Writing recently for the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), Stanford scholar Donald Emmerson analyzed China’s stance on the South China Sea in the context of remarks given by Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi at a bilateral dialogue in Washington, D.C. on June 24.

The rise of China as a global and regional power has created areas where the interests of China and the United States overlap in competition, the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific told a Stanford audience. But Admiral Samuel Locklear III, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), rejected the traditional realpolitik argument, which predicts inevitable confrontation between the United States, a status quo power, and China, a rising power.

“Historians will say this will lead to conflict,” Locklear said, during an address at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center last Friday. “I don’t believe it has to.”

The United States and China have a “mutual skepticism of each other,” the Pacific Commander acknowledged, but he characterized the relationship as “collaborative, generally.”

He said the dangers of direct military confrontation between the two powers is low, but warned against Chinese tendencies to perceive the United States as engaged in an effort to ‘contain’ the expansion of China’s influence. Instead, Locklear urged China to work with the United States to build new security and economic structures in the region.

Economic interdependence between the countries makes it impossible for the two countries to avoid working together, he told the seminar, co-sponsored by the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University.

He said that China has also benefited from the security environment that the United States has helped shape and maintain in the region.

Locklear reminded the audience of the central importance of the vast area under his command, which stretches from the Indian subcontinent across the vast Pacific Ocean. More than nine out of 10 of the largest ports in the world are in the Asia-Pacific region, and over 70 percent of global trade passes through its waters. The U.S. rebalance to Asia, a policy pursued by the Obama administration as early as year 2009, largely happened because of the economic and political importance of that area.

The mutual interest in economic prosperity depends, however, on a stable security environment. Washington has an interest in maintaining the structure of security that has ensured peace for the last few decades. Beijing seeks to change the status quo, to build a regional system that reflects its growth as a power.

Locklear called on China to work with the United States and other nations in the region, such as Japan and Australia, as well as the countries of Southeast Asia, to take the current “patchwork quilt” of bilateral and multilateral alliances and build a basis to maintain economic interdependence and security. He pointed to the U.S.-led effort to form a Trans-Pacific Partnership as a 12-nation economic structure, which could eventually include China.

“We want China to be a net security contributor,” he said, “And my sense is that both the United States and the nations on the periphery of China are willing to allow China to do that – but with circumstances.” He said conditions for the United States included open access to shared domains in sea, air, space and cyberspace.

The Pacific Commander cautioned against the danger, however, of unintended conflict, fueled by territorial disputes and Chinese assertiveness that worries its neighbors. Locklear stressed the need for more dialogue, including among the militaries in the region, an effort that the U.S. Pacific Command is currently carrying out.

“There’s a trust deficit in Asia among the nations, as it relates in particular to China,” he said.

Relations have been so icy that the top political leaders of Japan and China didn’t meet for nearly two years, only breaking the divide for a 20-minute meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Summit (APEC) in Beijing last month.

Refusing to engage at the highest level has made it difficult for countries to work on solutions to shared problems. The region now sees a confluence of old and new challenges that could threaten global stability if ill-managed, said Locklear, who has led the U.S. military command in the Pacific since 2012.                 

For decades, China and Japan have been at odds about sovereignty claims over islands in the East China Sea. In the past, during the time of Deng Xiaoping’s rule in China, the two countries agreed to, as Deng reportedly put it, ‘kick the issue into the tall grass’ for future generations to deal with it. These disputes have resurfaced in recent years, threatening to trigger armed conflict between the air and naval forces of the two countries.

Locklear said he believed that China and Japan would avoid inadvertent escalation, thanks to improved communications and tight command and control over their forces. But he also warned  that at least seven nations have conflicting claims in the South China Sea, which could easily escalate into direct conflict.

These situations, paired with an upsurge in Chinese military spending and the growing belief that the United States is a declining power, raise doubts about China’s intentions in the region. China’s Asian neighbors increasingly question the intensions of the world’s most populous nation, and second largest economy.

“Is it a return to the old days where you had basic tributary states? Is that the model that China is looking for? Or is it a 21^st century model?”

Locklear said China and other nations in the Asia-Pacific, as well as the United States, need to work harder to form shared views and consensus, particularly among those who “own the guns.”

Dialogue and interactions among the militaries are crucial, especially those who are called upon to make quick decisions during a possible flashpoint, for instance an accidental clash of boats or planes.

