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The U.S. financial crisis has spread around the globe. Financial globalization means that most countries and regions are not immune to the contagious effects of a financial crisis that originates in one country.

East Asian countries had already experienced the contagious effects of a financial crisis in 1997. That year, a financial crisis that broke out in Thailand and Indonesia reached Malaysia and then South Korea. Each of these countries reacted differently to the crisis. South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand accepted International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities that required neoliberal economic restructuring in return for emergency loans, while Malaysia rejected the IMF offer and instead encouraged the inflow of speculative financial capital, while reforming the banking and financial system. In the aftermath of the East Asian financial crisis, regional economic, financial and security cooperation were discussed among East Asian countries. These efforts resulted in the Chiang Mai Initiative, the Bond Initiative, the East Asian Summit, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Six Party Talks.

Thus, regionalism in East Asia was revived in response to external shocks, such as global financial volatility, endogenous opportunities such as East Asian market compatibility (Pempel, 2008), endogenous security threats such as the North Korean nuclear development, and exogenous opportunities such as "bringing in the U.S." (Pempel, 2008).

Nonetheless, East Asian regionalism is still at a low level of institutionalization compared to Europe. East Asian regionalism is still basically "bottom-up, corporate (market)-driven regionalism" (Pempel, 2005). 

I will discuss the obstacles and the opportunities that Northeast Asian countries are facing since the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization.

Hyug Baeg Im is Professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea. He is Dean at the Graduate School of Policy Studies and Director at Institute for Peace Studies. He received B.A. in political science from Seoul National University, M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. He was visiting professor at Georgetown University (1995-1996), Duke University (1997), Stanford University (2002-2003) and visiting fellow at International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington DC (1995-1996). He served as a presidential adviser of both Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun presidency. His current research focuses on the impact of IT revolution and globalization on Korean democracy. His publications include “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea,” World Politics, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1987), “South Korean Democratic Consolidation in Comparative Perspective” in Consolidating Democracy in South Korea (Lynne Rienner, 2000) and “’Crony Capitalism’ in South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan: Myth and Reality,” (co-authored with Kim, Byung Kook) Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2001), “Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Democracy at the End of Three Kims Era” Democratization, Vol. 11, No. 5(2004), “Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea” in Tun-jen Cheng and Deborah A. Brown (eds.), Religious Organizations and Democratization: Comparative Case Studies in Contemporary Asia (M.E. Sharpe, 2006) and “The US Role in Korean Democracy and Security since Cold War Era,” International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 6, No.2 (2006).

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HYUG BAEG IM Department of Political Science and International Relations Speaker Korea University
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In Southeast Asia, and particularly for for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), security has long trumped democracy as a priority. But the brutal dictatorship in Burma/Myanmar, political pluralism in Indonesia, and the global growth of democratic norms have led some Southeast Asians to question ASEAN’s habit of turning a blind eye to domestic abuses by member states. The concept of regional security, meanwhile, is being reoriented from military threats toward new dangers to health and the environment, and from state security toward human security.

Will promoting democracy cause local autocrats to hunker down, and split ASEAN into hostile camps? Will ignoring demands for democracy allow domestic pressures to rise to dangerous levels? Should Burma/Myanmar be expelled or engaged? How should ASEAN respond to nontraditional threats to security in which member states are themselves implicated? In Hard Choices, expert authors—including a foreword by Surin Pitsuwan, the current secretary-general of ASEAN—grapple with these and other key and controversial questions for Southeast Asia today—and tomorrow.

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HardChoices final front cover
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Marcus Mietzner is currently Lecturer in Indonesian Studies at the Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University. Between 1998 and 2008, he lived, worked and researched in Indonesia. He has published extensively on Indonesian politics, among others in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Southeast Asian Research and Contemporary Southeast Asia. His most recent book is Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation, published by ISEAS in Singapore in December 2008.

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Marcus Mietzner Lecturer in Indonesian Studies and Faculty of Asian Studies Speaker Australian National University
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Yoshiki Kaneko is a professor at Dokkyo University in Saitama, Japan.  SEAF hosted him as a visiting scholar at Stanford for part of 2007 to continue or complete the research and writing of several Japanese-language manuscripts on Southeast Asia that are now in print or awaiting publication.  They include three chapters  in edited volumes: two forthcoming in 2009, "Ethnicity and Politics in Malaysia and Singapore," in Beyond Ethnic Politics in South and Southeast Asia (Keiso Shobo), and "The Collapse of Judicial Independence under the Mahathir Administration in Malaysia," in Rethinking Southeast Asia Politics (Keio University Press); and one published in 2007, "The Function of the Judiciary in the Democratization Process in Southeast Asia," in New Political and Economic Order in Southeast Asia: Changes and Challenges aft the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997 (Daito-Bunka University, 2007).

