Authors
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

On June 2, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, along with Democratic Party of Japan leader Ichiro Ozawa, resigned due to a dispute over plans to relocate the U.S. Marine Air Station at Futenma, in the southern part of Okinawa, to Camp Schwab, in the northern part of the island. Writing in Slate.com, Daniel C. Sneider considers the Obama administration's role in the debacle and asks: Is this how allies should treat each other?

Hero Image
okinawa photo
All News button
1
Paragraphs

This study explores the effects of cross-sectional and time series differences among Japanese firms selecting one of two extant corporate governance systems. The paper presents evidence that the adoption by Japanese firms of a shareholder-centric, more transparent, system of corporate governance creates greater corporate value in comparison to the traditional system of statutory auditors. This paper takes advantage of the unique opportunity afforded by Japan's introduction of a dual system of corporate governance in 2003, when companies were offered a choice to adopt a new system of outside directors, i.e. a shareholder-centric committee system. Data analysis shows a significant increase in firm valuation as measured by Tobin's q, for companies that adopted the committee system, even though comparative financial data show little difference. This finding is attributed to signal sending, as companies who adopted this system signal a choice toward transparency and openness.

All Publications button
1
Publication Type
Working Papers
Publication Date
Authors
-

A graduate of the University of Tokyo and Stanford University, Yasuo Tanabe was Vice President of the Research Institute for Economy, Trade, and Industry in Tokyo and a career official at Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), later the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). He will address Japan's policies on energy and climate change.

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Yasuo Tanabe Former Deputy Director-General, Speaker Economic Affairs Bureau of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
Seminars
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

On February 26 and 27, 2010, the SPRIE-Stanford Project on Japanese Entrepreneurship hosted its second annual conference, "Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Japan" at the Bechtel Conference Center in Encina Hall at Stanford University, made possible through generous support from Cisco Systems and The Miner Foundation.

Scholars from universities across Japan and the United States gathered to present and discuss new papers seeking to understand the trends and dynamics of business and innovation in Japan through the lens of entrepreneurial companies, and institutions that affect those companies.

The conference agenda is below; presentation and other files will be linked as they are available.

All News button
1
-

What explains the recent large swings in the behavior of Japanese voters? Last August, for the first time in the post-WWII era, Japan's leading political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, lost power, making way for a new DPJ government. During the preceding months leading up to the lower house elections in August 2009, popular media coverage pointed to fundamental structural changes in the Japanese political economy as the underlying causes for changing voter preferences. To what extent can structural changes in the economy and society explain changing voter behavior and electoral outcomes? Japan's two decade old stagnating economy, rapidly graying society, and post-industrial advanced economic structure provide an ideal case for studying this question. Using both national and sub-national level data spanning two decades, we test both popular theories and conventional wisdom about the political effects of a graying society, widening income disparities, and industrial structural change.

Kay Shimizu is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. She received her undergraduate degree and PhD in political science from Stanford University (2008). Her research concerns the political economy of Japan and China, with a focus on fiscal politics, central local relations, and the politics of economic structural change. Her book manuscript, Private Money as Public Funds: the Politics of Japan's Recessionary Economy, examines the role of private financial institutions in Japan's political struggles to adjust to a changing economic and demographic landscape. She is on leave during the 2009-2010 academic year as an Advanced Research Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Program on US Japan Relations at Harvard University.

Philippines Conference Room

Kay Shimizu Assistant Professor, Political Science, Columbia University (currently on leave) & Advanced Research Fellow, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Program on US Japan Relations, Harvard University Speaker
Seminars
Authors
Peter M. Beck
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs

This WSJ article by Peter Beck originally appeared as Shorenstein APARC Dispatch in April 2010

North Korea is usually described as the "most isolated country on earth," its people effectively cut off from the outside world. My research tells a different story-that perhaps one million North Koreans are secretly listening to foreign radio broadcasts. The number of listeners is believed to be growing, which is all the more amazing when one considers that North Korean authorities only distribute radios with fixed dials, assiduously jam foreign broadcasts, and send citizens caught listening to foreign radio to the country's notorious gulags for as long as ten years.