“Trust really does fall in many ways to military leaders to get it right and to lead, to some degree, the politicians and the diplomats,” he said. Locklear spoke of a tangible example of collaboration in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise, also known as RIMPAC, hosted by USPACOM. Twenty-two countries participate in the world’s largest maritime warfare exercise in Hawaii, which this year included naval forces from China.

“Does it fix those friction points? No, it doesn’t.” But, Locklear concluded, “We hope that this kind of thing opens the door for future interaction.”

The audio file and transcript from the event can be accessed by clicking here. 

Eyes remain focused on Indonesia as votes for candidates Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto are counted in the country’s landmark presidential election.

On Wednesday, the polls reflected a precariously even divide between Widodo, also referred to as "Jowoki," the governor of Jakarta, and Prabowo, an ex-general and son-in-law of the country’s former dictator Suharto. Initial polls show Jowoki holds a slight lead, but the government has yet to declare an outright winner, with neither side conceding at the moment. 

Donald Emmerson, director of the Southeast Asia Forum at Shorenstein APARC, answers a few questions about the election and what it could mean for Indonesia’s fledging democracy.

This election will transfer power from incumbent president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the first to lead the country since its democratic transition. Is this election a turning point for Indonesia?

It is. It is only the third direct presidential election in the history of Indonesia. The first two, in 2004 and 2009, yielded landslide victories for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), giving him two consecutive presidential terms as president. His large margins of victory were, in effect, incontestable. In contrast, the presidential election on 9 July is being sharply contested, based on various "quick count" estimates of who won and by how much. Some of those estimates say that Joko Widodo ("Jokowi") has won. A smaller number of estimates assign victory to his opponent, Prabowo Subianto. These estimated margins of "quick count" success by one candidate over the other are typically small: the differences run between 1 and 5 percent.

These small margins asserted on behalf of contradictory outcomes have politicized the voting-and-counting procedure and stimulated fears of fraud. Prabowo in particular appears to be challenging the legitimacy of a possible win by Jokowi when the official result is announced. That announcement is scheduled to be made by the General Elections Commission on 22 July.

If the official margin of victory is very slender, whether for Jokowi or for Prabowo, the losing campaign could request a ruling on the matter by the Constitutional Court. If the request is taken up by the court, another month could elapse before a legal judgment is issued. Under this alarming if hypothetical scenario, Indonesia's political future could remain in a prolonged limbo conducive to major unrest. 

Given that the polls reflect a tightly contested race, will the losing party accept defeat?

Who knows? It will depend on what happens. That said, there are powerful reasons to believe that the loser, whoever he is, will think twice before taking his case to the streets. The onus on such vengeance as endangering Indonesia's fledgling democracy would be great. We also need to remember that if, as many expect, the election commission (and perhaps, later, the Constitutional Court) validates Jokowi as the next president, he is likely to face a parliamentary majority that supported Prabowo. Indeed, only 37 percent of the seats in the main national legislature are occupied by members of parties that endorsed Jokowi. If Prabowo is declared the loser, and the evidence of electoral malfeasance is absent or minor, Prabowo may accept having lost if he knows he can retain substantial influence over national policy while preparing for another presidential run in 2019. 

Both candidates campaigned on widespread platforms that called for reform in many areas ­– from energy to anti-corruption. What issues are Indonesians most concerned about?

Basically, poverty and corruption. But many Indonesians allocate their votes based less on policy distinctions than on the personalities of the candidates. Prabowo's ability to catch up with Jokowi in popularity during the campaign reflects in no small measure his more charismatic and commanding personality in contrast to Jokowi's relatively lackluster performance.

What steps can the next administration take to keep Indonesia from slipping back to its authoritarian past?

The two candidates are very different in this regard. Prabowo is a former general. He has been implicated in major violations of human rights. He is linked to the autocratic regime that preceded Indonesia's current democratic experiment. One can imagine many steps that Prabowo could take as president to nudge Indonesia back onto its former authoritarian track. He has already said that direct elections are not good for Indonesia.  

As for Jokowi, were he to become president, his task would be to achieve a level of probity and progress in Indonesia sufficient to convince the country that democracy can be effective not just in theory but in practice as well.

Emmerson also spoke about the election with Deutsche Welle on 16 July, and the Voice of America on 9 July.