Kaneko Yoshiki is a professor at Dokkyo University in Saitama, Japan.  SEAF hosted him as a visiting scholar at Stanford for part of 2007 to continue or complete the research and writing of several Japanese-language manuscripts on Southeast Asia that are now in print or awaiting publication.  They include three chapters  in edited volumes: two forthcoming in 2009, "Ethnicity and Politics in Malaysia and Singapore," in Beyond Ethnic Politics in South and Southeast Asia (Keiso Shobo), and "The Collapse of Judicial Independence under the Mahathir Administration in Malaysia," in Rethinking Southeast Asia Politics (Keio University Press); and one published in 2007, "The Function of the Judiciary in the Democratization Process in Southeast Asia," in New Political and Economic Order in Southeast Asia: Changes and Challenges aft the Asian Currency Crisis in 1997 (Daito-Bunka University, 2007).

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Unintended Consequences of Repression: Alliance Formation
in South Korea’s Democracy Movement (1970-1979)

Paul Y. Chang, Singapore Management University

Research regarding the impact of repression on social movements
has yielded conflicting findings; some argue that repression
decreases the total quantity of protest events while others argue
that it motivates protest. To move beyond this impasse, various
scholars have suggested exploring how repression influences
the quality of social movements. This study assesses the
impact repression had on the formation of alliances between
different social groups participating in South Korea’s democracy
movement. Results from negative binomial regression analyses
show that repression facilitated the formation of alliances
between movement actors at a time when the overall number of
protest events decreased. This study contributes to the literature
on coercion and mobilization by pointing to the possibility of
movement development during low levels of a protest cycle.

Recent studies of social movements have identified repression as one important aspect of the larger political opportunity structure that significantly shapes movement trajectories (Davenport, Johnston and Mueller 2005; Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005; Earl 2003, 2006; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; della Porta 1996). Empirical findings from past studies have revealed a "paradox" regarding the impact of repression on social movements (Brockett 2005, 1995). While some argue that repression reduces movement vitality (Olzak, Beasley and Olivier 2003) because of the added costs associated with repression (Tilly 1978), others argue that repression increases the rate of protest and collective action (White 1989; Khawaja 1993, 1994). In reviews of this literature researchers have puzzled over the fact that, "Both threats and opportunities can mobilize activism… For some challengers, increased political openness enhances the prospects for mobilization, while other movements seem to respond more to threat than opportunity." (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996:1645,1634; see also Earl 2006; Lichbach 1987).


Research and writing for this study was funded in part by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University. For comments on previous drafts, I thank Gi-Wook Shin, Susan Olzak, Doug McAdam, David S. Meyer, John Meyer, Jeong-Woo Koo, Myung-Koo Kang, Ehito Kimura, Yong Suk Jang, members of Stanford University’s Workshop on Social Movements and Collective Action and anonymous reviewers for Social Forces.

Direct correspondence to Paul Y. Chang, School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Level 4, Singapore 178903. E-mail: paulchang@smu.edu.sg.
© The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces 87(2), December 2008


For full text of the article, please visit http://socialforces.unc.edu/epub/folder.2007-02-09.8541500563/copy_of_december08

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Fall 2007 SEAF visiting scholar Joseph Liow's study of Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia has been published by Oxford University Press. Liow is an associate professor in the Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. He worked on completing the manuscript at Stanford. SEAF director Don Emmerson blurbed the book as "broad in coverage yet rich in detail, cautionary without being alarmist, [and] a cogent antidote to wishful thinking about religion, society, and the state, not only in Malaysia but in the wider Muslim world as well."
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This conference, sponsored by the Asia Health Policy Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and the Global Aging Program of Stanford Center on Longevity, explored the impact of rapid aging on economic growth, labor markets, social insurance financing, long term care, and health care in China, Japan, and Korea.

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Former Shorenstein APARC Fellow
Michael_Armacost.jpg PhD

Michael Armacost (April 15, 1937 – March 8, 2025) was a Shorenstein APARC Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) from 2002 through 2021. In the interval between 1995 and 2002, Armacost served as president of Washington, D.C.'s Brookings Institution, the nation's oldest think tank and a leader in research on politics, government, international affairs, economics, and public policy. Previously, during his twenty-four-year government career, Armacost served, among other positions, as undersecretary of state for political affairs and as ambassador to Japan and the Philippines.