Over a dozen radio stations from the United States, South Korea, and Japan currently broadcast to North Korea. Voice of America (VOA), one of the most popular stations, has been broadcasting to the North since 1942, while the equally popular Radio Free Asia (RFA) began its Korean broadcasts soon after being created by Congress in 1997. VOA focuses on news of the United States and the world, while RFA concentrates on the two Koreas. RFA also carries commentaries by two Korean speakers who grew up in the former Soviet Union and Romania. RFA serves as a substitute for the lack of a "free" station in North Korea, but unlike a typical "surrogate station"-which would be staffed largely by émigrés-RFA only employs one North Korean defector.

South Korea's "Global Korean Network" has been declining in popularity since it ceased to focus on North Korea and adopted a decidedly soft approach after the election of Kim Dae-jung as president in 1997. However, three stations run by North Korean defectors have sprouted up over the past few years, led by Free North Korea Radio (FRNK). These stations employ stringers in North Korea who can communicate by cell phone or smuggle out interviews through China. As a result, information is flowing in and out of the North more rapidly than ever. For example, when major economic reforms were undertaken in 2002, it was months before the rest of the world knew. In contrast, when the regime launched a disastrous currency reform on November 30, 2009, FNKR filed a report within hours.

How do we know that North Koreans are actually listening to foreign broadcasts? First, on dozens of occasions, authorities in Pyongyang have used their own media to attack foreign broadcasters. The North reserves the insult "reptile" exclusively to describe foreign broadcasters. In late March 2010, the regime likened defector broadcasters to "human trash." Ironically, this diatribe also contained the first official mention of the currency revaluation, so broadcasters have clearly struck a nerve. If they were in fact irrelevant, the regime would ignore them instead of lavishing them with free publicity.

Broadcasters to North Korea frequently receive heartbreaking messages from North Koreans in China, thanking them for their efforts. One listener described RFA as "our one ray of hope." More importantly, over the past several years, thousands of North Korean defectors, refugees, and visitors to China have been interviewed about their listening habits. An unpublished 2009 survey of North Koreans in China found that over 20 percent had listened to the banned broadcasts, and almost all of them had shared the information with family members and friends. Several other surveys confirm these findings. While we cannot generalize the listening habits of a self-selected group to the general population, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there are more than a million surreptitious listeners. The North Korean regime is not only losing its monopoly on the control of information; defectors also cite foreign radio listening as one of the leading motivations to defect.

Despite valiant efforts and growing impact, much more could be done to improve broadcasting to North Korea. VOA and RFA only broadcast five hours a day, and the defector stations limp along with shoestring budgets, due to a pervasive indifference within South Korea.

President Obama's human rights envoy for North Korea, Robert King, has pledged to expand funding for Korean broadcasting. For its part, Pyongyang claims that foreign broadcasts are part of the Obama administration's "hostile policy" toward the North. Only time will tell if these efforts will lead to change we can believe in-both in Washington and Pyongyang.

Hero Image
robertking 2013
All News button
1
-

The United States and Japan celebrated the 50th anniversary of the current US-Japan security treaty in January 2010, despite several dark clouds on the horizon. Both countries have seen transitions to Democrats in power in 2009 that led to new political debates over security practices. Is the future actually as rosy as portrayed by diplomats on both sides in this "anniversary year"? Relations will probably continue their rocky course in the coming months, but in the medium term the underlying logic for close US-Japan security cooperation, and for continuing development of defense capabilities in Asia for both countries, is quite strong.

Andrew Oros is a specialist on the international and comparative politics of East Asia and the advanced industrial democracies, with an emphasis on contending approaches to managing security and on the linkage between domestic and international politics. He is the author of Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford University Press, 2008) and the co-editor of and contributor to Japan's New Defense Establishment: Institutions, Capabilities, and Implications (Stimson Center, 2007), Can Japan Come Back? (Pacific Council, 2003), and Culture in World Politics (Macmillan Press, 1998). His latest work is as co-author of the forthcoming Global Security Watch: Japan (Praeger Press, 2010). He also has shared his research in over a dozen scholarly articles, numerous mass-media quotations, and lectures to policymakers in Washington, DC, Berlin, Tokyo, Beijing, and elsewhere.

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Andrew Oros Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies Speaker Washington College
Seminars
-

Donald K. Emmerson is a professor at Stanford University, where he heads the Southeast Asia Forum in the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is affiliated with the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies and the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law. 