Over 215 million Muslims live in the Asia-Pacific region, but despite their number and proximity to record growth and opportunity in greater Asia, their experience has been one of persistent, widespread socioeconomic and political decline. 

A new book, Modes of Engagement: Muslim Minorities in Asia, published by the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and distributed through The Brookings Institution, offers leading research on this topic and places it in a geographic perspective. Edited by Rafiq Dossani, a senior researcher at the RAND Corporation and Professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School of Public Policy, the book paves new paths to understanding the paradox of Muslim minorities in Asia. 

Dossani was at Stanford University for nearly fifteen years as a senior research scholar at Shorenstein APARC and as the executive director of the South Asia Initiative, studying the plight of Muslims and higher education in India, among other topics. The book is a result of a seminar series with the book’s contributors.

“Since the 1970s, especially in China, Asia’s growth rate has been unprecedented within Asia’s own history,” Dossani says. Mainstream Asia has seen a rise in job opportunities and income levels, and as a result, an individual ability to accumulate wealth and commit resources to long-term investments, such as education and innovation activities.

However, not all people have found benefit from this modern, economic transformation. Most notably, Muslims have seen a severe decline in their social and political space, as well as a narrowing of their identity.

Analysts find this surprising because history reflects a narrative that says Muslims should have profited along with the rest. “It wasn’t expected that Muslims would lose out in the countries in which they were minorities,” he says.

The volume investigates this puzzle through three case studies: the Philippines, India, and China. In each country, Muslims are at least 5 percent of the population, the largest number being in India. Dossani weaves together common threads that define the Muslim minority experience. Similarities include the impact of state-led ethnic nationalism and forced assimilation. He also writes that Muslims have been unable to use protest to secure any significant, long-term gains.

Given this dire reality, what prospects lie ahead for Muslim minorities? In conversation, Dossani suggests a few policy priorities gathered from the case studies featured in the volume.

Democracy is not the answer

Democracy, a form of governance that is often championed for its equal civic participation, has not facilitated a level playing field for Muslims when theory dictates it should.

“Democracy is not the answer to handling these problems,” says Dossani, emphasizing, “it is a most inadequate answer.”

This situation is evident in the case of India where Muslims have probably done the worst, compared to the Philippines, which also shares a legacy of colonial rule and transition to democracy.

Muslims in India, who have attempted to elevate their interests on the national stage, are stopped by coalition politics. Larger interests of the group can subsume their own, encroached upon further by caste issues, language barriers and other dividing factors. China’s Hui have found a significantly better experience than the Uyghurs, who were separated from mainland China early on and excluded from opportunities afforded there (the Uyghurs reside in a northwest region, Xinjiang). In the case of India, Muslims make up only ten to fifteen percent of the population in almost every state, thus their voice fails to find leverage in the political sphere, and effectively lose out.

Furthermore, democracy is not a panacea when states are vulnerable.

“When you have very weak and fragile states, where intuitions are subject to capture easily, democracy doesn’t work,” Dossani explains. Muslim minorities are unable to gain clout because the majorities, and elites attempting to fill a power vacuum, crowd them out.

Thus, collective interest and concerted efforts on the part of governmental and non-governmental organizations – a larger nexus of individuals working toward common goals – are essential to create momentum and staying power behind Muslim issues.

“You need civil society where it explicitly deals with the issues of minority populations and tries to convince the national government and state governments that improving the lots of minorities should be a national project with commitment to their improvement,” he says.

Development as a way forward

Some national projects were developed to openly address Muslim issues, but this led other internal ethnic and religious groups to ask, “Why are you appeasing the Muslims?”

Especially since 9/11, governments have increasingly come under pressure. Stigmas that narrow Muslim identity into “extremists” and “terrorists” are more progressively shared, making it near impossible for governments to explicitly offer a helping hand to Muslims without domestic backlash. 

But even with the odds against them, Muslim minorities still have a way forward.

In the three countries studied, Muslims have found traces of success, and in other Asian nations such as Sri Lanka and Nepal, there has been considerable accommodation of Muslims. Across all circumstances, “Muslims have done best in countries where the state has focused on education for all,” Dossani says.

Instead of providing ethnic-based aid, governments should focus on resource availability as a main qualifier for assistance. State-sponsored education and health care initiatives that capture the poorest populations help Muslims who inherently fall into this category. 

“Any wise government would say ‘look we want to connect education to development and focus on the poorest, no matter who they are.’ If they do that, Muslims will automatically get their fair share,” he says. The Philippines has already recognized this reality, and begun to implement development projects that naturally include Muslims.

