In hopes of expanding Stanford's presence in China, the University is now in the process of developing a new research facility on the campus of Peking University in Beijing as part of the Bing Overseas Studies Program (BOSP).

The new facility has just entered its initial planning phases. The campus is expected to encompass a broad range of research from a variety of departments, according to Political Science Prof. Jean Oi, who is involved in planning for the proposed facility.

"We already have a strong BOSP program in Beijing at Peking University," Oi said in an email to The Daily. "This would build on that to encourage more students and faculty across the different schools to have an overseas experience. We would like to have a center that could allow our faculty to hold seminars, workshops and do collaborative work with scholars in China."

BOSP currently operates overseas study programs in 10 cities around the globe, including Beijing, in addition to overseas summer seminars held each summer at a variety of locations worldwide. While these overseas programs are open to all undergraduates, the new Beijing research facility is expected to be utilized primarily by graduate students and faculty.

Oi said that it is unclear as of yet which specific programs will be the focus of the research, but the door is open to a wide range of areas.

"The nature and type of research will very much depend on the projects initiated by different Stanford faculty and students," said Oi. "There is no set agenda, although we expect there to be a variety of research topics."

BOSP and Peking University officials will have to work out the details of their agreement as planning proceeds. For now, however, it is more or less clear that, whatever the nature of the facility, it will be seen primarily as an arm of Stanford, developed for its students and faculty.

"There may be some special workshops and short-term courses that local students can take, but most of the classes will be those offered through the Overseas Study Program," Oi said. "For those classes, as currently is the practice, a few Chinese students can participate but this is mainly a program for Stanford students."

Within weeks of 9/11, Japan dispatched ships to the Indian Ocean to provide fuel and other support to the Western forces waging the war in Afghanistan.

It was the first time since World War II that Japan sent forces abroad to support an overseas military conflict, although in a noncombat role. American policymakers hailed Japan as a loyal ally, willing to put "boots on the ground."

Come Nov. 1, however, the Japanese ships will be heading home.

American officials worry that, after taking steps to shed its postwar pacifism, Japan will now shirk its role as an ally in international security.

But these concerns are alarmist. The Japanese government, even its liberal opposition party, has shown a desire and commitment to contribute to global security.

A renewal of the law authorizing the mission in Afghanistan is now increasingly unlikely, since the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which opposes the measure, won a shocking victory in last summer's elections for the upper house of parliament. While the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is still determined to reauthorize the military role, it faces significant public opposition and a tough road in the parliament.

Some American officials and experts have issued bellicose warnings that not renewing the mission would signal a dangerous retreat from Japan's responsibilities in the world and undermine the security alliance. Others accused DPJ leader Ozawa Ichiro of being irresponsible, even "anti-American."

These remarks are clumsy and unfair. The possibility of Japan's return to a lesser security role is real enough, but its mission in Afghanistan is the wrong test of the country's reliability as an ally.

In reality, the maritime mission has become largely symbolic. As for Mr. Ozawa, if Americans would listen carefully to his arguments, they would find that he seeks to expand, not contract, Japan's global security role.

What the US sees as backtracking on global responsibility is actually something else --opposition, shared by Japan's liberal and conservative parties, to the American decision to invade Iraq. Once carefully buried behind the appearance of alliance solidarity, it is now surfacing.

Ozawa and his party have been unusually open in questioning the Iraq war, characterizing it as a war without clear international justification. According to reliable accounts, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Kazuo privately shares that view, as do others in the LDP.

US officials critical of the DPJ for avoiding a greater security role for Japan should remember that the party supported the antiterrorism law when it was passed in 2001. But they refused to support its renewal later after the Iraq war began. Over time, senior DPJ members say, the mission's original purpose got muddied with military operations in Iraq. Japanese and American officials deny that any diversion took place, but the Pentagon admits that ships engage in multiple missions and there is no way to segregate how fuel is used.

The new version of the law proposed by the LDP explicitly narrows the role of the Navy to supporting antiterrorist interdiction operations, a backhanded acknowledgment that there was no clear separation from the Iraq war.

Ozawa has long advocated a more visible security role for Japan outside its borders, calling on the government to send forces to aid the Gulf War in 1991 and pushing through legislation allowing Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

Japanese peacekeepers, however, are restricted to noncombat missions. Despite inching toward a larger security role, the government stands by an interpretation of Japan's American-authored antiwar clause in its Constitution that bars the use of force for anything other than to respond to an attack on themselves. But Ozawa has long contended that the constitutional bar should not extend to UN activities.

