Readiness and Integration Organization (HQ RIO), the nomination recognizes Mastro’s exemplary performance and contributions to operational imperatives across the Department of Air Force by applying her globally recognized expertise as a China scholar and foreign defense analyst to bolster US national defense. Her analysis and advocacy impacted operational changes, updated national strategic policy relevant to the Indo-Pacific region, and increased strategic and combat readiness at the Wing, Major Command, Combatant Command, Service, and Department of Defense levels.

HQ RIO notes that “Mastro also led the national discussion on the U.S.-China relationship by publishing six peer-reviewed articles and book chapters; 14 commentaries in publications like The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal; recorded 40 radio spots and podcasts; conducted nearly 40 government, academic, and private sector speaking engagements and was quoted in more than 40 news pieces.”

Mastro has received numerous awards for her military service and contributions to U.S. strategy in Asia, including the 2020 and 2018 Meritorious Service Medal, the 2017 Air Force recognition Ribbon, and the 2016 Individual Reservist of the Year Award.

Her current research projects focus on the U.S.-China great power competition, deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, China’s maritime ambitions, and the China-Russia military relationship. She holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University.