Regime change can also motivate Muslim accommodation, either directly or indirectly, as is likely in the case of India.

Newly appointed Prime Minister Narendra Modi, although said to have an anti-Islamic stance in the past with the Bharatiya Janata Party, may in fact create policies that favor Muslims because it fits in with a grander vision of national growth. 

Referring to Prime Minister Modi, Dossani says, “It’s not clear that he cares about Muslims, but in some ways, he cares about development.

“At some point, any development-conscious person will realize that no country can progress if 15 percent of the country hangs behind.”

Diaspora matters

The swell of migration in the globalized era has made the formation of diaspora communities, dispersed populations outside of country of origin, a common phenomenon. Muslim minorities are a large part of this movement, seeking opportunity and using their ethnic or religious connections to establish a new life elsewhere.

Muslims of Asian origin are located beyond Asia – in the Middle East, North Africa and Southern Europe, among other areas. But despite being removed from their native soil, an allegiance and interest in the homeland typically remains.

“Diaspora exists in a very big way,” Dossani explains. Their influence should not be underestimated, both financially and politically. The Muslim diaspora provides an important channel of support that helps struggling Muslim populations.

Remittances from relatives overseas can bring in substantial transfers of money and support to populations that may not otherwise have enough resources, or be supported by the government. For several years now, one of the single largest inflows of money into the Philippines has been from these outside sources. India’s Muslim diaspora has a strong diasporan foundation with codified institutions set-up to organize relations. China’s experience is less documented, Dossani says, although he conjectures that some diasporan support exists, whether formally or informally.

Diaspora organizations, often led and supported by expatriates, appear to be growing worldwide, and can play a crucial role in the formation of Muslims’ global identity and network of support. Neighboring countries with Muslim majorities, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, have also offered themselves as diplomatic partners in resolving conflicts over Muslims’ conditions, given their own long histories of addressing them internally.

The Obama administration’s policy of “re-balance” toward Asia, that began as early as 2009, is now increasingly under stress, as those in the region question American staying power and China emerges as a challenger to U.S. dominance. As the territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas in recent months have demonstrated, China’s relations with the region and the United States have become visibly strained, bringing the U.S. re-balance policy into question and raising concerns about security tensions and the danger of conflict. 

U.S.-China relations are heading, for the foreseeable future, into “a very scratchy time,” predicted Kenneth Lieberthal, a respected senior China scholar at The Brookings Institution, in his keynote speech delivered at the annual Oksenberg Lecture on June 3 at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Lieberthal told a standing room audience in Encina Hall that while the U.S. attempt to temper its relations with China and others has “worked quite well over time,” now, “at a geostrategic level, we seem to be sliding with increasing speed toward an inflection point in U.S.-China relations.”

Lieberthal was joined by a panel of China experts, including Cui Liru of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), and Stanford’s Karl Eikenberry and Thomas Fingar, distinguished fellows at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Jean C. Oi, director of the Stanford China Program.

The discussion was part of the Oksenberg Lecture, an annual dialogue that functions as a policy workshop on U.S.-Asia relations, named in honor of late professor and senior fellow Michel Oksenberg (1938–2001). Oksenberg was a noted China specialist, who served as a senior member of the National Security Council and is credited as the architect of the normalization of relations with China under the Carter administration in the late 1970s.

Points of tension in the U.S.-China relationship have been increasingly visible. Senior American officials have assailed China for its aggressive actions toward its neighbors over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and in South China Sea, including its latest altercations with Vietnam and the Philippines. The United States recently indicted five members of China’s People’s Liberation Army for carrying out cyber espionage against U.S. technology companies.

Incidents like these have prompted both countries to throw harsh words at each other, leading to a situation of brinkmanship. However, Lieberthal pointed out that tense relations between the United States and China are certainly not new. Most notably, relations took a nosedive in 1989 when China cracked down on democratization protests at Tiananmen Square, in 1999 after the accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Serbia, and in 2008, in response to the global financial crisis.

The U.S.-China relationship has been riddled with periods of distrust in the past. But now, “the speed and scale of China’s economic growth, especially over the last two decades, has also increased concerns, on all sides, that the evolving distribution of power may create new frictions and suspicions,” Lieberthal said.