Armacost began his career in academia, as a professor of government at Pomona College. In 1969, he was awarded a White House Fellowship and was assigned to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State. Following a stint on the State Department's policy planning and coordination staff, he became a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo from 1972 to 74, his first foreign diplomatic post. Thereafter, he held senior Asian affairs and international security posts in the State Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security Council. From 1982 to 1984, he served as U.S. ambassador to the Philippines and was a key force in helping the country undergo a nonviolent transition to democracy. In 1989, President George Bush tapped him to become ambassador to Japan, considered one of the most important and sensitive U.S. diplomatic posts abroad.

Armacost authored four books, including, Friends or Rivals? The Insider's Account of U.S.–Japan Relations (1996), which draws on his tenure as ambassador, and Ballots, Bullets, and Bargains: American Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections (2015). He also co-edited, with Daniel Okimoto, the Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia, published in 2004 by Shorenstein APARC. Armacost served on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards, including TRW, AFLAC, Applied Materials, USEC, Inc., Cargill, Inc., and Carleton College, and he currently chairs the board of The Asia Foundation.  

A native of Ohio, Armacost graduated from Carleton College and earned his master's and doctorate degrees in public law and government from Columbia University. He received the President's Distinguished Service Award, the Defense Department's Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Secretary of State's Distinguished Services Award, and the Japanese government’s Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.

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Michael H. Armacost Speaker
David Bloom Speaker Harvard University
Judith Banister Speaker The Conference Board
Naoki Ikegami Speaker Keio University
Soonman Kwon Speaker Seoul National University
Shripad Tuljapurkar Speaker Stanford University
Marcus W. Feldman Speaker Stanford University
Naohiro Ogawa Speaker Nihon University
Andrew Mason Speaker University of Hawaii
Shanlian Hu Speaker Fudan University
Edward Norton Speaker University of Michigan
Shuzhuo Li Speaker Xi'an Jiaotong University
Maria Porter Speaker University of Chicago
Meng Kin Lim Speaker National University of Singapore National University of Singapore
Kai Hong Phua Kai Hong Phua Speaker National University of Singapore National University of Singapore
John C. Campbell Speaker University of Michigan Emeritus
Byongho Tchoe Speaker Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs
Young Kyung Do Speaker Asia Health Policy Program
Jian Wang Speaker Shandong University
Dolores Gallagher-Thompson Speaker Stanford School of Medicine
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David Straub, the acting director of Korean Studies Program, argues that Obama administration will finally give diplomacy a chance to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem. He stresses that Senator Obama understands the difficulties of dealing with North Korea and will proceed carefully. If North Korea does not respond to this more nuanced American approach, he concludes, the international community is likely to be more supportive of U.S. efforts to constrain North Korean behavior.

Among conservatives in Korea and other American allied countries, there seems to be some anxiety about the election of a relatively unknown, young African-American liberal as the next American president. Typically, when a new U.S. president is elected, American diplomats seek to reassure allies by telling them that the incoming president will pursue fundamentally the same policies as the outgoing president. However, President Obama clearly will adopt a significantly different foreign policy than President Bush, including toward North Korea.

Obama’s soaring rhetoric has led to a widespread (and correct) impression of him as idealistic, but the long presidential campaign also revealed him to be a disciplined politician and a skillful manager. His foreign policy will be much closer to the prudent realpolitik of President Bush’s father than it will be to the “neo-con” approach of President Bush himself.
And while it is true that Obama does not have deep experience in foreign affairs, his youthful years spent in Indonesia and Hawaii, taken together with his successful navigation of American society as a young African-American man, have given him a genuine empathy for different peoples and cultures. He has the self-confidence and intelligence to listen with an open mind to others and then carefully to make his own decisions.

President Obama’s policy toward North Korea will defy stereotypes of the past. In some ways he will be “softer” on North Korea than President Bush; in other ways, he will be “tougher.”  Like President Bush and his predecessors, President Obama will take the position that he can never accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Obama will not engage in bluster such as “all options are on the table,” which most South Koreans reject and which only plays into the DPRK’s hands.

Instead, Obama will finally give diplomacy a fighting chance. Even during the past couple of years, President Bush remained very reluctant to engage fully in negotiations with North Korea. President Obama will order that a policy review be conducted expeditiously, and he will probably appoint a very senior special envoy to take charge of negotiations with North Korea. While maintaining the framework of the Six-Party Talks and consulting very closely with the Republic of Korea and Japan, he will also authorize meaningful bilateral negotiations with North Korea. If those negotiations bear real fruit, he may even visit Pyongyang himself if he is confident that he will be able to strike a deal completely ending North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

President Obama will probably offer North Korea a “more for more” deal. In other words, compared to President Bush he will propose a much more detailed and concrete series of steps to be taken by North Korea, the United States, and other members of the Six-Party Talks. The aim will be agreement on an early end to North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.

