Corporate Governance Systems and Firm Value: Empirical Evidence for the Value of Transparency

This study explores the effects of cross-sectional and time series differences among Japanese firms selecting one of two extant corporate governance systems. The paper presents evidence that the adoption by Japanese firms of a shareholder-centric, more transparent, system of corporate governance creates greater corporate value in comparison to the traditional system of statutory auditors. This paper takes advantage of the unique opportunity afforded by Japan's introduction of a dual system of corporate governance in 2003, when companies were offered a choice to adopt a new system of outside directors, i.e. a shareholder-centric committee system. Data analysis shows a significant increase in firm valuation as measured by Tobin's q, for companies that adopted the committee system, even though comparative financial data show little difference. This finding is attributed to signal sending, as companies who adopted this system signal a choice toward transparency and openness.