Yet, refusing to work with each other is not an option, the senior scholar, who also served in the Clinton administration, told the audience. Without the United States and China in conversation, progress in multilateral areas such as climate change and trade would falter, he argued. Given the two countries’ position as the world’s largest economies, the international system would effectively be constrained if the two were entrenched in long-term bitterness.

Lieberthal recognized the common admonition, “if we treat China as an enemy, it will surely become one,” saying this warning could be applied to both sides. China and the United States must make greater efforts to manage and mitigate tensions.

“The question is whether we can prevent bad things, not only specific conflicts, but the political tensions and politics that make cooperation on major issues very, very difficult at best.”

He then outlined a few steps that could help China and the United States sort out their disputes. His recommendations began with the need for strong determination on the part of top political leaders to move things forward and the importance of clear, consistent use of vocabulary when discussing issues.

As a final point, but one that was offered as a contingent factor to success, Lieberthal said U.S.-China relations and both countries’ roles in greater Asia will depend on “how effective each of us is in dealing with domestic reforms,” because, “that will determine how dynamic, how vibrant, how innovative, and how secure we feel.”

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During the lecture, Ret. Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry shared his observations from the Shangri-La Dialogue, an inter-governmental security forum held from May 30 – June 1 in Singapore. The Dialogue has in recent years become a gathering of premiere defense ministers to discuss security issues in Track I and “quasi-track” meetings.

Afterward, Eikenberry talked with Shorenstein APARC about key highlights and implications that emerged from the Dialogue:

Shangri-La Dialogue

Photo credit: Flickr/The International Institute for Strategic Studies 

Media reported a tense environment overlaid the Dialogue. What was the general atmosphere there?

The remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue by Japanese Prime Minister Abe and U.S. Defense Secretary Hagel on the one hand, and Chinese General Wang Guanzhong, made clear very different views on the causes for tension surrounding various maritime sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas. Still, if you read the full text of all three speeches and the Q&As that followed, there is still great emphasis placed on dialogue and common interests. And in the many meetings that took place between national delegations on the margins of the conference events, the emphasis was on cooperation. 

What revelations at the Dialogue were surprising?

I think the degree to which dissatisfaction with China’s assertive behavior in pursuing its maritime claims was expressed by many of the participants – not just the United States and Japan. Vietnam, the Philippines and India were explicit. Analysts have said the only China (through threatening behavior) could contain China by catalyzing a counterbalancing response. From the results of the Dialogue, I think this is correct.   

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe emphasized values and international law throughout his keynote speech. What is your take on this?

The Prime Minister did emphasize both democracy and rule of law during his prepared remarks and answers to questions from conference participants. He was drawing an obvious distinction between Japan’s and China’s political systems and commitment to approaches to resolving territorial disputes. I think the Prime Minister is trying to establish Japan as a leader in East and Southeast Asia, and wanted to make clear what he views as important differences between the Japanese and Chinese “models.” 

U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel referenced China’s suspension of the U.S.-China Cyber Working Group. What direction do you think the cybersecurity dialogue will go now?

It was unfortunate that China suspended its participation in the U.S.-China Cyber Working Group after the U.S. Government’s indictment of five People’s Liberation Army officers for alleged cyber theft. The U.S. Government has been providing the PRC Government with evidence of cyber theft being conducted by entities in China and has failed to receive any meaningful response so the indictments seem warranted. It would seem that the Cyber Working Group is precisely the forum to discuss this matter and the many related to managing the cyber domain with agreed rules and procedures. Working Groups provide a forum to address disagreement and disputes. I think China’s response was counterproductive and hope the government will indicate a willingness to resume the dialogues in the near future.

Where do you see the regional security conversation heading next?

The risk is that security dialogues will be divided into two camps – one led by the United States and its close allies and partners, and the other by China – somewhat isolated at this time but seeking to entice Asian nations to bandwagon to its side. Perhaps further regional economic integration can facilitate a more common approach to security, but this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue is perhaps a warning that trends, for now, are not heading in a positive direction.

Nearly forty-four percent of Indonesia’s population is living on less than $2 a day, making it near impossible for some to seek proper health treatment. One way to improve this situation is through Indonesia’s conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, Margaret Triyana says.

The CCT program, first piloted by the World Bank in 2007 and expanded from 2009–10, encourages Indonesia’s most destitute to pursue health-seeking behaviors by reducing barriers to health care through cash incentives. Payment is given for receiving treatments at a local clinic. Essentially, the poor are reimbursed simply for “showing up” for health services.