This month, Ozawa proposed that instead of the maritime force, Japan should send peacekeepers to Afghanistan under the auspices of the UN-authorized international security forces, and to Sudan as well.

Ironically, the ruling conservatives reject that as unconstitutional, arguing it would be an act of collective defense rather than self-defense.

"If Japan is to really be an ally of the US ..." Ozawa wrote, "it should hold its head up high and strive to give proper advice to the US." And in order to do that," he continued, "Japan had to be willing to put itself more on the line by sharing responsibility for peacekeeping, not just sending a few boats out of harm's way."

These are ideas that should be embraced, rather than denounced, by American officials.

Reprinted by permission by the Christian Science Monitor.

Northeast Asia stands at a turning point in its history. The key economies of China, Japan, and South Korea are growing increasingly interdependent, and the movement toward regionalism is gaining momentum. Yet interdependency, often set in a global context, also spurs nationalism in all three countries, and beyond in East Asia. The essays in this volume assess current interactions -- or cross currents -- between national and regional forces in Northeast Asia, and suggest their future direction.

Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia features provocative, plain-spoken contributions from a range of eminent international scholars and practitioners. They address key questions facing the region today: What competing visions of regional integration are being considered in Northeast Asia? Will they be realized? How do national pressures, especially the renewed China-Japan rivalry, stunt the movement toward regionalism? What role can Korea play to mitigate tensions between the two arch-rivals? How does the United States figure in Northeast Asian regionalism? Do America's Cold War alliances still have currency?

By addressing these questions from both Asian and U.S. perspectives, Cross Currents sheds new light on the interplay of national and regional forces in this strategic part of the world. Reformulating these interactions constructively is one of Northeast Asia's most pressing contemporary challenges.

On October 11, the Stanford Board of Trustees approved the appointment of Shorenstein APARC's Director, Gi-Wook Shin, as the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Chair of Korean Studies.

An endowment was established in 1999 through the donations of alumnus Jae-Hyun Hyun, the Korea Foundation, and KSA, to enable the university to recruit a social science scholar whose work focuses on Korea from the perspective of contemporary policy issues. In addition to broadening Stanford's teaching and research programs in Asian studies, the holder of this chair is expected to conduct research on the political economy of Korea, trade and finance, security relations, politics, or other topics of importance to understanding Korea in the context of today's world.

When Professor Shin left UCLA to come to Stanford, he left the largest Korean studies program in the nation. With true entrepreneurial spirit, he has built an impressive and dynamic Korean studies program. It hosts luncheon seminars, workshops, and conferences, and has sponsored many Korean scholars, government officials, and business leaders who spend time at Stanford as visiting scholars. It also supports an active research program. Stanford is steadily becoming a world-class center for contemporary Korean studies.
-- Coit D. Blacker, Director FSI

In 2005, Dr. Shin was appointed Director of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. Since becoming director of the center, Shin has been laying a strong and dynamic foundation for interdisciplinary research, training, and outreach, both through his leadership of the Korean Studies Program and his efforts to bring focus to the center's wide-ranging affiliation of Asia-related projects, programs, and initiatives.

About the Donors:

Jae-Hyun Hyun received his MBA from Stanford in 1981. He is the chairman of Tong Yang Group, a diversified business conglomerate of Korea. The Tong Yang Group, which originally built its foundation as a manufacturer of cement and confectionery goods, is a fully integrated financial services group that offers virtually every financial service available in Korea, such as securities, merchant banking, life insurance, mutual funds, credit cards, venture capital, and asset management. Prior to joining Tong Yang, Mr. Hyun served as a public prosecutor at the city of Pusan's Public Prosecutor's Office. He has four children; three have attended Stanford (Jenny '99, Richard '03 and Tina '05).

The Korea Foundation was established in 1991 to promote an understanding of Korea throughout the world and to enhance international goodwill and friendship through a multitude of international exchange programs. The foundation promotes interest in Korea by supporting Korean studies at universities, research institutions, and libraries. The foundation also provides Korean studies materials to individuals and organizations, and provides scholarships for foreign scholars, students, and experts.

The Korea Stanford Alumni (KSA) Association, a group of dedicated Stanford alumni who have returned to Korea, hosts various events for its more than 500 registered members.

There is no consensus as to what outsiders can or should do in response to the dire situation inside Burma (Myanmar). At least that was the impression left by a vigorous discussion at a standing-room-only event convened by SEAF on October 18, 2007 on "Burma's Crisis: What Should Outsiders Do?"