Prior to joining Stanford’s faculty, Emmerson taught political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and spent time as a visiting scholar at the Australian National University (Canberra), the Institute of Advanced Studies (Princeton), and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington, DC), among other institutions.  He received his Yale University PhD in political science following a Princeton University BA in international affairs.

4th Floor Conference Room
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Washington DC, 20006

0
Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Affiliated Faculty, CDDRL
Affiliated Scholar, Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies
aparc_dke.jpg PhD

At Stanford, in addition to his work for the Southeast Asia Program and his affiliations with CDDRL and the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, Donald Emmerson has taught courses on Southeast Asia in East Asian Studies, International Policy Studies, and Political Science. He is active as an analyst of current policy issues involving Asia. In 2010 the National Bureau of Asian Research and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars awarded him a two-year Research Associateship given to “top scholars from across the United States” who “have successfully bridged the gap between the academy and policy.”

Emmerson’s research interests include Southeast Asia-China-US relations, the South China Sea, and the future of ASEAN. His publications, authored or edited, span more than a dozen books and monographs and some 200 articles, chapters, and shorter pieces.  Recent writings include The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century (ed., 2020); “‘No Sole Control’ in the South China Sea,” in Asia Policy  (2019); ASEAN @ 50, Southeast Asia @ Risk: What Should Be Done? (ed., 2018); “Singapore and Goliath?,” in Journal of Democracy (2018); “Mapping ASEAN’s Futures,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia (2017); and “ASEAN Between China and America: Is It Time to Try Horsing the Cow?,” in Trans-Regional and –National Studies of Southeast Asia (2017).

Earlier work includes “Sunnylands or Rancho Mirage? ASEAN and the South China Sea,” in YaleGlobal (2016); “The Spectrum of Comparisons: A Discussion,” in Pacific Affairs (2014); “Facts, Minds, and Formats: Scholarship and Political Change in Indonesia” in Indonesian Studies: The State of the Field (2013); “Is Indonesia Rising? It Depends” in Indonesia Rising (2012); “Southeast Asia: Minding the Gap between Democracy and Governance,” in Journal of Democracy (April 2012); “The Problem and Promise of Focality in World Affairs,” in Strategic Review (August 2011); An American Place at an Asian Table? Regionalism and Its Reasons (2011); Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation (2010); “The Useful Diversity of ‘Islamism’” and “Islamism: Pros, Cons, and Contexts” in Islamism: Conflicting Perspectives on Political Islam (2009); “Crisis and Consensus: America and ASEAN in a New Global Context” in Refreshing U.S.-Thai Relations (2009); and Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia (edited, 2008).

Prior to moving to Stanford in 1999, Emmerson was a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he won a campus-wide teaching award. That same year he helped monitor voting in Indonesia and East Timor for the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center. In the course of his career, he has taken part in numerous policy-related working groups focused on topics related to Southeast Asia; has testified before House and Senate committees on Asian affairs; and been a regular at gatherings such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable (Kuala Lumpur), the Bali Democracy Forum (Nusa Dua), and the Shangri-La Dialogue (Singapore). Places where he has held various visiting fellowships, including the Institute for Advanced Study and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 



Emmerson has a Ph.D. in political science from Yale and a BA in international affairs from Princeton. He is fluent in Indonesian, was fluent in French, and has lectured and written in both languages. He has lesser competence in Dutch, Javanese, and Russian. A former slam poet in English, he enjoys the spoken word and reads occasionally under a nom de plume with the Not Yet Dead Poets Society in Redwood City, CA. He and his wife Carolyn met in high school in Lebanon. They have two children. He was born in Tokyo, the son of U.S. Foreign Service Officer John K. Emmerson, who wrote the Japanese Thread among other books.

Selected Multimedia

Date Label
Donald Emmerson Speaker
Seminars
Authors
Karen Eggleston
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

In early spring, historic health reform passes, extending insurance to millions of uninsured. Despite problems with workplace-based coverage, controversy over government subsidies for insurance premiums, and disparities across a large and diverse nation, dramatic shift to a single-payer system was seen as impractical.