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She plans to produce multiple papers that focus on issues related to CCT interventions and its impact on mothers and children. Triyana will continue this research after leaving Shorenstein APARC this July, accepting an academic teaching position at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. 

Recently, Triyana discussed her research with Shorenstein APARC. 

What types of health initiatives does the CCT program sponsor, and for whom?

The CCT program targets Indonesia’s most poverty-stricken by selecting approximately the bottom 30 percent of the poorest households, with preference toward households with pregnant women or school-aged children. Eligibility depends on socioeconomic factors per district such as expenditure, education and asset ownership. The program stretches the rural-urban divide, covering people in and off Java (this is the main island where 60 percent of the population resides). Many initiatives in the household CCT program are focused on child and maternal health. For mothers, they include a series of prenatal care visits, an iron tablet prescription, childbirth assistance and postnatal care. For children, they cover vaccinations, monthly height and weight measurements at the clinic and vitamin A pills. Overall the CCT program is a combination of poverty reduction and human capital investments, attempting to induce good behavior that instills long-term health in low resource settings.

Who is the typical primary care provider in Indonesia?

The primary care provider is often a midwife. This is because Indonesia doesn’t have enough trained doctors to support the growing demand. Clinics operate at the sub-district level, which comprise of 10-15 villages each. Every village is assigned one midwife. Midwives can perform most procedures just short of surgery. For example, midwives offer typical delivery services but refer patients to a district-level hospital for a Caesarean section. This system, for the most part, functions well, but midwives do have an expanded scope of care that can be unsettling. Children have their cuts taken care of by midwives; adults can get antibiotics through them. This diffused system is perhaps more efficient, but it can call into question the legitimacy of their authority. Midwives receive only three years of training for their certification. This is something the Indonesian government intends to inspect and will likely restructure.

What behavior changes do you see as a result of the CCT program?

My initial findings show there is increased utilization of health care programs. The CCT program incentivizes certain behaviors – attending the clinic for a test or retrieving medication – which then, in theory, leads to better health. “Showing up” doesn’t automatically correlate with improved health, but if we think about the population at hand, it would in most cases. People who weren’t using health services before now are. Everyone that was offered the program signed up. Monthly attendance to CCT-linked programs is reported at a rate of 85 percent. In particular to maternal health, I noted a 10 percent increase in delivery fees. This trend follows what we would expect to see – because of increased utilization, there is a natural rise in price for the service. On the demand-side, I found a 40 percent increase in the use of midwives, and a rise in fees paid to providers for maternal and child services. These factors indicate with a high level of certainty that the CCT program lowers barriers to health care. 

Since health is effectively its own market, will increased demand for services cause a rise in price?

Yes, health care is its own market so the supply-demand relationship is relevant. My research looks at the local market because it depends upon the price being offered at the local clinic. Indonesia’s health care system is a public-private mixture, therefore public fees are regulated while private fees are less so. Indonesia now offers universal care, but people can pay a few for services beyond basic coverage. I saw a change in the private domain in terms of demand for services. The “demand shock” caused a bit of a higher price for services. It costs about $80 to meet all of the program requirements. Payment to midwives increased, while a slight decrease occurred for traditional birth attendants. I find no significant change in birth outcomes, and the quality provided by midwives does not appear to be affected by the program. These outcomes are exactly what we’d expect to see; it is consistent with the puzzle in the literature and economics, showing more women and children in the CCT program are seeking care from health care providers, but no change in health outcomes.

Can we expect increased utilization of health services in the long-run?

I anticipate there will be long-term increased utilization. The CCT program seeks to create habit formation by focusing on youth and pregnant mothers. For example, we can see this when expectant mothers attended the clinic for prenatal care, delivery assistance and postnatal care. With cost and travel barriers eliminated or reduced, participants should find it easier to initially come and then return. I did see repeat visits in my research as a positive outcome of the CCT program. A technique used to encourage commitment is a public education program as part of the program. Participants get a group briefing on how the program works, so that they are fully introduced to the incentives and guarantees of the program. 

Does Indonesia plan to extend this into a national program?

Yes, the CCT program is planned to go national later this year. The research shows that the benchmark of high attendance was met, program participants did “show up.” Next steps are to analyze health outcomes in maternal and child health, and then look at policy implications. Indeed, the Indonesian government is seeking ways to better target and deliver health services; it will be interesting to see the long-term effects of this program.

Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center faculty and scholars have published a variety of publications in early 2014, covering topics from the Japanese fiscal condition to disability policy in North Korea. 

Publications are often products of long-standing research projects led by Center affiliates. New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan, coedited by Shorenstein APARC Director Gi-Wook Shin and Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law Director Larry Diamond, emerged from the Stanford Korea Democracy Project, which seeks to understand social movements in South Korea.

Postdoctoral fellows who reside at Shorenstein APARC for a year of vigorous study and engagement in Center activities also support research publications. Former visiting scholar Dominik Müller, now at Goethe-University Frankfurt, published Islam, Politics and Youth in Malaysia: The Pop-Islamist Reinvention of PAS. Müller examined the religious bureaucracy of Malaysia at Shorenstein APARC in 2013.

Shorenstein APARC manages an active publishing program with Stanford University Press and the Brookings Institution Press. Center affiliates also publish extensively in external peer-reviewed academic journals and books, as well as in a working paper series led by the Asia Health Policy Program.

Publications released in recent months include: 

Comparative Institutional Analysis: Theory, Corporations and East Asia. Selected Papers of Masahiko Aoki, Masahiko Aoki, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014

The volume is a collection of 22 articles that span the course of Aoki’s 45-year academic career. The essays cover a wide range of topics from the comparative perspective including corporate governance, institutional change and mechanism design in Japan, China and South Korea. The articles suggest policy responses for industry and governments.

Confronting Memories of World War II: European and Asian Legacies, Eds. Daniel Chirot, Gi-Wook Shin, Daniel C. Sneider, University of Washington Press, 2014

Comparing the European and Asian legacies, the book provides insight into the influence that World War II continues to have on contemporary politics and attitudes. The collection gathers a variety of perspectives that compare how Europe and Asia handle memories and reflections of guilt, and how wartime experiences are reinterpreted and used for domestic and international purposes.

“Defying Gravity: How Long Will Japanese Government Bond Prices Remain High?” Takeo Hoshi, Takatoshi Ito, Economic Policy, January 2014

The article examines the fiscal regime of Japan and considers if the country can withstand its high debt to GDP ratio. The paper shows that Japan’s fiscal situation is unsustainable through various simulations, and suggests that sufficiently large tax increases and/or expenditure cuts would put government debt on a sustainable path.

“Facts, Minds, and Formats: Scholarship and Political Change in Indonesia,” Donald K. Emmerson, Cornell University Press, March 2014

Indonesia has changed dramatically in recent decades, and a wealth of literature highlights divergent interpretations and perspectives surrounding those dynamics. The article considers the demise of liberal democracy, the rise of President Sukarno in 1959, and the latter’s replacement by General Suharto in 1965. The essay is part of the larger volume, Producing Indonesia: The State of the Field of Indonesian Studies.

“The Fukushima Nuclear Disaster and the DPJ: Leadership, Structures, and Information Challenges During the Crisis,” Kenji E. Kushida, Japanese Political Economy, Spring 2014

The Fukushima nuclear disaster was a critical event that shook Japan’s political economy, society and national psyche, as well as the world’s perspectives on nuclear energy policy. The article examines how the nuclear disaster unfolded and analyzes the response undertaken by the Democratic Party of Japan under Prime Minister Naoto Kan. Kushida is the Takahashi Research Associate at Shorenstein APARC.

“Japan-Korea Relations: Time for U.S. Intervention?” Daniel C. Sneider, National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2014

The paper describes current relations between South Korea and Japan, recognizing that their relationship has noticeably deteriorated in recent months. While the United States has attempted to promote dialogue, its hesitant intervention is unlikely to change the overall dynamic of the Japan-Korea relationship. Sneider suggests that a more active U.S. mediation role could encourage reconciliation and normalization of relations.

“People with Disabilities in a Changing North Korea,” Katharina Zellweger, Shorenstein APARC, 2014 

The working paper details the environment that people with disabilities face in the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea. Despite its reputation as a repressive, closed society where human rights are routinely abused, there are in fact a number of institutions that work to address the needs of the disabled. Zellweger writes from a perspective of a senior aid worker with over thirty years of experience in Asia; she was the Pantech Fellow at Shorenstein APARC from 2011­–13.

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