Reviewing the protests that broke out in Burma in August 2007, swelled into mass demonstrations for democracy, and were brutally repressed by the junta in September-October, Maureen Aung-Thwin, who heads the Open Society Institute's Burma Project, argued for targeted sanctions. In her view, for example, cutting the flow of tourists to Burma would be less effective than spotlighting China's ties to the junta in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, when Chinese leaders would be especially sensitive to embarrassment. But if positive change could be achieved through engagement, that too would be worth trying, in her estimation.

Zarni, an author, activist, and visiting research fellow at Oxford University, differed from Aung-Thwin in recommending constructive and coordinated engagement. And whereas she thought that the political situation inside Burma, if it were to change at all, could change rapidly, Zarni argued that "gradual change is the only solution." Yet just as Aung-Thwin welcomed engagement, if that could promote democracy, protect human rights, and reduce the suffering of Burmese, so was Zarni amenable to sanctions if they could effectively serve such ends.

The willingness of both speakers to entertain a range of options reflected the difficulty of inducing change in Burma from the outside, and the corresponding inclination to be eclectic about options. One speaker from the floor went so far as to suggest that only physical intervention from the outside could end the repression. But of all the proposals suggested, that one appeared to be by far the least realistic.

Several speakers urged that China, India, and/or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) be persuaded to put pressure the regime. But there was little faith in the room that Burma's immediate neighbors would sacrifice their economic interests, including access to Burma's natural gas, for the sake of promoting political reform. The sense of pessimism prevailing in the room prompted one person in the audience to suggest later that all one could hope to do was extend humanitarian aid to the Burmese people and wait for political reforms that might never arrive.

Suharto's authoritarian "New Order" regime in Indonesia unraveled quickly in 1998. Aung-Thwin recalled a conversation she had had that year with an expert on Indonesia. He had told her he expected the New Order to last a long time. Three weeks later, Suharto resigned.

Aung-Thwin offered this anecdote by way of suggesting that events in Burma, too, could someday catch observers by surprise. Also surprising, in view of this discussion, would be the effectiveness of any external action, on the full spectrum from sanctions to engagement, to induce the democratization of Burma.

The Asia Society Northern California and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at the University of California-Berkeley co-sponsored this event with Stanford's SEAF. Of course none of the three is responsible for the opinions expressed on the panel or during the Q and A.

Please join us on Thursday, November 1 for the launch of the Stanford China Program, a new program of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC). With China at the forefront of so many contemporary issues, from economic growth to international security, scholars at Shorenstein APARC have developed the China Program in response to the increasing need to explore and explain dynamic changes taking place in China today. The Stanford China Program is composed of scholars who do their research on the ground, in the villages, company boardrooms and government institutions of China.

Our inaugural event, co-sponsored with the Center for East Asian Studies, illustrates the catalytic role that the Stanford China Program intends to play. The panel discussion "Growing Pains: Tensions and Opportunity in China's Transformation" will go beyond the headlines trumpeting China's spectacular growth. We will discuss the difficult questions facing China, about whether and how such a rapidly transforming nation will be able to manage the tensions that accompany growth at such a pace. Issues from growing income disparity to environmental damage and widening gaps between rural and urban China are forces that are tearing at the social fabric of China. Are these the signs of a system in crisis or, as the event title suggests, the necessary pains associated with growth?

These questions occupy not only scholars, but also policy makers and business leaders alike. The panelists will discuss a range of tensions and opportunities in contemporary China such as markets, governance, environment and social inequality. The panelists include:

• Melanie Manion, Professor of Public Affairs and Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, a specialist on issues of political governance in China.
• Leonardo Ortolano, UPS Foundation Professor of Civil Engineering in Urban and Regional Planning at Stanford, who will speak on environmental issues.
• Scott Rozelle, FSI Helen F. Farnsworth Senior Fellow at Shorenstein APARC and a leading expert on rural China.
• Andrew G. Walder, Denise O'Leary and Kent Thiry Professor of Sociology at Stanford and Director Emeritus of Shorenstein APARC will moderate the panel discussion.

The event is scheduled to take place from 5:30 - 7:00 PM, Thursday November 1 in the Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall, 616 Serra Street. A light reception will follow the panel discussion. Full details can be found at the link below.

I look forward to welcoming you to this inaugural event and to future activities of the Stanford China Program at Shorenstein APARC.

Sincerely,

Jean C. Oi
William Haas Professor in Chinese Politics
Professor of Political Science
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Director, Stanford China Program

Pro: Not as Tempting

by Sabrina Siddiqui, intern, BusinessWeek, and a senior at the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University.