The North Koreans should not think that President Obama will be “easier” than President Bush. If, as may well be the case, the North Koreans reject President Obama’s approach or drag their feet in responding to it, he, unlike President Bush, will have the international credibility to work more effectively with other members of the Six-Party Talks and the international community to limit North Korea’s options.

Moreover, as a hardheaded domestic politician, President Obama will be careful to avoid situations in which the Republican opposition could credibly criticize him as being naïve about North Korea. Indeed, Obama’s team recognizes clearly that, having declared itself a nuclear weapons state and tested a nuclear device, North Korea may not be prepared to verifiably give up its nuclear weapons ambitions.

In formulating and conducting his policy toward North Korea, President Obama will have access to many trusted experts on North Korea, beginning with Vice President Biden and his staff. Obama is also advised by a number of experienced officials from the Clinton administration, from former Defense Secretary Bill Perry to former career diplomat Jeffrey Bader.

U.S. relations with the Republic of Korea are key to any successful American policy toward North Korea. Obama and his team fully appreciate the importance of U.S.-ROK relations and the security alliance. They will coordinate very closely with the Lee Myung-bak administration and never sacrifice the interests of the Republic of Korea, which is immeasurably more important to the United States than the DPRK is or ever will be.
 
President Obama will support the implementation of the agreements President Bush reached with the Republic of Korea on the realignment of U.S. Forces of Korea and the transfer of wartime operational control, as befits the ROK’s military and economic might.
 
Under President Obama, the United States will also aim to approve, with some adjustments, the U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement, although it may take a year or so to do so as he perforce deals first with the global financial and economic crises and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  President Obama must be cognizant of the viewpoint of leading congressional Democrats and the constituencies they represent. It may be counterproductive if the ROK pushes too hard, too fast for U.S. approval of the FTA.
 
Obama’s inauguration will also open up new possibilities for U.S.-ROK coordination and cooperation on global issues. Unlike President Bush, whose early unilateralist mindset and specific policies caused dismay among international friends and foes alike, President Obama begins with a vast reservoir of sympathy and respect throughout the world. That will make it easier, and more useful, for the Republic of Korea to cooperate globally more with the United States.
 
In short, South Koreans should be reassured, not that President Obama’s foreign policy will be like that of President Bush, but that it will be different. Perhaps South Koreans will even begin to feel that their alliance with the United States is not just one that they feel they must have for their country’s long-term interests – but also one of which they can feel proud.

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Phillip Lipscy
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Professor Phillip Lipscy discusses the current international financial crisis and provides insight for future reforms. "The IMF and World Bank should be reformed to better reflect the interests and concerns of rising economic powers. Voting shares need to be further redistributed to reflect underlying economic realities. Decision making rules should be modified to give greater weight or agenda-setting authority to regional actors -- the US may have a strong interest in loans to Mexico, but Japan may have a greater stake in Indonesia. Assignment of the top positions should be made truly competitive. Core functions should be decentralized -- both institutions are headquartered in Washington, impeding employment of top talent from Asia and limiting intellectual exchange."

Major international crises often produce tectonic shifts in international relations. Under pressure from key European counterparts, President Bush has agreed to a "new Bretton Woods" summit on Nov. 15.

It would be hard to overstate the potential significance of this meeting. The first Bretton Woods, in 1944, set the rules for monetary relations among nations, and it created the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

While European leaders are pushing for greater regulation and a major overhaul of the international financial order, US policymakers have been lukewarm, emphasizing the preservation of free-market capitalism. This transatlantic drama has obscured the more fundamental problem—how to accommodate the historic shift of economic power away from the West toward Asia.

Including India, broader East Asia encompasses more than half of the world's population. The region already accounts for about one-third of global economic output, oil consumption, and CO2 emissions, and this is only likely to grow in the future. Over the course of the 21st century, Asia's economic and geopolitical weight in the world will, in all likelihood, come to rival that of Europe in the 19th century. Asian problems will become increasingly indistinguishable from global problems.

In the face of such dramatic change, the IMF and World Bank are becoming relics of a bygone era. At the time of their creation, by US and European negotiators, the major challenge was to get capital flowing from the US to war-ravaged Europe. The days of the US as creditor state are long gone—our massive current account deficit is financed by importing nearly $1 trillion in foreign capital every year. Major US banks are being rescued by sovereign wealth funds and financial institutions from the Middle East and East Asia. China and Japan alone held over $600 billion of securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, making the bailout of those institutions a major foreign policy issue.