Instead, reforms focus on expanding current social insurance programs as well as new initiatives to cover the uninsured, improve quality, and control spending. They provide a basic floor, subsidized for the poorest, but preserve consumer freedom to choose in health care. No government body dictates choice of doctor or hospital; investor-owned and private not-for-profits compete alongside government-run providers like community health centers and rural hospitals.

Left to be addressed in later phases are the difficult questions of how to slow the relentless pace of health care spending increases -- driven in part by technological change and population aging, but also perverse incentives embedded in fee-for-service payment and fragmented delivery. Pushed through despite multiple crises confronting the leadership, the final landmark health reform works in conjunction with measures enacted as part of the fiscal stimulus package to strengthen the healthcare system. Some provisions take effect immediately; others will take many years to unfold.

President Obama’s triumph on his top domestic priority? Actually, there were no votes along partisan lines, no controversy over abortion. I am describing health reform in China, which was announced almost exactly a year ago.

We do not hear much about the parallels in the US and Chinese social policy. But we cannot fully understand each other if we ignore these commonalities. We do not hear much about those who, in both societies, have been rendered destitute merely because they or a family member became sick or injured in a system with a social safety net full of gaping holes.

It will surprise many Americans to know that government financing as a share of total health spending was lower in socialist China over the last decade than in the United States. Now China has pledged about US$124 billion over 3 years to expand basic health insurance, strengthen public health and primary care, and reform public hospitals.

In China, the injustice of differential access to life-saving healthcare had sparked cases of social unrest. The April 2009 reform announcement was the culmination of years of post-SARS (2003) soul searching for a healthcare system befitting China’s dynamically transforming society. Special interests block change. (Sound familiar?) The CPC Central Committee and the State Council acknowledge that successful health reform will be “an arduous and long-term task”.  

If the US can pass sweeping health reform despite an unprecedented financial crisis, and China can envision universal health coverage for 1.3 billion while “getting old before getting rich,” then together we should be able to look past our many differences to focus on our common interests. Our two proud nations must work together to confront numerous challenges, such as upholding regional stability (e.g. on the Korean peninsula); redressing global economic imbalances (increasing health insurance can help spur China towards more domestic consumption); and investing in “green tech” for a warming planet and “grey tech” for an aging society.

 

* * *

When searching for insights about how other countries deal with similar challenges, Americans often look to Europe and Canada. Rarer is the comparison to counterparts across the Pacific. Yet President Obama has clearly articulated the vision of the US as a Pacific Nation, and there are developments around the Pacific Rim that merit consideration in our debates.  

Australia pioneered cost-effectiveness in health care purchasing, while the US continues to debate whether cost should be part of comparative effectiveness research and policy decisions.

Both Japan and South Korea, like Germany, have enacted long term care insurance to smooth the transition to an aging society. Their experiences might be fruitful as we implement the first national government-run long-term care insurance program, a little-heralded component of the newly passed legislation (and a fitting legacy of Senator Edward Kennedy).

Japan and Singapore provide universal coverage to older populations than ours with health systems that, although surprisingly different from each other in terms of public financing and role of market forces, both ranked among the best in the world -- and far higher than the US -- in the World Health Organization’s ranking of health systems in the year 2000. Although one may quibble with the ranking, it is indisputable that Japan spends a much smaller share of GDP on healthcare than the US does, despite being one of the oldest and longest-lived societies in the history of the world and having (like the US) a fee-for-service payment system.

Japan and South Korea are also democracies, where health policies occasionally engender heated debates. In South Korea, physicians went on nationwide strike three times to oppose the separation of prescribing from dispensing. Although Japan’s incremental reforms rarely spur such drama, the passions aroused by end-of-life care – embodied in the bizarre “death panels” controversy in the US health reform debate of 2009 – has its counterpart in the bitter nickname for Japan’s separate insurance plan for the oldest old: “hurry-up-and-die” insurance.

Yet Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong all offer health systems that provide reasonable risk protection and quality of care for populations older than ours, with a diverse range of government and market roles in financing and delivery, while spending far less per capita than the US.

No system has all the answers. But the US and our neighbors across the vast Pacific have a common interest in sharing what we’ve found that works for health reform. Despite divergence in our political and economic systems, we all value long, healthy lives for ourselves and our children -- and we’re united in health reforms that try to further that goal.

All News button
1
Subscribe to Japan