There is no doubt that over the last decade, India fortified its rule over the shared services and outsourcing (SSO) sector. Access to low-wage yet skilled workers allowed local global technology services giants Infosys (INFY), Tata Consultancy Services (TACSF), and Wipro (WIT) to employ tens of thousands of Indians to do work for such multinational corporate clients as Bank of America (BAC), Microsoft (MSFT), and Ericsson (ERIC).

But a recent study by Frost & Sullivan consolidates the idea that India's outsourcing has already peaked, and there are a number of factors to blame:

The Rupee Riddle. Earlier this year, the Indian rupee appreciated 8.4% against the U.S. dollar and touched 41.14 to the dollar, its highest rate in nine years. A significant reason for concern for the outsourcing sector, the upward value of the rupee continues to put a squeeze on earnings. By April, 2007, it had cut margins by about 2.5 percentage points.

Cost (In)Efficiency. Companies looking to outsource have long seen India as their most cost-efficient vehicle. But with wage inflation running 15% to 25% per year, India can no longer use the siren song of its labor being the cheapest. Competitors like China can offer their services at a lower cost, while firms like Infosys are stuck recruiting from outside the country, because the comparable Indian staff is growing too expensive.

That Age-Old Infrastructure. As much as the economy continues to boom, how long can it sustain its position when IT operations spend considerably on backup systems to fight regular blackouts? And the 300,000 engineering students who graduate each year may be short of the level needed to support modernization of infrastructure and industry growth. (Not to mention that the peculiarly accented "Doug Smith" on the computer help desk is a little too hard for U.S. callers to comprehend.)

So if you assume you're being rerouted by tech support to a call center in Bangalore, guess again. It seems India's grasp on the SSO market is at long-term risk, and it just so happens that your call might be answered by someone in Shanghai.

Con: Plenty of Spice Left

by Rafiq Dossani, Stanford University and Martin Kenney, University of California, Davis

Notwithstanding the occasional news stories about companies returning work earlier offshored to India, the logic behind offshoring and its financial impact (both on outsourcing firms operating in India and their American clients) remains intact. First, the logic: A fresh engineer costs $8,000, including benefits, on average in Bangalore. Even a "Google-quality", presumably equivalent to the best Google can hire anywhere (in fact, Google offers its India recruits the option of working in Silicon Valley if they so desire) costs $30,000. These wages are much lower than in the U.S. and will remain that way for at least a decadeespecially if the ambitious graduation targets of Indian education policymakers are realized.

Of course, there are problems in doing work long distance: Coordinating the work of global teams is costlier than coordinating such work locally. The intellectual property issues could be important. But offshoring is now tried and tested enough, and large corporations are deeply committed to it.

By 2010, many large multinational corporations like IBM (IBM) will have their largest workforces in India. This is creating a relatively rich ecosystem in a number of Indian cities, especially Bangalore.

Already, for a number of these firms, their Indian operations are being declared global centers of excellence, whose value goes well beyond just cost savings. Undoubtedly, some smaller firms have faced high initial costs, but even they, particularly the technology firms of Silicon Valley, have committed to Indian operations. Firms such as Infinera (INFNO) and HelloSoft have substantial Indian operations that are critical to their success. For them to retreat would require a major reorientation of their business strategy.

The appreciating rupee will, like rising wages, affect offshoring decisions. However, the Indian system integrators such as TCS, Infosys, and Wipro, which are also being squeezed by costs, have experienced profits rising at about 35% a year for the past decade and enjoy margins in excess of 20%. This provides ample room to absorb rising costs.

There can be little doubt that the Indian ecosystem is maturing. However, the growth of offshoring to India has not peaked.

Reprinted by permission from BusinessWeek.

SPRIE kicked off the fall quarter with two special events: first was a seminar on October 9 presented by Min Zhu, co-founder of WebEx, who spoke on "Beyond Beijing and High Tech: Chinese Entrepreneurship on the Edge." Min discussed the entrepreneurship scene in China and suggested that Silicon Valley venture capitalists investing there may be heading for trouble. John Boudreau covered the talk in the "Tech Notebook" section of the San Jose Mercury News.

Then, on October 10, Martin Eberhard, Tesla Motors' Co-Founder and President of Technology, spoke at the launch of the Stanford Entrepreneurship Network (SEN), a federation of organizations, including SPRIE, that focus on entrepreneurship acrosss the Stanford campus. Eberhard spoke of taking Tesla from the beginning stages of a start-up and formulated six lessons he learned from the experience. For more information about the SEN, visit the Stanford Entrepreneurship Network.