Despite these changed realities, both Bretton Woods institutions remain dominated by the West. By convention, the IMF is led by a European, the World Bank by a US national. The US is the only country with veto power over important decisions in either body.

My analysis of voting shares in the IMF indicates that the Allied powers of World War II have been consistently overrepresented compared to Axis powers despite the passing of more than 60 years since the end of that war. Studies show that IMF lending is biased in favor of recipients with strong economic and diplomatic ties to the US and key European states at the expense of other members.

This unbalanced representation had real consequences during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, when the IMF, as part of its rescue operation, implemented policies widely viewed as contrary to Asian interests. During the crisis, Japanese financial authorities proposed an Asian Monetary Fund as a potential alternative source of liquidity. This proposal was rejected by US officials, who feared dilution of IMF authority. However, over the past decade, East Asian states have stockpiled foreign currency reserves and developed regional cooperation that may eventually develop into a credible alternative to the IMF.

The IMF and World Bank should be reformed to better reflect the interests and concerns of rising economic powers. Voting shares need to be further redistributed to reflect underlying economic realities. Decisionmaking rules should be modified to give greater weight or agenda-setting authority to regional actors—the US may have a strong interest in loans to Mexico, but Japan may have a greater stake in Indonesia. Assignment of the top positions should be made truly competitive. Core functions should be decentralized—both institutions are headquartered in Washington, impeding employment of top talent from Asia and limiting intellectual exchange.

An international financial architecture that fragments or remains centered on the West as Asia rises will probably prove grossly ineffective. Europe attempted much the same during the turbulent period between the two World Wars, resurrecting a system based on British hegemony even as Britain was in relative decline. Those were scary times, with free riding and beggar-thy-neighbor policies feeding mutual distrust and economic catastrophe.

This will not be the last financial crisis we face. Next time, ad hoc cooperation by the US and Europe may prove insufficient. Franklin Roosevelt had the foresight to include China on the United Nations Security Council long before that nation became a geopolitical heavyweight. Similar foresight should be brought to bear as world leaders debate the future of the international financial architecture.

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Hard Choices offers a most rewarding perspective on how Southeast Asian states straddle the ongoing tensions among three rarely compatible goals—security, democracy, and regionalism. Empirically rich and topically diverse, [the book] is broad in scope and full of deep analytic insights. It will be appreciated well beyond Southeast Asia." — T. J. PEMPEL, University of California, Berkeley

Southeast Asia faces hard choices. The region’s most powerful organization, ASEAN, is being challenged to ensure security and encourage democracy while simultaneously reinventing itself as a model of Asian regionalism.

Should ASEAN’s leaders defend a member country’s citizens against state predation for the sake of justice—and risk splitting ASEAN itself? Or should regional leaders privilege state security over human security for the sake of order—and risk being known as a dictators’ club? Should ASEAN isolate or tolerate the junta in Myanmar? Is democracy a requisite to security, or is it the other way around? How can democratization become a regional project without first transforming the Association into a “people centered” organization? But how can ASEAN reinvent itself along such lines if its member states are not already democratic?

How will its new Charter affect ASEAN’s ability to make these hard choices? How is regionalism being challenged by transnational crime, infectious disease, and other border-jumping threats to human security in Southeast Asia? Why have regional leaders failed to stop the perennial regional “haze” from brush fires in democratic Indonesia? Does democracy help or hinder nuclear energy security in the region?

In this timely book—the second of a three-book series focused on Asian regionalism—ten analysts from six countries address these and other pressing questions that Southeast Asia faces in the twenty-first century.

Recent Praise for Hard Choices

“In this delightful volume, a diverse, fresh, and talented group of authors shed new light on Southeast Asia and speak engagingly to wider scholarly questions.  Emmerson's introduction sets the tone for an unusually creative edited collection.”
 —Andrew MacIntyre, Australian National University
“In Hard Choices, Donald Emmerson has brought together a remarkable group of leading young scholars to write on Southeast Asian regionalism from political-security, economic, and sociological perspectives. His introductory chapter defines the dimensions of regionalism on which the other contributors elaborate in a series of fine essays examining ASEAN’s past, present, and alternative futures. Hard Choices is a landmark study that will be consulted for years to come by scholars and practitioners. Highly recommended.”
—Sheldon Simon, Arizona State University

Examination copies: Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.

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Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia

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Donald K. Emmerson
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Shorenstein APARC
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